The Impossible Machine: A Genealogy of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. By Adam Sitze. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2013. 392 pp. $70 hardcover.SouthAfrica's TruthandReconciliationCommissionhas beena generative exercise at multiple levels particularly in the ways it has given rise to what Adam Sitze notes with some consternation, a industry. By that he refers not only to the political settlement or institutional lives it has cultivated, but we might also add the voluminous output it has encouraged in scholarly reflection. Sitze is of course adding here to this literature, but has managed to do so by offering a distinctive work of meticulously argued criticism that is both deeply and sharply challenging as well as nuanced and fundamentally thoughtful.Self-consciously, the Impossible Machine sets aside much of the existing terms of evaluating the legacy of the TRC from within Transitional Justice. Sitze seeks neither to laud the miracle that has been celebrated and transformed into a modular form of post-ColdWar conflict resolution nor trounce its ineffectiveness in dealing with larger social and economic structural challenges as some Leftcritiques have tended to do (see Meister, 2011). Instead, drawing on what he refers repeatedly to as a genealogical method-distinctive from history (history consoles as he tells us, while disturbs), Sitze locates the TRC in a longer political and conceptual history of jurisprudence, and one that is decidedly less marvelous than the story of law as the highest form of civilization. For Sitze, the central feature that distinguished the TRC from Nuremburg, its formulation of amnesty in exchange for truth, or more accurately, truth defined as political motive, looks much less savory when considered from within the genealogy of a prior jurisprudence on indemnity. A substantive part the book is devoted to a rich and expansive parsing out of indemnity through a consideration of its colonial career in the last nineteenth century. While indemnity was invoked in England to resolve the CivilWar in the late 1600s, Sitze reminds us that by the late nineteenth century it was really only deployed in its Diceyan formulation in the colonies and hardly ever in Europe by then. The implication is evident that it became a way to absolve the violence of imperial at key moments in the wake of anticolonial revolts in the colonies. In a deeply nuanced reading of Diceyan formulations of indemnity, Sitze shows the centrality of indemnity to calibrating or enabling the supremacy of sovereign power over legal prescript- Indemnity was not then simply one among many topics within Diceyan jurisprudence. It was the very keystone of that jurisprudence. Exactly like a keystone held together an arch, the indemnity convention holds together the two pillars of sovereign power, the sovereignty of law (there is no one higher than the law) and the law of sovereignty (salus publica suprema lex esto). In its absence, these two arches would collapse (p. 5). There is, in Sitze's account, a colonial history to the rule of law, or reason of state, ultimately sanctioning violence that trumps rights of citizens and subjects, that is, good over right in a deontological formulation that Transitional Justice seems unwilling to note. The primary procedural mechanism through which this happened in the colonies, he argues, has been through the process of the commission of enquiry, which has legalized illegality. Commissions of inquiry-among those he discusses are the nineteenth century cases of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), the Cape Colony, and Jamaica-have been the administrative political processes through which indemnity has been made to function politically to legitimate the repression of anticolonial revolts. He names these as tumult commissions. By tracing the relationshipbetween indemnity in its colonial career and amnesty as it is celebrated by Transitional Justice after the TRC, Sitze takes the sheen offthe shine, so to speak. …
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