Common Sense Philosophy Research Articles

Commonsense Realism and Triangulation

Realism about the external world enjoys little philosophical support these days. I rectify this predicament by taking a relatively pragmatist line of thought to defend commonsense realism; I support commonsense realism through an interpretation and application of Donald Davidson’s notion of triangulation, the triangle composed of two communicators coordinating and correcting their responses with a shared causal stimulus. This argument is important because it has a crucial advantage over the often used abductive argument for realism. My argument avoids unwarranted conclusions, whereas the abductive argument is “inflationary” because it reaches beyond the limits of evidence for its realist conclusion. To illustrate the problems of the abductive argument and motivate my Davidsonian approach, I take a brief look at the abductive argument for realism in Frederick Will’s work.

THE NECESSITY OF PRAGMATISM: OVERCOMING THE STALEMATE OF COMMON SENSE

The paper argues that the relation between the philosophy of common sense and skepticism ought to be perceived of as the relation between the two horns of a dilemma. Each position, it is therefore said, is able to confront the other with a valid objection, something which implies that neither of the two positions are defensible as such. The dilemma is only resolved, it is argued, by the way in which a pragmatic approach to knowledge enables us to incorporate the insights of both common sense and skepticism in a single position.

‘The Solution of the Enigma of the Universe’: J.F. Ferrier on Heraclitus

A conspicuous trend among physicists in the later twentieth century was the rapid and quite unexpected development of theories that had at the century’s outset generally been associated with Henri Bergson (1859-1941) and Karl Popper (1902-1994), conspicuously in the work of Nobel prize-winner Illya Prigogine. 1 This was now usually termed chaos theory, and was closely allied to concepts of nonlinearity, fractality, and complexity, and has notable ramifications in cosmology and the philosophy of Time. Prigogine himself acknowledged his philosophical predecessors, above all in Bergson and ultimately in Heraclitus. Evidence of the specifically modern continuities of this trend or development can be traced before Bergson to an interpretation of Heraclitus and the Philosophy of Time written by a powerful Scottish Common Sense philosopher of the mid nineteenth century, James Frederick Ferrier. In what follows it will be shown how, very much contrary to his normal tendency of thinking, Ferrier arrived at this interpretation, and just how it relates to Bergson and thence to Prigogine.

The rediscovery of common sense philosophy

Acknowledgments Introduction: Two Tribes The Metaphilosophy of Common Sense 'Evolutionary Argument' and the Metaphilosophy of Common Sense Towards a Taxonomy of Philosophical Error Theology's Trojan Horse Metaphysical Realism as a Pre-condition of Visual Perception Semantic Anti-Realism and the Dummettian Reductio Eliminating Eliminative Materialism Freedom and Responsibility On the Existence of Moral Facts Afterword Notes References Index

‘Organic Intellectuals’ as Catalysts of Change: Working with Young People in Conflict and Post Conflict Environments

Using the concept of ‘organic intellectual’, this paper explores the role of the indigenous community activist who engages with young people who become involved, directly or indirectly in communal and political conflict. The research also seeks to compare the skills, strategies and struggles utilised in this process between conflict and post conflict situations. Given the ‘fluid’ nature of the notion of the ‘organic intellectual’ it will also explore the intra-communal ‘struggle’ between ‘organic intellectuals’ with differing and opposing ideological worldviews, for the ‘hearts and minds’ of young people who find their communities in the forefront of conflict. The ‘organic intellectual’, being of and from the indigenous community and with an understanding of that community’s ‘commonsense philosophy’, is in a unique postion to influence and ‘empower’ young people. Often in conflict situations, and due to the socio-political realities and experiences of their community, many young people find themselves under communal pressure to enter into direct action and conflict or to resist such involvement. Either way a decision of this nature carries with it far reaching sociological and psychological consequences for the young individual and the community. The ideological position and subsequent role of the ‘organic intellectual’ is particularly significant when communities are in the process of both ‘divergence’ i.e. moving towards conflict and ‘convergence’ i.e. in the process of reconciliation and reconstruction. As ‘organic intellectuals’ they are in a position to motivate their respective communities through their ability to understand and articulate the prevailing dominant ‘commonsense philosophy’ and world view. As such they may also be ‘catalysts’ for change either as key mediators or antagonists in the ‘divergent’ or ‘convergent’ process. This paper, and on-going research, explores the struggles, strategies and skills of the ‘organic intellectual’ in working with young people to empower them to engage in democratic political processes.

Scottish Common Sense and Nineteenth-Century American Law: A Critical Appraisal

One overriding concern I have with Susanna Blumenthal's insightful and stimulating article, “The Mind of a Moral Agent: Scottish Common Sense and the Problem of Responsibility in Nineteenth-Century American Law,” is whether there is anything sufficiently distinctive about Scottish Common Sense philosophy that justifies the role Blumenthal ascribes to it. In a representative passage, she writes:Common Sense philosophy left would-be “moral managers” with a puzzle. If rational and moral faculties were innate and universal, what explained the great conflicts among men concerning matters of belief, manners, and morals … leading some to commit acts that were … patently irrational or downright evil? And to the extent that therewasa common sense about the dictates of reason, propriety, and moral sense, why did some individuals act in defiance of them?

Metaphysics, Moral Sense, and the Pragmatism of the Law

The authors of these insightful and stimulating commentaries all express skepticism about the role I assign to the Scottish Common Sense philosophy in my historical analysis, though their reasons for doing so are strikingly at odds with each other. Sarah Seo and John Witt concede the importance of the Common Sense philosophy at a theoretical level, even as they call attention to certain “competitor theories” of human nature, noting that these darker views of the self may have proved more influential in the framing of the American constitution. However, they go on to contend that all of this philosophizing about the human mind was actually of little consequence in the everyday adjudication of civil and criminal liability, as judges found more practical means of resolving “the otherwise intractable questions of moral responsibility” left unanswered by the Scottish philosophy. John Mikhail, by contrast, appears to be far more sanguine about the tractability of these questions, from a philosophical standpoint, going so far as to suggest that they were more or less resolved by British moralists before the Scottish Common Sense school even came into being. What truly set the Common Sense philosophers apart from their predecessors, and ought to determine their place in this history of ideas, Mikhail concludes, was the manner in which they contributed to the scientific process of tracing out the inner structure and innate capacities of “the moral mind”—a topic that is currently of intense interest in the cognitive and brain sciences.

The Measure of Mind

The Measure of Mind J. David Hoeveler (bio) John Carson. The Measure of Merit: Talents, Intelligence, and Inequality in the French and American Republics, 1750–1940. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007. xvii + 401 pp. Charts, notes, and index. $39.50. It is a simple proposition: democratic and republican governments function on the principle that all citizens deserve equal treatment. And it is a difficult question to answer: how, then, can such governments justify the inequality that derives from the disparity of intelligence and talents among individuals? In a study that ranges over two centuries and two nations that pioneered in republicanism, and among a great array of theorists and practitioners, John Carson takes up these questions. His work will give any reader much to think about. For indeed, any reflecting citizen must form some conclusions about these matters. Does nature arrange that some individuals or human types are inherently superior to others, or is society or special privilege mostly responsible for these effects? If nature is decisive, how far should a democratic state go in allowing a social elite to exercise power? Does it merit that power? Should the talented have an education different from the rest? And what are talents and intelligence anyway? How do we define and measure them? What understanding of these terms befits a democracy, such that it can properly justify the inequalities that derive from them and prevail in the social order? At the outset Carson himself seems to endorse some notion of collective intelligence, as his sprawling introduction might suggest. But he has read very widely and his ample endnotes will benefit any persons interested in this subject and peripheral ones. The Measure of Merit is an impressive piece of scholarship. Of course, many studies in intellectual history have tackled this question, mostly by examining political theories and social philosophies.1 Carson hopes to shed more light by looking at mental philosophers and psychologists among a larger group that has explored the subject of mind and intelligence. Doing so, of course, places great expectations on this group of thinkers, and it is not always the case that they intended their explorations of mind to have social readings or yield political policies. Carson, to his credit, is sensitive to social and political context and relates his subjects to the changing worlds of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. And his study [End Page 573] takes on much interest when he does. But sometimes he builds a bridge too easily traversed from the scientific realm to the social. Carson finds John Locke a useful starting point for his discussion. Indeed, Lockean ideas had considerable influence in both the countries he examines. In France Carson finds Lockean schools of associationists and sensationists, and also the influence of the (partly) Lockean rivals, the Scottish Common Sense philosophers. The author brings under review the French Enlightenment thinkers—Condillac, Condorcet, Helvétius, Rousseau. Together they reflected a concern of their movement, that the ancient regime faced a crisis of legitimacy: the old order could no longer be justified, but how might they reclaim a place for elites within a reformed system? Even with this concern as a background commonality, Carson finds much difference among the philosophes, as here and throughout his study he reads the texts with great sensitivity. Thus, for example, Condorcet may have insisted that all people, even the most savage, are natively equal, and with such confidence, he could call for a comprehensive system of education, available to all, but becoming progressively selective. Such a system would develop the talents of a new elite, trained in the sciences. A more skeptical view came from Voltaire, however: "No one will convince me that all minds are equally suitable to science," he wrote, "and that they differ only in regard to education. Nothing is more false" (p. 25). Americans also make an appearance in this first chapter. Thomas Jefferson set the terms of discussion for the young republic in articulating his concept of a natural aristocracy and his preference for it. That "natural aristocracy among men," rooted in virtue and talents as opposed to wealth and birth, Jefferson believed, could secure democracy on a safe foundation. John Adams had...

Prophet, Pastor, and Patriarch: The Rhetorical Leadership of Alexander Campbell (review)

Reviewed by: Prophet, Pastor, and Patriarch: The Rhetorical Leadership of Alexander Campbell Brian Jackson Prophet, Pastor, and Patriarch: The Rhetorical Leadership of Alexander Campbell. By Peter A. Verkruyse . Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2005; pp. ix + 225. $39.75. Alexander Campbell, father of nineteenth-century America's Restorationist Movement, was a man of profound rhetorical contradictions. He preached for unity within the Christian faith, yet his movement broke from the Baptists and eventually splintered into at least three distinct denominations. He was [End Page 551] university trained and immersed in both classical and Enlightenment rhetoric, and yet he eschewed the trappings of classical eloquence in favor of a more natural, conversational style. He sought to restore the ancient church, but used the persuasive principles of modern science, such as Lockean empiricism. He was an outsider without ecclesiastical rank, and yet his rhetorical leadership, according to Peter Verkruyse, hinged on the claim that his restoration theology could not be more authoritative, or more central, to Christianity. In Prophet, Pastor, and Patriarch, Verkruyse gives us a thorough and attentive reading of Alexander Campbell's rhetoric as he worked within these contradictions in publications and speeches, forging "an evolving leadership ethos" that was "progressively adapted to the shifting needs of the movement" (50). Near the end of the Revolutionary War, American religion began to transform itself through the impassioned work of largely uncredentialed populists whose charisma and rhetorical acumen did much to democratize the church. Methodists, Baptists, Mormons, itinerant preachers, African Americans, and women exhorters all contributed to a new atmosphere of anticlericalism, millennial expectation, innovative communication, and a new zeal for restoring the principles of the primitive church, long since lost. Under the leadership of Barton W. Stone, a Presbyterian minister in Kentucky, and Alexander Campbell, a handful of independent churches broke from other denominations to become the Stone-Campbell Movement, which would later fracture into the Christian Church, the Disciples of Christ, and the Churches of Christ. Through "discursive activities" alone rather than any "external authority" or "official position," Campbell became the leader of this popular religious movement (153). "The Ancient Gospel," he argued in 1830, "will alone be the instrument of converting the whole human race, and of uniting all Christians upon one and the same foundation," a foundation built on a literal interpretation of the Bible (24). Verkruyse describes how, as a young student at the University of Glasgow, Campbell was immersed in the rhetoric of the new science including Baconian induction, faculty psychology, Scottish commonsense realism, and George Campbell's "affective" rhetorical tradition (30). In all his rhetorical practices in America, Campbell used "historical and inductive proofs" to demonstrate the ways in which faith in the ancient gospel followed a clear understanding of the "facts" of the scriptures, if expounded naturally and with "perspicuity" by the preacher (38, 45). In his own writing and speaking, Campbell sought to convey these truths in "pure speech" that emphasized the "natural relationship between words, ideas, and human understanding" (44). This quest for certainty through evidentiary rhetoric was the hallmark of American theology until after the Civil War. To lay bare Campbell's rhetorical leadership, Verkruyse relies on a handful of the most popular theories in the discipline drawn from Aristotle, George [End Page 552] Campbell, Maurice Charland, Richard Lanham, Chaim Perelman, Kenneth Burke, and Ernest Bormann. He uses these theorists not so much to add anything new to the conversation on rhetorical theory as to read Alexander Campbell rhetorically to account for the way that his leadership of the movement evolved through his discourse. The product of this inquiry is a monograph in which each chapter introduces a different rhetorical theory and applies it through close reading to a selection from Campbell's sermons or articles. His goal, as he tells us in the beginning of the work, is to read Campbell's rhetorical leadership "diachronically" as it evolved from an uncompromising prophetic ethos of ridiculing theological enemies, to a more reasonable and tolerant pastoral ethos, and finally, in Campbell's old age, to a patriarchal ethos through which he cast himself as the father and "chief executive visionary" of the movement (146). Verkruyse's careful and close readings of...

Ferrier, Common Sense and Consciousness

James Frederick Ferrier developed his philosophy from a common sense background. However, his rejection of common sense philosophy in particular and Enlightenment philosophy in general results in the development of a system of idealism. In his series of lectures ‘An Introduction to the Philosophy of Consciousness - Parts I to VII’, which appeared in Blackwoods Magazine (1838–39), he outlines the problem with modern philosophy and argues that philosophy should follow a new direction. In his view, the most peculiar and interesting aspect of humanity is consciousness. He contends that the attempt to develop a ‘science of man’ is impossible because it transforms a person into an object of study and thereby fails to capture the most distinctive aspect of humanity, namely, consciousness. According to Ferrier, philosophy should be an extension of consciousness itself; it is: ‘consciousness sublimed’. This paper will outline the central arguments in ‘An Introduction to the Philosophy of Consciousness’ and show that an early example of British idealism was not only developed out of the common sense tradition but shares with common sense philosophy a focus on the immediate evidence of consciousness, placing the relationship between thought and world at the centre of philosophical inquiry.

Life Writing and Science Fiction: Constructing Identities and Constructing Genres

Each essay in the issue grapples with problems attending the social and literary construction of personal identities. Juxtaposing life writing and science fiction also suggests that generic identities ought to be grasped as complex social practices that connect discourse and power in a variety of ways.

Reid, Tetens, and Kant on the External World

Building on the research of Manfred Kuehn, the author argues that, whatever influence the Scottish Common Sense Philosophy of Thomas Reid may have had on the development of Immanuel Kant's refutation of idealism, it was filtered through the thinking of Kant's largely forgotten German contemporary, Johann Nicolaus Tetens. While the importance of Tetens for understanding Kant is examined in connection with only one idea, the aim is to demonstrate that Tetens is a figure worthy of serious historical consideration.

The influence of the Scottish covenant on the ‘election’ of representatives in the new American republic

SUMMARY This article analyses the nature of British and American political union in the late eighteenth century, and the manner in which Scottish religious ideas influenced the interplay between these two alternative political models, in order to contribute to new forms of representative assemblies. It uses the figure of John Witherspoon as a case study in order to outline the intellectual and structural links between American federal representation and the formation of religious representative hierarchies in the Anglo-Scottish Union during the eighteenth century. A notion of ‘virtue-as-duty’ was promoted by Witherspoon towards his students, and more generally, from within the large deliberative assemblies to which he belonged. If Witherspoon's students could correctly adopt his notion of virtue-as-duty, they could be set apart as small clusters, separate from other unregenerate factions, thereby giving them more authority as political representatives. This idea allows a link to be made between a Presbyterian form of representative hierarchy, and a classical republican one. In the Presbyterian hierarchy, although humans were ‘equalized’ by their shared depravity, some of the depraved could be ‘elected’ to higher social positions. In the classical hierarchy, general human equality nonetheless allowed social stratification. Yet where Witherspoon connected an elect few and a moral many, this also distanced the individual role in electing, or being elected. Both took place as a result of correctly fulfilled duty to divine moral conscience, rather than through any autonomous political choice moderated by individual moral sense, as imposed by a form of Scottish common-sense philosophy that most scholars argue was introduced into the American political context by Witherspoon himself. Rather, the legitimacy of those ‘elected’ derived from their ability to articulate that their position of leadership was ‘disinterested’ because it was divine grace that had placed them in such a position of public prominence, rather than their own agency or interest. That we can identify Witherspoon as the figure who was charged with teaching a new generation of leaders this form of counter-intuitive legitimacy allows us to connect him to a fundamental paradox with regard to the rise to prominence of his student-politicians, such as James Madison: Witherspoon's religious strain of thought, which shared many analogues with the late eighteenth-century Scottish covenanting movement, meant that his students could only justify their entrance into an aristocracy of leaders by negating the agency which supposedly allowed them to become a member of a public political elite within a federal representative system.

The Dominance of Evangelicalism: The Age of Spurgeon and Moody (review)

The Dominance of Evangelicalism: The Age of Spurgeon and Moody. By David W. Bebbington. [A History of Evangelicalism: People, Movement and Ideas in the English-Speaking World.] (Downers Grove, IEinois: InterVarsity Press. 2005. Pp. 288. $23.00.) David W. Bebbington is a general editor of the series in which this book is volume three in the projected five-volume series which will cover the eighteenth century to the present. His subject is the evangelical movement in the English speaking world-Britain, the United States, and the settler colonies of the British Empire-in the nineteenth century. He deals with this vast subject skillfully, and has produced a useful and clearly written account based upon an impressive familiarity with both primary and secondary source materials. The central thesis of the book is the dominant place of evangelicalism in the culture of the nineteenth century. The steps which defined the evangelical experience were the acceptance of the Bible as the source of truth, conversion as its beginning, redemption as its object, and work as its consequence. The spread of literacy and a common text, the English Bible, allowed evangelicals all over the world to share a religious bond that transcended distance and national and denominational identities. Bebbington uses two men to symbolize this unity, the American revivalist, Dwight L. Moody, and the English Baptist, Charles Haddon Spurgeon. Moody, together with his musical director, Ira Sankey crossed the Atlantic to preach to huge audiences with a message that cut across denominational lines. Moody's powerful sermons and Sankey's upbeat hymns were followed by inquiry rooms, a form of personal counseling, innovations widely copied. Spurgeon presided over London's Metropolitan Tabernacle, where he preached to the largest Protestant congregation in the world for nearly forty years. Spurgeon's printed sermons, published weekly, made him famous all over the world. Though a Baptist, like the nondenominational Moody, he was a man whose appeal was far beyond his religious base. Bebbington emphasizes throughout his work the unity of evangelicals world-wide. What is most striking about the movement is less its heterogeneity over space than its internal connections. (p.78) National historians have ignored the inner dynamic of evangelical experience which bound the faithful together. Evangelicals shared a common view of spirituality which found its expression in prayer, was reaffirmed by the home, guided by the sermon, and expressed in the conviction that Jesus was personal savior. That evangelical spirituality fueled outreach at home and the mission field abroad. Nineteenth-century evangelicalism was influential, because it was in harmony with the dominant cultural movement of Romanticism. Bebbington argues that the evangelicals were not as hostile to the Enlightenment as generally believed, and offers as evidence the influence of Enlightenment Commonsense Philosophy, particularly the argument that belief in God was intuitive in all human beings. …

The Skeptic and The Madman: The Proto‐Pragmatism of Thomas Reid

Even though the philosophy of common sense is not justifi able as such, the assump- tion upon which it rests, namely that there are things which we are not in position to doubt is correct. The reason why Thomas Reid was unable to bring this assumption out in a justifi able manner is that his views, both on knowledge and nature, are to be considered dogmatic. American pragmatists such as Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey on the other hand, may be seen as offering us a ‘critical’ and post-Darwinian philosophy of common sense.

Thomas Reid and Philosophy with Children

This paper presents a rationale for doing philosophy with children. It suggests a rationale that differs from more usual arguments supporting philosophy with children—for such reasons as that it will enhance problem solving-skills or will help pupils' thinking to be more logical. These worthy objectives are not denied but only considered somewhat subordinate to the rationale proposed. This is presented in three steps. In the first step the issue of whether philosophy should be done with children is considered in the context of claims that children may be too young to do philosophy or too inexperienced in the ways of academic discipline to be able to discern proper philosophy. These objections are weighty enough, especially in view of general teacher reluctance to engage with philosophy itself in any form. In the second part, I invoke the common sense philosophy of Thomas Reid as a method of philosophy particularly significant for, and appropriate to, philosophy for children. Finally, I show how these aspects arising out of my understanding of Reid's philosophy can help resolve at least some of the misgivings people have about doing philosophy with children. It is hoped that these discussions will illuminate the question of how it may be appropriate for children to do philosophy in classrooms today.

Legal Positivism and Scottish Common Sense Philosophy

This paper identifies a volitional theory of meaning common to speech act theory and legal positivism, represented by Hart and Kelsen. This model is compared and contrasted with the model of social operations developed by Reid, a Common Sense Enlightenment philosopher. Whereas the former subscribes to the view that meaning is generated by acts of will, the latter finds meaning to consist of the dual elements of sign and ‘directedness’.The ability of positivist theories to provide a structural account of the difference between legal rules and other rules is inextricably linked to this commitment to the volitional theory of meaning. The commitment to the volitional view however leads to problems in requiring that some kind of authority be presupposed in for plain rules to attain legal force. Such authority can only be established with recourse to further rules (thus falling into a malign infinite regress) or must be accepted as a matter of faith. Reid's criterion of direction however vitiates the need for an authority, instead accounting for social communication in general, and rules in particular, in terms of sociological factors. Although no comprehensive critique of the volitional theory is proposed, Reid's model is preferable on the grounds of explanatory richness.The core claims of the paper are that: (a) legal positivism necessarily subscribes to the volitional theory of meaning; (b) rejection of the volitional theory necessarily entails rejection of the positivist view that legal and non-legal rules can be differentiated on structural grounds (c) another counter-model exists which avoids some of the pitfalls of the volitional theory; (d) if the volitional theory is rejected then the existence of rules can only be accounted for in a 'strong' sociological sense and legal theory must accordingly accept the dominant role of sociology in conceptualising the nature of rules.

Аналітична філософія д. Е. Мура: неомодерн як реставрація філософських настанов модерну

The author argues that the philosophical and cultural origins of analytic philosophy can be determined through its connection with the Enlightenment, but this thesis should not be accepted without reservations. The position of analytic philosophy in the context of scientism is not absolute. In particular, Moore is in "open conflict" with scientism and "all forms of skepticism." According to the author, this conflict is a consequence of the Enlightenment roots of analytic philosophy. The article compares the strategies of antiskeptic polemics of Thomas Reed and George Edward Moore, in particular, their attitude to common sense and criteria of truth. The conclusion of this comparison is the thesis that the crisis of the philosophy of common sense is inevitable both in case of its failure and in case of complete success. The author claims that the attempt to combine philosophy and common sense can ultimately lead to the self-destruction of philosophy.

Between Reason and Common Sense. On the Very Idea of Necessary (though Unwarranted) Belief

This essay is intended as a companion-piece to my article, “Reality in Common Sense: Reflections on Realism and Anti-Realism from a ‘Common Sense Naturalist’ Perspective.” (Philosophical Investigations, Vol. 25, No. 4 (October 2002). It explores the epistemological dimension of the Common Sense Naturalism that I developed in that earlier, predominantly metaphysical essay; a position that combines the views of David Hume, Thomas Reid, and the Wittgenstein of On Certainty. My ultimate aim is to produce a comprehensive philosophy of common sense, one that with future installments, will come to include an ethical and social-political philosophy as well. “Between Reason and Common Sense” offers a common sense naturalist reply to the skeptic. My basic argument is that the skeptic makes a Rylean category mistake, when he applies the concept of warrant to epistemologically basic beliefs, such as the belief in the external world or in the continued and distinct existence of bodies. He misidentifies these beliefs as being ordinary, when they are really a part of the framework that make the practices of believing and justifying possible. As a result, they are not themselves open to confirmation or disconfirmation. I also try to characterize the nature of the necessity carried by framework beliefs, in a way that avoids the charge that the common sense naturalist is simply a closet foundationalist.

Nathaniel William Taylor and Thomas Reid: Scottish common-sense philosophy's impact upon the formation of New Haven theology in Antebellum America

This paper will examine the relationship between Scottish common-sense philosophy and the formation of New Haven Theology. It will be illustrated that Nathaniel William Taylor's adaptations of orthodox Calvinism (particularly the doctrines of election and predestination and total depravity) relied heavily upon the principles of common-sense philosophy found in the work of Thomas Reid. Furthermore, it will be argued that Taylor's adaptation of Calvinism was a necessary accommodation to the phenomenon of mass conversion and evangelism during the Second Great Awakening.