Comprehensive Peace Research Articles

Impact of the Peace Agreement 2005 in Nepal

This study is related to the significance and importance of Nepal's peace agreement. The peace agreement and the interim constitution led politics from a precarious situation to the constituent assembly. The constituent assembly had appeared as a base to take on dialogue whether the state was trying to search for a solution to the boorish problem. The peace agreement that followed the Maoist war is very important in the politics of Nepal. The study has tried to find out whether the government has been able to operate after that time according to the comprehensive peace agreement in Nepal. This paper examines the impact of the peace agreement on Nepalese politics and its significance. The conclusion has been derived by using secondary data only.

Verification of Peace Accords and Military Expenditures in Post-Conflict Societies

ABSTRACT Why is it that some governments ending a civil war in a negotiated settlement succeed in reducing military spending while others fail? Civil wars ending in peace agreements result in relatively low military expenditures; however, not all governments succeed in the reduction. I argue that implementing a third-party verification mechanism of peace accords helps reduce military spending in post-conflict societies because the verification mechanism facilitates the peace accord implementation by enabling reciprocal implementation and by increasing the cost of noncompliance through active information flow. Implementation of peace agreements reduces threats posed by both former and outside rebel groups. This makes the government decrease the military expenditure allocated to appease internal security threats. I tested this argument using 32 civil wars with a comprehensive peace agreement between 1992 and 2011. The results indicate that initiating a verification mechanism leads to lower military spending.

Strategic Deployment of UN Political Missions to Replace UN Peacekeeping Operations: The Demand and Supply Sides of Transition Logic

ABSTRACT Although United Nations peacekeeping operations (UN PKOs) produce positive outcomes for peace, some missions are strategically replaced by cheaper and smaller UN political missions (PMs). This article explores why certain peacekeepers are replaced by UN PMs and unpacks the exit strategy of UN PKOs. The logic of demand-side and supply-side perspectives is evaluated using data on the deployment of UN peacekeepers and UN PMs in post-civil war countries between 1993 and 2016. Signing comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) increases the chances of UN PKOs being replaced by UN PMs because as the willingness to develop politically increases, the demand for civilian personnel after demilitarization also rises. On the supply side, as the preferences of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council concerning target states become more heterogenous, UN PKOs are more likely to be replaced by UN PMs because coordination problems encourage members to choose less burdensome missions.

Chastising the child of necessity: peace journalism and Almajiri repatriation during COVID-19

ABSTRACT COVID-19 pandemic posed unprecedented challenges to global health and livelihoods. While countries take measures to protect their citizens and reduce hardships on vulnerable populations who seem to suffer most, COVID-19 puts a spotlight on Nigeria’s severe problem of child neglect. We investigate Nigerian newspapers’ adoption of a peace journalism approach to emphasize the underlying causes of child neglect in their reporting of the oppressive deportation of child beggars called Almajirai during COVID-19. A qualitative content analysis of articles obtained from six Nigerian newspaper websites indicates a positive response to peace-oriented journalism, which suggests a comprehensive peace journalism intervention is needed.

The political deduction and building political security In Sudan post of 2019


 
 
 
 The political deduction in political security issues has become one of the topics that related with the attention of researchers and specialists. On the philosophical level, the deduction based on a certain reason to be as the basis for proving a specific issue that cannot be tackled by the existence of contradictions between two extremes - paradigm (Security and Instability). So that, the future of political security in Sudan is still instability, although the international community's ability to impose their Comprehensive Peace Agreement since February 2005, and according to the requirements of what included in the clauses of the agreement to complete the procurement of democratic transition period, as for the Sudanese opposition forces and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement which are represented the real partners of power. So, the ability of the National Congress Party at that time could have power to consolidate its inclusiveness as a dominant political party.
 From the another hand, the possibilities to infer the dimensions of political security in Sudan are ready to restore the army’s control over the political life, but with the need to maintain the settlement of critical political issues according to a new criteria that take into account the demands of civil forces; However, the civilian leadership was still inactive by as a result of internal divisions and rivalries within, so that the local, regional and international pressures remain to be the only source of strength to achieve a kind of consensus and satisfaction to overcome the critical period and accomplish what can be achieved for the benefit of the political security for Sudan, at the present and future alike. Finally, the absence of mechanisms for managing the divergent interests between civil and military leaders may lead to an unstable civil-military alliance, and they concern about losing of the whole absolute privileges and powers that they enjoyed during the past three decades for the rule of former President Omar al-Bashir, leaving the civilian leadership in 2019 to be as a drastically situation in its inability to form a united front that pushed towards neutralizing the military’s authority or resorting to confront a new period as a returning of violence as what happened in the past. As for the multiplicity of factors affecting on the political security crisis in Sudan, it meant that there is no real solution to subsequent crises in the future, so that the possibility of shifting towards civilian rule remains the only way to manage differences. And the differences between civilians and military alike might erupted at any reason or incentive.
 
 
 

Transitional Justice Provisions in the Juba Peace Agreement: A Critical and Prospective Overview

Justice was one of the three pillars that formed the slogan—“Freedom, Peace, Justice”—of the 2019 Sudanese revolution that ushered in the current transition process. It is central to peacebuilding. The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) affirms that “accountability, reconciliation, and justice are critical for ensuring durable peace and security in Sudan.” This is further expounded in the National Agreement and the Darfur, Eastern, and Two Areas tracks of the JPA. However, skepticism about its ambition and implementation is as strong as its prospects for peace and reconciliation. Previous peace agreements, including the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005), the Darfur Peace Agreement (2006), and the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (2011), had engaged with justice issues without success, as evidenced by conflict intractability and abuse. Drawing from primary and secondary sources, this article critically analyzes the human rights and justice provisions of the JPA, their implementation mechanisms, and policy pathways for their effectiveness. It argues that although the JPA casts an ambitiously comprehensive and innovative vision of transformative justice, the attendant implementation mechanisms invoke a more retributive outlook that is likely to jeopardize the peace process.

Forging the Juba Peace Agreement: The Role of National, Regional, and International Actors

Apart from national contestations, there has been some form of third-party involvement in the conflict and peace process in Sudan. Actors in the immediate region and internationally played the role of mediators in the peace efforts in Sudan. The international community played a role in negotiating the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan and other agreements. The Sudan government and armed groups are key actors in conflict and peace but there was hardly any negotiated peace that was reached without the involvement of regional and international actors. IGAD, the AU, and the UN were among key actors in the Juba Peace Agreement. Through the analysis of existing material, this contribution looks critically at the roles played by different actors in the process and how regional and international actors brought the interlocutors around the table. A key argument in the article is that mediators succeed in having parties sign agreements but play no significant role beyond that.

A Legal Analysis of the Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan and Its Darfur Component

The 2020 Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) is a complex instrument, consisting of a general agreement dealing with national issues and six additional agreements negotiated in parallel “tracks,” separately addressing the multiple regional conflicts that have beset Sudan in recent decades. The purpose of the article is to provide a legal analysis of the JPA and to assess its implications for both peacebuilding in Darfur and the democratization of Sudan. After situating the agreement in the context of Sudan’s comprehensive peace process, the article presents the structure of the document, sheds light on its legal nature, and introduces the core issues addressed therein. It then focuses on the Darfur Agreement, considering the importance of the Darfur conflict to both the recent history of Sudan and the success of the peace process. Based on this analysis, the article assesses the main achievements and potential challenges to an effective implementation of the JPA.

The Grimness of the Alternatives: Carter, Israel, and the Civil War in Lebanon

In 1977, United States president Jimmy Carter wanted a comprehensive peace for the Middle East. Amid the devastating civil war in Lebanon, Israel had found common ground with Christian militias and turned against the Palestinians. However, Carter's peace had to include Israel, and his persistent headache was to get the Jewish state to accept his suggestions, be it in Lebanon or in the negotiations with Egypt. Thus, Carter had to sacrifice any heroic peace for Lebanon on the altar of Egyptian-Israeli peace.

International Third Parties and the Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements After Civil War

Comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) are the most impactful negotiated settlements ending civil wars, but their implementation varies across post-conflict countries and over time. To explain varying implementation, this study identifies central challenges in CPA implementation and suggests that international third parties are uniquely positioned to overcome them. (1) IGOs with high economic leverage, and (2) prior foreign aid both set incentives that reduce domestic barriers to implementation. Quantitative evidence on the implementation of CPAs from 1989-2015 supports this argument. Both post-conflict countries’ participation in IGOs with high economic leverage and higher volumes of prior foreign aid are associated with higher rates of CPA implementation. Multiple estimation approaches, including instrumental variables, support this finding. Case evidence from the 2007 CPA in Ivory Coast tracks the processes by which IGOs and donors help overcome stakeholder resistance and facilitate implementation. This finding encourages more concerted efforts by policymakers to advance CPA implementation.

An Analysis of the Failure of the Peace Process (2013-2015) with PKK through the Ripeness Theory

Turkey has experienced a protracted conflict with the PKK since 1984. Over the history of almost 30 years of the violent conflict, the first comprehensive and overt peace attempt was launched by Turkish government in 2013. It had lasted for two years with great optimism and high expectations on reaching a political settlement before it failed in July 2015. This article aims to explore the reasons of the failure of 2013-2015 negotiations and examines whether conditions were suitable for launching a ‘peace process’ in 2013 to resolve Turkey’s conflict with the PKK. It draws on three main elements of Zartman’s Ripeness theory: mutually hurting stalemate (MHS), a formula for a way out and valid spokespersons. It is argued in the article that the conflict in Turkey was not in fact ripe enough for negotiations which were initiated and conducted hastily without any formula for way out and with problematic spokespersons.

Territorial peace: land governance and sustainable peacebuilding

ABSTRACT Conflicts have a strong impact on land tenure, use, distribution, accessibility, and governance; consequently, a sustainable strategy for peacebuilding requires the set-up of land-based institutional arrangements from the peace negotiation phase onwards. Based on the concept of territorial peace, these arrangements have a key role in the reconstruction of the collective, productive, and symbolic functions of the territory after conflicts, and in addressing conflict root causes related to land inequality. This paper contributes to the development of the concept of territorial peace by providing a framework for its operationalisation, based on three categories of arrangements, and testing it, to qualitatively explore and compare two comprehensive peace agreements: Colombia and the Philippines. Land may take the role of peacemaker in addressing territorial peace’s collective dimensions, especially when it is at the core of a peace agreement; however, its implementation remains volatile if it lacks trust, security, and technical capacity.

Follow the money: Assessing Women, Peace, and Security through financing for gender-inclusive peace

AbstractThe Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda and women's participation in peace processes are strongly supported by states. Yet financing to support the implementation of WPS has lagged behind overt international commitments to the agenda. WPS scholars and practitioners have highlighted the funding shortfalls for enabling WPS implementation and continued under-investment in gender-inclusive peace. In this article, we ask how much are donor states financially backing the implementation of gender-inclusive peace agreements which they promote? We use a high ambiguity-conflict model of policy implementation to explore the mechanisms of bilateral and multilateral financing for gender-inclusive peace. We trace to what extent international investments are supporting specific gender provisions in two progressive gender-inclusive peace processes, the 2016 Colombian Peace Agreement and 2015 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the Philippines. In both case studies, we reveal a drastic gap between the international donor rhetoric and the funding. Patterns of financial investment do not follow nor support the life cycle of inclusive peace processes. We suggest key strategies for further research to address this policy and recommend that all gender provisions of peace agreements be monitored in-country and all gender-responsive investments be tracked and evaluated.

Elusive Settlements in Regional Conflict Complexes: Syria, Zartman, and the Limits of Ripeness Theory

What are the conditions for a civil war’s ‘ripeness for resolution’ when the conflict itself is regionally and internationally complex? The failure of sustained efforts for a comprehensive peace agreement toward ending Syria’s brutal civil war suggests that the ripeness concept has significant limits when international actors become extensively involved as protagonists in civil wars. This article presents Zartman’s theory of ripeness for international mediation to de-escalate internal armed conflict and assesses the contribution and limits of this theory in regional conflict complexes such as Syria. I argue that in regional conflict complexes the ripeness concept requires a certain multidimensionality: the barriers to progress to bring a conflict to fruition may lie with the complexities of international coalitions more than it does the within-country perceptions of protagonists, dynamics of power among them, threat, and sheer exhaustion after a protracted civil war. Civil wars with deep regional and international entanglements like Syria’s place high demands on concepts such as ripeness due the inherent deep complexity of interplay between international and domestic interactions.

The Impact of Criteria and Flexibility in Nepal’s Rebel-Military Integration Program

The integration of rebel combatants into regular forces is often a political negation for power. Several examples from the past show how such pursuits have brought about mutinies and communal violence and pushed the countries back to instability. Current literatures do not provide success stories from which crucial elements of rebel-military programs can be extracted for implementation in future programs. The thesis statement presented by the study is that conflicting parties need to invent options for mutual gain, which can be achieved using flexibility and standard criteria when all other means to achieve an agreement fail. In this regard, Nepal’s rebel-military integration process presents a unique case where former Maoist militias were integrated into the Nepali Army as individuals and after fulfilling the toned-down institutional criteria requirements. Using a qualitative design, the study of the rebel-military integration program in Nepal identified the areas within the program that adopted adequate flexibility and criteria fulfillment, and explored how those potentially led to the successful integration of ex-Maoist combatants into the Nepali Army. In order to analyze this information, secondary data such as the Interim Constitution of Nepal, 2007, the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), 2006, integration program documents, journal and news articles, and organizational reports were reviewed. For the cross-validation of information, Key Personnel Interviews were conducted with program executives and Nepali Army representative, and Focus Group Discussions were conducted with regular as well
 Signposting in abstract and in paragraphs in the paper: It is a good idea to give a structural overview of your key arguments in the paper, for example, Part I deals with… Part II deals with..
 
 
 The data analysis involved a qualitative exploratory approach in order to analyze the causal variables as discussed in the preceding research design section. The different sources of data allowed data-triangulation in order to better explore which elements of the program applied criteria and flexibility and to what degree, as well as how they impacted the integration process. The details are discussed in the subsequent sections-

Brief Synopses of New Arabic-Language Publications

Brief Synopses of New Arabic-Language Publications

Why did governance and institutional establishments fail in Sudan and South Sudan?

ABSTRACT Since its independence in 1956, Sudan has continued its search for an inclusive and sustainable system that will address the sociopolitical and economic needs of its diverse ethno-cultural and religious population. The post-independence political elites have adopted colonials’ traditions of political violence, subjective sociopolitical contracts and inequitable means of wealth distribution that only serve interests of the rulers. Consequently, the people of Sudan have lived through two bloody civil wars (1955−2005) that ended with the signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and separation of South Sudan in 2011. The separation of South Sudan did not, however, lead to good governance, political stability, or economic and institutional development. The neo-SPLA/M political establishment has failed to initiate the process of nation-building and socioeconomic and political reforms that would return political power to the people. The military elites in both countries continue to undermine the endless quest for sustainable, equitable and inclusive social, economic, and political participation. The two nations continue to endure challenges posed by decades of violence tainted with unresolved ethnic and regional grievances and identity politics. Thus, lack of political will for conflict resolution, transformation to democracy and equitable power sharing has delayed all aspects of sustainable economic development, thereby fuelling everlasting political violence.

Dissolving conflict. Local peace agreements and armed conflict transitions

ABSTRACT The lessening likelihood and the often-sobering outcomes of comprehensive national peace processes directed attention to local peacemaking in recent years. Difficult to distinguish and define, local peace agreements work on a broad range of issues and engage a multitude of diverse actors. Local peace agreements construct a world of peacemaking that contradicts an ordered and levelled understanding of conflict. Instead, they reveal hybrid conflictscapes that are enmeshed in ways analytically hard to distinguish. In such an environment, local peace agreements can employ various functions: they can connect and strategise relationships between actors, mitigate and manage conflict settings, or disconnect localities or communities from the broader conflict landscape. In doing so, they do not necessarily work towards a linear and sequenced resolution of a conflict but towards dissolving it by undermining the conflict’s logics and conditions.

Peace processes, violence, and de facto states: introduction

Only a quarter of outcomes of armed conflicts that ended during the first two decades of the 21st century resulted from negotiated peace or ceasefire agreements. While comprehensive, final, and conclusive peace agreements are in relative decline, ceasefires, limited, or partial, accords, and local agreements proliferate. The dynamics of peacemaking and the critical interplay of talks and violence during peace processes become increasingly nonlinear, complex, and unpredictable. In this special issue, a mix of actors, dynamics and factors at the interface of peace processes and violence is narrowed down to contexts that involve de facto states, most of whom experience both an ongoing or stalemated peace process and recurring violence of different types and varying degree of intensity. The article provides the analytical context for the special issue and discusses basic terminology and concepts, such as “peace processes” and “de facto states”, and some of the global data-based trends and research literature on the volume‟s subject. The first part of this article focuses on peace processes and the interplay of peacemaking and violence, the second one looks into the “state of the art” on de facto states, while the third one presents a summary of, including the main take-off from, the authors‟ contributions to this special issue.

The African Union Use of Force to Uphold Democracy and Constitutionalism in Practice: How Far Have We Gone?

This paper makes an assessment of how far the African Union (AU) has gone in exercising the mandate of use of force as one of tools for upholding democracy and constitutionalism within the continent. The key intention of this assessment is to scrutinize the suitability of the use of force in the AU’s framework as one of the channels for safeguarding democracy and constitutionalism. The work has employed qualitative research methods, relying on both primary and secondary data. Parallel to that, four case studies from selected AU missions in Africa have been relied upon (Burundi twice, Comoros, Mali and the Gambia). Findings reveal that generally the AU has made significant strides in utilizing its mandate in the use of force in upholding democracy and constitutionalism in Africa by restoring peace, rule of law, stability, human security and in safeguarding people’s will. The AU has also proved to be a reliable first responder in African constitutional crises given the fact that intervention by the UN system takes too long to be engaged and that the UN does not deploy peacekeeping forces where there is no comprehensive peace agreement. Despite that encouraging development, critical challenges still exist. The AU has not succeeded in addressing one notorious vice in Africa which largely contributes to recurrent constitutional crises, namely bad governance. Bad governance exists in various forms such as disrespect of presidential term limits, nepotism and willful disregard of the will of the people in general elections. Other challenges include financial constraints to adequately fund large scale operations, excessive reliance of donors for its peace operations, lack of political will from some African states, and difficulties in harmonizing interests of all parties to conflicts. In order to address these challenges, the AU should achieve its financial autonomy. It should explore further on the lead nation approach and put in place a more formal system on terms and conditions of participation of those nations and anchoring peace support operations. The UA should also make more efforts to instill upon African leaders the culture of good governance because it will greatly reduce constitutional crises which necessitate the use of force in addressing them. Lastly, the AU should discourage procuring of peace deals without the free consent of all the key actors in constitutional crises. Free consent is crucial in ensuring that the peace deals will be adequately respected. The overall outcome of this assessment therefore serves as an encouragement of the AU to continue working tirelessly in improving the mechanism of use of force because it has proved to be a potential tool for upholding democracy and constitutionalism in appropriate circumstances.