Illiberal Research Articles

China and Russia Policy in the 2021 Election and Beyond

Abstract The new German government resulting from the 2021 Bundestag election will have to revise and reshape the legacy of the Merkel era's policies on Russia and China. Germany's own interests as a geoeconomic power will have to be balanced against concerns about the values of these two illiberal states and the strategic challenges they pose. The new coalition government in Germany will have to find consensus between three parties that hold often conflicting views, led by a team with little foreign policy experience.

The ‘competitive authoritarian’ turn in Turkey: bandwagoning versus reality

Turkey’s fast-paced democratic backsliding has attracted unprecedented scholarly interest from observers both inside and outside the country. Among various labels proposed to define Turkey’s new regime type, ‘competitive authoritarianism’ (CA) has by far outdistanced its rivals. As plenty of time has passed since its coinage, it is timely to commence a scholarly discussion on the appropriateness of the term. Our analysis reveals that the CA argument comes with three major shortcomings when applied to the case of Turkey. First, although its proponents discuss the concept adequately and seem to find abundant evidence to convince most of their audience, they undertake little, if any, theoretical discussion to show why CA is more plausible than its alternatives. Second, although the party system is generally regarded as the main indicator of a certain regime type, the link between the two remains un(der)-explored. Third, the mechanism leading to the transition to CA is not fully identified. We conclude that experts have jumped on the CA bandwagon, dubbing Turkey’s authoritarian regime competitive authoritarian without sufficient conceptual sophistication; this has proved deleterious rather than beneficial to the relevant literature.

Playbook of Subnational Illiberalism: Autocrats Face the Opposition-led Local Governments

Recognizing the growing tensions between autocrats in the center and opposition-led local governments in Hungary, Poland and Turkey since 2018–2019 local elections, the article contributes to existing literature on illiberal democracies with a subnational portion of illiberal playbook. Tactics identified through the detailed study of the European context and brief review of Latin American experience leaves us with the following categories in the playbook: abuse of (existing) supervisory and accountability mechanisms; generating of financial vulnerability; centralization (outright and indirect) and deconcentration. Each of these categories assemble various means evolving through application and reinterpretation of traditional rules pertaining to local government, as well as crisis-induced innovations. While the Polish account carries the optimism still that antecedent robust guarantees and popular support matter even when illiberals rule the center, the playbook proved successful in Hungary and Turkey. Although certain incrementalism stayed as the most vulnerable actors were the first victims of soon-to-be normalized measures, crisis in Hungary and Poland did stretch the limits to the point that ulterior motives of undermining opposition-led local governments became publicly observable. Reflecting on this phenomenon, in the end, the article poses a theoretical question whether such pretextual instrumentalization of law can itself be judicially manageable, at least in situations when clear political opponents are targeted.

Neo-mercantilism in action: China and small states

This study investigates the relations between the People’s Republic of China and seven small European states with particular reference to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. It highlights the gap between the rhetoric of economic liberalism and the realities of neo-mercantilism with Chinese characteristics. The article analyses China’s geopolitical strategy and its support of infrastructural projects abroad in relation to the “China Dream” as articulated by Xi Jinping. The impact of engaging with a more assertive China for smaller countries is examined. The article concludes that, increasingly, there is a distinction in the EU between liberal and illiberal democracies. China’s preference for bilateral relations with countries on the BRI is informed by its broader geopolitical aims that resonate well with the neo-mercantilist model. The impact of China’s stance seems to be more muted in the more democratic small nations and more pronounced in autocracies.

Facing illiberal democracies

Facing illiberal democracies

Use of Religion in Blame Avoidance in a Competitive Authoritarian Regime: Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet)

Blame avoidance has been one of the most applied strategies by policy makers in both democratic and non-democratic regimes to avoid responsibility and accountability in cases of failure and tragic events. It is also known that politicians have used religion for Machiavellian purposes, as exactly advised by Machiavelli. However, a systematic empirical analysis of how religion is used for blame avoidance by politicians has not been conducted. In this article, we aim to address this gap by examining the empirical data derived from the weekly Friday sermon texts produced by Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs and delivered in more than 90 thousand mosques every week to a large segment of the population in Turkey, where the majority claims to be religious. Starting with its violent response to the peaceful Gezi protests in 2013, the ruling AKP has opened up a new phase in Turkish political history by resorting to civilizational populism: it blamed the Western world for financing and masterminding the protests, using the protestors as internal pawns to attack Turkey and the Muslim World, suppressed the protests brutally and entered into a populist authoritarian regime. Our paper shows, following this turn, how the Diyanet sermons started using religion to help with the AKP’s blame avoidance. The Diyanet either parroted the AKP’s conspiratorial narrative or tried to convince the citizens that all negativities are works of God and with these humans are being tested by God. The AKP’s use of religion to avoid blame is a text-book case of how both a religious institution and religious discourse can be used to help the incumbent avoid responsibility. Whenever, there was a problem that would the AKP votes, the Diyanet’s sermons tried to shift the blame to either God or citizens or conspiratorial enemies.

Contrasting Modern and Contemporary Populist Regimes

Abstract The article analyses populism as a specific logic of governmental exercise that sets into motion the pattern of transformation of contemporary democratic regimes: democratic hybridization. Democratic hybridization entails the piecemeal dismantling of key aspects of liberal constitutionalism that take place in already democratized societies and is carried out by democratically elected administrations. The proposed pattern of regime hybridization differs from the one described by the literature on competitive authoritarianism since it does not take place within an authoritarian regime but in a democratic one. If carried out to the end, the pattern of democratic hybridization might lead to the replacement of democracy with authoritarianism. Such a pattern of political change (and not the traditional pattern of regime rupture) is the main threat faced by liberal democracies nowadays.

Populist attitudes and challenges towards liberal democracy: An empirical assessment of the Turkish case

The rise of populism presents a challenge to liberal democracy in various countries. This article questions how populist attitudes affect the democratic preferences of the electorate. Using representative survey data fielded from Turkey in 2019, we first tested the effect of populist attitudes on illiberal democratic attitudes. The results show the negative impact of populism on support for illiberal democratic attitudes. Next, we analyzed which dimension of populism correlates with illiberal democratic preferences. Our results pointed to the negative influence of the Manichean outlook on preferences concerning democracy. Contrary to expectations, as anti-elitist and people-centric attitudes increase, support for illiberal democracy decreases. Hence, the relative emphasis on different dimensions of populism is likely to shape the net balance of its influence on democracy. Electoral alliance preferences also shape democracy preferences. The ruling People’s Alliance voters are more supportive of illiberal democracy than the opposition blocs and parties.

Violence and Impunity: Democratic Backsliding in the Philippines and the 2022 Elections

As president from 2016 to 2022, Rodrigo Duterte captured the judiciary, dominated the legislature, attacked the media, and presided over a campaign of mass killing, leaving an estimated 30,000 alleged drug criminals dead. Despite wielding vast amounts of power, Duterte stepped down after the national elections on May 9, 2022 in a largely peaceful transfer of power to Ferdinand Marcos Jr., son and namesake of the former dictator deposed in 1986. Why did Duterte amass power without causing full democratic collapse into authoritarian rule? The Philippines experienced backsliding to competitive authoritarianism: while elections remain free and somewhat fair, other features of democracy like civil liberties and political freedoms have eroded badly because of mass violence. The Philippine case demonstrates the autocratizing e ect of an emerging form of political violence: a focused campaign of state terror that produces fear and electoral success. I present evidence from two cases—the national "war on drugs" and its local antecedent in Davao City—to explain how violence escalates, provokes accountability, evades culpability, and contributes to democratic backsliding without immediate collapse to authoritarianism. With the election of Marcos Jr., the impunity of the former incumbent is likely to become institutionalized, and democratic backsliding is unlikely to be reversed.

The paradox of judicial dialogue with the European Court of Justice in an illiberal democracy: The recent experience with the Hungarian Constitutional Cour

El crecimiento de formas nacionales populistas de gobierno en algunos Estados miembros de la UE ha provocado un marcado deterioro del respeto por la democracia y el Estado de derecho. Las acciones de estos gobiernos iliberales han llevado a la captura de aquellas instituciones diseñadas para garantizar el estado de derecho, incluidos los tribunales constitucionales. Algunos de estos tribunales, conscientes de la protección de la soberanía nacional y respondiendo a la jurisprudencia del TJUE que promueve la independencia judicial, se han negado a reconocer el carácter vinculante para ellos de las sentencias del TJUE. El Tribunal Constitucional húngaro (TCH) tuvo recientemente la oportunidad de seguir a sus tribunales hermanos en Alemania, Polonia y Rumania en el caso «Refugee Pushback» («La devolución de refugiados»), pero se negó a hacerlo. El trabajo examina la UE más amplia y los contextos constitucionales internos más específicos para comprender el enfoque cauteloso de la Corte y evitar una confrontación directa con el TJUE. Analiza cómo el TCH, en casos excepcionales y de forma ultima ratio, podría utilizar tres tipos de control para verificar si, en el ejercicio de las competencias compartidas entre la UE y los Estados miembros, se viola el contenido esencial de un derecho fundamental (control de derechos fundamentales), la soberanía de Hungría (control de soberanía o control ultra vires), así como su identidad constitucional (control de identidad constitucional). Sin embargo, al mismo tiempo, el TCH equilibra la protección del orden constitucional nacional con el requisito de la UE de cooperación sincera en forma de diálogo judicial con el TJUE.

The fascist authoritarian model of illiberal democracy

Based on our observations and scholarship about how democratic norms are currently being undermined, we propose a model of fascist authoritarianism that includes authoritarianism, the production and exaggeration of threats, conspiracy-oriented propaganda adoption, and distrust of reality-based professions. We refer to this as the Fascist Authoritarian Model of Illiberal Democracy (FAMID) and argue that all components are essential for understanding contemporary antidemocratic movements. We demonstrate that all components of FAMID correlate with illiberal antidemocratic attitudes, that Republicans generally score higher than Democrats on the model components, and that all components significantly contribute to predicting illiberal antidemocratic attitudes. We find approximately equal support for both left-wing and right-wing illiberal antidemocratic attitudes. The fascist authoritarian model of illiberal democracy helps explain the basic mechanisms by which an authoritarian leader works to erode liberal democratic norms—and does a better job at doing so than simpler authoritarianism theories.

Book notes: The Society of the Selfie: Social Media and the Crisis of Illiberal Democracy by Jeremiah Morelock and Felipe Ziotti Narita

Book notes: <i>The Society of the Selfie: Social Media and the Crisis of Illiberal Democracy</i> by Jeremiah Morelock and Felipe Ziotti Narita

The securocratic state: conceptualising the transition problem in Zimbabwe

ABSTRACT The eclipse of colonial rule in 1980 saw the metamorphosis of a securocratic state that has compounded democratic transition in Zimbabwe. Through an analysis of published data, the article interrogates this Zimbabwe transition problematique. Literature identifies it as competitive authoritarianism that captures the electoral system, judiciary, media, and legislature to block democratic transition. However, this article reveals that at the centre of this transition problematique is the military factor that has transmuted into an omnipresent and omnipotent fulcrum of the political system. The military elite initiated the rise and fall of the former President Mugabe, the rise of President Mnangagwa and, if not interrupted, it will be a mediator in his fall and the rise and fall of future leaders. The Military established a securocratic state after capturing the ruling party. Since then, the ruling party has been used by the military elite to populate key state institutions to preserve power and maintain this status quo. This article argues that the process of entrenchment of military power in Zimbabwe began during the armed struggle. The article also posits that the securocratic state emerged from a cross-pollination between African and European governance traditions.

Representation of Women and Ethnic Minorities in the Russian State Duma 1993-2021

Abstract Elections to the Russian State Duma provide a unique context to study the representation of women and ethnic minorities in a national legislature. Russian elections have witnessed dramatic institutional variation, including a shift from semi-democratic contestation to competitive authoritarianism and the use of different electoral systems. Moreover, ethnic federalism has produced political and demographic conditions that promote the representation of titular ethnic groups in ethnic republics. Finally, the transition from a fragmented party system to one controlled by a single dominant party potentially has important potential ramifications for women and minority representation. We use a unique dataset that codes the ethnicity and sex of individual legislators for each election from 1993 to 2021 to examine how regime type, electoral rules, demographic conditions, and party affiliation have affected descriptive representation in Russia. Using similar data on selected states from Eastern Europe, we compare Russia’s experience with that of other postcommunist states as well as the United States.

The relevance of the open society to Hong Kong’s fight against moral and institutional decay: Lessons for Central and Eastern Europe

The situation in Hong Kong today is not dissimilar to the moral predicaments that Central and Eastern Europe had endured during the Communist era. Then, as now, state oppression and intimidation aim not only at generating a pervasive sense of learned helplessness in society but also incentivising political opportunism. This paper begins with a thorough examination of the relevance of the open society against the background of the regime’s all-out attacks on the pro-democracy opposition and the civil society in the name national security following unprecedented protests in 2019. Civil society organisations are in retreat under the pressure of autocratic rule, but the normative appeal of the open society as a custodian for the city’s distinctive values and identity is expected to grow against the backdrop of the moral and institutional decay of the official, ‘Orwellian’, realm. It then seeks to explain why the barriers against norm entrepreneurship – individual and collective actions resisting moral decline and decay – are not insurmountable as they first appeared. Three decades after the end of Communism in Europe, the moral commitment to the open society serves as rallying point against the rise of illiberal democracies or electoral authoritarianism. In any case, autocrats are not invincible and there is nothing inevitable about the authoritarian backlash.

A Commentary on the So-Called Defense of Christian Europe: The Fidesz Party’s Response to the Migration Crisis in Hungary

Abstract This essay examines the issue of migration in Hungary since 2015, focusing in particular on the way in which Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz government have mobilized populist fears of a migrant invasion as a key trope in their efforts to construct an illiberal state, and how in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the crisis in Afghanistan, they have continued to capitalize on populist (mis)conceptions of the so-called migrant crisis in the lead-up to the 2022 elections. Beginning with a description of Fidesz as a populist radical-right party, the essay examines Orbán’s response to the migration crisis in summer 2015 and concludes with an analysis of official Fidesz social media posts over a two-week period in September 2021. Confident in its self-proclaimed historical mission, Fidesz has used the perceived migrant crisis not only to argue that the liberal policies of the European Union are a threat to the future of European culture and civilization, but also to position itself as the protector of Hungary, and of Christian Europe more generally.

Dam building by the illiberal modernisers: ideological drivers for Rwanda and Tanzania’s megawatt mission

Globally, and especially in Africa, twentieth-century dams were typically imagined through high modernist ideology as the premier development project, but this ended with the decade-long hiatus in dam construction from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. However, dam-building is back. Does this mark the resurgence of a modernising ideology, of grand plans of mega-infrastructures implemented from an enlightened vanguard? This article analyses this question using Rwanda and Tanzania as case studies. It makes a twofold contribution. The first, to the literature on why the resurgence of dams is happening. Using theory, it shows how to understand the influence of ideology alongside other strategic factors and conceptualises the application of high modernism to dam building. This allows a more precise assessment of the influence of ideology on dam resurgence, with the cases of Rwanda and Tanzania demonstrating significant contrasts with past tendencies to aggrandise the infrastructure itself as the harbinger of progress. The second contribution to this special issue is on the ideology influencing a raft of 21st century illiberal states in Africa that have embarked on grand development missions. The article compliments other texts in this issue, demonstrating the presence of an evolved illiberal modernisers ideology that combines tenants of the past with more recent norms. Thus, an assumption of technologies’ ability to linearly generate development is combined with contrasting ideas about sustainability, the importance of the private sector’s role and hydropower’s limitations. This demonstrates the way today’s illiberal modernisers, engaged in global debates, adapt and update development ideology.

Illiberal smart urbanism? Lessons from the politics of state-led smart securitisation in Miskolc, Hungary

This article makes the case for the ‘illiberal smart city’ in response to a growing body of literature on the post-politicisation of smart urbanism. Drawing on the centralised rollout of an intelligent CCTV network in Miskolc, Hungary, under a regime that calls itself ‘illiberal’, the article proposes an alternative perspective on the politics of smart urbanism in continuation of dialogues on the ‘actually existing smart city’. To this end, two key claims will be put forward. First, in contrast to mainstream post-political understandings of smart urbanism, Miskolc’s smart surveillance project is wrapped up in an explicitly right-wing populist, and in certain respects racialised social ordering campaign. Second, not only is the CCTV network a key manifestation of a populist agenda, but it also reproduces the illiberal smart city through engineering a new consensus around securitisation without responding to the root causes of crime and segregation. Rather than engaging in depth with the digital technologies themselves, the article instead focuses on the underpinning politics of smart surveillance in Miskolc to show how, in the project’s implementation, post-political ideas are replaced by the overt campaigning machinery of the illiberal state.

Макиавеллистический момент Европы: перспективы интеграционного проекта ЕС в условиях утраты глобального политического равновесия

The European integration project, after 70 years of the successful implementation, is now facing a significant number of difficulties caused by the process of globalization. The list of these difficulties includes: (1) the incompleteness of the process of formation of the European identity; (2) the deepening contradiction between two fundamental legal principles — transnational and national constitutionalism; (3) the growing asymmetry between the European regions; (4) dramatic disputes over migration issues; (5) the ideological confrontation between liberal and illiberal democracies. This situation, exacerbated by the challenges of globalization and officially defined today as the “existential crisis” of the EU, revealed certain significant flaws in the current integration model hung between confederalism and federalism. The shortcomings, such as weakened democratic legitimacy, ineffective decision-making and the absence of clear and stable European leadership, have resulted in the growing spread of Euroscepticism and rightwing populism, as well as the erosion of Europe’s mission in the world. The increasingly obvious threat of a loss of political balance in Europe makes it important to comprehend the potential directions and scope of changes in the EU integration project, to assess the hypothetically possible legal and institutional forms of the new integration model and their political implications. The author describes the current situation as a Machiavellian moment in Europe: under the conditions when the preservation of the status quo only reinforces the contradictions within the integration project, the European elites are faced with the necessity to make a clear choice between a confederal and a federal system in order to find a new legitimizing formula for this fading project, and it should be done as soon as possible.

Lessons from the Advocacy Coalition Framework for climate change policy and politics

The world faces grand challenges that threaten our socio-economical, ecological, and political systems. Inequities, insurrections, invasions, and illiberal democracies represent a sample of the population of problems facing life as we know it. Paramount among these problems lie climate change, caused principally by human activity of burning fossil fuels. This paper offers a perspective on climate change from a “lens” in the social sciences. By analyzing applications (n = 67) of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to climate change, we aim to examine patterns across these applications of the ACF, particularly concerning the characteristics of coalitions, how they behave, change policy, and learn. We conclude that future studies should examine how coalitions and beliefs can better address wicked problems in an increasingly global and interconnected world. We propose the prioritization of studying non-democratic governance arrangements and underrepresented locations of study, pairing the ACF with other theories and frameworks to address complex questions, and prioritizing normative dynamics of climate change politics.