Complex Fraud Research Articles

Reflections on Roskill

Recounts how the Frauds Trials Committee, under the chairmanship of Lord Roskill, was established almost 20 years ago to deal with perceived defects in investigation, prosecution and trial of serious and complex fraud, and how different financial services and fraud investigation were then compared with today. Describes how fraudsters have become more resourceful, mobile and international. Outlines the recommendations of the Committee, for instance that a unified fraud office should be set up and that jury trials for fraud be abolished. Reports that neither of these reforms has taken place, although the Serious Fraud Office resulted from the Report. Criticises both the suggestion to abolish jury trials and the lack of resources that governments have made available for tackling the huge amount of fraud that has taken place since Roskill.

Keynote Address to the 17th International Cambridge Symposium on Economic Crime

In the words of the song, ‘Money Makes the World go Round’. In the business of investigating and prosecuting serious and complex financial fraud, especially the international variety, the money goes around the world pretty effectively as well. And the more it can do so without the movement of the funds being detected, the more effective is the flow of mis‐appropriated money and the less likely the fraud will be detected and the fraudster brought to book.

Investigations into White‐Collar Offences and the ‘Sick Man’ of France

In England and Wales the Crown Prosecutor is a lawyer who is independent from the investigation and is charged with assessing evidence and evaluating whether a prosecution should proceed or not. The CPS is intentionally authorised to override the decisions of the police to curb any potentially over‐zealous investigations and evidence gathering that might subsequently tarnish the standards of procedure in the courts when applying the criminal law. The increasingly burdensome rules of disclosure have made demands on the CPS which are akin to the overall requirement on the investigating magistrate of civil law jurisdictions to find the truth by examination of the prosecution and defence evidence. The recent moves to return a limited number of lawyers to police stations is a further indication that the future role of the CPS may include an active rather than solely passive role in evidence gathering. The Serious Fraud Office are directly involved in the investigation and prosecution of complex frauds. This office has statutory and judicial authority to conduct investigations which follow an inquisitorial rather than accusatorial model. The juge d'instruction in France has authority to direct and control police investigations and subsequently to compile a dossier of evidence for presentation before a trial court. This paper points out that there are close parallels emerging in pre‐trial procedures in England and Wales and in France and the criticisms of the role of the investigating magistrate, the ‘sick man’, may hold lessons to be learnt for investigators and prosecutors within this jurisdiction.

New Zealand: A Current Analysis of the New Zealand Serious Fraud Office

The New Zealand Serious Fraud Office (NZSFO) was set up in 1989 in response to issues arising out of the 1980s financial crisis, in particular the share‐market crash of 1987. In the short period of about a year the total sum thought to be involved in corporate fraud schemes in New Zealand had increased dramatically, from NZ$10m–15m before 1988 to NZ$50m–70m in 1989. Consequently, the Department of Justice proposed setting up a specialist institution and legal mechanisms for the investigation of serious or complex fraud.

The Policing of Commercial Malpractice — Public Law or Self‐Regulation

Whilst the criminal justice system has evolved over the last seven years, it can be argued that the ability of the current criminal justice system in England and Wales to deal with the investigation, prosecution and trial of serious and complex fraud can still be challenged. Using material gathered whilst undertaking research for the Diploma in Compliance Studies at Exeter University, this paper makes a number of recommendations in this context. The existence of civil remedies and the regulatory structure created under the Financial Services Act 1986 may offer a limited opportunity to deal with some categories of commercial malpractice in an expedient and cost‐effective manner, outside the scope of the criminal justice system. This paper derives from research carried out with the purpose of reviewing the investigation, prosecution and trial of serious fraud in England and Wales in order to assess whether commercial malpractice is in fact a proper subject for ‘public law’, or whether it could be more effectively and expediently dealt with through civil law remedies, or by the self‐regulatory agencies created under the Financial Services Act 1986. This paper represents a summary of the main findings and interpretations of that research, which included interviews with three experts in the field. In considering this issue, one is bound in two ways. If one concludes that the criminal justice system can offer an effective and efficient method of the disposal of commercial fraud, the arguments for and against the use of the regulatory system become commensurably less significant. If, however, the conclusions suggest that major legislative and procedural changes are required to facilitate the effective and efficient prosecution of commercial fraud, the scope for use of regulatory sanctions where appropriate takes on a greater significance. Thus there are two elements in the writer's conclusion. First, there was concern to assess the veracity of the conclusions drawn by the Fraud Trials Committee in 1986 to the present, and other problems faced by the criminal justice system in the investigation, prosecution and trial of commercial fraud. Secondly, it was important to consider arguments for and against the use of regulatory sanctions for the disposal of commercial crime. The conclusions drawn from a review of the problems faced by the criminal justice system are, it is suggested, fundamental to the question of whether the increased use of regulatory sanctions is necessary, or desirable.

Interview with George Staple, Director of the Serious Fraud Office

The Serious Fraud Office was set up on the recommendation of the Roskill Committee by the Criminal Justice Act 1987. It is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of serious and complex fraud. In recent years the Office has been criticised for the way in which it handles cases, largely as a result of the perception that there have been too many acquittals in the cases which it has chosen to prosecute. In this interview, Matthew Weait discusses the role and aims and problems of the Office with its present Director, George Staple. Mr Staple considers the problems which the Office faces, the extent to which he considers criticism justified and wider issues relating to the effective prosecution of fraud. George Staple, 52, took up the post of Director in April 1992. Formerly senior litigation Partner of Clifford Chance, he was appointed in 1986 as a Companies Act Inspector. Between 1987 and 1991 he sat as a Chairman of the Authorisation and Disciplinary Tribunal of the Securities Association and the Securities and Futures Authority. For many years Mr Staple was a member of the Commercial Court Committee and served as Treasurer of the Law Society from 1989 to 1992.

A Mathematical Approach to Complex Fraud Problems

A Mathematical Approach to Complex Fraud Problems