Common Sense Beliefs Research Articles

Judges and lawyers’ beliefs in repression and dissociative amnesia may imperil justice: further guidance required

ABSTRACT This article examines continuing misunderstanding about memory function especially for trauma, across three UK samples (N = 717). Delayed allegations of child sexual and physical abuse are prevalent in Western legal systems and often rely upon uncorroborated memory testimony to prove guilt. U.K. legal professionals and jurors typically assess the reliability of such memory recall via common sense, yet decades of scientific research show common sense beliefs often conflict with science. Recent international surveys show controversial notions of repression and accurate memory recovery remain strongly endorsed. In historical cases, these notions may lead to wrongful convictions. The current study surveyed the U.K. public, lawyers, and mental health professionals’ beliefs about repression, dissociative amnesia and false memories. Study findings give unique data on judges’ and barristers’ beliefs. Overall, the study findings reinforce international scientists’ concerns of a science – knowledge-gap. Repression was strongly endorsed by lay, legal and clinical participants (> 78%) as was dissociative amnesia (> 87%). Moreover, suboptimal professional legal education and juror guidance may increase misunderstanding. Correcting beliefs about memory function, and extending the contribution of memory science in the courtroom remains an important quest for cognitive scientists.

CONTRIBUIÇÕES DE LUKÁCS E GRAMSCI NO MÉTODO DIALÉTICO COMO PROCESSO EDUCATIVO

This essay seeks to bring together the ideas of Gramsci and Lukacs, in their perspective of the orthodoxy of the dialectical method, each in its own way (historicity and totality), and which is a unique method for theory and an educational practice in the broadest sense of the term , That is, of human formation. And also the ideology that also was a point of convergence between those of the craftsmen of the Marxist thought. For to the two, and this is clear in Ontology and in the Cadernos, ideology is the vehicle of which men are used to give answers to the conflicts of the experience. Therefore, education must be an ideological intervention to demoralize common-sense beliefs and transmute them into an emancipated consciousness.

Biased Knowers, Biased Reasons, and Biased Philosophers

Abstract In Bias: A Philosophical Study, Thomas Kelly offers a response to epistemological skepticism grounded in his account of bias. According to Kelly, the classic argument for skepticism is best understood as an attempt to show that our commonsense beliefs are biased against the skeptic. Kelly grants that this is true but argues that biased beliefs can still be knowledge. I offer two objections. First, if we are applying Kelly’s theory of bias to skepticism, it is best to think of the skeptic’s challenge to be that our anti-skeptical beliefs are based on what we know to be biased reasons. Kelly has not shown that this sort of bias is compatible with knowledge. Second, Kelly’s approach to the problem of skepticism is an example of what I have called “unambitious epistemology.” And, for that reason, it is not a satisfactory answer to skepticism.

Favela’s Individual and Collective Access to Justice under the Brazilian Democratic Constitution: An Overview of 30 Years of Insurgent Peripheral Litigation

This paper discusses the democratization of the judiciary in Brazil considering its access for people who live in favelas. We used a temporal and spatial analysis of the civil decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals of the State of Rio de Janeiro (TJRJ). The analysis takes two perspectives: (1) the access to justice – whether individually or collectively; and (2) the response of judges to the claims filed. The results suggest a connection between: (1) the increasing access by favela dwellers to the judiciary and the improvement of social development levels; (2) low incidence of collective claims and negligence by judges regarding this kind of claim; (3) lack of consistency between the precedents and the favela reality and social changes over the past few years; and how these findings (4) challenged some academic common-sense beliefs on "access to justice" in Brazil.

Mind-brain identity theory confirmed?

Presented here is a novel graphical, structural, and functional model of the embodied mind. Despite strictly adhering to a physicalistic and reductionist approach, this model successfully resolves the apparent contradiction between the thesis regarding the causal closure of the physical realm and the widely held common-sense belief that the mental realm can influence physical behavior. Furthermore, it substantiates the theory of mind-brain identity while shedding light on its neural foundation. Consciousness, viewed as an epiphenomenon in certain respects, simultaneously possesses causal potency. These two aspects operate concurrently through distinct brain processes. Within the paper, particular emphasis is placed on the significance of qualia and emotions, accompanied by an explanation of their phenomenal nature grounded in the perceptual theory of emotions. The proposed model elucidates how autonomous agents can deliberate on various action scenarios and consciously select the most optimal ones for themselves, considering their knowledge of the world, motivations, preferences, and emotions.

Determinism, Counterfactuals, and the Possibility of Time Travel

The Consequence argument is an argument from plausible premises–our lack of causal power over the laws and past–to an implausible conclusion: that if determinism is true, we are equally powerless with respect to the future. What the compatibilist needs is a theory of counterfactuals that preserves the links between counterfactuals, causation, and the natural laws in a way that supports our commonsense belief that we have the power to make a causal difference to the future but no such power with respect to the past. Lewis’s critique of the Consequence argument was based on his theory of counterfactuals and his analysis of causation as a counterfactual relation between particular events. He argued that, at a world that is deterministic in the way that ours might be, counterfactuals are temporally asymmetric in a way that matches the contingent temporal asymmetry of cauation. So it is not surprising, but only to be expected, that the past is causally closed while the future is causally open. If this worked, it would be just what the compatibilist needs. But it doesn’t work. There is an argument, due to Tooley and recently endorsed by Wasserman, that a fundamental feature of Lewis’s theory of counterfactuals is inconsistent with the metaphysical possibility of time travel and backwards causation. If this is right, then Lewis’s response to the Consequence argument fails. I endorse this conclusion, but argue that there is a better theory of counterfactuals–a theory that leaves open the metaphysical possibility of time travel to the past and backwards causation.

English is ‘the language everybody shares’ but it is ‘my native language’: language ideologies and interpersonal relationships among students in internationalizing higher education

ABSTRACT This paper examines the roles of different language ideologies—sets of common-sense beliefs about language and its speakers—in students’ identity construction and negotiation in the context of internationalizing higher education. Along with the increasing diversity of students as English speakers, language ideologies have been critically examined for potential contribution to inequalities among students. I analyze two focus group discussions of students from international English-medium instruction master’s programs at a Finnish university. I explore the students’ talk using critical discursive psychology to illuminate possible intersections between language ideologies and students’ situated identity construction, paying attention to ideological dilemmas alongside students’ identity negotiation. The findings indicate that both emerging and established language ideologies may become relevant to students’ identity construction and negotiation. Possibly, turning students’ attention towards the multilinguality of every student and the specific purposes and characteristics of academic language might contribute to the discursive sustainability of inclusive interpersonal relationships among students.

Circumcision Stories: Enhancing our Understanding of Parental Perspectives in a Context of Controversy.

This commentary examines twelve stories in which parents recount how they (and often their co-parent) decided whether or not to circumcise their newborn sons. Several debated whether this should be their decision to make. The stories offer an intimate glimpse into people's efforts to do the best for children in a context of incomplete and changing information and intense public controversy. The commentary explores the diverse meanings and contradictory commonsense beliefs that surround foreskin removal in the United States today. Considering these parents' reflections-and their silences-can help us appreciate the real-life consequences of debates about the ethics of male circumcision.

Plant sentience: Time scale matters

Segundo-Ortin & Calvo (2023) have made a valuable effort in directing the discussion about plant sentience toward a strict scientific path. However, scientific endeavors must reconcile with common sense beliefs. Although nowadays people tend to accept the idea of animal sentience, this is not easily extended to plants. One reason is the difference in time scale in which phenomena occur in plants and animals; but this still does not preclude the possibility , in principle, of plant sentience in a form difficult for us to imagine.

Peirce on Vagueness and Common Sense

Abstract: "Issues of Pragmaticism" (1905) contains the only published version of Peirce's doctrine of "critical common-sensism." One of the claims of that doctrine is that common sense beliefs are invariably vague. In this paper, we seek to explain this claim. We begin by providing a philological reconstruction of the drafts of "Issues of Pragmaticism" and a comparison of Peirce's several, successive expositions of critical common-sensism across those drafts. Then we examine Peirce's theory of vagueness; we show that there is both a "subjectal" and a "predicative" variety of vagueness, and that Peirce construes predicative vagueness according to three distinct models. Finally, we assess in what sense, i.e., according to which of the three models, common sense beliefs may be said to be invariably vague.

Peirce on Vagueness and Common Sense

Abstract: "Issues of Pragmaticism" (1905) contains the only published version of Peirce's doctrine of "critical common-sensism." One of the claims of that doctrine is that common sense beliefs are invariably vague. In this paper, we seek to explain this claim. We begin by providing a philological reconstruction of the drafts of "Issues of Pragmaticism" and a comparison of Peirce's several, successive expositions of critical common-sensism across those drafts. Then we examine Peirce's theory of vagueness; we show that there is both a "subjectal" and a "predicative" variety of vagueness, and that Peirce construes predicative vagueness according to three distinct models. Finally, we assess in what sense, i.e., according to which of the three models, common sense beliefs may be said to be invariably vague.

Understanding Hegel's Logic: On Houlgate's Hegel on Being

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Students’ understanding of the inverse square law in electrostatics

One problem of learning Electrostatics is that students often learn from their commonsense beliefs about electric force and electric field. This study investigated students’ conceptual understanding of finding electric force, electric field, and electric potential of point charge after learning an introductory physics course. We administered the Electrostatics Conceptual Evaluation Test to four lecture-based classes in high school. The first question was a comparison of the electric force from two-point charges at two different positions and the second question was a comparison of the electric field from a point charge at two different positions. The use of the inverse square law is required to find the electric force and the electric field at various positions. It was found that many students answered incorrectly. They described that the electric force and the electric field decrease whereas the distance increases by neglecting the inverse square law. This finding can be particularly used to suggest high school teachers to develop their effective strategy to support student learning.

The Priority of Common Sense in Philosophy

The aim of this paper is to explore the issue of priority of common sense in philosophy. It is divided into four parts. The first part discusses examples of common-sense beliefs and indicates their specific nature, especially compared to mere common beliefs. The second part explores in more detail the supposed positive epistemic status of common-sense beliefs and the role they play in delimiting plausible philosophical theories. The third part overviews a few attempts to formulate a legitimate argument, or justification, in favor of the positive epistemic status of common-sense beliefs, none of which, however, appears to be clearly successful. Finally, the fourth part addresses the central issue of priority of common sense. Two different types of priority are introduced, epistemic and methodological, and it is argued that only the latter applies to common-sense beliefs. If so, then common-sense beliefs are not to be conceived as cases of knowledge but as the clearest cases of what we believe is knowledge.

Knowledge and the Fall in American Neo-Calvinism: Toward a Van Til–Plantinga Synthesis

Abstract Cornelius Van Til and Alvin Plantinga represent two strands of American Protestant philosophical thought influenced by Dutch neo-Calvinism. This paper compares and synthetizes their models of knowledge in non-Christians given the noetic effects of sin and non-Christian worldview commitments. The paper argues that Van Til’s distinction between the partial realization of the antithesis in practice and its absolute nature in principle correlates with Plantinga’s insistence on prima facie–warranted common-sense beliefs and their ultimate defeasibility given certain metaphysical commitments. Van Til endorsed more radical claims than Plantinga on epistemic defeat in non-Christian worldviews, the status of the sensus divinitatis, and conceptual accuracy in knowledge of the world. Finally, an approach to the use of evidence in apologetics is developed based on the proposed synthesis. This approach seeks to make more room for evidence than is generally recognized in Van Tilianism, while remaining consistent with the founder’s principles.

EFFICIENCY OF COLLECTIVE ACTIONS OF BEEF CATTLE PRODUCERS IN THE MIDWEST OF BRAZIL

Contrary to common-sense beliefs that beef cattle producers have difficulties in cooperating among themselves, cooperation initiatives can be noticed in Brazil, especially in the Midwest region. Built on a theoretical framework of Collective Actions and Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), this work analyzes the horizontal cooperation pattern of beef cattle producers in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul (MS). We focused on Private Interest Organizations (PIOs) with the purpose of identifying typologies and analyzing beef collective actions efficiency. Case studies with seven PIOs conducted through semi-structured interviews exhibits the efficiency of these organizations regarding the ability to provide collective goods, which vary according to their organizational aspects and typology. Results points out that PIOs were founded to contribute in technology and professionalization, increasing competitiveness and access to new markets, coordinating productive systems, reducing transaction costs among agents, modifying the institutional environment, and, finally, altering the behavior of bovine meat consumers.

Santayana, Commonsensism, and the Problem of Impervious Belief

Abstract Commonsensism is a thesis about commonsense beliefs: our commonsense beliefs are items of knowledge (or should be so regarded) that have epistemic or methodological priority. This account of commonsensism risks making our commonsense beliefs impervious to philosophical argument. But in Santayana's commonsensism, what deserves our trust is not our commonsense beliefs but the development of common sense over successive generations. Our commonsense beliefs deserve only a secondary or subsidiary trust; we trust them only insofar as we trust the momentum of common sense. I examine Santayana's distinctive form of commonsensism and explain why he avoids putting trust primarily in commonsense beliefs.

Social representations of COVID-19 (Representaciones sociales del COVID-19)

ABSTRACT This is a reflection on the communication modalities of dissemination, propagation and propaganda as they have manifested in the COVID-19 pandemic. It describes the anchoring of the representations of COVID-19 in past diseases, other nationalities, anti-hygienic practices and groups deviating from the ethos of individualistic self-control. It examines the objectification of the representation of COVID-19 in heroes (healthcare workers), elite villains (pharmaceutical company owners, ineffective governments), common villains (careless people, mindless masses) and victims (the elderly, the poor). It provides explanations and hypotheses on the sociopolitical correlate, the dynamic of common-sense beliefs and their relationship with social behaviour.

Evolutionary debunking arguments, commonsense and scepticism

Evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs) seek to infer from the evolutionary origin of human beliefs about a particular domain to the conclusion that those beliefs are unjustified. In this paper I discuss EDAs with respect to our everyday, commonsense beliefs. Those who seriously entertain EDAs for commonsense argue that natural selection does not care about truth, it only cares about fitness, and thus it will equip us with beliefs that are useful (fitness-enhancing) rather than true. In recent work Griffiths and Wilkins argue that this is a mistake. Fitness-tracking and truth-tracking are not rival, but rather potentially complementary, hypotheses about the function of our cognitive belief-forming systems. It may be that those systems maximise fitness by tracking the truth. I argue that while they are right about the standard EDAs for commonsense, the threat of evolutionary scepticism remains, because cognitive systems whose function is to track the truth may still be highly unreliable. I propose an alternative, Moorean approach to vindicating our commonsense picture of the world and dispelling the threat of scepticism. Once this has been established, however, we may appeal to evolution to explain the good fit between our cognition and the world. I thus propose that an evolutionary explanatory project ought to replace the troubled evolutionary justificatory project. This ought to be appealing to those such as Griffiths and Wilkins who seek a naturalistic non-sceptical account of our commonsense beliefs and their origins.

A Modest Argument Against Scepticism

Abstract: In this paper we don’t intend to show, against the sceptic, that most of our everyday beliefs about the external world are cases of knowledge. What we do try to show is that it is more rational to hold that most of such beliefs are actually ca- ses of knowledge than to deny them this status, as the external world sceptic does. In some sense, our point of view is the opposite of Hume’s, who held that reason clearly favours scepticism about the independent existence of an external world rather than common sense belief in such an independent existence. In arguing for the superior rationality of this common sense, Moorean view, we also take a fallibi- list conception of knowledge to be rationally preferable to an infallibilist view of it. Keywords: Scepticism, argument from knowledge, common sense, brains-in-a-vat, Moore, Hume, fallibilism.