Lessening Effects of SOX on the Relationship between Executive Compensation Components and Cost of Equity Capital

Abstract

The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) imposed stringent requirements on corporate executives to hold them more accountable for their management decisions. This act has ramifications for executive pay as well. This study investigates the lessening effects of SOX on the association between executive compensation and cost of equity capital. The regression analyses are based on 11,649 firm-year observations of publicly listed companies in the United States from 1998 to 2014. The results show that bonuses and shareholdings are associated with a lower cost of equity capital, while the stock options are not related to the cost of equity capital. In addition, the findings indicate that SOX weakens the association between the cost of equity capital and executive bonuses, stock options for all top five executives. However, SOX lessens the association between the cost of equity capital and shareholdings, only for the three non-CEO and non-CFO executives. This is the first study to investigate how the change in regulatory environment invoked by SOX impacts the association between executive compensation and cost of equity capital. Moreover, this study examines the impacts on all top five highly paid executives and focuses on the three components of executive compensation that are involved with SOX.