The article elucidates in what way neuroscience and in particular neuroimaging can contribute to the clarification and empirical underpinning of theories in the philosophy of mind and the anthropology of religion. Its initial hypothesis is that there are two principal ways in which neuroscientific data are relevant to philosophy, exhibiting the unconscious processes in the generation of phenomenal and intentional consciousness, and complementing semantic and phenomenological approaches in the analysis of complex mental phenomena. Whereas the first kind of relevance is widely recognised, contributions of neuroscientific data to the analysis of complex mental phenomena are often rejected as involving a kind of "category mistake." The article argues that imaging studies can in fact contribute to a better understanding of the nature of certain complex mental states and processes and exemplifies this by recent brain imaging studies on religious experience. Finally, theories like those of Andrew Newberg are taken to task for misrepresenting "neurotheology" as a new form of theology.