Abstract One of the many puzzles in Aristotelian hylomorphism is this: What happens to matter when it comes to be enformed? Interpreters ascribe to Aristotle different theories of diachronic composition. Some of them assume that he endorses a view that contemporary metaphysicians label as ‘preservationism’: matter survives unchanged in the hylomorphic whole. Others take it that he accepts what nowadays is tagged as ‘annihilationism’: matter is annihilated and replaced by a new object, the one created by the union of matter and form. And yet others argue that he maintains that matter survives in the hylomorphic whole but it undergoes some significant changes, a thesis which, in modern metaphysical parlance, is labelled as ‘alterationism’. This paper does four things. First, it shows that none of these approaches to the issue at hand is satisfactory. Second, it examines some key passages in Physics I 7 and Generation and Corruption I 1-5 where Aristotle is often assumed to maintain incompatible views about coming to be. Third, it argues that there is no incompatibility between the positions presented in these texts. Finally, it shows that this same textual evidence sheds light on Aristotle’s views on what happens to matter when it comes to be enformed. He actually adopts different theories of diachronic composition for different hylomorphic wholes. He applies alterationism to non-substances and annihilationism to substances.
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