In the aftermath of the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami, both the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and "ordinary people" pledged donations to the afflicted regions.1 Triumphant headlines in the People's Daily likewise made a statement about China's rise from aid recipient to aid donor. Not coincidentally, the expanding scope of projects financed by China abroad, mainly in Africa and South America but also closer to home in Burma, Cambodia and Laos, attracted considerable attention from Western media in 2005.2 From Guyana to Nigeria, China has emerged as a key source of state-led investment in infrastructure projects without the good-governance and human-rights strings that are attached to financing through international development structures, and Chinese companies have become a visible presence as major builders of roads, pipelines, bridges, hospitals, harbors, stadiums, water-supply facilities and so on.3 In the Sudan, Chinese state-owned enterprises have invested US$3 billion in the oil industry and helped to build a 1,540-kilometre pipeline and a refinery.4 In July 2005, censured by the UN for evicting 700,000 people from their houses, Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe traveled to China for a US$300 million loan (he was denied it). In Northern Laos, Golden Boten City, a new Chinese real estate development, with international airport included, is being advertised to investors as a "developing space beyond belief. The brochure of the Golden Boten City Group assures potential investors that Although now there are just 1500 people living in 3 villages in Golden Boten City, you should believe that thousands of people will gather here in a beautiful morning or an autumn evening. They [will] live and develop here with various occupations and identities, to form a huge community, and a modern society.5 Similar signs of Chinese architectural modernity are fast squeezing out British colonial memories from Pakistan's hill stations and Sierra Leone's coast. In the institutionalized world of international development, in which states earmark aid budgets to be channeled through institutions such as the World Bank, such projects would be classed as private investment or, at best, as private aid. Yet in China-where aid and debt relief, though increasing, are far less significant than state subsidies for overseas construction projects6-both officials and managers discuss them in the language of development. While the roots of development discourse in China and in international organizations are shared, as are their proclaimed goals of aiding the economic and human progress of recipient societies, their emphases are rather different. The discourse of international development has, in the past decade, veered away from the previous, strongly criticized, unilateral emphasis on economic indicators and structural models originating in the West, and towards a socially and culturally "sensitive" framework-though just how much difference that shift has made on the ground is a matter of debate.7 Chinese accounts of "contributing to development" abroad do not share these recent scruples: they typically remain purely economic and are set in contexts that, from the perspective of the now-professionalized "international development community", appear highly unusual. The idea of exporting development centering on investment, trade and migration (for Chinese road projects are built by Chinese workers, and Chinese-sponsored farming projects typically bring both Chinese workers and technical advisors) is quite different from that practiced by today's international organizations, though perhaps not that different from earlier, colonial projects, in which the ground-level agents of modernization tended to be indentured laborers and traders imported from India and, again, China. Central to Western-originated international discourse is the separation of aid from investment: the idea that development aid is a not-for-profit affair, and accusations of profit-making can discredit donors. …