Common Foreign And Security Policy Research Articles

A constitutional perspective on EU arms controls: mediating trade, security, and humanitarian responsibility

Abstract This article examines how European Union (EU) arms control measures are tailored to its constitutional foundations. EU Member States subject shipments of arms and components to controls so as to screen them for risks and potentially block them. In this context different Member States may make different geopolitical and humanitarian risk assessments. Existing EU measures have achieved only limited security screening harmonisation, and have left room for Member States to shirk their obligations under international humanitarian law. But in case of joint arms production, which the EU subsidises to become more autonomous, one Member State’s arms controls may block another State’s exports and thereby jeopardise cooperation. This article posits that any reform of EU arms controls should start by re-evaluating their present legal basis. A constitutional competence analysis shows that controls on arms shipments to non-EU states should be regulated in part through the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), and not just through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This would be consistent with other EU regulatory regimes for trade security. While a joint CFSP-CCP approach cannot fully prevent conflict, since this would require further foreign policy harmonisation, it could help foster security convergence and strengthen humanitarian due diligence mechanisms.

Revisiting liberal intergovernmentalism in CFSP: preference formation and the EEAS

ABSTRACT Liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) posits that member states’ preferences are domestically shaped and align with the positions of the largest states. However, during EEAS negotiations, major states had divergent views on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) integration, risking nonagreement. Despite the inability to counter external threats effectively, states prioritised sovereignty and national interests. This paper, based on interviews with member states and EU institution representatives involved in the bargaining process, evaluates LI’s applicability to CFSP integration. It examines the preference formation of France, Germany, and Spain during the creation (2002–2003) and design (2010) of the EEAS, the last revolution in the institutional framework of the CFSP and the most innovative body established by the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). The study contributes theoretically and empirically to understanding LI. Since member states follow an exogenous but not liberal preference formation process, it concludes that LI should be revised.

Turkey and the EU: waning foreign policy alignment in a changing international context

ABSTRACT The current relationship between the European Union (EU) and Turkey is dragged outside the standard EU accession framework and is increasingly shaped by Turkey’s positions and actions regarding a set of regional and global foreign policy issues. For the EU to carry forward Turkey’s long-stalled accession negotiations, Turkey is expected to show progress on multiple fronts, including a satisfactory level of policy alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This article provides an in-depth analysis of Turkey’s poor alignment with the EU’s CFSP positions since 2014. It looks into regional as well as international issues that occupied the agenda of EU foreign policy and explores the utility-based and normative explanations behind Turkey’s (dis)engagement in policy cooperation.

THE ISSUES OF CHALLENGING EU SANCTIONS DECISIONS: MECHANISMS AND CJEU CASE LAW ANALYSIS

This article examines the legal framework and judicial oversight of the European Union's (EU) restrictive measures, which are integral to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The focus of this study is on the mechanisms available for challenging these measures and the pivotal role played by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in ensuring their legality and procedural fairness. Through a comprehensive analysis of relevant case law, this article explores the procedural requirements for challenging sanctions, including the prerequisites for standing, the timelines for lodging complaints, etc. It highlights the CJEU’s approach to balancing the EU’s policy objectives with the protection of fundamental rights, emphasizing the court’s scrutiny of the Council of the EU's decisions and the necessity for robust evidence supporting sanctions. Key findings include an examination of the evolving landscape of EU sanctions in response to geopolitical events, such as the conflicts involving Russia and Ukraine, and the legal challenges that have arisen from these measures. The article provides insights into the broader implications for international law and the ongoing need for judicial oversight to ensure the effectiveness and fairness of EU sanctions.

The Use of Sanctions to Achieve EU Strategic Autonomy: Restrictive Measures, the Blocking Statute and the Anti-Coercion Instrument

Sanctions are increasingly used by the European Union to pursue foreign and security policy objectives. Nowadays, these objectives include the protection of the Union’s strategic autonomy too. As our empirical analysis suggests, restrictive measures – the official EU notion for sanctions – define strategic autonomy as much as they are defined by it. We understand the notion of ‘sanctions’ widely, not only encompassing measures adopted within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), but also other EU acts closely connected to sanctions – including the Blocking Statute and the Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI) – that also aim to strengthen the Union’s strategic autonomy. The picture sanctions paint is one of strategic autonomy as a principle not only of processes, but also of substance. In terms of processes, it is an objective that allows for selective uses of partnership; and in terms of substance, it is also in the name of this principle that EU institutions have proceeded to a balancing between rights, interests, and values. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), sanctions, strategic autonomy, Blocking Statute, extra-territorial sanctions, Anti-Coercion Instrument

The Europeanization of Security and Turkey’s Membership of the European Union

Europeanization is a relatively new concept, the roots of the idea of the Europeanization of security in Western Europe go back to the early days of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and became manifest after the demise of the USSR, which marked the end of the Cold War. Therefore, the process of European integration can also be seen as a Europeanization of the security culture of European Union (EU) member states. This Europeanization is a transition from the classical perception of security, based on state-centric high poli-tics (achieving security by military power), to a modern one, that is, giving priority to low politics (achieving security by non-military power, through economic and political integration). Hence, the Euro-peanization of security is actually a process of de-securitization which eliminates security and insecurity concerns from perception. However, non-military security problems and dynamics can also be present in that de-securitization.By contrast, the Turkish state’s security culture, which takes its roots from the founders of the Republic, gives priority to high - ra-ther than low - politics. The Turkish state’s elite are inclined to look at issues through the lenses of security or insecurity. This Turkish state outlook is a consequence of its securitization tradition in which security problems having no military element in their resolution are considered inferior in importance to military ones. Acknowledge-ment of the contradictory natures of the linear transition of Europe-anization of security in Western Europe and traditional Turkish se-curity perceptions is crucial in order to grasp one of the main under-lying reasons behind Turkey’s continuing exclusion from the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The EU as a Crisis Manager: Ensuring Accountability Under IHL

In 2022, the EU published its Strategic Compass, setting the course for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the coming years. The most eye-catching proposal in the Compass is the creation of an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (EU RDC). The creation of such a multinational force as part of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) toolbox, which may well engage in armed conflicts, is problematic for the attribution of possible violations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). This paper describes how the EU may be held accountable for the acts committed by the troops it deploys. Then it will discuss how the differences in the organization of EU operations may affect the opportunities for attribution. Finally, the paper recommends the EU’s CSDP operations to have a command and control structure that is fully integrated as this ensures the highest level of certainty when it comes to the attribution of wrongful acts. European Union, EU Rapid Deployment Capacity, International Humanitarian Law, EU Strategic Compass, multinational operations, accountability, CFSP, peacekeeping, crisis management

Are EU GSP Withdrawals and CFSP Sanctions Becoming More Alike?

At their inception in the early 1990s, conditionality clauses were introduced in the General Scheme of Preferences (GSP) as an instrument for the protection and promotion of labour standards and human rights in the Global South. Conditionality in the GSP as an instrument of development and trade policy was conceived as separate from foreign policy tools in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Notwithstanding the very limited suspension practice, previous research highlighted indications of political contamination in withdrawal decisions. This article explores the question as to whether GSP withdrawals are becoming more similar to CFSP sanctions. Relying primarily on policy documents and legislation, the article discusses the evolution of GSP conditionality from its origins to present, including the proposal for a new Regulation governing the GSP tabled by the Commission in July 2021 and currently under consideration. With this aim in mind, it first outlines the evolution of the design of withdrawal mechanisms, taking issue with the changing focus of the GSP conditionality, which has expanded considerably while withdrawal practice remains marginal. Following that, the implications of the identified trend(s) for the European Union (EU) are teased out. Economic sanctions, GSP, EU trade policy, labour standards, human rights, CFSP

The politicisation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the British domestic debate on Brexit: a challenge to EU-UK foreign and security cooperation

ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is to study the evolution of Britain’s involvement in the EU’s foreign and security policy in order to highlight the reasons that led the issue to be left out of talks on the post-Brexit future relation. The paper argues Europeanisation or de-Europeanisation largely depends on the degree of politicisation of issues both in the EU, the EU-27 and in the UK. As long as foreign and security issues remained relatively low key, the UK was able to enjoy the magnifying effect of its participation in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and contributed to the decision-making process in order to successfully influence EU policies. Politicisation of foreign and security issues was due both to developments in EU-led or national initiatives and to the reaction they provoked in the UK. The EU insisted the UK was to be considered as a ‘third country’ and stressed the need for future cooperation to be institutionalised. On the contrary, in the UK, public distrust against a putative European ‘super state’, led successive governments to avoid any formal commitment to new EU initiatives.

Peacekeeping and crisis management: a brief assessment of EU-UN cooperation

The present short paper aims to add to the debate on the future of peacekeeping and crisis management in the current context of international relations. Starting from the premise that cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations (UN) for peace and security is a significant source of synergies between both organisations, the paper highlights the way in which the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) were built, summarising the applicable legal regime, especially following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. By providing a review of the legal background to EU crisis management and assessing the EU’s added value for UN-led efforts, the paper concludes that the Lisbon Treaty provisions provide the EU with the instruments necessary to assume a significant role in peacekeeping and crisis management. Although the EU’s natural partner in the field of peacekeeping and crisis management is the UN, there is growing uncertainty regarding the strength of the ties between both organisations as multilateralism traverses a crisis seemingly unlike others in the past.

Responsibility of Targeted Actors in the Context of Restrictive Measures: The Case of Belaeronavigatsia

In the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Union may adopt restrictive measures, also known as sanctions, against natural or legal persons and groups or non-state entities. Such measures are one instrument – among many others – to achieve certain policy goals, including the protection of the Union’s values and the advancement of fundamental rights, democracy, and the rule of law. There are sanctions of different kinds to coerce, constrain, or signal a targeted actor, and they are chosen and combined with a view to implement the most effective strategy. Belaeronavigatsia, a state-owned enterprise engaged in regulating airspace and providing air traffic assistance in Belarus, was deemed responsible for the repression of civil society and democratic opposition following its involvement in a flight diversion that ultimately led to the arrest of an opposition journalist and his companion. As a consequence, the Council froze its assets, a decision the enterprise contested by arguing that it could not be held ‘responsible’ for the referred act, and that the sanction was not in accordance with the principle of proportionality. The judgment in the case Belaeronavigatsia v. Council offers an overview of the main features of restrictive measures, reminds the interpretative criteria for undefined notions in Council’s decisions and then clarifies the terms ‘responsible for the repression’ with a special focus on the element of causation, and assesses the principle of proportionality in an area influenced by political, economic, and social motivations, such as the CFSP. CFSP, restrictive measures, sanctions, freezing of funds, responsibility, causation, proportionality

THE EU-UKRAINE PARTNERSHIP IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: A CRITICAL REVIEW

The article provides a comprehensive analysis of the partnership between the European Union (EU) and Ukraine in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The analysis is based on a thorough review of relevant literature, official documents, and expert opinions, and aims to identify the main challenges and achievements of the partnership and offer recommendations for its further development. The author emphasizes the successes and challenges of the EU-Ukraine partnership in areas such as political cooperation, economic integration, and security cooperation. While the EU's support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity has been a key factor in the partnership's success, the article also highlights several limitations and shortcomings of the partnership. These include the slow pace of reforms in Ukraine, the impact of corruption on the country's development, and the EU's limited leverage over Russia's actions. To address these challenges, the article offers recommendations for how the EU-Ukraine partnership can be strengthened, including deeper engagement on issues such as energy security, human rights, and rule of law as well as a more proactive approach to supporting Ukraine's democratic development and reform agenda. The analysis suggests that these steps are crucial for ensuring the partnership's continued relevance and effectiveness, and for supporting Ukraine's path towards European integration and democratic consolidation. Overall, this article provides a critical and nuanced assessment of the EU-Ukraine partnership in the context of the CFSP, offering important insights for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners in the fields of EU foreign policy, Ukrainian politics, and international relations.

The Rationale and the Perils of Failing to Invoke State Responsibility for Cyber-Attacks: The Case of the EU Cyber Sanctions

AbstractMalicious cyber activities are on the rise. States and other relevant actors need to constantly adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape, including by setting up effective deterrence mechanisms. This is what the European Union (EU) has done through the adoption of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Decision 2019/797, which allows it to impose targeted sanctions to deter and respond to cyberattacks that constitute an external threat to the EU or its member states. However, in contrast to other horizontal regimes of restrictive measures in force within the EU, foreign governments are not included as potential targets of cyber sanctions. Moreover, the recital of the Decision specifies that the adoption of restrictive measures does not involve attribution of international responsibility for cyber-attacks to a third State. This article aims at identifying the rationale behind the inclusion of these distinctive features. It starts by considering the legal uncertainty that surrounds attribution of international responsibility for cyber operations. Next, it explains why the EU is not well placed to invoke third-State responsibility, and the reasons behind its reluctance to do so. It will then illustrate the risks inherent in the lack of a clear legal framework to attribute the responsibility of cyber-attacks to third countries. This may have serious consequences in terms of legal certainty when a cyber-attack amounts to a breach of the prohibition on the use of force in international relations. Then, we explore recent developments in EU legislation in the area of cyber security and the possibility to strenghten the powers of the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA). We draw two conclusions: first, the Union might develop the capacity to attribute cyber attacks to specific actors and there is an interest to do so. However, Member States are probably still reticent to take this step. Two, despite the advantages of establishing a reliable attribution mechanisms, it is submitted that the majority of States prefers to take advantage of a regulative gap that allows them to react to cyber incidents as they see fit.

The Role of EEAS Chairs in Council Negotiations on Foreign and Security Policy Post‐Lisbon

AbstractThis article examines the impact of the introduction of a permanent chair in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Lisbon Treaty transferred the functions of the rotating Presidency to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, represented at lower levels by officials from the European External Action Service (EEAS). Whilst the permanent chair was intended to improve effectiveness in CFSP negotiations, recent deadlocks challenge such expectations. Drawing on sociological approaches, we show that the ability of EEAS chairs to uphold the impartiality norm has been undermined by the fact that they are perceived as ‘outsiders’ by national negotiators. This has had negative consequences on the chairs' capacity to fulfil key roles of organiser, broker and political leader and, in turn, negotiation dynamics. Based on these findings, we argue for the need to take norms and identity factors more seriously when designing institutions.

Benelux and European Union CFSP Security in Response to the Russia-Ukraine War

This study discusses the security cooperation of the three countries of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. In particular, this paper elaborates on its role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) adopted by the European Union in responding to the Russia-Ukraine Conflict, 2014-2022. The method used in this research is qualitative with analytical descriptive. The research source uses secondary data in the form of literature review. This study is analyzed using the theory of Regional Security Complex (RSC) and the Concept of Cooperative Security. RSC theory is used to analyze the cooperation of Benelux as a regional power in developing European Union CFSP security cooperation. Result shows that Benelux is not brave enough to make a decision which is completely different from the EU public. The Benelux countries’ position is to agree with the EU's decision on the Russia-Ukraine war.

ЕС – Латинская Америка: институты сотрудничества и доверие к ним латиноамериканцев

Relations between the European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean have been rather unstable. Despite several significant successes achieved in the framework of the European Union, Latin America and the Caribbean Summits (EU–LAC), in fact, in the late 1990s they entered a period of stagnation. The vision of the key tasks of multilateral cooperation between the European Union and LAC was different. For the EU interaction with Latin America was important, both from the point of view of greater consolidation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and from the point of view of its greater involvement in the world agenda already in the positions of a prominent actor, broadcasting its authority outside the traditional sphere of influence. For LAC, relations with Europe were considered as a mechanism capable of activating, first, intra-regional processes. This article discusses the development of cooperation between the European Union and Latin America, which is traditionally special for both regions, at the present stage. Despite the different vision of the main goals and objectives of interregional relations, the partnership between the EU and LAC are built around three main institutions of cooperation: political dialogue, assistance and trade. These three thematic vectors were identified at the I EU-LAC Summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1999, as the basis for bilateral cooperation. The author examines in detail all three institutions of multilateral interaction, including their achievements and obstacles. The mechanisms of cooperation launched under the pressure of new global challenges are identified. A separate section of the article is devoted to the analysis of the results of public opinion polls, which sheds light on the attitude of Latin America towards the European Union and its regional policy. The author approaches the analysis of the EU-LAC cooperation model comprehensively and bilaterally: from the standpoint of common tasks in the international arena of both the EU and Latin American countries, considered in close connection with the ongoing global and regional latest processes.

External drivers of EU differentiated cooperation: How change in the nuclear nonproliferation regime affects member states alignment

ABSTRACT Since its establishment, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has strived to increase convergence among EU member states. Yet, convergence remains elusive and scholars have started to explain the emergence of differentiated cooperation resulting from multiple internal EU crises. We posit that the convergence in the EU member states with respect to nuclear weapons has been fundamentally altered by the humanitarian turn to nuclear disarmament. This has led to a crystallization of differentiated subgroups among the member states, whose membership coincides with that of informal groupings active in the broader nuclear nonproliferation regime. Combining quantitative data on resolution sponsorship at the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process and voting at the UN General Assembly, we show that significant change in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime led to differentiated cooperation within the CFSP, resulting in two cohesive subgroups of member states.

The Role of Turkey as a European Union Security Player in Africa

Turkey’s current role as international mediator tempers the year 2020 with repeated crises, and the multiplication of misapprehensions with France and Greece. Therefore, as tensions gradually erupted between Turkey and the European Union (EU), this article through the retrospective of partnerships in the African space, highlights evidence of the advantages that the integration of Turkey in its area or more targeted and consensual policies could confer to the EU. The paper expounds on the new model of cooperation within the discipline of security studies; it merges the institutional approach and the triangular cooperation framework in illustrating Turkey and EU foreign policy towards Africa. The work fundamentally explains the transformation of Ankara and European Union’s security policies within Africa. It notes that the change from the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and later on to Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) provides a new synergy for cooperation among the three actors. Therefore without being an EU member, this model legitimately provided Turkey with a kind of de facto membership and consequently grants them with the latitude to engage in EU’s security policy.

Article: Arms Transfers and Human Rights: Assessing the Impact and Enforcement of the EU Common Position on Arms Exports in a Multilevel Analysis

Arms export control measures are an important tool to defend the universality of human rights, democracy and to prevent conflicts. The European Union (EU) has a long tradition in striving towards these goals.One of the most important outcomes regarding such is the 2008 Council Common Position (CP) defining Common Rules Governing Control of Exports of Military Technology and Equipment Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This article focuses on the implementation and effectiveness of this CP. In particular, it investigates whether EU countries have applied and enforced human rights principles in arms export practices following the approval of the CP or whether a promarket and pro-export approach have prevailed. In this way, it fills a lack of organic analysis on the impact of the CP. Secondly, for the first time, it compares EU-level regulation impact with that at the global level, in order to assess the ‘net value’ of the EU regulation at the international level also from a diachronic perspective. Lastly, a comparison with the national level offer suggestions for mutual reinforcing. By using quantitative methods, the research aims to offer empirical evidence concerning the EU arms export control regimes and their effectiveness and to contribute to the present debate about the means at the EU’s disposal to defend the universality of human rights and promote democracy. EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, human rights, arms trade, arms exports control and disarmament, normative power, democracy, autocracy, sanctions, arms embargo

Roadmap for Stronger Security and Defence of Europe: EU “Strategic Compass” Implementation Prospects

The European Union continues to develop the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Adopted in March 2022, the EU’s “Strategic Compass for Security and Defense” in the next decade should become a roadmap for the development of the EU’s ambitions, stated in the 2003 and 2016 EU Strategies. The Strategic Compass offers a list of measures to strengthen the defense component in EU policy. They are concentrated in four main areas: crisis management, resilience, capacity building and partnerships. A significant innovation is the proposal to apply the qualified majority voting procedure on certain issues of foreign policy, security and defense policy. As part of the new EU Strategy, it is proposed to create a group of Rapid deployment forces and increase investment in the defense sector. The innovation will also be the holding of EU exercises and the EU Security and Defense Partnership Forum. Specific action plans for the announced initiatives should be developed by the end of 2022, and their implementation is scheduled for 2030. The Strategic Compass was perceived ambiguously — the key points of criticism are the inability of the Union to ensure its own strategic autonomy. In the context of the changed geopolitical situation in Europe, which coincided with the publication of the new Strategy, the EU countries continued to follow the lead of US policy. The emphasis in Compass on the complementarity of the foreign and security and defense policy of the EU in relation to the Alliance confirms that the countries of Europe will tend to rely on the usual institutions of NATO as opposed to the creation of new structures of the European Union. In addition, significant disagreements in the perception of threats by EU member states, as well as the general amorphousness of the Union’s foreign policy initiatives, remain a problem. It is likely that a significant breakthrough in the creation of effective institutions of European foreign policy, security and defense policy will not be achieved, but the acquisition of new powers by the European Commission will strengthen supranational control over the policies of EU member states in these areas.