Competitive Political System Research Articles

The Challenge of Building Strong Political Parties for Democratic Governance in Uganda: Does multiparty politics have a future?

Introduction The purpose of this paper is to locate the function of political parties in democratic governance. It examines the problems encountered by political parties in the process of building and sustaining competitive political systems. It looks back at the conditions that have led to a resurgence of multiparty democracy in the last two decades and highlights the Ugandan case as a country that has emerged from a failed state to monopoly politics and to back to multipartyism. It points o...

BRIDGING THE GAP: REVITALISING POLITICS AND THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS

Although the management of public expectations represents an underdeveloped field of political analysis, the global financial crisis and increasing evidence of public disengagement from conventional politics is likely to focus attention on the capacity of the state and the behaviour of politicians. As such, this article seeks to develop our understanding of public expectations by arguing that the dominant incentives and sanctions framework within competitive political systems facilitates the public’s capacity to make demands of politicians while at the same time making it very hard for politicians to impose their expectations of public behaviour vis‐à‐vis the state.

Democracy and Social Policy in Brazil: Advancing Basic Needs, Preserving Privileged Interests

AbstractHas democracy promoted poverty alleviation and equity-enhancing reforms in Brazil, a country of striking inequality and destitution? The effects of an open, competitive political system have not been straightforward. Factors that would seem to work toward this goal include the voting power of poor people, the progressive 1988 Constitution, the activism of social movements, and governance since 1995 by presidents affiliated with center-left and left parties. Yet these factors have been counterbalanced by the strong political influence and lobbying power of organized interests with a stake in preexisting arrangements of social protection and human capital formation. An analysis of four key federal sectors, social security, education, health care, and public assistance, illustrates the challenges for social sector reforms that go beyond raising basic living standards to enhancing socioeconomic inequality.

Electoral Systems and Real Prices: Panel Evidence for the OECD Countries, 1970–2000

In a recent article, Rogowski and Kayser introduced a claim to the political economy literature that majoritarian electoral systems: (a) systematically privilege consumers relative to producers and, consequently, (b) reduce real prices. The authors, modifying an established model of regulation, showed that, within a competitive political system, politicians favour those who provide only votes (consumers) over those who provide both money and votes (producers). When producers provide only money, the intuition becomes apparent even without a model: politicians respond more to voters under (majoritarian) systems in which a small change in vote share can produce a large change in seat share. Cross-sectional evidence for the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries in 1990 was strongly supportive, suggesting that real prices were, all else equal, about 10 per cent lower in the averageOECDcountry with single-member district (SMD) electoral systems than in those that used some form of proportional representation (PR).As with all new empirical claims, healthy scepticism is warranted. Indeed, recent research in related areas has to be contrasted with – but it has not contradicted – these price results, associating proportional electoral arrangements with more positive social welfare outcomes including (a) less income inequality, (b) higher public spending, or, in combination with central banking institutions, (c) greater price stability. We acknowledge the possible incongruity of these results with those of Rogowski and Kayser; after all, verification of the price effects would suggest a more complicated relationship between electoral institutions and social welfare than is indicated in the extant literature.

Political Competition and Convergence to Fundamentals: With Application to the Political Business Cycle and the Size of Government

We address the problem of how to investigate whether economics, or politics, or both, matter in the explanation of public policy. The problem is first posed in a particular context by uncovering a political business cycle (using Canadian data for 130 years) and by taking up the challenge to make this fact meaningful by finding a transmission mechanism through actual public choices. Since the cycle is in real growth, and it is reasonable to suppose that public expenditure would be involved, the central task then is to investigate the role of (partisan and opportunistic) political factors, as opposed to economic fundamentals, in the evolution of government size. We proceed by asking whether the data allow us to distinguish between the convergence and the nonconvergence hypotheses. Convergence means that political competition forces public spending to converge in the long run to a level dictated by endowments, tastes and technology. Nonconvergence is taken to mean that political factors other than the degree of political competition prevent convergence to that long run. The general idea here, one that may be applied in any situation where the key issue is the role of economics versus politics over time, is that an overtly political factor can be said to play a distinct role in the evolution of public choices if it can be shown to lead to departures from a dynamic path defined by the evolution of economic fundamentals in a competitive political system.

Political Competition and Convergence to Fundamentals: With Application to the Political Business Cycle and the Size of the Public Sector

We address the problem of how to investigate whether economics, or politics, or both, matter in the explanation of public policy. We first pose the problem in a particular context by uncovering a political business cycle (using Canadian data covering 130 years), and by taking up the challenge to make this fact meaningful by finding a transmission mechanism through actual public choices. Since the cycle is in real growth and it is reasonable to suppose that public expenditure would be involved, we then focus on empirical investigation of the role of (partisan and opportunistic) political factors, as opposed to economics, in the evolution of government size. We ask whether the data allow us to distinguish between the convergence and the nonconvergence hypotheses. Convergence means that political competition forces public spending to converge in the longer run to a level dictated by endowments, tastes and technology. Nonconvergence is taken to mean that political factors other than the degree of political competition prevent convergence to that long run. The general idea is that a political factor can clearly be said to play a role in the evolution of public choices if it can be shown to lead to departures from a dynamic path defined by economic fundamentals in a competitive political system. The results of applying cointegration and error correction modeling to implement this idea show that public expenditure cannot serve as the required transmission mechanism. Of the political factors considered, only variation in the degree of political competition leads to substantial departures of public expenditure from its long run path defined by economic fundamentals. We conclude with some general implications of the analysis for future research.

The political economy of state-level fair employment laws, 1940–1964

This paper explores the political economy of anti-discrimination legislation during the ascendancy of the Civil Rights Movement. It traces the diffusion of state-level fair employment laws and evaluates the relative importance of various demographic, political, and economic factors in promoting such legislation. Activism by Jewish organizations, the NAACP, and unions (particularly the CIO) were key factors in securing the adoption of fair employment legislation. Less unemployment, a larger Catholic population, more competitive political systems, and Democratic governorships appear to have been less important. Predicted times for the adoption of fair employment laws by the southern states underscore the necessity of federal intervention to establish legal protection from job market discrimination.

Targeting Democracies: Regime Type and America’s “Aggressively Unilateral” Trade Policy

Objectives. The American trade policy instrument Section 301 authorizes the president to demand changes in foreign states’ trade policies and to fortify these demands with threats of sanctions. I examine the economic and political factors that influence the selection of states as targets for Section 301 proceedings. Methods. I develop an argument connecting a state’s regime type to the likelihood that it will be targeted under Section 301. Controlling for other relevant factors, democratic states are predicted to have a higher probability of being targeted. I test the hypothesis in a set of regression models on cross–sectional time series data with both targeting incidence and targeting frequency as dependent variables. Results. States with more open and competitive political systems are more likely to be targeted under Section 301. Of the included variables, only a state’s regime type and the size of its trade relationship with the United States have consistently significant effects across alternative model specifications. Conclusions. Section 301 plays on the rivalry between protectionist and export–oriented interests by demanding reductions in trade barriers and backing them up with threats directed against export industries. Industries currently favored by protectionist policies have a higher chance of losing such a political contest in a political system more open to interest–group competition. The institutional form of political competition within a state affects the state’s response to international pressure on trade policy.

Democratization and Urban Bias in Postcommunist Russia

For the last twenty-five years urban bias has been one of the most prevalent theoretical frameworks for analyzing urban-rural relations in developing nations. Urban bias is commonly thought to be of greater intensity and duration in nondemocratic nations, in particular one party systems.' As post-Soviet states democratize and open their political systems to competition, urban bias would be expected to be more difficult to maintain. In particular, Robert Bates hypothesized that in nations with competitive party systems, political competition for votes leads to a shift in policy in favor of rural interests.2 According to this argument, rural groups in competitive political systems are able to organize for the purpose of seeking and mobilizing electoral support, thus influencing policy in ways that are advantageous to rural interests. Moreover, rural interests and the rural population at large present opportunities for urban interests to build support through alliances. In seeking out rural alliances, urban groups would court rural interests and make policy concessions that benefit the rural sector in exchange for electoral and political support. Why has urban bias remained, and even intensified, during increased political competition and democratization in post-Soviet Russia? Why has democratization been accompanied by a significant decline in the ability of rural interests to influence policy in ways that are beneficial to them? Why has democratization in Russia, apparently paradoxically, been accompanied by economic policies and policy outcomes that are characteristic of urban bias in noncompetitive one party states? This article, first, analyzes aspects of the urban bias problem that have not been previously considered and, furthermore, have not been applied to post-Soviet states. The importance of political cohesion and differences over ideology have not received the emphasis they deserve, thus creating a theoretical vacuum for understanding rural politics in postcommunist nations. In particular, four factors have been ignored: ideological differences between the state and rural interests, the ideological compatibility of rural interests, the internal coherence of rural interests, and the nature of political alliances formed by rural groups. This article, second, analyzes peasant-state relations in postcommunist Russia, bearing in mind what the analysis suggests about Russian democratization. Rural political weakness due to ideological differences and lack of cohesion

The Judiciary and Delegative Democracy in Argentina

In 1983 Argentina began a promising transition from authoritarian rule toward democracy with the election of President Raid Alfonsin. Since then, much progress has been made: large-scale human rights violations are a thing of the past, several smooth elections for various offices have been held, and a competitive political system operates fairly well.1 Nevertheless, Argentina's experience has demonstrated that the road to effective democratic governance is not smooth or direct.2 Instead, one might argue that over the past several years a variant type of democratic regime, what Guillermo O'Donnell calls a delegative democracy, has emerged and begun to consolidate.3

The Politics of Social Regulatory Policy: State and Federal Hate Crime Policy and Implementation Effort

Research suggests there has been a rise in the number of hate crimes since 1985. At the same time, legislatures at the local, state, and national level have enacted policies that both track and regulate hate crime. This article is an effort to determine the factors influencing hate crime policy and implementation efforts. The project is divided into three sections: In the first section, the characteristics and extent of hate crime are discussed. Section two describes hate crime policy as social regulatory policy and uses this theoretical framework to explain state variation in laws con cerning hate crimes. In section three, I present a model of policy imple mentation to predict state implementation efforts of federal hate crime policy Based on the variables suggested by these theoretical frameworks, I present hypotheses and conduct a multiple regression analysis using a fifty-state data set. The results indicate hate crime policies and imple mentation efforts are largely attempts by politicians to satisfy organized interests in competitive political systems. I discuss the implications of these findings and suggest avenues for future research.

The Complexity of Tax Structure in Competitive Political Systems

We explore the nature of tax complexity in competitive political systems. The analysis does not rely upon imperfections in the operation of the public sector. Complexity arises in the course of the struggle for office, during which political parties are induced to propose platforms that discriminate carefully among heterogeneous voters. A basic model is enriched by the addition of administration costs and self-selection, factors which limit the ability of any government to discriminate fully. The effect on complexity of inequalities in political influence is also investigated. The analysis suggests that simple tax systems (such as a flat tax or a broadly based tax without special provisions) are not compatible with vigorous political competition.

North Carolina government & politics

North Carolina has been a leader in the South and the nation since 1775, when it became First in Freedom by calling for its independence from British rule. Throughout its history, the state has had a reputation as a progressive force. This book offers both an assessment and an examination of the realities of the state's leadership. Analyzing a wide range of political actors and organizations, which includes the state legislature, the governor and executive branch, the judiciary, political parties, interest groups, and the media, Fleer illuminates North Carolina's rich political history, its evolving constitutional order, and its changing political culture. Although revealing a pattern of elitist paternalism in the state's political history, the book illustrates a parallel pattern of popular participation and control. Major forces of change are increasingly defining the state. These transitional factors include a significant biracial electorate, a stratified society, a diverse electorate, increasingly varied and mobilized political interest groups, a competitive political party system, and a more representative political leadership. New challenges to the state's future development are its aging population, the preparedness of its work force, the globalization of its economy, the protec-tion of its natural resources, and the education of its children for the next century. Each new political debate, policy choice, and election reminds North Carolinians of their fundamental challenge: establishing a government by enlightened and effective popular consent. Jack D. Fleer is a professor of political science at Wake Forest University and the author of North Carolina Politics: An Introduction.

The Rise of Conservative Capitalism: Ideological Tensions within the Reagan and Thatcher Governments

The phrase liberal capitalism has occasionally been used in contemporary political criticism to lump together the ideological approaches of nonsocialist political parties and to suggest that there are few significant differences among those who generally support a market-based political economy. C. B. Macpherson, in an influential essay entitled The Real World of Democracy (1965), argues that “by admitting the mass of the people into the competitive party system, the liberal state did not abandon its fundamental nature; it simply opened the competitive political system to all the individuals who had been created by the competitive market society.” As a first approximation then, liberal capitalism appears to stand for a combination of rational contractualism, utilitarian individualism, and the laissez-faire economics of Adam Smith.

How business can influence government credibility

The business community has failed to act on a fundamental given: a healthy political system is essential to a healthy economic system. A competitive economic system requires a competitive political system. Good citizens — motivated and informed — make effective leadership possible.

Elite conflicts in Chinese politics: A comparative note

Politics in less competitive political systems often focuses on relationslai'ps among the few leading political figures. This focus of attention follows from the characteristically highly centralized decisionmaking process, the top-heavy elite structure, and the lack of input from mass opinion wit:h regard to the direction of the political system. As a consequence, political scientists interested in studying authoritarian or totalitarian political systems may be tempted to direct their attention to the background, the career, and the political orientation and style of top-ranking leaders as a short-cut to understanding and predicting political developments in those systems. In the China field, a great many studies 'have been made of the important political leaders of mainland China. This number increased after the years of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Various models have been developed 'to describe and analyze relationships among Man Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-ch'i, TSng Hsiao-p'ing, Lin Piao, Chiang Ch'ing, Wang Hung-wSn, and other political leaders? For example, the red vs. expert model attempts to picture

The Anatomy of Political and Social Change: Turkish Parties, Parliaments, and Elections

A crucial stage in the process of political modernization is the induction of the rural masses into the political system. Such an induction spells the end of traditional political systems and fundamentally alters the relationship between city and countryside. Samuel P. Huntington refers to this phenomenon as the While the Green Uprising may occur in a variety of political systems, the particular form in which it is manifested depends upon the system and the political groups or forces under whose auspices it occurs. When the Green Uprising takes place within a competitive political system, Huntington suggests that it often takes the form of one segment of the urban elite developing an appeal to or making an alliance with the crucial rural voters and mobilizing them into politics so as to overwhelm at the polls the more narrowly urban-based parties. 1 Huntington cites Turkey as a classic example of this form of the Green Uprising. The ruralizing election in Turkey, which brought to power a new regime based on the electoral support of the peasant masses, occurred in 1950. The new ruralized regime coincided with a number of changes in Turkish politics. One of these was a shift in the composition of Parliament from persons with military and official backgrounds to persons with commercial and professional careers. Another was a rise in the representation of local or provincial elites as opposed

Political Participation, Institutionalization and Stability in India

TWENTY YEARS OF BREAKDOWNS IN PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENTS; the replacement of competitive political systems by military-bureaucratic regimes throughout Asia and Africa; civil war in Vietnam; the disintegration of Nigeria and the perpetration of genocide in that country, have inspired pessimism among most observers about the future of democratic politics in the new states. It has been suggested that political scientists now turn their attentions to the question of ‘political decay’ as well as to the question of ‘political development’ and that political leaders in the new states concentrate upon building the instruments of political control before engaging in serious economic development and social mobilization, and before permitting political competition and political participation: for, it is argued, rapid increases in economic development, social mobilization, and political participation work against the building and maintenance of strong and stable political institutions in a developing society.