Commonsense View Research Articles

RESPONSIBLE CHOICES, DESERT-BASED LEGAL INSTITUTIONS, AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY NEUROSCIENCE

AbstractNeuroscience is commonly thought to challenge the basic way we think of ourselves in ordinary thought, morality, and the law. This paper: (1) describes the legal institutions challenged in this way by neuroscience, including in that description both the political philosophy such institutions enshrine and the common sense psychology they presuppose; (2) describes the three kinds of data produced by contemporary neuroscience that is thought to challenge these commonsense views of ourselves in morals and law; and (3) distinguishes four major and several minor kinds of challenges that that data can reasonably be interpreted to present. The major challenges are: first, the challenge of reductionism, that we are merely machines; second, the challenge of determinism, that we are caused to choose and act as we do by brain states that we do not control; third, the challenge of epiphenomenalism, that our choices do not cause our actions because our brains are the real cause of those actions; and fourth, the challenge of fallibilism, that we do not have direct access to those of our mental states that do cause our actions, nor are we infallible in such knowledge as we do have of them.

For-Profit Business as Civic Virtue

According to the commonsense view of civic virtue, the places to exercise civic virtue are largely restricted to politics. In this article, I argue for a more expansive view of civic virtue, and argue that one can exercise civic virtue equally well through working for or running a for-profit business. I argue that this conclusion follows from four relatively uncontroversial premises: (1) the consensus definition of “civic virtue”, (2) the standard, most popular theory of virtuous activity, (3) a conception of the common good widely shared by liberal political philosophers, and (4) the mainstream economic theory of for-profit business.

About the (Non)Linearity in Inflation Hedging

We examine the impact of inflation on returns to bills, bonds, equity, and several international assets. The analysis covers 50 countries across 61 years and uses spatial correlation consistent standard errors and a matrix transformation to account for overlapping data. The results indicate a nonlinearity in inflation hedging for most assets: Bills and bonds hedge low inflation well, but as expected, fail to protect against serious inflation. Equities and most international assets hedge serious inflation eectively in the short and long run. However, their real returns react negatively when inflation is low, especially at short horizons. Only commodities and emerging market equity remain as reliable hedge and do not exhibit a duality. The observed nonlinearity bridges the conflicting views of existing empirical research, especially the perverse hedge of equities, and the common sense view of real and international assets to be an inflation hedge.

If ‘one size does not fit all’ when embedding adult literacy in the workplace, how can we identify ‘what works’?

This article discusses the results of funded research that investigated how an industry training organisation in Aotearoa New Zealand embeds literacy in the workplace. Results confirm a ‘common-sense view’ that there is not one right way to embed workplace literacy. They also reveal a number of findings about what works effectively when embedding adult literacy in a workplace. The article first examines relevant literature around the purposes and meanings that inform embedded literacy practices. It then introduces the study that generated the data before outlining the various practices through which literacy is embedded into workplace education. This is followed by an exploration of some issues arising from this diversity before finally offering some insights about what needs to be considered when building in literacy into workplace programs.

Becoming Resilient: Overturning Common Sense — Part 1

How might we engage with the concept resilience in a world obsessed with the measurement and cataloguing of deficits and virtues alike; with predicting outcomes, producing certainty and the reification of stable identity? This article is based on a plenary address presented to the Australian Family Therapy Conference in 2009 and takes Deleuze's paraphrase of the 17th century philosopher, Spinoza as a point of departure from common sense views of identity. Can resilience be possessed by some as a personal quality enhancing their coping skills or might resilience be a vital aspect of living which passes through us? Perhaps resilience bounces back towards us and enables the unsettling of dogmatic beliefs and a stable sense of identity Enquiry might then shift from the moral; What kind of person am I? How should I live? towards an ethical position of wonder; What else might there be? What might I be capable of?This article invites an ethical exploration of desire, its capture and of resistance and explores the politics of identity; illustrated with men's journeys of struggle with violence, sexuality and belonging and the discovery of ethics and generous forms of love in the face of adversity.

Weakness and compulsion: the essential difference

This paper aims to defend the common-sense view that we exempt compulsive agents from responsibility to the extent that they are unable to choose what they do and hence they cannot control their actions by their choices. This view has been challenged in a seminal paper by Gary Watson, who claimed that akratic agents lack control in the same sense but they are responsible nonetheless. In the first part of the paper, I critically examine the arguments Watson advances for this claim first in his original paper and then in some more recent works. I conclude that his account is based on the widely held assumption that both compulsive behavior and weakness of the will must be understood as a direct result of some inner motivational conflict. In the second part, I argue for an alternative understanding of the difference between weakness and compulsion. My claim is that compulsion is a cognitive rather than a motivational deficiency, since the compulsive, unlike the weak-willed, does not desire to perform the action which she actually performs. Furthermore, I argue that compulsive agents cannot control their actions by their choices because they have a distorted view of their own actional abilities. In the final part of the paper, I discuss a consequence of this account to the conditional analysis of free will as a condition of responsibility.

Emotion and Agency in Zhuāngzǐ

Among the many striking features of the philosophy of the Zhuāngzǐ is that it advocates a life unperturbed by emotions, including even pleasurable, positive emotions such as joy or delight. Many of us see emotions as an ineluctable part of life, and some would argue they are a crucial component of a well-developed moral sensitivity and a good life. The Zhuangist approach to emotion challenges such commonsense views so radically that it amounts to a test case for the fundamental plausibility of the Daoist ethical orientation: If the Zhuangist stance on emotion is untenable, then other aspects of Daoist ethics may founder as well. In this essay, I explore what I call a Zhuangist ‘Virtuoso View’ of emotion and its connections with human agency, attempting to show that at least one version of a Zhuangist approach to emotion passes the ‘basic plausibility’ test. I begin by describing the Virtuoso View and sketching its theoretical foundation, which involves claims about human agency, the self, psychophysical hygiene, the good life, epistemology, and metaphysics. Next, I defend the Virtuoso View against three objections, namely that it abandons intentionality, that it interferes with a good life, and that it yields a schizophrenic conception of agency. I argue for three major theses. First, the Virtuoso View is easily intelligible and largely defensible. Second, it reflects a crucial insight into a fundamental dichotomy at the core of human agency: the unavoidable conflict within a self-aware human agent between an internal, engaged perspective and an external, detached one. Third, I suggest that certain problems or conflicts arising from the Virtuoso View actually reflect inherent features of the human predicament and thus are not mere conceptual defects. Hence even if we do not find the Virtuoso View wholly convincing, we can nevertheless gain much insight from it.

Privileges of First-Person Reference and of Third-Person Reference

It is a widely held view that persons have privileged knowledge about their own minds, although numerous different views on what this privilege exactly consists of exist. One possible way of interpreting it is to claim that persons can refer to their own mental states in a privileged way. I will argue that this view has to be extended. Our common-sense view about reference to mental states implies that besides privileges of first-person reference to one's own mental states, there also exist privileges of third-person reference to the mental states of others: Other persons can refer to all of the mental states of a person in a way that the person cannot. In a next step, I will explain that persons can take two perspectives towards their own mental states: a first-person perspective and a third-person perspective. I will conclude that the possibilities of first-person reference from a third-person perspective are limited.

Von Marburg nach Pittsburgh: Philosophie als Transzendentalphilosophie

The article reconstructs some of the basic decisions underlying Hermann Cohen′s theoretical philosophy by drawing a line to some claims of Winfrid Sellars′ and to one aspect of Robert Brandom′s philosophy. The first part is concerned with a comparison of the main theses of Cohen′s book Kants Theorie der Erfahrung and Sellars′ early essay entitled Some remarks on Kant′s Theory of Experience, both authors reading the Critique of Pure Reason as the discovery of a new, holistic concept of experience. The second part discusses some of the parallels between Cohen′s and Sellars′ respective critique of the myth of the given, and it is shown how Cohen′s later critique of Kant can be understood against this background. In the third part I suggest interpreting Cohen′s logic along the lines of Robert Brandoms inferentialism. It is the declared intention of both philosophers to explain the origin of the content of epistemic claims without making use of any claim about mental representations. The article ends with a comparison of Cohen′s and Sellars′ visions of the systematic character of philosophy. It is argued that while both assume the compatibility of scientific realism with an irreducibly normative ethics, Cohen′s approach is more ambitious, insofar as it requests ethics to develop its own ethical theory of man, the task of which is to overcome the mythical presuppositions of our common sense views on morals.

EMOTION AND ANECDOTE IN PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT: THE CASE OF HAVI CAREL'S ILLNESS

Abstract: Critics of Havi Carel's 2008 book, Illness: The Cry of the Flesh, have contended that Carel's deployment of phenomenological philosophy adds little to commonsense views about illness and that Carel relies too heavily on emotion‐laden autobiographical anecdotes. Against these contentions this article argues: first, that a perfectly respectable task of philosophy is to find reasons to support pre‐existing beliefs; and secondly, that Carel's use of anecdotes, while certainly appealing to readers' emotions, constitutes part of a legitimate argumentative strategy. The article links these proposals with broader debates concerning the proper task of philosophy and the role of emotionality and imagination in philosophical inquiry.

What aspects of vocabulary knowledge do textbooks give attention to?

Vocabulary researchers have established that multiple aspects of word knowledge need to be mastered in order for a learner to truly know a word. Teachers, however, seem to follow the commonsense view that equates learning words with learning meanings, and to mostly ignore other aspects of word knowledge. This study seeks to discover whether the same is true of textbooks. The vocabulary activities in nine General English textbooks at three proficiency levels were analysed and each activity’s focus on one or more of nine aspects of vocabulary knowledge noted. The results show that a single aspect of vocabulary knowledge — form and meaning — receives by far the most attention in the textbooks at all three levels, while two other aspects — grammatical functions and spoken form — also receive attention. The other six aspects receive little or no attention. This study thus suggests that a more rounded view of vocabulary knowledge needs to be adopted by materials writers, and argues for an approach in which items are revisited regularly as different aspects of vocabulary knowledge are introduced.

Cognitive development of bilingual children

There has always been a common-sense view that the number of languages that children learn, whether through natural exposure or educational intervention, has consequences for their development. The assumption was that these consequences were potentially damaging. Even now, after approximately 50 years of research on the topic, parents remain concerned about their children's development when it includes a bilingual experience. It is now clear that although parents were correct that speaking more than one language has consequences, the assumption about the nature of these consequences is not: the outcome of the experience is in fact the opposite of what many early researchers claimed and what many contemporary parents intuitively believe. In contrast to early warnings about negative consequences, bilingualism turns out to be an experience that benefits many aspects of children's development. Although there are documented delays in acquiring some formal aspects of each language, such as vocabulary (Bialystok 2010), bilingualism has either no effect (intelligence) or positive effects (metalinguistic awareness, cognitive development) on development.

BonJour on explanation and skepticism

Laurence BonJour, among others, has argued that inference to the best explanation allows us to reject skeptical hypotheses in favor of our common-sense view of the world. BonJour considers several skeptical hypotheses, specifically: (i) our experiences arise by mere chance, uncaused; (ii) the simple hypothesis which states merely that our experiences are caused unveridically; and (iii) an elaborated hypothesis which explains in detail how our unveridical experiences are brought about. A central issue is whether the coherence of one’s experience makes that experience more likely to be veridical. BonJour’s recent treatment of “analog” and “digital” skeptical hypotheses is also discussed. I argue that, although there are important lessons to be learned from BonJour’s writings, his use of inference to the best explanation against skepticism is unsuccessful.

A Sorry State: Apology Excepted

Hegemony is a preferred mode of governance. Because it relies more heavily on consent than on coercion, it tends to produce a more willing, and less resistant, citizenry. By its nature, hegemony depends crucially upon a widely shared, common-sensical view that elites are acting in the interests of those being governed, and this common sense underpins the legitimacy and authority of those in power. Failure to maintain such legitimacy can produce moments of severe crisis in governance, and such threats must be avoided or ameliorated. Typically, this kind of boundary work takes place “behind the scenes.” There are moments, however, when these efforts at state maintenance become visible, and might be investigated to reveal mechanisms that could be turned to progressive ends. We contend that official, state apologies offer one such avenue for investigation, and we offer our substantiation for this claim in the paper below.

Science, Common Sense and Reality

Does science provide knowledge of reality? In this paper, I offer a positive response to this question. I reject the anti-realist claim that we are unable to acquire knowledge of reality in favour of the realist view that science yields knowledge of the external world. But what world is that? Some argue that science leads to the overthrow of our commonsense view of the world. Common sense is 'stone-age metaphysics' to be rejected as the false theory of our primitive ancestors. Against such eliminativists about common sense, I argue that science both preserves and explains commonsense experience of the world. Though science may lead to the overthrow of deeply held beliefs, common sense reflects a more basic and durable level of experience. Commonsense beliefs are well-confirmed beliefs which are vindicated by their role in successful practical action each and every day. Common sense provides a firm basis on which to establish the realist approach to science.

Responsibilities of Criminal Justice Officials

abstractIn recent years, political philosophers have hotly debated whether ordinary citizens have a general pro tanto moral obligation to follow the law. Contemporary philosophers have had less to say about the same question when applied to public officials. In this paper, I consider the latter question in the morally complex context of criminal justice. I argue that criminal justice officials have no general pro tanto moral obligation to adhere to the legal dictates and lawful rules of their offices. My claim diverges not only from the commonsense view about such officials, but also from the positions standardly taken in legal theory and political science debates, which presume there is some general obligation that must arise from legal norms and be reconciled with political realities. I defend my claim by highlighting the conceptual gap between the rigid, generalised, codified rules that define a criminal justice office and the special moral responsibilities of the various moral roles that may underpin that office (such as guard, guardian, healer, educator, mediator, counsellor, advocate, and carer). After addressing four objections to my view, I consider specific contexts in which criminal justice officials are obligated not to adhere to the demands of their offices. Amongst other things, the arguments advanced in this paper raise questions about both the distribution of formal discretion in the criminal justice system and the normative validity of some of the offices that presently exist in criminal justice systems.

The democratic common sense

This article highlights ordinary young citizens’ understanding of democracy. In a system based on rule of the people, it is surprising how little attention scholars have paid to common-sense views of democracy. The article is based on focus group interviews with young Swedes. Their views of democracy are analyzed in the context of democratic theory. The results show that there is massive support among the youths for the democratic idea, that they see elite democracy as a self-evident form of democracy and that they consider democracy to be a problematic good, emphasizing their doubts about human capacity, limited ruling opportunities and problems around inequality and risky principles. References to research on Swedish education show that the conceptualizations in several respects reflect how democracy and citizenship are framed in Swedish schools. It is suggested that the results of the study can influence both the form and content of civic education.

What is the mathematical meaning of Steenbeck's principle of minimum power in gas discharge physics?

It is shown that Steenbeck's principle of minimum power, or voltage, for discharges with fixed current is not a corollary of the principle of minimum entropy production, in contrast to what is frequently assumed; besides, the latter principle itself does not provide a reasonable approximation in gas discharge physics. Similarly, Steenbeck's principle is not a corollary of mathematical models of gas discharges. Hence, this principle contradicts the mathematical models. A methodically correct evaluation of the error caused by the use of Steenbeck's principle requires a comparison of a solution obtained with the use of this principle with an exact solution to the same problem, rather than with experimental results or results deemed reasonable from the point of view of common sense. Such a comparison is performed for two examples from the theory of a cylindrical arc column. The examples show that the error incurred by the usage of Steenbeck's principle is uncontrollable and may be unacceptably high.

History and the Obvious

Even if historiography had the aim to be more elevated than history, it never really succeeded in finding more order in the historical events than the order which the point of view of common sense could see in them.In a certain sense historical writing remained obvious, that is, common sense, just like the flowing of the events it narrated. On the contrary, philosophy always claimed to give an account of human reality which was intended to be superior to human reality. That's the reason why philosophy never holds history in high esteem.

Tacit Consent Without Political Obligation

'Tacit consent' has long interested historians of political thought and political philosophers, but its nuances nevertheless remain unappreciated. It has its roots in the Roman law concept of a 'tacit declaration of will'. Explicating this concept allows a new conception of tacit consent to be proposed, which I term the 'tacit declaration of consent'. The tacit declaration of consent avoids both the triviality of common sense views and a weakness in Hobbes' account. Unlike other contemporary philosophical accounts, it avoids fictions and meets the condition of intentionality. Furthermore, it also advances understanding of the sorts of claim offered by proponents of a tacit consent-based theory of political obligation, whilst facilitating a more radical critique. The tacit consent-based theory of political obligation is not simply limited in application, but indefensible. It unwarrantedly transposes onto tacit consent the potentially fictional character of declarations of will.