Commander's Intent Research Articles

CENTRALIZED CONTROL OR DISTRIBUTED CONTROL – DO WE NEED A PARADIGM SHIFT?

The centralized control and decentralized execution is one of the basic tenets of air power command and control, a tenet that has proven its importance and usefulness throughout history. The development of electronic and cyber warfare capabilities, space, surface-to-air missile systems and A2/AD (anti-access/area interdiction) strategies create contested operational environments that limit traditional concepts of command and control (C2) in the effective employment of air forces. The new US Air Force Doctrine, “Air Force Doctrine Publication 1 – The Air Force”, formally establishes mission command as the philosophy for command and control (C2) airpower and centralized command, distributed control, and decentralized execution the way to be implemented. Conducting air operations in a contested operational environment requires an approach to command-and-control principles that responds to threats to communications and attacks on air operations centres. Distributed control exploits the flexibility and versatility of air power to ensure that it remains responsive, survivable, and sustainable, especially in a contested environment. The benefits associated with distributed control (as well as decentralized execution) are maximized when the commander's intent is clearly communicated and guides subordinate actions, in order to allow continuity of operations. Commanders will continue to face the challenge of harmonising centralization, distribution and decentralization, a struggle that will be situation dependent and that requires an approach within the guidance of the higher echelon.

The Commander's Intent – Myth or Reality within the Air Force? –

"Over the time, spreading the commander’s vision at the execution level has required a format as well as a language that could ensure the fluidity of information and their understanding, above all. This has taken shape in the concept that has been coined the “commander’s intent”, acknowledged as the key element in providing the necessary framework for expressing the freedom of action, playing the important role of strengthening and encouraging the initiative of subordinate commanders during mission accomplishment."

BROADER SPECTRUMS OF HIERARCHY: NEW ANIMATED ORGANIZATION CHARTS

AbstractThis article looks beyond categories to full‐spectrum thinking, the ability to seek patterns and clarity across gradients of possibility—outside, across, beyond, or maybe even without any boxes or categories—while resisting false certainty. In particular, it examines the animated organization charts of the future. The Army is prototyping a future where hierarchies are no longer static; they will be animated. Command‐and‐control only works in predictable slow‐moving environments, and there aren't very many of those any more. The Army now practices what they call “commander's intent,” “mission command,” or “flexive command.” At Electronic Arts, one of the world's most successful video game publishing companies, their commander's intent is “we exist to inspire the world to play.” Distributed‐authority networks will mean fluid hierarchies that require constant reassessment of who is in the best position to make which decision at what time. Individuals will need to learn how to lead when they cannot control. Organizations will need to learn how to flex rapidly while retaining clarity of direction. Societies will need to create commons that benefit everyone, shared assets, and a decision‐making process that helps people decide what they choose to do together.

Initiative and Military Effectiveness: Evidence from the Yom Kippur War

AbstractScholars investigating the sources of military capability have located sources of effectiveness in the structure of the international system, the characteristics of states, and features of the armed forces engaged in battle. They also point toward the likely influence of individual-level variables, but such claims tend to lack theoretical and empirical justification. We advance the literature by investigating whether individual initiative—that is, actions taken by soldiers and junior officers to achieve their commander's intent while in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise—systematically conditions armed forces’ performance on the battlefield. We develop a theory connecting individual initiative with military effectiveness, highlighting the role of “problem-solving” in facilitating the use of men and materiel in battle. We then assess the empirical validity of our claim through an examination of a uniquely informative episode in military history: Israel's fight on the Sinai front during the first three days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The case allows us to hold constant a wide range of potentially confounding variables and, to the best of our knowledge, conduct the first systematic investigation of the impact of individual initiative on the performance of units engaged in combat actions. Our findings suggest individual initiative does have systematic effects on armed forces’ effectiveness in combat. Implications and directions for future research on the development and use of military capabilities are briefly considered.

Biobehavioral Insights into Adaptive Behavior in Complex and Dynamic Operational Settings: Lessons learned from the Soldier Performance and Effective, Adaptable Response Task.

The purpose of this study was to explore the biobehavioral correlates of adaptive behavior in the context of a standardized laboratory-based mission-relevant challenge [the Soldier Performance and Effective, Adaptable Response (SPEAR) task]. Participants were 26 healthy male volunteers (M = 34.85 years, SD = 4.12) with active military duty and leadership experience within the last 5 years (i.e., multiple leadership positions, operational deployments in combat, interactions with civilians and partner nation forces on the battlefield, experience making decisions under fire). The SPEAR task simultaneously engages perception, cognition, and action aspects of human performance demands similar to those encountered in the operational setting. Participants must engage with military-relevant text, visual, and auditory stimuli, interpret new information, and retain the commander’s intent in working memory to create a new plan of action for mission success. Time-domain measures of heart period and respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) were quantified, and saliva was sampled [later assayed for cortisol and alpha-amylase (sAA)] before-, during-, and post-SPEAR. Results revealed a predictable pattern of withdraw and recovery of the cardiac vagal tone during repeated presentation of battlefield challenges. Recovery of vagal inhibition following executive function challenge was strongly linked to better task-related performance. Rate of RSA recovery was also associated with better recall of the commander’s intent. Decreasing magnitude in the skin conductance response prior to the task was positively associated with better overall task-related performance. Lower levels of RSA were observed in participants who reported higher rates of combat deployments, and reduced RSA flexibility was associated with higher rates of casualty exposure. Greater RSA flexibility during SPEAR was associated with greater self-reported resilience. There was no consistent pattern of task-related change in cortisol or sAA. We conclude that individual differences in psychophysiological reactivity and regulation in response to an ecologically valid, military-relevant task are associated with performance-related adaptive behavior in this standardized operational setting. The implications for modern day warfare, where advancing our understanding of the nature of individual differences in adaptive problem solving is critical to mission success, fitness for duty, and other occupational health-related outcomes, are discussed.

Mission Command in the Australian Army: A Contrast in Detail

ABSTRACT: This article explains importance of mission command to joint operational effectiveness through experiences of Australian and American armies. Guidance is also given regarding caveats of subordinate competencies and experiences, which affect appropriate application of leadership practice. Military operations--whether combat, peacekeeping, or humanitarian, whether single-country or multinational--are complex and unpredictable. Intelligence, understanding one's own capabilities and limitations, and carefully crafted command guidance at best lend limited insight into how to confront what lies ahead. Adversaries seek to deceive and surprise. Environmental conditions change. Leaders' understanding of circumstances at sharp end increasingly dims further up chain of command one goes, even in an era of communications capabilities undreamed of a generation ago. The sergeant leading his squad sees what his platoon leader cannot. Those at battalion, brigade, and higher know little of what confronts their trusts below. The wise military leader recognizes unforeseeable events always lie ahead. Those commanders, therefore, require subordinates be ready to adapt to unexpected. Mission command--the practice of assigning a subordinate commander a mission without specifying how mission is to be achieved--provides a means of addressing this challenge. (1) The United States is not only country committed to practicing mission command. Armies in Australia, Canada, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, and United Kingdom have adopted familiar approach. Centuries old in concept and decades aged in military doctrines, effective implementation has nonetheless proven elusive. The following paragraphs focus on Australian approach to mission command. Australia and United States have a long historical partnership. The two countries' soldiers served side by side in East Timor, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam; on World War II battlefields; and elsewhere. There is great value in learning from such allies and colleagues akin to but different from ourselves. This article presents mission command practices during recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, major predecessor conflicts from World War 1 on, and in today's Australian Army brigade. The events include both confrontations with armed foes distant from Australian shores and disasters on island continent itself. US and Australian Perspectives American and Australian views on mission command are similar both in concept and in terms of two countries' expectations regarding what philosophy requires of senior and subordinate leaders. Seniors must cultivate implicit trust between and across all elements of land force in such a way that subordinates develop situational awareness that prepares them to exercise sound judgment in support of commander's intent. (2) In this manner, US Army General Ulysses S. Grant conveyed he would not dictate a plan to Major General William T. Sherman in 1864, but admonished him to execute [work] in your own way. (3) This exchange makes it clear mission command concept has long been with America's army even though term was not introduced in doctrine until 2003. (4) America's joint and army definitions of mission command are common in spirit but different in detail. Mission command in joint doctrine is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders, [which direct] a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished. (5) The US Army defines approach as exercise of authority and direction by commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in conduct of unified land operations.... [It] emphasizes centralized intent and dispersed execution. …

Challenges facing U.S. government and Department of Defense efforts in strategic communication

Without entering the debate about exactly what strategic communication is or should be, this article enumerates challenges facing efforts to inform, influence, and persuade in pursuit of national policy objectives first for the U.S. government in general, and then specific to the Department of Defense. With the problem space thus defined, the article then offers a handful of solutions and suggestions, including requiring desired information endstates as part of commander's intent and separating efforts to manipulate and deceive from truthful efforts to inform, influence, and persuade.

A philosophical approach to time in military knowledge management

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore the temporal relationship of information to decision making (based on shared intentions and common desired end‐states) by proposing a moment of temporal convergence when the human perception of events in time, and the time‐depreciating‐value of knowledge in the face of opposition and uncertainty, may map onto a future goal‐state. The concept of temporal convergence was developed to help apply information and knowledge management theory to some of the complex military processes addressed under Network‐Centric Warfare, such as: commander's intent, course of action, situational awareness and self‐synchronisation.

USJFCOM Commander’s Guidance for Effects-based Operations

Herein are my thoughts and commander's guidance regarding effects-based operations (EBO). This article is designed to provide the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) staff with clear guidance and a new direction on how EBO will be addressed in joint doctrine and used in joint training, concept development, and experimentation. I am convinced that the various interpretations of EBO have caused confusion throughout the joint force and among our multinational partners that we must correct. It is my view that EBO has been misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations. Therefore, we must return to time-honored principles and terminology that our forces have tested in the crucible of battle and that are well grounded in the theory and nature of war. At the same time, we must retain and adopt those aspects of effects-based thinking that are useful. We must stress the importance of mission type orders that contain clear commander's intent and unambiguous tasks and purposes and, most importantly, that link ways and means with achievable ends. To augment these tenets, we must leverage nonmilitary capabilities and strive to better understand the different operating variables that make up today's more complex operating environments. My assessment is shaped by my personal experiences and the experiences of others in a variety of operational situations. I am convinced that we must keep the following in mind. First, operations in the future will require a balance of regular and irregular competencies. Second, the enemy is smart and adaptive. Third, all operating environments are dynamic with an infinite number of variables; therefore, it is not scientifically possible to accurately predict the outcome of an action. To suggest otherwise runs contrary to historical experience and the nature of war. Fourth, we are in error when we think that what works (or does not work) in one theater is universally applicable to all theaters. Finally, to quote General Sherman, Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and disaster. History is replete with examples and further denies us any confidence that the acute predictability promised by EBO's long assessment cycle can strengthen our doctrine. The joint force must act in uncertainty and thrive in chaos, sensing opportunity therein and not retreating into a need for more information. USJFCOM's purpose is to ensure that joint doctrine smooths and simplifies joint operations while reducing friendly friction. My goal is to return clarity to our planning processes and operational concepts. Ultimately, my aim is to ensure leaders convey their intent in clearly understood terms and empower their subordinates to act decisively. While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and many partner nations have adopted the EBO nomenclature, NATO's policy focuses on the whole-of-government/Comprehensive Approach. In short, NATO's effects-based approach to operations (EBAO) does not fully mirror US EBO. Thus I have not addressed NATO's use of EBAO in this USJFCOM commander's guidance. This article explains my perspective and provides guidance on issues related to USJFCOM use of EBO, EBAO, operational net assessment (ONA), and system-of-systems analysis (SoSA) in future force development, training, and experimentation. Elements of these concepts have proven useful in addressing closed systems such as targeting, where their effects can be measured per the US Air Force's deliberate analysis and targeting methods. However, the concepts have been misapplied by others to operations beyond their original intent, resulting in overextension and confusion. Therefore, we will change course and provide the joint warfighter with a more balanced and understandable framework in which to plan, execute, and assess operations. My Perspective After a thorough evaluation, it is my assessment that the ideas reflected in EBO, ONA, and SoSA have not delivered on their advertised benefits and that a clear understanding of these concepts has proven problematic and elusive for US and multinational personnel. …

Indirect leadership under severe stress: a qualitative inquiry into the 2004 Kosovo riots

Purpose – The purpose of this research is to develop a theoretical understanding of indirect leadership in a severely stressful peacekeeping context, focusing on the perspective of subordinates. Peacekeeping missions in recent decades have led to increased exposure to acute danger.Design/methodology/approach – Retrospective in-depth interviews were carried out with 17 Norwegian officers and soldiers, who were involved in the handling of a violent riot in Kosovo during a peacekeeping mission. The interviews were analyzed using a grounded theory approach.Findings – A model emerged with three categories: Situational Characteristics, Organizational Characteristics, and the Commander's Intent. A related core category was labelled Subordinates' Appraisal or Sensemaking. During the climax of the riot, a strict following of the ordinary chain of command was impractical. Local initiatives at lower organizational levels were needed, but these, in turn, required competence and a trustful organizational environment.Research limitations/implications – Not representative of the entire population. Given the male-dominated military context under consideration, there could be no meaningful analysis of possible gender-related differences. The results related to a general model of indirect leadership and specific stress. Organizational theory-related additions and limitations are suggested.Practical implications – The proposed model may be a practical tool for management education.Originality/value – The study's identification of key aspects of indirect leadership in severely stressful contexts is a useful addition to the literature.

A Metric for the Shared Interpretation of Commander's Intent

An enduring challenge in management and in military command is ensuring that subordinates select actions as their leader would, particularly when circumstances change unexpectedly. An experiment was conducted to test a measure of shared interpretation of commander's intent and its effects on the adaptability of subordinates. Performance was measured in the context of a simulated law enforcement task. A course of action ranking procedure was used as a measure of interpretation of intent with rank order correlation reflecting shared interpretation. The study validates a measure of shared interpretation of commander's intent and supports the hypothesis that making values explicit enhances shared interpretation and adaptability. The findings indicate that when missions change in unexpected ways, a commander's intent statement that presents the values by which actions are to be prioritized produces greater agreement between commander and subordinates on action preferences than do intent statements that prescribe command preference for specific actions.

Countering Insurgents through Distributed Operations: Insights from Malaya 1948–1960

This article examines the emerging US Marine Corps concept of ‘Distributed Operations’ (DO) and its applicability to counter-insurgency. DO involves dispersing the force and empowering decentralised units so as to create a network of mobile, agile and adaptable cells, each operating with a significant degree of autonomy yet in line with the commander's overall intent. This concept's applicability to irregular campaigns is assessed with reference to the Malayan Emergency, in which the British and Commonwealth forces employed dispersed and decentralised small-unit formations to great effect. The article teases out the conditions that allowed DO to succeed in Malaya, and comments on the requirements and implications for the use of DO today in the prosecution of the ‘Long War’.

Computational military tactical planning system

A computational system called fuzzy-genetic decision optimization combines two soft computing methods, genetic optimization and fuzzy ordinal preference, and a traditional hard computing method, stochastic system simulation, to tackle the difficult task of generating battle plans for military tactical forces. Planning for a tactical military battle is a complex, high-dimensional task which often bedevils experienced professionals. In fuzzy-genetic decision optimization, the military commander enters his battle outcome preferences into a user interface to generate a fuzzy ordinal preference model that scores his preference for any battle outcome. A genetic algorithm iteratively generates populations of battle plans for evaluation in a stochastic combat simulation. The fuzzy preference model converts the simulation results into a fitness value for each population member, allowing the genetic algorithm to generate the next population. Evolution continues until the system produces a final population of high-performance plans which achieve the commander's intent for the mission. Analysis of experimental results shows that co-evolution of friendly and enemy plans by competing genetic algorithms improves the performance of the planning system. If allowed to evolve long enough, the plans produced by automated algorithms had a significantly higher mean performance than those generated by experienced military experts.

Communication of Intent in Distributed Supervisory Control Systems

Distributed supervisory control systems are characterized by remote supervisors who work through multiple local actors to control a dynamic process. Coordination normally occurs through the use of predetermined plans and procedures. However, these plans and procedures can be underspecified and brittle when an actor is confronted with an unanticipated situation. In these instances, the local actor must adapt the plan in a manner consistent with the intent of the remote supervisor. This research investigated the communication of intent in military C2 systems by using a mixed-fidelity simulation. US army battalion commanders and subordinate company commanders developed operations orders using their standard planning procedures. Anomalies were introduced that forced them to rely on the senior commander's intent rather than the written plan. In spite of an embedded procedure for communicating intent in the military domain, in most instances, company commanders failed to follow their battalion commander's intent. Explanations for the poor performance and methods for imparting presence and communicating intent are discussed. Implications of the study extend to other types of distributed supervisory control systems in which machine agents can function as either remote supervisor or local actor.

The Impact of Veritatis Splendor on Catholic Education at the University and Secondary Levels

THE IMPACT OF VER/TATIS SPLENDOR ON CATHOLIC EDUCATION AT THE UNIVERSITY AND SECONDARY LEVELS* CARDINAL PIO LAGHI Prefect of the Sacred Congregationfor Catholic Education INTRODUCTION T HE TOPIC which has been proposed to me, "The Impact of Veritatis Splendor on Catholic Education at the University and Secondary Levels,'' requires a note of clarification with regard to the word impact. When this Encyclical Letter of Pope John Paul II appeared, it was received with much comment, both positive and negative, on the part of the press and the other media. This is one aspect of the topic proposed : to trace in a synthetic way a picture of the reactions which the document stirred. Such would certainly be an interesting study, but I would perhaps be led to traverse much terrain before arriving at the nucleus of what I feel is my duty to say to you. I shall limit myself, therefore, to commenting on two positive reactions appearing in Italian newspapers immediately after the publication of the Encyclical. The first was in the well-known Roman newspaper, Il Tempo, under the title, "An Act of Consistency in an Epoch of Doubt." It states: "If lighthouses had been moved every month, the sailors in the night would have seen the ships of history dashed against the rocks; and no voyager would have reached his homeland again if the North Star, within the Zodiac, had to obey vacillating positions of fashions and ideologies.... The papal document stirs discussions.... Nevertheless it is very much of current interest. While many ships finish on the rocks because they have * This paper was originally presented at the Forum on Catholic University Education at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, 3 November 1995. 1 2 CARDINAL PIO LAGHI sailed following fireflies instead of lighthouses and while the ruling classes have shipwrecked for having chosen compasses that lie, there is abroad a need to see the permanence of certain values recognized in the midst of all that changes, the necessity of an ethical nucleus linked to principles of the human person, honesty , freedom and responsibility." This is a positive reaction, then, which welcomes the Encyclical as a text which says things that have to be said, giving basic directions for a journey, and stating the things no one dares to speak but of which everyone knows the necessity in daily living. This is also the substance of another comment on the Encyclical that I think it would be useful to cite. Carlo Bo, a university professor and a well-known figure in Italian intellectual life, writes: "Modern culture no longer has objective criteria for distinguishing good from evil,'' and he adds, "John Paul II has fought against Communism in defense of freedom; now he criticizes Western culture, which makes of freedom an absolute value.... The exaltation of freedom leads to ethical relativism, against which the Pope raises his voice." Agreement and basic approval are transparent in these lines, but the title under which they appear is "A Call to Order." Immediately the image is evoked-negative to the sensitivities of our times-of a commander intent on imposing order on his soldiers. The heart of the problem perhaps, at least with regard to the teaching of moral theology in the Catholic context, is in the clear perception of the need for an unchanging point of reference, of a lighthouse for the voyage, and at the same time the fear of speaking of this need, of making it the subject of reflection, communication , and teaching. There is a kind of widespread fear which keeps us at a distance from the truth, from the permanent foundations of human acting, from the objective and the universal; a fear which is perhaps the principal cause on account of which so great a part of contemporary humanity risks dying of thirst while standing before a spring of cool water. In order not to appear authoritarian or negative, one keeps silent, does not speak, expresses oneself in a partial or even an erroneous way with regard to all that is most necessary for life. It would be difficult not to see in this a problem which is typically an educa- THE IMPACT OF VERITATIS SPLENDOR 3...