Competitive Political Environment Research Articles

Symbol or Substance? An Empirical Assessment of State Responses to Kelo

The Kelo decision provoked considerable legislative activity as 46 states adopted legislation on eminent domain in its aftermath. Only about half adopted restrictions that were more than symbolic, however. This paper examines those responses using a logistic regression analysis and finds that all else equal: (1) states where legislatures were more constrained by tax and expenditure limits were less likely to adopt substantive restrictions; (2) a larger number of Republicans in the state legislature made a state more likely to adopt a substantive restriction; (3) overall Republican strength (as measured by gubinatorial elections) made states less likely to adopt a substantive response, suggesting political competitiveness not ideology motivated action; (4) there was no evidence that measures of an electorate's overall ideology (with respect to environmental, liberal, or conservative causes) made a difference; (5) economically growing states were more likely to adopt substantive restrictions; and (6) greater degrees of inequality and larger African-American populations were not correlated with the type of response. Taken together, these results suggest a public choice model of legislative action, rather than an ideological one, with legislatures facing other constraints (e.g. TEL and slower growth) being less likely to give up valuable eminent domain powers and legislatures where adoption of real reform was less costly (faster growth) or more beneficial (more competitive political environments) more likely to do so.

Defense Effort and Institutional Theories of Democratic Peace and Victory Why Try Harder?

Examining the relationship between regime type and defense effort provides evidence for reformulating theories of democratic peace. Consistent with liberal theories, regime type has substantively and statistically significant effects. In times of peace, democracies bear lower defense burdens than other states and keep proportionately fewer soldiers under arms. During times of war, however, democracies try harder and exert greater defense effort than non-democracies. Contrary to the results of some recent studies, all other things being equal, the arsenal of democracy appears to out-gun its opponents when it counts. Examining three components of democracy separately indicates that a largely overlooked factor, political competition, tends to drive these outcomes. Executive constraints are also associated with increased defense effort during war. But there is little evidence that wide participation or large winning coalitions have the predicted effects on defense effort. The results point to the flexible quality of defense effort in democracies, which is theoretically and empirically accounted for by the competitive political environment rather than institutional factors favored by existing theories.

The Influence of Political Discussion on Policy Preference: A comparison of the United States and Japan

This research tests if political discussion influences policy preference. The literature greatly stresses the non-rational nature of political decision-making. Rational policy preferences require learning specific details in a competitive political environment. Yet, research shows that most people do not have the skills to understand policy. Social networking is one way to help people understand policy. Social network influence on policy preferences, however, is mostly ignored. We show that the likelihood of supporting a policy increases when one's social network supports a party that advocates that policy. We control for the political knowledge of the respondent, network size, partisanship, ideology, socioeconomic, and policy-specific determinants. Examining data from the 2000 American National Election Study and Japanese Election Study 3, we find strong results in the United States, but mixed results in Japan. Additional research we perform shows a stronger social network influence in Japan.

Nonincremental Change in An Urban Environment

Must change in urban politics be incremental, as structuralist analysts have claimed? Welfare policy in New York City under Giuliani suggests not. The city's welfare policy has undergone the following major changes: a sharp reduction in the PA caseloads; creation of the country's largest work experience program; striking organizational restructuring; and the introduction of a new information management system. The key factors that made these dramatic changes possible were New York City's highly competitive political environment in the early 1990s; the development of a popular set of public ideas related to reciprocal obligations; a policy feedback effect of welfare policy of the Dinkins years; and the emergence of Giuliani as a skillful policy entrepreneur. Another crucial factor was the unforeseen effect of the 1989 city charter revision that eliminated the only institution that had historically been a counterbalance to the mayor's power. The result suggests that a nonincrementalist theory of political change can be usefully applied at the local level of American politics.

Health promotion, advocacy and health inequalities: a conceptual framework

SUMMARY Advocacy has often been described as a key strategy for the achievement of health promotion aims, but multiple and conflicting definitions and usages exist. The concept itself may be unnecessarily intimidating. Advocacy work can take place at the level of both ‘cases’ and ‘causes’. Two main goals underpin health advocacy—protection of the vulnerable (representational advocacy) and empowerment of the disadvantaged (facilitational advocacy). This paper attempts to integrate existing models and definitions into a conceptual framework for considering the role of advocacy in addressing health inequalities. It argues that we need to pay some attention to the diversity of values and goals of health promotion if we are to understand which models and approaches to health advocacy apply and in what context. This paper concludes that advocacy for health fulfils two functions: as a form of practice and as a useful strategy for a discipline which has to be self-promoting as well as health-promoting in order to survive in the competitive political environment of contemporary health work.

No chance for incentive-oriented environmental policies in representative democracies? A Public Choice analysis

Using the Public Choice approach, this paper gives an explanation as to why in representative democracies, in which political entrepreneurs attempt to maximize utility, an incentive-oriented environmental policy has hardly any chance of being implemented. We discuss two main aspects: first, the reasons which make it difficult to enforce any kind of environmental policy in the competitive political environment. And second, why such a policy—if it can be implemented at all—is very often enacted with inefficient instruments. In order to give a satisfactory explanation of these ‘execution deficits’, we differentiate between voters’, politicians’, interest groups’, and bureaucracies’ behavior to show that there are conflicts with other policies, and that individual rationality may be the greatest obstacle in implementing most incentive-oriented environmental policies. In the final section we provide five suggestions for overcoming these difficulties.

Thinking the Unthinkable in Public Administration

This article argues for ending tenure in the federal civil service. Arguments for tenure, and by extension against the old spoils system, are lacking. Even in the 19th century, relatively few federal managers lost their jobs after party changes. At the same time, limited rotation made the civil service relatively innovative and legitimate. Today, media scrutiny, more programmatic parties and presidents, and the limited capacity of the White House suggest that if presidential appointment authority were vastly expanded, the results would be modest. Such results as would occur might empower political leaders to accomplish more of their objectives and to remake under performing organizations, as well as empower career managers (who would still exist) to better lead their organizations. Each tendency would increase the effectiveness, representation, and legitimacy of the bureaucracy without necessarily increasing corruption. My arguments do not apply to state and local governments, which often operate in less competitive political environments.

Federalism and the growth of government revisited

Recent research in public economics has been testing for a relationship in federal states between the decentralization of governments and the total and individual size of government shares in GNP. According to one view, economic theory offers no unambiguous empirical predictions. Provided there is a competitive political environment at each government level, the rivalry between political parties will result in an outcome that conforms approximately to the preferences of the citizens, as interpreted in the conventional median-voter model. Under this scenario, it is not certain what differences might be caused by more decentralization (Oates, 1985). To determine any difference we would have to possess considerable knowledge about the distribution of tastes and the location of the populace. It has been hypothesized, nevertheless, that increased decentralization could result in a higher level of government expenditure. Quoting the economic historian John Wallis, Oates(1985: 749) suggests that since individuals have more control over public decisions at the local than at the state or national level, they will wish to empower the public sector with a wider range of functions and responsibility where these activities are carried out at more localizedlevels of government.

Japan's Keidanren and Its New Leadership

that Keidanren's ability to exert influence on the policy-making process is effectively neutralized. A final barrier to consensus arises from differences among individuals within the leadership. Japanese businessmen do a remarkable job of obscuring their conflicts from public view, but most assuredly they do exist, and they, too, complicate Keidanren's ability to achieve consensus on controversial issues. In the future, even when Keidanren reaches its own consensus on issues, its work will be only half done. At one time it could act as an almost quasi-official body, so intimately involved were its officers with affairs of state-in no small part because so many of them had experience as former bureaucrats. But, in the competitive political environment that has emerged since the 1970s, Keidanren has become just one of many interest groups attempting to wield its influence (albeit one with exceptionally good access to political and bureaucratic elites). Moreover, Keidanren can no longer assume that it will be the natural beneficiary of government policy, as was the case when there was a widespread national consensus on economic growth as the highest priority. Today the Japanese political agenda contains a larger number of options, all of them being considered under financially straitened circumstances. These tendencies have diminished Keidanren's natural influence and have obliged it to work harder to achieve its aims, sometimes even in competition with other business