Commodity Taxation Research Articles

Merit goods and excise taxation in quasilinear markets for complementary private consumption

This paper models merit goods such as education and health, in a Lindahl-Foley environment in which public goods may be treated as private ones since merit goods are public goods that could have been provided privately. It does so in terms of a Levitan-Shubik quasilinear quadratic utility from complementary commodities and uniform taxation of non-merit commodities to finance the provision of merit goods. This analytical framework serves best the purpose of characterizing the general equilibrium. Complementarity is found to serve as an engine for increased output after the introduction of taxation, with a higher volume of private goods, lower tax rate, and minimal price for the merit goods at the new equilibrium.

Quality and Imperfect Competition

We study the relationship between market power and quality supply. We develop a flexible approach to imperfect competition in product qualities and prices (or quantities), which encompasses several existing models. We uncover sufficient statistics, including our quality parameter, which can be estimated empirically, for many comparative statics. These statistics allow us to extend the seminal analysis of quality distortion under monopoly to imperfect competition, and to analyze the effects of technology shocks and commodity taxes, as well as changes in market concentration. Our approach accommodates various modelling choices related to firms' costs, the timing of the game, or multi-product firms.

A Model of the Optimal Tax Mix Including Capital Taxation

This paper uses a three-tax linear model to study the optimal tax mix numerically. The three aggregate taxes relate to labour, capital and commodities. The most striking result is that with a linear expenditure system based on econometric estimates, indirect (i.e. commodity) taxation dominates the optimal tax mix, with over 80% of tax revenue coming from indirect taxes. The main reason for this outcome appears to be that commodity taxation has a less harmful effect on labour supply than labour income taxation and a less harmful effect on capital supply than capital income taxation. Comprehensive computational modelling of the optimal tax mix has been absent from the literature. In light of the results presented here, there appears to be considerable scope for further research in this area. From a theoretical perspective, a major innovation in this paper is the introduction of capital taxation into a static tax mix model. The analytical part of the paper provides approximate predictions for optimal linear tax rates, called the modified inverse elasticity rule. Using these formulas, explanations are provided for the dominance of indirect taxation in the optimal tax mix.

Multi‐part tariffs and differentiated commodity taxation

AbstractWe study commodity taxation in markets where firms, such as Internet Service Providers, energy suppliers, and payment card platforms, adopt multi‐part tariffs. We show that ad valorem taxes can correct underprovision and hence increase welfare, provided the government applies differentiated tax rates to the usage and access parts of the tariff. We obtain this result in different settings, including vertically interlinked markets, markets where firms adopt menus of tariffs to screen consumers, and where they compete with multi‐part tariffs. Our results suggest that exempting these markets from taxation may be inefficient.

Trade and commodity taxes as environmental instruments in an open economy

PurposeIn a simple reciprocal dumping model of trade, this study scrutinizes the strategic role of trade and commodity taxes as environmental instruments when consumption of an imported product generates pollution. The results suggest that for sufficiently small values of the marginal disutility from pollution, commodity taxes can be preferred over import tariffs, and compared to the case of trade policies, free trade can be welfare dominating even for higher values of the marginal disutility from pollution when commodity taxes are used strategically as environmental instruments.Design/methodology/approachThe authors employ a reciprocal dumping model of trade.FindingsA sufficiently high marginal disutility from pollution (or sufficient asymmetries between the countries in terms of their marginal disutility from pollution) may jeopardize bilateral trade, especially if countries are given the option to set tariffs freely for imported goods (consumption of which generate environmental pollution). For sufficiently weak transboundary pollution and sufficiently low marginal disutility from pollution, (1) both Nash trade and domestic policies may prove to be helpful in addressing consumption-based pollution, and (2) it is possible to show in such a case that Nash domestic policies may be preferred over Nash trade policies, especially when both transboundary pollution and the trading partner's marginal disutility from pollution are sufficiently low.Originality/valueThe novel contribution of this paper is (1) to capture asymmetries among trading partners in terms of how much they account for environmental pollution when deciding on their (domestic/trade) policy measures and (2) to focus on environmental degradation that is caused by final consumption of a product imported from a trading partner.

A UNIFIED PERSPECTIVE ON EFFICIENCY, REDISTRIBUTION, AND PUBLIC POLICY

Specialized theoretical and empirical research should in principle be embedded in a unified framework that identifies the relevant interactions among different phenomena, enables an appropriate matching of policy instruments to objectives, and grounds normative analysis in individuals’ utilities and a social welfare function. This article advances an approach that both provides integration across many dimensions and contexts and also identifies which tasks may be undertaken separately and how such analysis should be conducted so as to be consistent with the underlying framework. It employs the distribution-neutral methodology and welfare analysis developed in Kaplow (2008a) and related work, offering applications to income taxation, commodity taxation, tax expenditures, externalities, public goods, capital income and wealth taxation, social security and retirement savings, estate and gift taxation, and transfer programs. It also explores welfare criteria and examines how their consideration enables the normative analysis of the taxation of families, heterogeneous preferences, and tax administration and enforcement.

Goods and services tax, cascading, and revenue performance: Analyzing Indian commodity taxation market

Indian economy has finally introduced an improvised value‐added tax commonly known as goods and services tax (GST) with an explicit focus to target cascading. Cascading is by far the most serious issue of a tax structure as it leads to many other challenges like opaqueness, complexity, evasion besides deadweight losses. GST is a fiscal policy reform aimed at integrating and harmonizing the Indian tax structure and hence reduce the incidence of cascading. This study is an attempt to empirically analyze the possible impacts of GST on the cascading and hence revenue collection in the Indian economy. The study has employed a simple but representative simultaneous equation model representing the commodity taxation using time series data from 1990 to 2017. This study finds that reduced cascading under GST will enhance the revenue efficiency of the Indian commodity tax structure. The findings are corroborated by the post‐GST revenue performance of Indian states and the central government.

Optimal indirect tax design in an open economy

Given that tariffs continue to serve as a primary source of government revenue in many countries, we analyze the optimal indirect tax problem, consisting of commodity taxes and tariffs, under a revenue constraint. This study shows that the optimal commodity tax structure follows the Ramsey rule regardless of whether a country is small or large, which implies that the same optimal commodity tax rules are applied across a range of situations. We also show that the optimal tariffs are not zero, but negative, even in the small country case, which implies stronger support for the World Bank’s recommendation of tariff reductions for a country facing a revenue constraint. In addition, this study analyzes the optimal commodity taxation when tariffs cannot be fully adjusted. Numerical examples demonstrate some of our major findings and the magnitude of the welfare gains by these optimizations for a few countries.

Two Reasons for not using Commodity Taxation in the Presence of an Optimal Income Tax

espanolEste trabajo presenta dos argumentos a favor de un uso exclusivo del impuesto sobre la renta con fines redistributivos. El primero es el hecho de que la mayoria de resultados sobre imposicion indirecta no lineal, tales como las formulas de Mirrlees para la eficiencia de Pareto, los resultados de Seade sobre tipos marginales zero en los extremos de la escala de renta, y la regla impositiva de Corlett y Hague solo resultan validos bajo el enfoque de segundo orden con la poco realista funcion de utilidad lineal en relacion a la capacidad individual. El segundo se centra en que, para que el teorema de Atkinson y Stiglitz resulte valido, es suficiente suponer que las preferencias son debilmente separables entre el consumo y la capacidad individual. Todo ello relega el uso de impuestos no lineales sobre el consumo al improbable escenario en que, aparte de preferencias no debilmente separables entre el consumo y la capacidad individual, existe una solucion al problema planteado bajo el enfoque de primer orden. EnglishThis paper presents two arguments in favor of the sole use of an income tax for redistribution purposes. The first is that most findings on nonlinear commodity taxation such as Mirrlees’s formulae for Pareto efficiency, Seade’s results on zero tax rates at the endpoints of the scale, and the Corlett-Hague tax rule only become valid under the second-order approach for the unrealistic class of utility functions that are affine with respect to ability. The second is that, for the Atkinson and Stiglitz theorem to hold, it suf- fices with assuming that preferences must be weakly separable in consumption and ability, a result that also remains valid with linear commodity taxation. All this relegates the use of nonlinear commodity taxes to the unlikely scenario in which, apart from non-weakly separable preferences between con- sumption and ability, there is a solution to the first-order approach problem.

Salience and Taxation with Imperfect Competition

This paper studies commodity taxation in a model featuring heterogeneous consumers, imperfect competition, and tax salience. We derive new formulas for the incidence and marginal excess burden of commodity taxation, and we find that tax salience and market structure interact when considering tax incidence but do not directly interact when considering the marginal excess burden. We estimate the necessary inputs to the formulas by combining Nielsen Retail Scanner data from grocery stores in the US with detailed sales tax data. We calibrate our new formulas and conclude that the incidence of sales taxes on consumers is increasing in tax salience, and the marginal excess burden of taxation is larger than standard formulas that ignore imperfect competition and tax salience. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

A Unified Perspective on Efficiency, Redistribution, and Public Policy

Specialized theoretical and empirical research should in principle be embedded in a unified framework that identifies the relevant interactions among different phenomena, enables an appropriate matching of policy instruments to objectives, and grounds normative analysis in individuals’ utilities and a social welfare function. This article advances an approach that both provides integration across many dimensions and contexts and also identifies which tasks may be undertaken separately and how such analysis should be conducted so as to be consistent with the underlying framework. It employs the distribution-neutral methodology and welfare analysis developed in Kaplow (2008a) and related work, offering applications to income taxation, commodity taxation, tax expenditures, externalities, public goods, capital income and wealth taxation, social security and retirement savings, estate and gift taxation, and transfer programs. It also explores welfare criteria and examines how their consideration enables the normative analysis of the taxation of families, heterogeneous preferences, and tax administration and enforcement. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Technology and tax systems

Technological innovations facilitating e-commerce have had major effects on consumer behavior and firm organization in the retail sector, but the effects of these new transaction technologies on fiscal systems remain unknown. We extend models of commodity tax competition to include multiple types of commodities, trade, and remote commerce, assuming, in accordance with current policy, that e-commerce is taxed at destination while cross-border shopping is taxed at origin. When the cost of online shopping falls, we show that equilibrium tax rates and revenues decrease in large, core jurisdictions but increase in small, peripheral ones, reducing tax differentials. Policy commentators warn that e-commerce erodes tax revenue – true enough for some governments – but, more accurately, changing transaction costs can generate entirely new commercial and fiscal equilibria that ultimately “redistribute” tax revenues from jurisdictions with concentrations of traditional vendors toward others. With some reinterpretation, the model is also adapted to analyze profit-tax competition when firms can respond to high taxes both through profit-shifting and through relocation, each dependent on transactions costs. Changes in technology may again redistribute tax revenues from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions.

Household bargaining, spouses’ consumption patterns and the design of commodity taxes

Abstract We study optimal commodity taxes under household bargaining. We focus on the taxation of ‘female’ and ‘male’ products. The expressions for the tax rates include Pigouvian and incentive terms. When the female spouse has the lower bargaining weight, the Pigouvian term calls for a subsidization of the ‘female good’, and a taxation of the ‘male good’. The incentive term depends on the distribution of bargaining weights across couples. When the bargaining weight of the female spouse increases with wages, the female good will be consumed in larger proportion by more productive couples. In this case the Pigouvian term is mitigated.

Cost distribution and equity of climate policy in Switzerland

Swiss targets for climate policy require significant reductions of emissions by 2050. While such reductions can be achieved in a cost-efficient manner by employing taxes on greenhouse gas emissions, such taxes tend to lead to a regressive distribution of policy cost among households. To counteract such a regressive outcome, tax revenue may be recycled in a progressive way. This paper uses a computable general equilibrium model coupled with a microsimulation of household income and expenditure to examine the policy cost of different carbon tax policies and their distribution across households. I find that in the absence of revenue recycling, emission taxation leads to a regressive distribution of policy cost. I analyze different revenue recycling schemes (per-capita lump-sum transfers, reductions in labor taxation, and reductions in VAT taxation of necessary commodities) and their ability to avoid regressive outcomes.

Building a computable general equilibrium tax model for Italy

ABSTRACTIn this paper, we develop a multi-sectoral computable general equilibrium tax model for Italy allowing for a number of fiscal tools. We illustrate the methodology for modelling and accommodating the full range of direct and indirect taxes into the national general equilibrium model. In particular, we build a commodity tax matrix by commodity, source, user and tax type; and a production tax matrix by industry and tax type. We also put a special emphasis on the institutional sector accounts, incorporating a detailed system of equations. Our model provides a powerful tool for acquiring new insights in fiscal policy analysis, through the assessment of tailored tax reforms, which can consist of either changes in tax rates and tax bases for indirect and direct taxes. Finally, to validate the model we perform an equalizing Value-Added-Tax rates reform. We find that a budget-neutral uniform tax rate reform would be GDP and welfare improving. However, results across agents and sectors vary.

Optimal mixed taxation, credit constraints, and the timing of income tax reporting

AbstractWe study optimal income and commodity tax policy with credit‐constrained low‐income households. Workers receive an even flow of income during the tax year, but report their incomes and make tax payments (receive transfers) at the end of the year. They spend their disposable income on multiple commodities over the year. We show that differentiated subsidies on commodities can be optimal even if the Atkinson–Stiglitz Theorem conditions apply. When the optimal policy leaves low‐income households with binding credit constraints, it may be optimal to subsidize differentially the good that they consume in higher proportion. Uniform subsidies would also relax the credit constraint, but would be more costly to the government since they would equally benefit unconstrained households. Numerical examples suggest that commodity tax differentiation increases with basic needs and with the interest rate at which government borrows.

On Optimal Commodity Taxation in a Spatial Setting

This paper is concerned with optimal commodity taxation in a spatial setting, represented by a monocentric urban model with homogenous people. It shows the need for an adjustment of the basic optimal taxation formulas, i.e. Ramsey (1927) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), in a spatial setting and the reasons for this. The main finding is that the adjustment is not required to increase efficiency but rather to render the allocation competitively sustainable. Applying the basic (unadjusted) formula to a spatial setting requires income redistribution that is spatially differentiated and self-financed. This instrument is, by our premise, unavailable. Moreover, if this instrument were available, that is, spatially-differentiated head taxes and subsidies, it would render commodity taxation redundant in the first place. Unequal treatment of equals is reminiscent of Mirrlees (1972), but the reason for the two cases is completely different.

Some results from the theory of optimal taxation and their relevance for increasing the progressiveness of Indian tax structure

Results in the theoretical literature on optimal taxation are reviewed to study their relevance for the design of income and commodity tax reforms in India. Given the recent steep increase in inequality, there is a need to increase significantly the overall progressiveness of the Indian tax structure. In the absence of a comprehensive income tax base in India, where much of income escapes taxation, this can be done by greater reliance on commodity taxation. GST slabs and GST rates have to be fixed in accordance with the “many-person Ramsey rule” for commodity taxation that is based on both equity and efficiency considerations. Currently, there is not much variation in the marginal income tax rates faced by people at the high end of the income distribution, even though there is a lot of variation in their incomes. This implies that the existing income tax design gives nearly the same social welfare weights to both billionaires and salaried people with incomes close to Rs. 10,00,000. Thus, to combat the growing inequality in India, the progressiveness of income taxation at the tail of the income distribution also needs to be significantly increased, as this will be equivalent to making social preferences more inequality-averse.

Regressive Sin Taxes, with an Application to the Optimal Soda Tax*

Abstract A common objection to “sin taxes”—corrective taxes on goods that are thought to be overconsumed, such as cigarettes, alcohol, and sugary drinks—is that they often fall disproportionately on low-income consumers. This paper studies the interaction between corrective and redistributive motives in a general optimal taxation framework and delivers empirically implementable formulas for sufficient statistics for the optimal commodity tax. The optimal sin tax is increasing in the price elasticity of demand, increasing in the degree to which lower-income consumers are more biased or more elastic to the tax, decreasing in the extent to which consumption is concentrated among the poor, and decreasing in income effects, because income effects imply that commodity taxes create labor supply distortions. Contrary to common intuitions, stronger preferences for redistribution can increase the optimal sin tax, if lower-income consumers are more responsive to taxes or are more biased. As an application, we estimate the optimal nationwide tax on sugar-sweetened beverages, using Nielsen Homescan data and a specially designed survey measuring nutrition knowledge and self-control. Holding federal income tax rates constant, our estimates imply an optimal federal sugar-sweetened beverage tax of 1 to 2.1 cents per ounce, although optimal city-level taxes could be as much as 60% lower due to cross-border shopping.

On the distributional effects of commodity taxation

AbstractA commodity tax system is inequality reducing if the after‐tax distribution of income Lorenz dominates the before‐tax distribution of income, regardless of initial conditions. This paper identifies necessary and sufficient conditions under which an ad valorem commodity tax system is inequality reducing, shedding light on the role of taxing luxury—as opposed to necessary—commodities in the equalization of after‐tax incomes.