Common Security Research Articles

Francuska prezydencja w Radzie Unii Europejskiej – bilans w świetle Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony UE

This analysis aims to evaluate the implementation of the priorities of the French Presidency of the Council of the European Union and the challenges it faced, with particular emphasis on the objectives of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. The article describes the French Presidency in a broader European geopolitical context, which affected the final shape of the presidency’s goals and their implementation.

‘Afghanistan Factor’ in India–Russia Relationship

Afghanistan has been an important factor in India–Russia ties. There was not much cooperation between them before 1979. However, in later years, the two countries had an intelligence-sharing mechanism along with Afghanistan in order to deal with their common security challenges which had close links with security situation in Afghanistan. In the 1990s, India–Russia supported their mutual fight against terrorism as Taliban-controlled Afghanistan became a common security challenge. In the current context, both countries have established institutional mechanisms to coordinate their Afghanistan policies. Their engagement with Taliban is ‘conditional’ while the two countries would continue to share intelligence and coordinate their respective Afghanistan policies since they still face similar security challenges from Afghanistan.

Searching common security in the Bay of Bengal

ABSTRACT The Bay of Bengal gained greater importance as an economic hub when the Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand – Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) initiative was established in 1997. Besides the promotion of trade and investment, security issues have also become a common concern for BIMSTEC members since 2005. In contrast to other regional organisations BIMSTEC member states share common perspectives of many non-traditional security threats. Even if regional solutions with all member states may be difficult to achieve this has opened the space for bilateral or mini-lateral initiatives mainly under India’s leadership. The BIMSTEC summit in 2022 has strengthened the institutional framework of the organisation that should help to tackle common security challenges.

RONSI: a framework for calculating return on network security investment

This competitive environment is rapidly driving technological modernization. Sophisticated cyber security attacks are expanding exponentially, inflicting reputation damage and financial and economic loss. Since security investments may take time to generate revenues, organizations need more time to convince top management to support them. Even though several ROSI techniques have been put out, they still need to address network-related infrastructure. By addressing gaps in existing techniques, this study delivers a comprehensive framework for calculating Return on Network Security Investment (RONSI). The proposed framework uses a statistical prediction model based on Bayes’ theorem to calculate the RONSI. It is validated by Common Vulnerability Security Systems (CVSS) datasets and compared to existing studies. The results demonstrate that the annual loss is reduced to 75% with the proposed RONSI model after implementing a security strategy, and the proposed model is compared with existing studies. An organization can effectively justify investments in network-related infrastructure while enhancing its credibility and dependability in the cutthroat marketplace.

Lithuanian-Polish security cooperation in European Union (EU) Defence Programs

This article is part of a broad discussion concerning the deteriorating security environment in the European neighbourhood and the initiatives the European Union (EU) and its Member States (MS) took to intensify security and defence cooperation. The war in Ukraine put pressure on the entire regional security structure. Hence increased investments and more collaboration are necessary to jointly develop and use the military capabilities that the EU and Baltic region need. In this context, it is interesting how Lithuania and Poland – both Eastern EU members with grave concerns and engagement in regional security – perceive and utilize the potential that EU programs offer. This article will look deeper into the level of cooperation between Lithuania and Poland before the intensification of military operations in Ukraine in February 2022. Furthermore, the paper presents an overview of the regional cooperation concept, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and its funds, agencies, and instruments. The key elements of this study are the analysis of both countries’ involvement in the European Defence Fund (EDF) preparatory programs implemented since 2017.

The EU as a Crisis Manager: Ensuring Accountability Under IHL

In 2022, the EU published its Strategic Compass, setting the course for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the coming years. The most eye-catching proposal in the Compass is the creation of an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (EU RDC). The creation of such a multinational force as part of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) toolbox, which may well engage in armed conflicts, is problematic for the attribution of possible violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This paper describes how the EU may be held accountable for the acts committed by the troops it deploys. Then it will discuss how the differences in the organization of EU operations may affect the opportunities for attribution. Finally, the paper recommends the EU’s CSDP operations to have a command and control structure that is fully integrated as this ensures the highest level of certainty when it comes to the attribution of wrongful acts. European Union, EU Rapid Deployment Capacity, International Humanitarian Law, EU Strategic Compass, multinational operations, accountability, CFSP, peacekeeping, crisis management

EU Sanctions Against the Russian Federation and Their Implications for the Foreign Trade of the Czech Republic

Modern European integration entails the common foreign and security policy. In February 2022, the Russian aggression against Ukraine moved the deplorable situation from 2014 to another level calling for an EU reaction via legal instruments. Based on them, ten sanctions packages have emerged with significant consequences. The aim of this paper is to analyze it, in particular the connection of these ten sanctions packages and foreign trade between the Czech Republic and the Russian Federation. This aim is achieved by addressing three sets of goals: (i) the legal analysis of EU trade policy instruments, (ii) an advanced statistical and critical analysis of the trade between Czech Republic and Russian Federation and (iii) a creation of a timeline of the application and its ramifications. This reveals interesting propositions about the impact of these sanctions packages on the Czech foreign trade and about the effectiveness of the EU´s trade policy.

Deterrence and Security： The Impact of Military Conflicts on Global Peace

Deterrence theory is one of the important theories of international relations research during the Cold War. From the birth of deterrence theory to today, its main meaning has developed from nuclear deterrence as the core to conventional deterrence. By studying the impact of the Gulf War on the US deterrence capability and the impact of the Russia-Ukrainian War on Russia's deterrence capability, this paper argues that military conflict is not only a test of deterrence capability, but also a shaping process of deterrence capability. In military conflict, a country's performance will affect its opponents and other countries' perception of its strength and will, thereby increasing or decreasing its deterrence capability. The United States established a strong conventional deterrence capability in the global scope through the Gulf War, which enabled the United States to obtain a large number of potential allies and national interests after the Cold War. Russia's mediocre performance in the Russia-Ukrainian War is undermining its conventional deterrence that it established after the Cold War through military reform and a series of military actions, and its geo-security environment is deteriorating due to its reduced deterrence capability. Based on this, countries should correctly assess their own and other countries' strength and will, avoid overestimating or underestimating their own or others' deterrence capabilities, and thus avoid military adventures. At the same time, they should also abide by international laws and rules, respect other countries' sovereignty and interests, in order to achieve lasting peace and common security.

STRUCTURING RESILIENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Resilience is a dimension with a pronounced multidisciplinary character covering a wide range of areas of society, which gives it a fluid profile and difficult to fit into a conceptual-functional typology. The interest in resilience is undoubtedly one of the trends of the current decade, however precursory elements are found throughout history in the most diverse forms of manifestation. As in the case of other dimensions explored in recent years from the perspective of European cooperation in the field of security and defence, resilience was quickly integrated into the steps carried out under the auspices of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), becoming one of the key objectives of the European Union’s external action toolkit and, last but not least, of the operational commitments carried out globally by this organization. The contribution of the EU Global Security Strategy (EUGS) in designing resilience as a central element of the European security and defence cooperation agenda was defining. The main direction promoted by the EUGS was to strengthen resilience aspects in external action, while taking a structured approach to exploring options for strengthening internal resilience. Subsequently, the outbreak of the war in Ukraine as a result of Russia’s aggression additionally valued the strategic significance of states’ resilience and, subsequently, the importance of the EU’s contribution in this direction. This study is aiming to bring into light the way in which CSDP answers to the challenge of consolidating the resilience. In this vein, the methodological approach that was implemented responded the multidisciplinary character of this topic. In order to consolidate the comprehensive character of the present study, a historical perspective has been used that correlates the evolution of resilience in EU context with the development of various CSDP instruments. In this sense, an important direction of research is represented by the interaction between resilience and EU’s external action and how the EU response to crisis situations has evolved. To a similar extent, this paper approached the resilience from the perspective of internal security of European Union, especially in the context of the war in Ukraine. A special note is made on how the latest EU strategic document (Strategic Compass) placed resilience as being one of the strategic objectives of CSDP. Given all of these aspects, the main conclusions of the article are emphasising the importance of adequate calibration of national approach in generating resilience, not only in the conceptual area but also on the practical aspects such as capabilities and resources required by a strong resilience. At the same time, a special attention is given to how the partnership and external interaction, especially between EU and NATO, are tailored to enhance and complement the national contributions in the field of resilience.

Federalism for Bioethics?

In the wake of the Dobbs decision withdrawing federal constitutional protection for reproductive rights, the United States is in the throes of federalist conflicts. Some states are enacting draconian prohibitions of abortion or gender-affirming care, whereas other states are attempting to shield providers and their patients seeking care. This article explores standard arguments supporting federalism, including that it allows for cultural differences to remain along with a structure that provides for the advantages of common security and commerce, that it provides a laboratory for confined experiments, that it is government closer to the people and thus more informed about local needs and preferences, and that it creates layers of government that can constrain one another and thus doubly protect rights. We contend that these arguments do not justify significant differences among states with respect to the recognition of important aspects of well-being; significant injustices among subnational units cannot be justified by federalism. However, as nonideal theorists, we also observe that federalism presents the possibility of some states protecting rights that others do not. Assuming that movement among subnational units is protected, those who are fortunate enough to be able to travel will be able to access rights they cannot access at home. Nonetheless, movement may not be readily available to minors, people without documentation, people with disabilities, people who lack economic resources, or people who have responsibilities that preclude travel. Only rights protection at the federal level will suffice in such cases.

The War in Ukraine and the EU’s Geopolitical Role in Spanish Media Discourses

The EU’s ability to protect common interests and effectively address the challenges faced by its members relating to external threats is one of the most debated questions in the European landscape. Understandably, the war in Ukraine has had a major impact on discourses regarding the EU Common Security and Defense Policy, granting them more space and thus visibility in the media and public debates. Our study examines Spanish media discourses about the EU’s geopolitical role and, more specifically, to what extent such discourses foster or hamper European integration processes. To collect data and carry out this study, we selected six media outlets based on their ownership, ideological stance, consumption frequency, and impact on public opinion. Our sample includes 540 news items, collected between July 2021 and March 2022. Our discourse analysis benefits from, inter alia, a Foucauldian framework that focuses on the sayable, conservation, memory, reactivation, and appropriation. In addition, we also identify communicative strategies that are employed to promote different discourses, as well as possible policy alternatives, concerning the EU’s geopolitical role and future prospects.

유럽연합법의 자치성 원리와 기본권 보호에 관한 연구

The European Union's accession to the European Convention on Human Rights began in the 1970s and was marked by the Lisbon Treaty, which authorized the EU's accession. In 2013, a draft agreement was prepared by the Council of Europe's Steering Committee on Human Rights, but the draft agreement was rejected by the European Court of Justice in Opinion 2/13 on the question of the autonomy and specificity of EU law. The negotiations resumed after a gap of more than five years, and the issues raised in Opinion 2/13 were addressed through a process of consensus and amendments were finalized.
 This article revises the intent of the European Court of Justice's decision to reject the draft and compares the content of the final amendment to the draft to understand the process of reaching a consensus on respect for EU autonomy.
 The renegotiation process of the CDDH Negotiating Group has also organized the sections relating to the autonomy of EU law, which were challenged by the European Court of Justice in Opinion 2/13, into four baskets: Basket 1 is the EU’s specific mechanisms of the procedure before the European Court of Human Rights, Basket 2 is the operation of inter-party applications (Art. 33 of the Convention) and of references for an advisory opinion (Protocol No. 16 to the Convention) in relation to EU Member States, Basket 3 is Discussion of proposals submitted on the principle of mutual trust between the EU member states (in the area of freedom, justice and security), Basket 4 is Discussion of proposals submitted on the situation of EU acts in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy that are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union.
 From the 6th meeting in 2020 to the 18th meeting in March 2023, the amendments largely accepted the issues of autonomy of EU law raised in the opinion 2/13. There was consensus in the negotiating group that the CFSP policy aspect of basket 4 should be resolved internally by the EU, and the recommendation to keep the CDDH informed of the EU's efforts and progress, and to actively monitor relevant issues, was accepted, leaving it up to the EU to resolve the issue, while respecting its autonomy.
 The future of the EU's accession to the Convention depends entirely on the will of the EU and its Member States. The rapid entry into force of the amendments proposed by the CDDH Negotiating Group will depend on how quickly the EU and its member states can come up with a solution to Basket 4, the issues of common foreign and security policy whose resolution is pending.
 As a result, the unanimous agreement on the amendment by the Negotiating Group of the Council of Europe's Human Rights Steering Committee is a clear indication that all countries involved are committed to the EU's accession to the European Convention on Human Rights.

Putting the Common Security and Defense Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean under Scrutiny: Türkiye’s Conflicting Role

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new global security and economic environment (Defence budgets’ decline, imminent threats from the Gulf War and NATO’s quest for a new identity), provided a window of opportunity for establishing and designing the EU’s security institution. Thus, what was initially considered farfetched after the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, entered a new phase, which included perception transformation, to be gradually incorporated into daily discourse. Hence, the 2003 “European Security Strategy”, the 2010 “Internal Security Strategy”, and later the 2016 “Global Strategy” reflect Member States’ perception of transformation and their belief that the EU needs a Common Security and Defence Strategy approach. Given these documents that indicate determination for notable integration and institutional restructuring, this analysis delves into the impact of Europeanisation concerning the implementation of institutional reforms and the CSDP. More specifically, this analysis probes the constraints of Europeanisation concerning the EU’s real operational dynamics, especially in light of the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Sea security challenges. These challenges are examined in relation to Türkiye’s revisionist public diplomacy, public policies, and the militarization of its foreign policy (including ongoing negotiations centered on migratory flows, assertions, and constructed narratives over Greek and Cypriot islands and seas). The situation has become more pronounced following the identification of gas and oil reserves in the area in 2010. This analysis has a two-fold focus: Firstly, to investigate Europeanisation impact on the operational implementation of CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) in time of crisis, and secondly, to evaluate the behavior of Türkiye within the Europeanisation framework, as proposed by Radaelli and Violakis.

Understanding the Environmental Security Perceptions of the European Union’s Security Actors

In this paper, we are interested in assessing the different environmental security concepts, policies, and actions of actors involved in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Through exploratory qualitative research, we interviewed key stakeholders who formulate both the climate security discourse and its policy outcomes. Aiming at finding the different perceptions and practices among various actors, we conducted 27 qualitative interviews with practitioners from 17 different institutions, such as EU bodies and agencies, think tanks, and ministries of defense (MoDs). This article discusses the divergence between announced environmental and climate security strategies and policies related to their actual results. Notably, the findings indicate that the effectiveness of the political directives compared with the practices and the developed capabilities around the environment–security nexus are dependent on individual initiatives and efforts that a developing community of practitioners is attempting to carry out. Our study indicates that tailored environmental security policies and actions are needed to motivate both practitioners and policymakers to develop downstream methods and programs that are suited to resolving security-related challenges associated with environmental issues and especially climate change.

A Novel Administration Model for Managing and Organising the Heterogeneous Information Security Policy Field

Information security policy (ISP) plays a crucial role in maintaining the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of sensitive data. However, it is of high complexity and heterogeneity due to the variety and redundancy of security policy practices and complexity of organisational systems. Various and duplicate ISP models and frameworks have been offered in the literature. The duplicate security policy practices, procedures, and processes in the existing models have made ISP disorganised, unstructured, and unclear to organisational users. As a result, there is still a need for a standardised and integrated model to make it simpler to share, manage, and reuse ISP practices amongst the organisations. The main objective of this study is to construct a metamodel to unify, organise, and structure ISP practices. By identifying, recognising, extracting, and combining the common information security policy practices from various ISP models in a built ISP metamodel called ISPM, we seek to make it simple for users and field specialists to derive/instantiate security policy models for their organisations. The development and validation process of the ISPM is based on the common security frameworks such as ISO 27001 frameworks. The developed ISPM consists of 19 common security practices: organisation, risk management, access control policy, edit, review, compliance, business management, backup and recovery, incident response, SETA program, security awareness, security training, security education, email security policy, cloud security policy, network security policy, website security policy, physical security policy, and privacy security policy. Each common security practice consists of several operations and attributes. The performance of the developed ISPM was compared to that of other models to evaluate its completeness and logicalness. Using ISO 27001 as a framework, the findings confirmed the comprehensiveness of ISPM. Therefore, it can contribute to organisations’ security by helping them to develop their own security policy models.

Software defect prediction method based on the heterogeneous integration algorithm

A software defect is a common cyberspace security problem, leading to information theft, system crashes, and other network hazards. Software security is a fundamental challenge for cyberspace security defense. However, when researching software defects, the defective code in the software is small compared with the overall code, leading to data imbalance problems in predicting software vulnerabilities. This study proposes a heterogeneous integration algorithm based on imbalance rate threshold drift for the data imbalance problem and for predicting software defects. First, the Decision Tree-based integration algorithm was designed following sample perturbation. Moreover, the Support Vector Machine (SVM)-based integration algorithm was designed based on attribute perturbation. Following the heterogeneous integration algorithm, the primary classifier was trained by sample diversity and model structure diversity. Second, we combined the integration algorithms of two base classifiers to form a heterogeneous integration model. The imbalance rate was designed to achieve threshold transfer and obtain software defect prediction results. Finally, the NASA-MDP and Juliet datasets were used to verify the heterogeneous integration algorithm’s validity, correctness, and generalization based on the Decision Tree and SVM.

An Empirical Study of SETA Program Sustaining Educational Sector’s Information Security vs. Information Systems Misuse

Information systems misuse and data breaches are among the most common information security threats at the organisational and individual levels. Security, Education, Training and Awareness (SETA) program can be effective tools in addressing and preventing such risks for sustaining the educational sector’s information security, although it is costly to implement and achieves limited results. Several studies have shown that SETA implementation can improve corporate employees’ information security protection behaviours. This study adopts the method of quantitative research, deterrence theory with selected perceived cost and information security awareness (ISA) as intermediate variables and explores how SETA programs affect information system abuse on campuses. The results show that implementing the SETA program positively impacts perceived cost and ISA; perceived cost and information security positively impact reducing misuse behaviour of information systems. At last, we provide rationalisation suggestions for individual students and schools to help SETA programs to be better implemented.

Cooperation on Non-Traditional Security: India–Pakistan and the Locust Attack

The two nuclear-armed states of South Asia, India and Pakistan, besides being arch-rivals face common non-traditional security challenges. A recent example indicates that, despite having differences, they cooperated to successfully deal with the locust upsurge of 2019–2020. This study looks at why and how they arrived at joint efforts to thwart this non-traditional security threat. To set the context for this, it also explores the phases of the locust cycle and the reason why it constitutes a potential threat to the food security of both India and Pakistan. The study finds that the chances of cooperation between hostile states may increase if there are mutual threats in the non-traditional security realm. It further concludes that the chances of cooperation between the belligerent states increase if they are part of regional and international mechanisms to deal with the threats.

ICT Security Tools and Techniques among Higher Education Institutions: A Critical Review

Higher education institutions (HEIs) are increasingly relying on digital technologies for classroom and organizational management, but this puts them at higher risk for information and communication (ICT security attacks. Recent studies show that HEIs have experienced more security breaches in ICT security composed of both cybersecurity an information security. A literature review was conducted to identify common ICT security practices in HEIs over the last decade. 11 journal articles were profiled and analyzed, revealing threats to HEIs’ security and protective measures in terms of organizational security, technological security, physical security, and standards and frameworks. Security tools and techniques were grouped into categories with specific ways to protect ICT security. HEIs also implement general security standards and guidelines, such as the ISO 27000-series and Center for Internet Security (CIS) controls, in their framework. Through synthesis and analysis of ICT security tools and techniques among HEIs, this critical review hopes to provide research directions on IT governance that academic and technical administrators can further explore to secure their information resources.

A Novel Security Framework to Mitigate and Avoid Unexpected Security Threats in Saudi Arabia

Many organizations around the world suffer large losses due to unexpected risks which can have a profound impact on their survival. This paper presents a novel security framework to address the security needs of Saudi organizations. There are four stages in the security framework: risk assessment and management, security intelligence and analytics, security policies and procedures, and security monitoring. A comprehensive security solution was provided by combining common security frameworks, e.g. ISO/IEC 27001:2013, NIST Cybersecurity Framework, and COBIT. The developed framework was designed to help Saudi organizations identify, assess, and control risks and respond to unexpected events in a timely and effective manner. It is expected to help organizations develop and implement effective security measures to protect their critical assets and operations from security threats. The proposed framework is comprehensive and can cover most organizations' requirements.