Competition Policy Research Articles

Tractor Rage: Intellectual Property, Agriculture, Competition Policy, and the Right to Repair

Tractor Rage: Intellectual Property, Agriculture, Competition Policy, and the Right to Repair

Challenges faced by competition agencies in enforcing competition rules in labour markets: an enforcer’s practical reflection

This article aims to reflect on the challenges that competition agencies face when applying competition rules to labour market infringements. These challenges are multifaceted and range from the detection and investigation of anti-competitive conduct to the complexities of the applicable legal frameworks and its intersection with labour rights. To better understand these challenges, we outline the general objectives of competition law and explore the specificity of labour markets. This will serve as the backdrop for the reflections and conclusions reached from the practical perspective of an enforcer. The article also focuses on the advocacy efforts and enforcement action put forward by competition agencies, highlighting the key role played by the Portuguese Competition Authority in advocating and enforcing competition law in labour markets in Europe. We conclude by attempting to predict the future importance of labour markets in the context of general competition policy goals and objectives.

Coordination in labour markets: the need for case-by-case assessments

Competition enforcement is increasingly focusing on labour markets. Authorities have initiated wage-fixing and no-poach agreements investigations, which are usually ran as by object cases. These agreements are seen to restrict competition in labour markets, leading to lower wages to the detriment of workers. Absent efficiencies, the negative impact of wage-fixing and no-poach agreements on employed workers’ income can be expected and has been widely documented in the empirical economic literature. However, these agreements may also change downstream product markets’ output, thereby affecting consumers. While this effect has been recognized, scarce attention has been devoted to it, even if consumer welfare is stated to be at the core of competition policy. Similarly, the discussion on efficiencies has been limited. This paper examines the potential impacts of wage-fixing and no-poach agreements on all economic agents, including workers, employers and, crucially, consumers. This paper shows that although the impacts of wage-fixing and no-poach agreements on employed workers and employers are clear, their effects on consumers depend on the prevailing market conditions. This suggests that the welfare consequences of these agreements cannot be assumed but must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis using economic evidence.

New directions in competition policy: an overview

Abstract Competition policy has faced increasing scrutiny in recent years, with tension between traditional antitrust frameworks and contemporary critiques, including the ‘hipster antitrust’ movement. Some of the critics contend that competition policy has failed to address the growing market power of dominant firms, especially in the digital sector. This issue of the Oxford Review of Economic Policy explores the validity of these claims and their potential implications for the future of competition policy. It also examines how emerging methodologies, particularly those rooted in data science, can enhance our understanding both of how firms behave and how competition authorities and courts make decisions. This article summarizes a diverse range of contributions from academics, regulators, and practitioners in law and economics. It concludes with a discussion of how competition economics might adapt to the challenges posed by the hipster antitrust movement and the rapid changes in how firms compete.

Globalization and European Integration: A Central European Perspective

Two decades after the biggest ever enlargement of the European Union, post-transition countries face a series of challenges, posed primarily by de-globalization and growing illiberalism. Declining European competitiveness, as highlighted by the Draghi Report (2024), calls for major restructuring both regionally and community-wide. This invited survey article attempts to solve a puzzle: if Europeanization has not been very successful, how could it promote globalization? Furthermore, Central Europe counts as a success story, both in terms of convergence and in terms of stabilizing west Europe’s previously restive neighborhood. Sustaining this success is not automatic. We posit the two main conditions. These are: more focus on Ordnungspolitik (single market, competition policy, and capital markets union) and de-emphasis of re-distrubution (CAP and Cohesion). We also show why and how Central Europe will decide the future of the EU and the ways it can cope with globalization.

How does competition policy promote corporate digital transformation: evidence from the “Fair Competition Review System”

ABSTRACT Using the ‘Fair Competition Review System’ introduced in 2016 as a quasi-natural experiment, we analyse the impact and mechanisms of competition policy on corporate digital transformation, based on data from Chinese listed companies between 2011 and 2022. The findings reveal a significant positive effect through four channels: the ‘factor substitution channel’ raising labour costs, the ‘creative destruction channel’ boosting R&D investment, the ‘supply chain channel’ improving downstream demand structure, and the ‘information asymmetry channel’ increasing environmental uncertainty. These results provide insights into how competition policy can empower digital development.

Research on the Application of Blockchain Technology and Its Impact on the Effectiveness of Accounting Information Systems in Enterprises in Ho Chi Minh City

Objectives: This study explores the application of Blockchain Technology (BCT) to enhance the effectiveness of Accounting Information Systems (AIS) in enterprises in Ho Chi Minh City. Theoretical Framework:Grounded in the Technology-Organization-Environment (TOE) framework, the research investigates the interplay between technological, organizational, and environmental factors influencing Blockchain Technology adoption. Method: The mixed-methods approach encompasses qualitative interviews to refine the research model and quantitative surveys of 198 enterprise representatives, analyzed through Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS-SEM). Results and Discussion: Results demonstrate that perceived benefits, compatibility, organizational learning, and innovation positively impact Blockchain Technology adoption, while complexity and competitive intensity act as barriers. The integration of Blockchain Technology into AIS improves data quality, operational efficiency, and decision-making accuracy, addressing issues of transparency and fraud prevention. However, challenges such as high implementation costs and technical intricacies persist. Research Implications: The study offers practical implications for managers seeking to leverage emerging technologies for competitive advantage and policy recommendations to facilitate technology adoption in developing economies. Originality/Value: Original contributions include the empirical validation of TOE in the Vietnamese context and insights into how Blockchain Technology enhances AIS functionality. This research bridges gaps in the literature by providing actionable guidance for optimizing accounting systems in a dynamic business environment.

The Value and Profits of Firms

Abstract The real growth of the stock market value of firms has increased from close to 0% on average per year between 1958 and 1980, to 5.2% between 1980 and today. This change coincides with the rise of market power and profits, starting in 1980. This paper proposes to decompose the value of firms based on profits (earnings) rather than dividends. Because firms on average pay out only half of profits in dividends, dividends poorly measure firm performance. I decompose the sources of the rise of the value of all publicly traded firms into: 1. The subjective and risk-free discount factor; 2. Expected future profits; and 3. Shareholder equity (retained earnings). I find that 20% of the rise is due to the discount factor, and 80% is due to profits (half of which is retained earnings). I build a general equilibrium model of the economy where firms have market power; I perform counterfactuals and evaluate the welfare implications. The objective is to study the impact of competition policy. If market power today dropped to the level of 1980, average stock market values would be 40% lower. If market power had never increased in 1980, the average stock values would be 80% lower.

Challenges in the legal regulation of competition in the context of the digital transformation of the economy

Competition law and policy foster, maintain and encourage competition in markets by establishing and ensuring prohibitions on business practices that may harm competition. The risk of anticompetitive practices is shown to increase with the tendency of large digital companies to form diversified conglomerates by developing new products and services or acquiring promising start-ups that reduce competition in the market. These companies operate through unique business models, and their use of advanced technologies and data exacerbates existing anticompetitive practices while creating new ones. Big data is explored as a key tool for gaining competitive advantages, and the complexities of interpreting artificial intelligence algorithms are discussed, particularly in relation to tacit collusion. The study also investigates the antitrust regulation of digital platforms in the European Union (EU) and China, highlighting the emergence of dominant “structuring” platforms in the markets. The authors argue that ensuring competitive market functioning in the presence of these platforms has become increasingly difficult for regulators. A number of regulatory changes are proposed to address these challenges

Use of Exclusive Data for Corporate Research on Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence: Implications for Innovation and Competition Policy

Use of Exclusive Data for Corporate Research on Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence: Implications for Innovation and Competition Policy

Artificial intelligence and competition policy

Artificial intelligence and competition policy

Competition of regulatory ecosystems in approving medicines: policy implications in the case of Europe.

The competition between business ecosystems is relevant not only for strategic management, but also for health policy and regulators. Regulation is one key factor in ecosystem competition, and government and regulatory bodies implement new pharmaceutical legislations, policies, and guidelines contributing to business environments capable of attracting startups, biotech firms, and pharmaceutical industry investments in innovative medicines and technologies. Implications for patients and societal welfare require a thorough analysis of strategies aimed at enhancing the competitive advantage of the European Union (EU) in attracting pharmaceutical companies to prioritize the submission of their innovative medicines. This analysis is essential for ensuring that patients have timely access to new treatments, that society benefits from advances in healthcare, and could foster the competitive advantage of the European regulatory ecosystem. Here, we present data from 65 interviews with pharmaceutical industry professionals, offering direct insights into regulatory ecosystem competition and global health policy. Our report underscores the necessity for effective strategies that enhance the competitive advantage of the European regulatory system.

Practical aspects of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection’s activities on the Internet to protect consumers and ensure fair competition

The President of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection is the central government administration body responsible for shaping and implementing competition and consumer protection policy in Poland. The scope of its competences has been clearly defined in the law. The aim of the article is to focus on the implementation of these competences in a practical aspect, focusing on activities on the Internet. The analysis is based on issues related to competition and consumer protection law, administrative law, as well as issues related to marketing and the use of the latest trends in marketing. The author asks to what extent the use of these trends by a public administration body affects the effectiveness of its operation and building trust in it. The article contains many examples resulting from nearly two years of observation of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection’s activities on the Internet. At the same time, the author refers to specific legal acts, statistical data from the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection reports and her own conclusions in the field of public institution marketing.

Competition Concerns and Antitrust Responses to China's Health and Medical Data Openness Policy

As a policy trend in many jurisdictions around the world, health care data openness can effectively improve the level of public governance, drive innovation in the medical industry, and promote market competition in the medical industry to a certain extent. However, the process of opening up health care data often comes with the risk of competition. First, the opening of health care data may lead to more efficient and stable collusion in reaching and implementing collusion. Second, the opening of health care data will also lead to more exploitative and exclusive abuse in the health care industry. Third, the opening of health care data will also lead to the frequent occurrence of data-driven and leveraged mergers and acquisitions risks. In order to effectively eliminate competition risks, China should propose new anti-monopoly countermeasures. On the one hand, China should strengthen the legislative regulations on the opening of health and medical data, including the regulation concept of monopoly agreement should be adjusted from information transparency to the implementation of classification and classification, and the regulation of abuse of market dominance should pay attention to the quantification of market power and the identification of specific behaviors, so as to include operators' commitments in the regulation of data-driven mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, China also needs to introduce a full-chain regulatory system that combines the dual effects of competition advocacy and law enforcement, in the form of prior routine market investigations and fair competition reviews, as well as a flexible in-process and after-action regulatory approach. In addition, it is also necessary for China to build a coordinated regulatory model across multiple departments. On the basis of emphasizing the fundamental position of competition policy, we should make full use of the power of social supervision to regulate the restrictive competition behavior in the process of health and medical data opening in a more comprehensive way, and improve the safety and innovation of health and medical data opening to the greatest extent. 健康医疗数据开放作为世界范围内多个司法辖区的政策趋向，能有效提高公共治理水平、驱动医疗行业创新，以及在一定程度上促进医疗行业的市场竞争。然而，健康医疗数据开放过程通常伴随着竞争风险。其一，健康医疗数据开放可能导致共谋的达成与实施更高效，以及共谋合意更加稳定。其二，健康医疗数据开放也会导致医疗行业的剥削性滥用与排他性滥用行为更加普遍。其三，健康医疗数据开放还会导致数据驱动类与杠杆并购类风险的频发。为了有效消除竞争风险，中国应提出新的反垄断应对方案。一方面，中国应强化健康医疗数据开放的立法规制，包括垄断协议规制理念应从调整信息透明度到实施分级分类，滥用市场支配地位的规制则需注重市场力量的量化与具体行为的识别，将经营者承诺前置纳入数据驱动型并购的规制中。另一方面，中国还需要导入全链条监管体系，以结合竞争倡导与执法的双重功效，具体表现为事前常规性市场调查与公平竞争审查双管齐下，以及构建弹性的事中与事后监管方式。此外，构建多部门的协同监管模式对中国而言同样必要。在强调竞争政策的基础地位上，充分借助社会监管的力量，较为全面地规制健康医疗数据开放过程中的限制竞争行为，最大程度提高健康医疗数据开放的安全性与创新性。

Everything Everywhere All At Once: competition policy and industrial policy choices in an era of structural change

Abstract: There is a clear revival of active industrial policy in many OECD economies. There is also a renewed activism in competition policy, with broad issues such as digital market power, the green transition, and geopolitics on the agenda of competition authorities. The new activism reflects technological transformations that are reshaping economic structures and hence presenting policy-makers with long-run supply-side economic challenges. In this context, there is no clear assignment of policy tools to different bodies, but rather a need for coordination of policies across domains. Nor can technical decision-making by economic regulators be separated from the need to make normative judgments about the strategic direction of the economy. This implies two fundamental unsolved institutional challenges: how to combine expert analysis with political legitimacy; and how to coordinate policies across bodies whose responsibilities or remits sometimes conflict.

How does competition policy need to change in a world of artificial intelligence?

Abstract This paper investigates how the advent of artificial intelligence is likely to change competition policy. As economists we tend to view artificial intelligence as a technology that lowers the costs of prediction. In general, we know that lowering costs can affect market structure, though typically in the direction of facilitating competition. In general, the article argues that the traditional tools and frameworks we use in competition policy are robust to the advent of artificial intelligence as a technology that might need competition authority intervention. However, there are serious questions about how easy it will be for competition policy-makers to use their traditional tools to identify bad intent by firms in a world where business decision-making is driven by algorithm.

Competition policy and labour market power: new evidence and open questions

Abstract Emerging evidence on pervasive and rising market power in US labour markets has led some competition agencies to wonder if the prevailing focus on product market power is too narrow. We survey existing competition enforcement in labour markets and the empirical evidence on the extent and impact of labour market power, with a particular focus on the UK. We find that in contrast to the US, labour market power in the UK has not risen substantially. Nonetheless, workers vary in their exposure and, for some, labour market power has significant economic costs. Labour market power also appears to interact in significant ways with other labour market policies. We argue these findings underscore the danger of making policy decisions based on evidence from other countries, or by analogy with product markets. We survey what these findings mean for existing tools available to competition agencies and conclude by laying out four types of open questions: theoretical, empirical, legal, and normative.

Philosophies of competition policy

Abstract At a high level of abstraction, different approaches to competition policy are philosophies that differ as to the proper intensity, scope, and focus of enforcement. These three components of a philosophy largely govern the decisions made by enforcement agencies and courts. This article describes, compares, and traces the history of major philosophies and their components. The article concludes by recommending that every competition enforcement agency release a statement of its philosophy, and by sketching the author’s philosophy.

Implications of behavioural economics for the pro-competitive regulation of digital platforms

Abstract: In recent years, the relevance of behavioural economics to competition policy has become ever more apparent, especially in digital markets. Choice architecture, which shapes how consumers make decisions online, has been at the centre of numerous recent legal cases brought under competition law, as well as the development of regulations at promoting competition in markets currently dominated by major tech platforms. This article focuses on the impact of behavioural insights for the design and implementation of one such regulation, the EU’s Digital Markets Act (DMA). It underscores the relevance of choice architecture to several DMA provisions and emphasizes the necessity of testing different designs—through online experiments, field trials, and surveys—to ensure compliance. Despite their seemingly minor effects today, such improvements to choice architecture could prove pivotal in fostering competitive markets.

Competition policy for conglomerates, platforms, and eco-systems

Abstract We discuss the economics of eco-systems, distinct from other industrial structures but currently without an agreed definition. Our aim is to clarify the discussion around eco-systems by organizing the issues and pointing out where an eco-system approach could be useful. We begin by drawing a distinction between eco-systems and other structures that share some of their features, such as platforms and conglomerates concentrating on the level of control, the importance of externalities, the importance of access fees or taxes, and the presence of multiple ‘entry points’. Building on this discussion, we identify theories of harm that are likely to apply to eco-systems. These include blocking entry paths and ‘defensive foreclosure’. We then exposit the eco-system dimensions in a series of recent cases around Microsoft, Google-Alphabet, Facebook-Meta, Amazon, and Apple. We see that defensive foreclosure has been a common denominator in eco-system theories of harm and that an eco-system approach can be fruitful to understand the harms—and benefits—in such cases.