Common Defence Policy Research Articles

Impact of Defense Expenditures on Economic Growth

Purpose: The objective of this paper is to determine the impact that the 2% of GDP allocation on Defense expenditures has on the NATO member states that have assumed this commitment. Design/Methodology/Approach: In terms of national defense industries two aspects must be taken into consideration. Employment is the first considered, as a functioning defense industry, be it through partnerships, off-set or just internal production would decrease unemployment and have a positive impact on economic growth. The second argument is that of imports and exports of armament that have increases since countries have been required not only to jump to 2% in terms of defense expenditures Findings: The empirical results show that before for member states correlation exists and positive effects on imports and exports can be observed, while for non-NATO countries that are in different partnerships in terms of security and defense with the United States, there seem to be a mixture of effects on different categories of economic activities. Practical Implications: It is the aim of this paper to show whether the 2% of the GDP allocation should be continued to all NATO member states that have yet to commit to this effort. So far findings indicate, that while results are not always positive, key advantages can be observed by applying this strategy, rather than not going forward with the commitment. Originality/value: Investing in defense and security is an innovative approach now that the EU on its own is considering requesting special allocation on the Common Defense and Security Policy for member states. It is therefore worth analyzing if investments already requested by NATO are feasible and whether duplicating efforts might or might not appear when both NATO and EU ask member states to contribute more to defense expenditures.

European Union’s Crisis Response Potential and Military-Technical Cooperation of the EU member-states

The article analyzes the origins and current trends in the development of the crisis response structures and mechanisms within the European Union. The reasons for the failures of the EU in the implementation of the plans of previous decades to create EU Armed Forces separate from NATO are being considered. Thirty-four military, police, border and consultative operations and EU missions in conflict regions are being typologized in the article. It is concluded that the most in-demand operations were EU police and numerous "training" or "consultative" missions aimed at creating modern and professional state security forces in unstable regions. Although formally the European Union is only a subregional international organization, in practice the EU does not consider it necessary to legitimize its own interventions into conflicts through UN mechanisms. Operations and missions are conducted on the basis of the European Council's own policy decisions. However, the EU does not conduct openly coercive military-political missions on its own, leaving decisions on them to the UN Security Council. The article analyzes the structure, types, purposes of several dozen programs of military-technical and military-political cooperation implemented by the European Union within the framework of the EU Permanent Structured Cooperation Program (PESCO). The author structurally subdivides PESCO programs into groups: structures and means of joint crisis response, military-infrastructure programs, naval initiatives, programs in information and communication and cyber-spheres, logistics and military-medical programs, military-training programs. The content of each group's programs is reviewed in detail. The article substantiates the conclusion that the implementation of the currently announced PESCO programs will strengthen mostly the EU's marginal (background) capabilities in operations and missions under the Common Security and Defense Policy. PESCO does not actually include programs directly aimed at any drastic improvement of capability for missions and operations in crisis and conflict regions outside the EU.

V4 Security and Defense Policy – National and Allied Challenges in Member States

Abstract Making the common European security and defense policy more effective starts at state level. It is of paramount importance that the member states of the respective federations are able to demonstrate modern forces with a high level of compatibility and qualification and also that the use of these national forces, at allied level, should be possible without major obstacles. In this publication, the author presents the main historical points of the defense policy of the Visegrad Co-operation (V4) countries, and in this context the steps and efforts required of the force in order to respond to new types of security challenge.

EU Common Security and Defence Policy and China: a case study of coopetition

With the 2019 EU–China Strategic Outlook, the EU has revalidated its dual perspective on China as cooperation partner and strategic competitor at the same time. So far, considerations of China in EU and EU Member States have primarily focused on economic questions. However, as China‘s foreign policy becomes more assertive and visible via military deployments in the EU‘s geopolitical neighbourhood, the EU needs to confront this challenge by giving appropriate and concrete political responses in a geostrategic context as well. Based on the concept of „coopetition“, this article provides an analysis and subsequent recommendations on how the EU can integrate the “China factor” in its Common Security and Defence Policy, while ensuring that a balance of cooperation and competition in EU’s China policy is retained

Theoretical aspects in multi-level security management of the European Union in the framework of Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Governance is a way for society to get organised, take and implement decisions by means of mutual understanding, reaching agreements and taking actions. It works at every level and is visible in social, political and economic dimensions. It includes a range of instruments, principles, institutions and practical action. States, governmental and non-governmental entities with some competences in governance aim to boost development level and provide security to their citizens. The concept of multi-level governance (MLG) is a characteristic of the European Union (EU) and its areas, where it is capable of exercising its governance at many levels using sectorial internal and external policies. This article focuses on multi-level security management by the European Union within the concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR), dedicated to two sectorial external policies, i.e. the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CFDP). In this article, the author will attempt to explain what Security Sector Reform actually means for the European Union. For better understanding this analysis author adopted the multi-level governance theory to demonstrate how the SSR concept can be combined with MLG. The author put forward a thesis that, due to many similarities, i.e. in the EU approach to security management in external relations

Brexit and the “New” Transatlantic Relations: Potential Reflections on the Strategic Re-Positioning and Development of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union

Brexit and the “New” Transatlantic Relations: Potential Reflections on the Strategic Re-Positioning and Development of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

Problem setting. Security issues are importantfor contemporary international relations research, since security has been and remains one of the most important aspects in the functioning of international relations. Ensuring security is seen as an important task for both a state and the international community in the broad sense of the term, in particular for the EU. In today’s context, the problem of information security of the individual, the state and the society is fundamentally relevant as it needs, primarily, a complex reflection, taking into account the realities of the present. In addition, continuous monitoring of the security situation in the information field, the ranking of threats by the degree of influence on national interests, the rational redistribution of forces and the means to neutralize threats are urgently needed.Recent research and publications analysis. Problems of European politics and defense are constantly in the center of attention of Western scientists, first of all Laura Chappell, David J. Galbreath, Jocelyn Mawdsley, Robert McCabe, Hugo Meijer, Deborah Sanders, Ian Speller, Marco Wyss, and others. In the Ukrainian literature, some solutions to this problem are found in Ya. Tymkiv’s manual, in the encyclopedic dictionary-directory «Modern Political Vocabulary», in the Glossary of the Encyclopedic Dictionary of Information Security, articles by Yu. Bytyak and I. Yakovyuk, M. Dmytrenko, E. Nikipelova,O. Poshedin, O. Sosnin and O. Dzioban, M. Trebin which the author of the paper researches and identifies previously unsolved parts of the general problem the article is devoted to.Paper object: to analyze the term «security», to identify the place of security in the European security and defense policy, to characterize the peculiarities of the problem of the Euro-Atlantic security space formation.Paper main body. In the article, based on the conceptualization of the security problem in the aspect of international political issues, the definitions of the security by domestic and foreign scientists are explored. Particular attention is paid to information security, which requires, first of all, a comprehensive understanding of the today’s realities. The evolution of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy, its current interpretation in the EU’s Global Foreign and Security Policy, has been traced. The main security priorities were identified, namely, defense, counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, energy and strategic communications. Special attention is drawn to the problem of creating the Euro-Atlantic security information space, i.e., the space of a dialogue between Ukraine and the NATO, which should accompany the necessary reforms in Ukraine in order to bring it closer to Euro-Atlantic standards.Conclusions of the research. Therefore, in the modern science of international relations there is no definition of security that would satisfy both domestic and foreign scientists. This is explained by the fact that certain components of the security content acquire a certain value or lose it, depending on the internal situation in the country and the international situation. The problem of information security which requires, first of all, a comprehensive understanding of the present realities is ofparticular importance in today’s context.The contours of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy began to be defined in the 1990s, and its current interpretation is reflected in the EU’s Global Foreign and Security Policy, 2016. Defense, counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, energy and strategic communication are the main security priorities. The issue of creating a Euro-Atlantic security space that is the space of a dialogue between Ukraine and the NATO, which should accompany the necessary reforms in Ukraine in order to bring it closer to Euro-Atlantic standards is of utmost importance.

France’s military operations in Africa: Between institutional pragmatism and agnosticism

ABSTRACTThis article examines France’s institutional preferences in the context of its military operations in Africa. It argues that, if France had its multilateral moment in the 1990s and 2000s, it has since become institutionally agnostic. Institutional agnosticism means that France no longer has strong institutional preferences when running military operations; instead, it has over the last six or seven years opted for various frameworks based on a pragmatic analysis of what institutions – the UN, the EU, the G5 Sahel or regional organisations – bring. France is opportunistic as it wants to keep open all options while retaining the right to run unilateral missions. The first part presents the evolution of French military operations over time and how they have become increasingly multilateral after the end of the Cold War. The second part aims to unpack why France has embraced multilateralism, identifying three main issues: multilateralism as burden-sharing, multilateralism as legitimacy provider, and the African continent as a theatre for the operationalisation of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. In the third part, the article looks at why France has become institutionally agnostic and why it continues to run national operations as a consequence of institutional agnosticism.

EU SECURITY & DEFENSE POLICY: THE EVOLUTION OF FORMATION

The task of building an effective security architecture facing the European Union is extremely important in that the approach to its solution will determine the nature of the relations between the countries in the region in the future. An analysis of the processes of building a common security and defense policy (EUSR) of the EU is impossible without addressing the interrelated problems: security in the EU with the European Union's place in the Euro-Atlantic processes and in the world at large. The development of the SPBO has a significant impact on all countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, which explains the relevance of its further study by national science. Until the scientific and legal literature has addressed the issue of forming and developing a common security and defense policy in the EU. In many ways, this is explained by the relatively short period of existence of the ESDC as a phenomenon, with the result that, in most cases, the study focused on considering the formation, rather than the functioning, of the ESDC mechanisms designed to prepare the EU component for further work. First of all, we are referring to studies on various aspects of the history and current activities of the European Union. In addition, the authors analyze the common issues of European security: from the problems of building security models for Europe to issues related to the activities of European regional military-political organizations on the security and interaction of European and US countries in the field of the common security and defense policy of the EU. Other authors have considered some aspects in the process of becoming an EU Security Council. However, the existing work does not allow for a holistic picture of the process of forming and developing a common foreign and security policy of the EU, in turn, the continued development of a common foreign and security policy of the EU necessitates the development of new aspects of identified issues and generalizations. In this article, the author focuses on highlighting the main stages of the EUSF formation and its importance for the effective functioning of the EU as a whole. There are four main stages in the development of the common security and defense policy: the first stage (1992-1997) is the signing of the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties; the second stage (1998-2002), when the EU declared its intention to form an ESDP in Saint-Malo (1998), as well as the decisions taken at the Cologne, Helsinki, Nice, Lachen summits; the third stage (since 2003), the Berlin Plus agreement was reached (March 2003). The Council of Europe adopted the first European Security Strategy (December 2003); and the final stage began with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009. Within this framework, the European Union is trying to adequately respond to some of the new challenges that emerge in the process of globalization, shaping European identity.

The Role of Great Britain in the Process of Formation of Relations EU–NATO: History and Modernity

The article presents the results of a study of the UK’s involvement in the European Union–NATO relations process during 1990–2010s in the context of establishment the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). The methodology of the study was formed by a systematic approach, methods of historical analysis, historical-genetic, periodization, comparative-historical, etc. An interdisciplinary approach made it possible to use certain methods of other sciences, in particular, political science (institutional comparative analysis, event analysis), elements of political modeling and forecasting. It is stated that the British leadership has been in the position of preserving the integrity of the Atlantic co-operation system since the early 1990s. The UK’s position as a staunch supporter of Atlanticism has become one of the decisive and at the same time controversial factors in the creation of the EU Security and Defense Council. Until the second half of the 1990s, British governments opposed the EU’s provision of military and political resources and supported the WEU as a «European support» for NATO. The Blair government’s consent to the transfer of WEU functions to the European Union opened the way for establishing a direct relationship between the union and the Alliance. The signing of the Berlin Plus Agreement with the European Union in 2002–2003 was one of the main elements of NATO’s reform. The political and strategic crisis of NATO in the early 2000s reinforced the relevance of a purely European defense structure. However, the inability of the EU to deploy military resources, the resistance of the Atlanteans, led to a general failure of the autonomy of the CSDP. During the Cameron governments, London openly favored the formation of a NATO Response Force, rejecting the development of EU military resources. Although in the context of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy, Europeans’ attention has shifted from the EU’s military capabilities to traditional Atlantic security structures, the strengthening of the Union’s military mechanisms following Britain’s exit has not been ruled out. The United Kingdom is directly involved in the strategic weakness of the EU as a subject of the European and world security system, in a NATO-dependent operational and resource plan. At the same time, Brexit can complicate the task of unifying security, weakening the difficult EU–NATO relationship. Key words: Great Britain; EU; NATO; Common Security and Defense Policy; USA.

Institutional mechanism of EU peacekeeping

The aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, which has been going on for more than five years, has led to irreparable losses – the deaths of thousands of our country's defenders and civilians, immensely more people being maimed, tortured and inhumane, deprived of their housing and means of subsistence. The losses of infrastructure, economy and culture of the country are enormous. It is no exaggeration to say that the very existence of Ukraine as a sovereign state has been questioned, and the political, social, economic, psychological trauma already inflicted by Russian aggression will be felt for a very long time – not for years, but for generations. But the biggest challenge for Ukraine is that the algorithm for stopping aggression and restoring the territorial integrity of the state has not yet been invented. The use of international peacekeeping mechanisms is considered by many Ukrainian and foreign experts to be one of the means of achieving this goal. This prompts an appeal to the study of the institutional mechanism of the European Union's peacekeeping activity, as an organization actively involved in counteracting Russian aggression in Ukraine and having significant peacekeeping experience. The paper demonstrates that the institutional structure of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has evolved for the most part over the last ten years (after the entry into force of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty) and is still partly in the making and cannot be considered as complete. The author argues that the CFSP in general, and in particular the Common Security and Defense Policy, is provided by both intergovernmental and supranational institutions, but decision-making and partly their implementation remain intergovernmental and require consensus on fundamental issues and the achievement of a complex qualified majority in their implementation, while common organs in this area is just of an executive nature.

The European Defence Policy and Transatlantic Cooperation in Times of Obama and Trump Administrations

The purpose of the study is to analyze the development of the European common security and defense policy during the Obama and Trump administrations by determining the specifics of its formation, trends and causes. It is observed the preconditions and principles for the formation of European CSDP; tendencies of its evolution in the post-bipolar era are considered; the EU CSDP is explored as a part of transatlantic system in the times of Obama administration; the trends and changes in the CSDP are examined in correlation with NATO policy under the Trump administration. The research emphasizes a significance of the European defense policy, which has been creating in two following ways: as a united force within NATO and as a unique initiative in parallel to the transatlantic cooperation (mostly, after the destruction of the bipolar system). However, the Euro-Atlantic defense ties never crashes, despite the periodic abatements. The article notes that Europe has substantially strengthened its positions at the end of the era of bipolarity, demonstrating its intention to create the own security system. It was found that in 2010–2016 there was a tendency weakening of American influence on the European community defense integration. According to Western European researchers, the EU defence initiatives became a matter of concern to both American presidents. However, during the Obama period, European governments failed in realizing their intentions (despite the desire to create their own army) due to the lack of mutual understanding on the issue and unwillingness to bear the additional costs of implementing the CSDP. However, such an opportunity has arisen during Trump’s presidency. It is stated that the foundation of a new stage of European defence integration was laid in 2016. Since 2017, European countries have taken new steps by creating the European Defense Fund (EDF) and starting the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). In addition, the article notes that in 2017–2018 there was an increase in the participation of national contingents in NATO. Moreover, the EU considers its defense system as «autonomous», but not absolutely independent of existing and effective structures. It is concluded that transatlantic relations matter and the further cooperation between European governments and the United States could be enhanced.

«Европейская оборона» через призму французских интересов и возможностей

The article is devoted to the analysis of the complex of problems associated with the organization of the defence structures of the European Union and the role of France in this process. The focus of the project «European defenсe», the possibility of its implementation within the EuroAtlantic space are investigated. The continuity and evolution of the European defence potential building program are shown. The concepts of «European defenсe», «European army» are analyzed and their real content is revealed. The pairing of France’s national efforts with partners in the framework of the Permanent Structured Cooperation on Security and Defence (PESCO) projects is shown; the importance of a pragmatic approach to building a «European defenсe» on the basis of a number of interstate programs of military-industrial cooperation is highlighted. The connection between the new stage of scientific and technological progress and the revitalization of plans to strengthen the defence potential of the EU is revealed. The evolution of the French leadership’s approach to building a «European defenсe» is presented, its assessment of the current state of this project, and in connection with this, features of its views on the prospects for developing a dialogue with Russia. Against the background of a slowdown in the development of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy, the role of interstate initiatives outside the EU, aimed at accelerating and increasing the effectiveness of military operations, has been highlighted. The examples of individual actions emphasize the key role of states, in particular France, in the implementation of missions of a pan-European character. As a result of the analysis, a conclusion was made about the sustainable and non-opportunistic nature of the transformations in the field of military construction in the EU. A forecast is given regarding the possible scale and real fulfillment of European defence construction plans. The conclusion about the significance of the «European defenсe» project for the implementation of France’s geopolitical plans and the strengthening of its positions in the EU and in the Euro-Atlantic field is substantiated.

Ukraine–NATO: State and Prospects of Cooperation Development

Сurrent relations of Ukraine with NATO and prospects for their development to develop a common defense and security policy are considered. It is noted that the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, its illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, waging a «hybrid war» against it, military intervention in the eastern regions of Ukraine, constant military, political, economic and information pressure from Russia necessitate Ukraine’s search for more effective guarantees. NATO remains the most influential security organization, so political and military cooperation with it is vital for Ukraine. Today, NATO’s European policy focuses mainly on security issues, as well as on enhancing dialogue with both member countries and candidate countries. The definition of modern features of NATO’s European and Euro-Atlantic policy and prospects for the development of Ukraine’s new security policy are relevant. The purpose of this article is to analyze the current relationship between Ukraine and the Alliance and their development prospects. The Concept of Improving Public Awareness of Ukraine’s Cooperation with NATO during 2017–2020 approved by the President of Ukraine on February 21, 2017 in order to increase public support for state policy in the field of Euro-Atlantic integration and the level of trust of Ukrainian citizens in NATO as a key institution in strengthening international security is analyzed. The results of sociological research on Ukraine’s membership in NATO are presented, which reflect the dynamics of public support for Ukraine’s membership in NATO. Key words: NATO-Ukraine; cooperation; security; sociological data; Ukraine’s membership in NATO.

INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL MECHANISM OF THE EU IN THE SPHERE OF SECURITY AND DEFENCE

The article examines the features of the institutional and legal mechanism of the Union in the field of security and defence from its founding under the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to the current stage under the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. The legal characteristics of the EU institutions, that deals with the defence and security of Member States is provided. In particular, the activities of the European Council, the Council of the EU, the European Parliament, as well as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy were analyzed. It is established that the institutional component of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy is characterized by the preservation of the sovereign powers of the Member States, as the development and decision-making at the highest level takes place through intergovernmental bodies of the Union. The powers of subsidiary bodies established by decisions of the EU Council are studied. The activities of the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff, the European Defence Agency, and the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management are analyzed. In particular, the Political and Security Committee is the central executive body of the Union and a kind of "engine" of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Especially important is his work on crisis management and finding the most optimal solutions in this direction. The EU Military Committee is the highest military body of the European Union, which manages all military activities within the EU. The EU Staff is the Union's main military expert body, tasked with early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning in line with the European Security Strategy. The European Defence Agency is a center of cooperation in the field of defence policy between Member States, EU institutions and third countries. It is noted that the EU institutional mechanism in the field of security and defence is represented not only by purely military but also by civilian structures, among which the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management is the key. It has been found that the above institutions have sole executive powers and are not empowered to make legally binding decisions for Member States. It is concluded that one of the trends in the development of the EU institutional mechanism in the XXI century is so-called military-civil synergy, which occurs through cooperation between military and civilian structures of the Union, whose activities are aimed at achieving systematic goals in security and defence issues.

Сучасні процеси трансформації викликів та загроз національній безпеці країн-членів ЄС

It is substantiated that, today, civil and military analysts are interested in acquiring up-to-date knowledge on the transformation of challenges and threats to the national security of EU Member States, with not only military and national security issues but also virtually all spheres of human life. It is determined that the European Union, unlike the North Atlantic Alliance, is not a military and political organization and never intended to become one, but from the very beginning of its existence, the Member States of the European Union were aware of how important a component of socio-economic and political relations is. security for the prosperity and freedom of a democratic society, economic internationalization, the development of science, medicine, industry. There is a particular danger of hybrid wars, which is that the enemy behaves extremely cunningly and cunningly, often making himself a friend. Therefore, in today's world, the devastating effects of hybrid warfare cannot be overstated, which in itself is also a challenge to modern democracy, the preservation of state sovereignty and the development of civil society. It is proved that special attention in the European Union is also paid to the development of rapid response to environmental and energy problems, cybercrime, intensification of interethnic, interfaith and other conflicts by eliminating procedural, financial and political factors that hamper the deployment of fighting, reduce the effectiveness of military operations under a common security and defense policy. Conflict prevention is proposed to be implemented through the development of a mechanism for early detection of threats to the European security system in order to respond to modern realities. As the experience of Russian aggression against Ukraine has shown, the European Union, for a long time, did not receive proper signals from Kiev about the threat to European security coming from the East. The emergence of such a mechanism should be preceded by the formation of a common center for the collection, analysis and coordination of information to ensure national priorities for the development of the security of states. A similar mechanism already exists in the FRONTEX Agency, but only at the level of public order and the state border.

In Search of Lost Time: Memory‐framing, Bilateral Identity‐making, and European Security

AbstractBilateral relations between France and either Germany or the UK are the backbone of European security and defence cooperation. From a strategic and cultural point of view, these relations are not self‐evident. In this article, we track the memory‐framing processes accompanying the creation of major bilateral initiatives. Leaders such as Adenauer and De Gaulle, Mitterrand and Kohl, Blair and Chirac, and Sarkozy and Cameron imagined bilateral communities of fate informed by mutually understandable historical memories: the World Wars for the Franco‐German relationship and the Empire for the Franco‐British relationship. Based on these memory frames, Franco‐German identity undergirds a policy‐based integration of core state powers while Franco‐British identity informs capacity‐building and force projection (a resource‐based integration). These bilateral identities led to earmarking national military forces for common purposes and intertwined defence industries. In some cases, they also provided an impetus for EU cooperation in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy or the Common Security and Defence Policy.

Az európai védelmi kezdeményezések törésvonalai

This study examines how the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy was shaped by the European defence initiatives after 2016. By asking what divisive issues appeared in connection with the main initiatives of the so-called Comprehensive Defense Package, the study systematically evaluates the emerging fault lines between member states. In the European context, the analysis shows that fault lines related to the internal (European) dynamics of these initiatives are connected to the functional prospects of the EU’s crisis-management tools, as well as to the increasing competences of the supranational EU institutions. Regarding the transatlantic context, the duplication of autonomous European capabilities with NATO, as well as the direction towards strengthening the autonomy of the European defence industry, generated tensions between the United States and the European Union, which has highlighted divisions between member states’ preferences in these matters as well.

EU Cybersecurity in the Context of Increasing Cyberthreats in the Modern Globalized World

The article is an attempt to analyze the EU’s ever-increasing cybersecurity challenges in today’s globally digitalized world. The researcher remarks that since 2013 the European Union has been pursuing the policy of developing awareness of cyber-attacks targeting and beefing-up restrictive measures. The author underlines that the European Council has adopted the regulation known as the Cybersecurity Act to become more cyber-proof. This is evidenced by a number of studies carried out within the EU as well as that this legal regulation facilitated imposing targeted restrictive measures to deter and respond to cyber-attacks in EU and abroad. Furthermore, the EU cybersecurity market is one of the fastest growing in the ICT sector, providing huge economic opportunities. Underpinning the cybersecurity industry will enable European companies to take advantage of these opportunities and increase citizens and businesses’ confidence in the digital world, while significantly contributing to the goals of the EU Digital Single Market Strategy. Broadly speaking, the problem can be addressed by such strategic priorities for enhancing EU cybersecurity as followed: achieving cyber resilience; dramatically reducing cybercrime; elaborating the common cybersecurity and defence policy; developing industrial and technological resources to ensure cybersecurity; establishing coordination mechanisms to prevent, detect, mitigate and respond to cyber bullying and information security as well as improving engagement with the private sector to enhance cybersecurity. The ultimate goal of the above-mentioned EU strategy appeared to be a Public Private Partnership (cPPP) that was concluded on 5 July, 2016 between the European Commission and the European Cyber Security Organization (ECSO). The objective of such partnership is to ensure awareness and resilience in an increasingly multifaceted cyber threat environment and to foster collaboration between public and private actors in the early stages of the research and innovation process to enable the EU Internet users to access secured innovative and credible European solutions (ICT products, services and software).

A small state’s anticipation of institutional change: effects of the looming Brexit in the areas of the CSDP and internal market

ABSTRACTBrexit will profoundly change politics in the European Union, and all countries will have to adjust to the new situation. But the issue is more pressing for small member states that are more dependent on international organisations than big states. This article studies how the institutional setting affects a small state’s preparations for Brexit in the areas of the common security and defence policy and internal market. Contrary to the expectations, it shows that the Czech Republic, the small state under scrutiny, has invested more effort into a preventive adjustment in the internal market policy than to the CSDP. This result is explained by the existence of alternative institutional frameworks that are expected to mitigate the impact of Brexit on EU’s security and defence policy. It also suggests that while small states profit from the existence of strong institutions, they also face the risk of unmitigated impact when these institutions change.