Completed Cohort Fertility Research Articles

Replacement-Level Fertility has Now Become the Rule In Most of Eastern Europe

Replacement level fertility in 7 eastern European countries from 2 studies are discussed in terms of the effects of policy on fertility completed cohort fertility mean age at childbearing cohort fertility by birth order and abortion and contraception. Several trends appear: 1) between about 1945-65 fertility declined throughout eastern Europe and 2) after 1965 fertility stabilized with variations in timing and magnitude. The fluctuations are attributed to pronatalist measures that restricted abortion and contraception after 1965 abortion laws were liberalized during the 1950s. Countries with the most radical changes in abortion law experienced the greatest declines in annual fertility i.e. Romanias total fertility rate (TFR) fell dramatically after abortion was legalized in 1956; however in Hungary fertility declines were from 2.6 to 2.0 births/women by 1960 after liberalization in 1956 but strong pronatalist measures preceded liberalization by 3 years. IN Bulgaria Poland and Yugoslavia fertility declined only slightly or sporadically and restrictions on abortions were either gradual or minimal. Czechoslovakia relaxed its abortion law in 1965 but introduced childbearing incentives; the result was a sudden increase in fertility and then a return to the prior level. Romania is considered the best example of the effects of government intervention on fertility. East Germany is also discussed. Demographic policy only marginally affected cohort fertility or completed fertility. The mean age at childbearing also decreased after World War II (WWII) i.e. between 1950-60 in Czechoslovakia the mean age dropped by 2 years. Liberalization around 1965 slowed or stopped the decline in mean age. East Germany and Bulgaria followed this pattern. Pronatalist measures contributed to a further decline in mean age at childbearing. Confounding factors were 1) laws that were contradictory cancelled each other out in longitudinal measures such as completed fertility and 2) laws were directed either at small or large families. Cohort fertility was examined by birth order; findings were that higher order fertility dropped in the 1935-50 cohorts and for later cohorts slowed or reversed itself. In countries where higher order births were lowest 2nd and 3rd births increased. The gap between high and low fertility countries has narrowed. The incidence of abortion was examined from national registry statistics and found to vary widely between countries and follow a non-western pattern. Since WWII abortion was the most frequently used method of preventing unwanted births in eastern Europe.

Fertility expectations: a short cut or dead-end in predicting fertility

The Norwegian Fertility Survey (1977) and a follow-up study (births recorded among those same women for the 1978-82 period) were used to examine if an easy method for estimating completed cohort fertility is also a viable one. If so this means that the responsibility of making fertility projections merely shifts from the forecaster to the women themselves. The discussion summarizes opportunities and results in analyzing fertility expectations. For this purpose fertility expectations are defined as beliefs or ideas about future births. Analyses of birth expectations can be divided into 2 main topics: do birth expectations to some extent remain stable; and what is the relation between fertility expectations and fertility behavior. The Norwegian Fertility Survey provides information about the womens childbearing expectations in 1977. The Central Population Register gives information about the number of realized births among these same women during the following 5 years (1978-82). Interviews were successfully completed with 4137 women. The sample was representative of Norwegian women aged 18-44 years (born 1933-59). The non-response rate was 18%. All the women interviewed were followed up in the register survey. Up to the end of 1982 12 of them had died. The Central Population Register gives information of all births in the same period excluding women who had emigrated or stayed abroad during all or a part of that period. Of the respondents in 1977 42% expected to have children in the future while the same percentage expected not to have children in the years to come. The question on expectations was directed to both childless women and women with children. 84% of the women younger than 25 expected at least 1 birth in the future; only 50% of the women in the last half of their 20s thought they still had births to come. The proportion expecting future children declines further to 19% among women 3034 years of age and for the older women almost none expect to give birth in the future. Almost all women who in 1977 expected not to have (more) children have been consistent in their behavior. 5 years after the interview only 3% of them had had children. As much as 51% of those who expected a birth in the future have not yet had any birth. Among the women expecting to have terminated their childbearing in 1977 5 out of 5 were older than 30 years. Among all respondents more births were wanted than were realized. As the results show overestimation not underestimation unwanted births cannot be the explanation of the difference between expectation and behavior. If the youngest women had had the same age-specific 1st birth pattern as women of age 18-20 at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s a considerably higher percentage among them would have had children.

Assesssing Cohort Birth Expectations Data from the Current Population Survey, 1971–1981

Data from the fertility supplements to the Current Population Survey from 1971 to 1981 indicate that in the aggregate, the lifetime birth expectations of married women 18 to 39 years old in 1971 will closely approximate their completed cohort fertility. During this period, the youngest group of women, 18 to 24 years old, delayed their childbearing; their short-term expectations (1971-76) were not realized, but they made up enough births in the latter half of the decade to enable them to attain their lifetime birth expectations. In retrospect, the "failure" of birth expectations data to predict the "period" fertility downswing in the 1970s resulted not from poor predictions of married women, but rather from unanticipated marital and subsequent childbearing patterns of women who were single at the beginning of the decade. The authors conclude that birth expectations are useful predictors of completed cohort fertility, if adjustments are made to incorporate changes in the proportions married within the birth cohort.

Regional fertility patterns in the United States: convergence or divergence?

Birth expectations data frequently are used in population projections. A common assumption in preparing sub-national population projections is that the completed cohort fertility rates of the areas in question will converge over time to a level equivalent to the prevailing average number of lifetime births expected nationally by women in the principal reproductive ages. This paper examines whether such an assumption is justified for the United States. Although there is little supporting evidence for any convergence in state fertility rates for the period 1940 to 1977, birth expectations data for women 18 to 29 years old for 1977 and 1978 indicate a fairly uniform expected family size of two children per woman. The reliability of these expectations data are examined in light of the currently low period fertility rates.

Some social determinants of recent trends in British fertility.

SummaryThe contrast in birth rates in England and Wales between the periods on either side of the peak in 1964 is described and its components discussed. The drop after 1964 is mainly due to a drop in marital fertility at all ages, and especially the youngest. There is, however, as yet no evidence for a fall in the completed fertility of recent cohorts although their birth intervals are clearly lengthening. The mechanisms of such a change are described and their relative importance suggested. It is concluded that ultimate responsibility for the changing tempo of recent British fertility lies with fluctuations in the economic situation of the country.