Components Of Executive Compensation Research Articles

Lessening Effects of SOX on the Relationship between Executive Compensation Components and Cost of Equity Capital

The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) imposed stringent requirements on corporate executives to hold them more accountable for their management decisions. This act has ramifications for executive pay as well. This study investigates the lessening effects of SOX on the association between executive compensation and cost of equity capital. The regression analyses are based on 11,649 firm-year observations of publicly listed companies in the United States from 1998 to 2014. The results show that bonuses and shareholdings are associated with a lower cost of equity capital, while the stock options are not related to the cost of equity capital. In addition, the findings indicate that SOX weakens the association between the cost of equity capital and executive bonuses, stock options for all top five executives. However, SOX lessens the association between the cost of equity capital and shareholdings, only for the three non-CEO and non-CFO executives. This is the first study to investigate how the change in regulatory environment invoked by SOX impacts the association between executive compensation and cost of equity capital. Moreover, this study examines the impacts on all top five highly paid executives and focuses on the three components of executive compensation that are involved with SOX.

Executive Compensation and Labor Expenses

Abstract Using data on US public firms, I uncover a strong and positive correlation between executive compensation and labor expenses. On average, a 1 % increase in the wage bill translates into a 0.3 % raise in total executive pay. This association is driven by wages rather than by employment growth, is stronger for the incentive than for the salary component of executive compensation, and is particularly pronounced in the financial sector.

CEO compensation, portfolio holdings and strategic investments

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship of CEO compensation plans and the risk of managerial equity portfolios with the extent of strategic investments in advertising, capital expenditures and research and development (R&D). The elements of compensation are salary, bonuses, options and restricted stock grants. The authors proxy the design of CEO equity portfolios by the price performance sensitivity of the holdings and the portfolio deltas.Design/methodology/approachThe authors use the components of executive compensation and portfolio risk as the dependent variables, regressing these against measures for the level of strategic investment. The authors test for non-linear relationships between the components of CEO compensation and strategic investments. The sample is a broad cross-section from 1992 to 2016.FindingsThe authors find strong support for non-linear relationships of capital expenditures and R&D with CEO bonuses, option grants and restricted stock grants. There are very complex relationships between the components of executive compensation and R&D expenditures, but little evidence of a relationship with advertising expenditures. The authors also find strong complex relationships in the design of CEO equity portfolios with advertising and R&D.Originality/valueLittle earlier research has considered advertising, capital expenditures and R&D in a unified framework. Also, testing for non-linear associations provides much greater insight into the relationship between the components of executive compensation and strategic investment. The findings represent a valuable incremental contribution to the executive compensation literature. The results also have normative policy implications for compensation committees’ design of optimal annual CEO compensation packages to incentivize or discourage particular strategic investment behavior.

Executive Compensation and the Cost of Debt

This study examines how different components of executive compensation affect the cost of debt. We find that debt-like and equity-like pay components have differing effects: an increase in defined benefit pensions is associated with lower bond yield spread, while higher share holdings lead to higher spreads. In addition, we find that stock options have a mixed impact on the cost of debt whereas cash bonus has no significant impact. Overall, our results indicate that corporate bondholders are fully aware of both risk-taking and risk-avoiding incentives created by various executive pay components.

CEO's Compensation: A Tool to Augment Corporate Governance to Achieve Optimal Level of Corporate Social Responsibility

In this paper we used components of executive compensation namely bonus, value of options granted, and value of pension accumulated for executives from Wharton Research Database to drive conclusion regarding implications of how such short term (bonus) and long term (value of options granted and value of pension accumulated) incentives play a role in determining the level of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) ratings among firms. Our results suggested that contracting executive compensation schemes based on long term incentives would tend to favor firms’ level of Corporate Social Responsibility while designing optimal contracts based on short term incentives could be more of an agency cost to firm in terms of level of CSR ratings.

Executive compensation, corporate governance and firm performance: evidence from India

Compensation received by the company directors attracted widespread attention in the recent literature. The existing research focused mainly on the executive compensation, and largely ignored non-executive compensation. Our study focused on the effect of corporate governance and performance variables on the executive as well as non-executive compensation structures in the Indian context. We obtained supporting evidence for managerial power theory as well as tournament theory in this paper. However, we could not find conclusive evidence for the agency theory with regard to executive compensation. Our research shows that as the board size enlarges, executive compensation rises further. However, we found that the proportion of non-executive directors (NEDs) on the board enhances executive compensation. We observed that if the chief executive officer plays dual role (CEO cum chairman) in a firm, NEDs receive lower remuneration. Our results reveal that the corporate governance variables namely board size, CEO duality and proportion of NEDs on the board have significant impact on the non-executive compensation. We affirm that our findings will be useful for the investors as well as institutions viz., the stock exchanges, academic institutions and the regulators as it integrates the relationship among the components of executive compensation, corporate governance and firm performance.

Executive compensation, corporate governance and firm performance: evidence from India

Compensation received by the company directors attracted widespread attention in the recent literature. The existing research focused mainly on the executive compensation, and largely ignored non-executive compensation. Our study focused on the effect of corporate governance and performance variables on the executive as well as non-executive compensation structures in the Indian context. We obtained supporting evidence for managerial power theory as well as tournament theory in this paper. However, we could not find conclusive evidence for the agency theory with regard to executive compensation. Our research shows that as the board size enlarges, executive compensation rises further. However, we found that the proportion of non-executive directors (NEDs) on the board enhances executive compensation. We observed that if the chief executive officer plays dual role (CEO cum chairman) in a firm, NEDs receive lower remuneration. Our results reveal that the corporate governance variables namely board size, CEO duality and proportion of NEDs on the board have significant impact on the non-executive compensation. We affirm that our findings will be useful for the investors as well as institutions viz., the stock exchanges, academic institutions and the regulators as it integrates the relationship among the components of executive compensation, corporate governance and firm performance.

The optimal shape of compensation contracts with earnings management

The research question of why earnings management occurs is decomposed into two questions in this article: Which component of executive compensation generates incentives for earnings management? and Why is the compensation structured that way in the first place? We first use as a dynamic stochastic equilibrium model to show that ‘big bath’ and earning overstatement can co-exist as equilibrium financial reporting strategies when thresholds are used in compensation contracts. In order to understand the use of performance thresholds as a prevailing compensation strategy in practice, we then derive the optimal compensation contract when the manager is privately informed about economic earnings and his expertise in managing earnings. Equilibria exist in which the inactive region below a threshold in compensation should be economically significant.

Performance Share Plans: Valuation and Optimal Design

Performance share plans are an increasingly important component of executive compensation. A performance share plan is an equity-based, long-term incentive plan where the number of shares to be awarded is a quasi-linear function of a performance result over a fixed time period. A special case is a performance-vested share plan, which provides a fixed number of shares whenever a performance result exceeds a threshold goal. We begin by documenting the size and importance of performance share plans and performance-vested share plans. Next, we derive closed-form formulas for the value of a performance share plan or performance-vested share plan when the performance measure is: (1) a non-traded measure following an Arithmetic Brownian Motion (e.g., earnings per share), (2) a non-traded measure following a Geometric Brownian Motion (e.g., revenue), or (3) a rank-order tournament of traded asset returns that are following Arithmetic Brownian Motions (e.g., percentile of ranked stock returns). Finally, we compare the actual payout of plans to our new valuation formulas, the reported values on proxy statements, and heuristic values. We find that our valuation formulas do significantly better or at least tie reported value and heuristic value in matching the magnitude of actual payout in all subsamples. We also find that our valuation formulas are more accurate or tie in all subsamples. The policy implication is that FASB should consider requiring that grant date fair value be estimated using valuation formulas such as ours.

The Value-Relevance of Stock Options

Stock options have become an increasingly important component of executive compensation. One of the primary reasons firms grant stock options to their executives is to motivate them to increase the firm value. If the stock price increases, executives will be rewarded through the increase in the value of their options. Theoretically, the higher the stock price, the higher the value of those options and the wealthiest the executives will become. Granting stock options to di- rectors, however, may raise a question about its effectiveness since monitoring management is the primary reason of their appointment. Nonetheless, if the directors are also agents, whose interests are not necessarily aligned with those of the shareholders, the same arguments will apply to them. Consistent with these arguments, this study empiri- cally shows that the value of CEO stock options and the value of director stock options are positively associated with the firm value. These results suggest that besides earnings and book value of equity, the value of CEO stock options and the value of director stock options have value-relevance in explaining the firm value.

Dividend payout and executive compensation: theory and Canadian evidence

PurposeThis paper seeks to present and test a model of the association between dividend payout and executive compensation.Design/methodology/approachThe authors develop a model based on Bhattacharyya whereby managerial quality is unobservable to shareholders, and therefore first‐best contracts are not possible. In the second‐best world, compensation contracts motivate high quality managers to retain and invest firm earnings, while low quality managers are motivated to distribute income to shareholders. These hypotheses arising from the model are tested on data for Canadian firms' dividend payouts over the period 1993‐1995 using tobit regression analyses.FindingsConsistent with the predictions of the Bhattacharyya model, the results show that, ceteris paribus, earnings retention (dividend payout) is positively (negatively) associated with executive compensation. These results hold when payout is defined as common dividends plus common share repurchases.Research limitations/implicationsThe Canadian data provide only limited information on the components of executive compensation. A more useful test would be possible with more detailed information on, for example, salary, bonus, and benefits.Originality/valueSeveral recent papers have documented an association between dividends and executive compensation. This paper presents and tests a model that provides a potential explanation for this link.

Executive Compensation: New vs. Old Economy and the Impact of NASDAQ Crash and Sarbanes Oxley Act

This is a new study which examines whether the determinants and the forms of compensation in new versus old economy US firms are the same over time and if the structure of compensation for executives in both groups changes after the NASDAQ crash and the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley act.The results reveal that the new economy executives receive, on average, much more than the executives from the old economy, primarily due to stock options, but in the last few years the difference in compensation between the executives of both groups is decreasing.We find that the NASDAQ crash and the Sarbanes-Oxley act had a significant impact upon the structure of the components of executive compensation in both new and old economy firms. Firms in both groups have reduced the use of stock options and have instead increased the use of bonuses and restricted stocks.We also find that the factors that explain executive compensation in new and old economy firms are generally different, and in the case of the variables that are the same, like firm size component, the intensity of the factors is different.

Executive Compensation in UK Property Companies

We study the drivers of executive compensation in the listed UK property sector. The United Kingdom provides an excellent opportunity to analyze executive compensation due to high transparency in the different components of executive compensation. We show that company size is the most important variable in explaining the level of executive compensation. We find that absolute and relative share performance significantly explains long-term compensation, that management style has a distinct influence on the level of executive compensation, and that using alternative monitoring mechanisms (institutional shareholders, debtholders, and outside directors) leads to higher levels of long-term incentives. We find only weak evidence of pay-performance sensitivity for both cash and long-term compensation. Executive shareholdings provide a much stronger link between pay and performance than does executive compensation.

EXECUTIVE STOCK OPTIONS: A FIRM VALUE APPROACH

Executive stock options are an important component of executive compensation and the topic is of interest to both practitioners and academics. The vigorous debate on whether these options should be treated as an expense is subsiding but discussion continues on how these instruments should be valued in order to expense them. In this paper, executive stock options are viewed as contingent claims on a firm's assets and we formalize this through the concept of an augmented balance sheet. This means that the total market value of the firm's assets is equal to the market value of its traded securities plus the market value of its stock options. This approach leads to two valuation formulae for these options: one in terms of the firm's stock price and the other in terms of firm value. We explore the connections between these two approaches and derive explicit valuation formulae under certain assumptions.