Tactical Intelligence Research Articles

“TAP‐IN” to strategic and tactical intelligence in the sales and marketing functions

“TAP‐IN” to strategic and tactical intelligence in the sales and marketing functions

Capillary electrophoresis analysis of isomeric truxillines and other high molecular weight impurities in illicit cocaine.

The analysis of by-products and impurities in illicit cocaine, including the isomeric truxillines, is important for derivation of both strategic and tactical intelligence. In the present study, various capillary electrophoresis techniques were investigated for this purpose. The use of the anionic beta-cyclodextrin sulfobutyl ether IV as a run buffer additive at pH 8.6 gave a good separation of the truxillines and similar high molecular weight impurities in less than eight minutes. These impurities were first isolated from the bulk cocaine matrix using liquid-liquid extraction and size-exclusion high performance liquid chromatography. There was a red shift in the UV spectra obtained for the truxillines using photodiode array (PDA) UV detection during CE analysis. This anomalous behavior is attributed to photo-degradation of the truxillines during the PDA-UV irradiation process. Laser-induced fluorescence detection using a UV krypton/fluoride laser provided greater selectivity and sensitivity versus UV detection for certain uncharacterized high molecular weight impurities.

Isotopic Analysis of 13C as a Tool for Comparison and Origin Assignment of Seized Heroin Samples

Abstract The applicability of isotopic analysis of 13C for forensic purposes has been discussed in the case of heroin. The obtained results showed first that morphine acetylation induces an isotopic fractionation, so that the 13C enrichment of diacetylmorphine depends on both geographical origin of the sample and source of acetic anhydride used by the drug trafficker. That measurement can then be of great interest in the determination of common-batch samples (tactical intelligence purpose). Second, diacetylmorphine deacetylation has also been studied and it appeared that this deacetylation allows to relieve the enrichment from the acetylation-induced part. Therefore, measuring morphine 13C enrichment, from deacetylated heroin samples, can be useful for determining the geographical origin of the samples (strategic intelligence purpose). Moreover, measuring both diacetylmorphine and morphine 13C enrichments may help identify the source of acetic anhydride used by the drug trafficker, so that the fraudulent laboratory where the morphine samples have been acetylated.

Projecting power from the sea: The RN contribution to the air battle

In determining a perspective for the future, we must maintain a deterrent effort to threaten strategic targets, also working to coordinate the three services into one effective fighting force. In this comprehensive article Admiral Loughran argues that Trident is still essential to this scenario, albeit in a deterrent, rather than an offensive, role. Strategic and tactical intelligence is the key to operations. Projecting power from the sea cannot be maximised without sufficient air support, as highlighted in two recent conflicts where the flexibility of the Air arm enabled the performance, where necessary, of a three in one role—air to air, air to ground and reconnaissance. With air superiority achieved, it is”, equally essential that, the same degree of control is maintained underwater to ensure the, supply of materials to ground forces. With, the freedom of the seas .crucial to both economic well‐being and national and international defence, the Royal Navy will enter the 21st Century working ‘with its’ ...

Exploring a Relationship Between Tactical Intelligence and Battle Results

Exploring a Relationship Between Tactical Intelligence and Battle Results

Recent advances by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in drug signature and comparative analysis

A general review of comparative analyses of illicit drug substances is presented, including discussion of both trace level chemical and ballistics examinations. The results are important for deriving strategic and tactical intelligence via forensic analysis.

Military intelligence, 1870-1991: a research guide

Series Foreword by Roger J. Spiller Preface Introduction General and Strategic Intelligence Institutional Studies Tactical Intelligence Imagery and Aerial Reconnaissance Human Intelligence and Counter Intelligence Signals Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Deception, Surprise, and Warning Appendix: Acronyms and Abbreviations Author Index Subject Index

Neutralizing the Valley: The Role of Military Intelligence in the Defeat of Jubal Early's Army of the Valley, 1864-1865

Neutralizing the Valley: The Role of Military Intelligence in the Defeat of Jubal Early's Army of the Valley, i864-1865 William B. Feis "Despite their decisive character," writes historian Gary W. Gallagher, "operations in the [Shenandoah] Valley during 1864 will most likely never inspire the mixture of uncritical adulation and intense interest like that directed toward Jackson's Valley campaign."1 Although this assertion remains true, the duel between Jubal Early and Philip Sheridan has inspired renewed interest in the past few years. Recent studies have examined the campaign from varying perspectives in an effort to determine why Early eventually lost the symbol of Southern invincibility to Sheridan's merciless torch. Explanations for the Confederate defeat include, but are not limited to, the numerical superiority Sheridan enjoyed over his opponent, the overall strategic situation in 1864 that demanded Confederate aggressiveness in the Valley, Early's uncanny ability to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory, the abysmal performance of the Confederate Valley cavalry, and the substantive impact of guerrilla warfare, specifically the John Singleton Mosby variety, upon Federal operations. Assessments of both commanders' generalship throughout the campaign also factor into the equations posited by historians.2 The author would like to express his sincere gratitude to Prof. Peter Maslowski, Mr. Edwin C. Fishel, and Dixee Bartholomew-Feis for reading early drafts of this essay. 1 Gary W. Gallagher, ed.. Strugglefor the Shenandoah: Essays on the ¡864 Valley Campaign (Kent Ohio: Kent State Univ. Press, 1991), 18. 1 For the most recent examples, see essays by Jeffry D. Wert, A. Wilson Greene, Robert K. Krick, and Dennis E. Frye in Gallagher, ed.. Struggle for the Shenandoah. See also Jeffry D. Wert, From Winchester to Cedar Creek: The Shenandoah Campaign of 1864 (Carlisle, Pa.: South Mountain Press, 1987), which is also the best and most recent full-length study of the campaign's decisive phase. Civil War History, Vol. XXXIX, No. 3, © 1993 by The Kent State University Press 200CIVIL WAR HISTORY Although these factors constitute some of the major elements that determined the outcome of the 1864 Valley campaign, they are by no means exclusive . One important aspect, and the subject of this essay, remains relatively untouched: how strategic and tactical intelligence aided the Federals in their defeat of the Confederate Army of the Valley. Although the acquisition of accurate and timely military intelligence was not the decisive factor in the campaign, it was nonetheless an essential one. An examination of Ulysses S. Grant's Bureau of Military Information and Sheridan's Valley scouts commanded by Maj. Henry K. Young and the information these groups collected provides a different perspective from which to view events. Looking at the Valley campaign from this angle illuminates the information available to Grant and Sheridan concerning troop movements between the Valley and Richmond and demonstrates how they utilized this intelligence to make command decisions. As this study will show, good information coming at the right time played a significant role in the Union high command's effort to remove the Valley's strategic assets from Lee's grasp and eliminate Early's chances to imitate Jackson's Valley masterpiece of 1862. By the fall of 1864, it remained a matter of time before "Stonewall's Valley" belonged to Phil Sheridan. The Valley campaign of 1864 began as an attempt by Confederates under Gen. Robert E. Lee to drive Gen. David Hunter from the Valley and protect the "breadbasket" ofthe Confederacy. Lee knew the loss ofthe Shenandoah meant disaster from his already-hungry army. The man he picked to save the Valley, Jubal Anderson Early, did more than drive the Federals out; he marched down the natural invasion corridor into Maryland and reached the outskirts of Washington, causing considerable alarm among the Northern population, the Lincoln administration, and the commanding general of all armies, Ulysses S. Grant. The raid ground to a halt at the gates ofthe capital after Grant hurriedly dispatched the Sixth Corps from the Petersburg siege lines to man the capital's defenses, and Early, discouraged over the lost opportunity , returned to the Valley.3 However, the Federal commander in chief remained deeply concerned about what had transpired in the weeks between...

The Use of Digital Map Data to Provide Enhanced Navigation and Displays for Poor Weather Penetration and Recovery

A GEC Marconi Avionics/MoD joint–funded integrated, digital terrain system called ' PENETRATE ' (passive enhanced navigation with terrain referenced avionics) is in its fourth year of flight trials on a Hunter fast–jet aircraft at the Defence Research Agency, Farnborough. Although originally designed to enable military aircraft to penetrate enemy defences at low level in poor weather conditions and at night, the system also has a direct read across to civil air transport operations. The heart of the PENETRATE system is a digital data–store housing a three–dimensional model of the terrain including cultural details, obstructions and tactical intelligence information.PENETRATE incorporates terrain-referenced navigation to provide accurate position information relative to the ground contours. A sophisticated digital map displays navigation information and includes intelligence and intervisibility overlays. Head-up visual enhancement options are provided which can be tailored to the outside visibility. These comprise monochrome skeletal perspective displays which are superimposed on the outside world view and also on the forward-looking infra-red (FUR) scene. The display enhancements range from obstruction cues through ridge line overlays to skeletal perspective terrain presentations.This paper covers the philosophy and architecture of PENETRATE together with details of the demonstration system. It also discusses the capability of this digital terrain system to enhance the safety of civil aircraft approaches into difficult airports such as Kathmandu and Hong Kong.

Primate tactical deception and sensorimotor social intelligence

Primate tactical deception and sensorimotor social intelligence

Engineering Geology and Military Operations: An Overview with Examples of Current Missions

Geological investigations in support of military ground operations are intelligence functions which may be categorized as either combat or engineer , and which are related to either tactical or construction operations. Combat intelligence includes the evaluation of geological terrain data such as slope, relief, and soil/rock type, whereas engineer intelligence involves mobility and countermobility operations, sources of construction materials, water supply, camouflage and deception, and siting of facilities. In tactical situations, these intelligence functions are performed cooperatively by troops of two separate U.S. Army Branches, Military Intelligence (MI) and Corps of Engineer (EN) troops at the command echelon of Theater Army, and at its subordinate commands, Corps, and Division. Military Intelligence units have the capability to evaluate remote imagery such as panchromatic aerial photography, multispectral scanner, thermal infrared, and side-looking airborne radar, as well as data derived from passive battlefield geophysical sensors. These evaluations are generally directed toward locating enemy troop and weapons concentrations, as opposed to the analysis of geological data for construction purposes. Most geological information pertinent to both combat and engineer intelligence is collected and evaluated by Engineer troops in Terrain Teams which are part of Topographic Battalions. Engineer intelligence is generally presented to Engineer units in technical report format; combat intelligence, on the other hand, is delivered to tactical commanders in the semi-technical formats of map or photomosaic overlays. Most of the applied geoscience research activities are conducted at Corps of Engineer laboratories and include underground construction, tunnel detection, tactical hydrology, ground-water exploration, hazardous-waste site mitigation, and mobility and countermobility evaluations. All of these activities have civilian applications. As applied military research, the general goal is to increase the mobility and survivability of friendly forces and to decrease the effectiveness of numerically superior enemy forces. Considerable potential defensive advantages have been developed through innovative applied geoscience research. These advantages are largely untested during wartime conditions, but they remain in current American national defense strategy, and will continue so throughout the final quarter of the Twentieth Century.

The role of target acquisition in combat intelligence past and future

(1989). The role of target acquisition in combat intelligence past and future. Intelligence and National Security: Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 119-126.

Extracting Differences in Expert Mental Representations: An Application of a Technique for Characterizing Schemata

A study was conducted to test 1) the validity and generalizability of a technique for characterizing schemata of military intelligence information, and 2) its applicability for explaining differences in expert judgments. The task required tactical intelligence analysts to summarize a military scenario in preparation for a briefing. Ten analysts chose the south avenue of approach, and six chose the north avenue of approach as the correct solution. Extraction of topics from the analysts' summaries was used to create a schema for each avenue of approach. The results demonstrated considerable agreement between the two derived schemata. However, critical differences were found, and these differences explained the analysts' different conclusions. Implications for decision aid development and future research are discussed.

An Iterative Bayesian Decision Aid: Toward Improving the User-Aid and User-Organization Interfaces

An iterative Bayesian decision aid was developed to give users greater control of the decisionmaking process and thereby increase the likelihood of aid implementation. The aid permits users to modify the initially assessed likelihood ratios and resulting posterior odds for the hypotheses under consideration until they feel comfortable with the inferred implications of the data. The aid was applied to the area of military tactical intelligence analysis and evaluated experimentally by experienced analysts on a training task representative of that decisionmaking environment. Experienced and inexperienced (but trained) analysts working with the aid were 1) better able to discriminate between the most and least likely hypotheses and 2) assigned final likelihoods to the hypotheses that were more similar to normative likelihoods derived from Bayes' theorem than unaided analysts. In addition, analyses of individual analysts revealed large differences in decisionmaking strategies. These differences demonstrate that users can approach the inference problem using their own decisionmaking style, thereby ensuring user control over all stages of the decisionmaking process.

Summarizing Military Information: An Application of Schema Theory

This study was conducted to support the development of guidelines for summarizing tactical intelligence data. Sixteen staff officers were asked to read a description of a tactical scenario and to examine 30 enemy situation data (ESD) messages describing the beginning of an enemy border crossing and attack. Each officer summarized the intelligence in preparation for a briefing, and these summaries were evaluated by five knowledgeable military analysts. Collectively, the evaluators favored summaries presented in conversational style, with hard facts and an interpretation of what the intelligence implied. A more specific two-dimensional outline for summarizing was derived by applying recently refined principles of schema theory to the contents of the summaries judged “good” by the evaluators. It was suggested that these prescriptive norms provide the basis for the development of guidelines for staff officers to enable them to produce more useful and effective intelligence-message summaries.

It's Up to You, Mr. President

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Additional informationNotes on contributorsRoland SawyerMr. Sawyer is a reporter on the Washington Bureau of the Christian Science Monitor who has devoted much of his attention to the problems of continental defense, civil defense, and atomic energy. Before coming to Washington he was accredited for a period to the United Nations, and has also served as assistant national editor of the Monitor. During the war he was a naval reserve officer specializing in air combat intelligence and saw service both in the South Pacific and in Europe.

THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE PROGRAM OF THE ARMY JAPANESE LANGUAGE SCHOOL AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN1

HE BASIC MATERIALS AND METHODS underlying the spoken IanT guage programs given to the students of the Army Japanese Language School, the ASTP unit, and the Civil Affairs Training School at the University of Michigan were developed in 1943 and the early part of 1944. The materials used in the programs were changed from time to time in accordance with changing conditions, the chief of which was the gradual shift from training for combat intelligence to training for the work of occupation. The following is a description of the spoken language program given to Classes V, VI, and VII of the Army Japanese Language School. These were the classes that received training both for combat intelligence and for occupation, By May, 1944, when Class IV of the Army Japanese Language School had arrived in Ann Arbor, the staff had acquired enough experience with methods to adopt the oral-aural approach for beginners in the study of Japanese. The oral-aural approach means devoting the first five or six weeks to the spoken language without reference to written materials. The students memorize the spoken models with no attempt at grammatical analysis. They mimic in unison the instructor’s pronunciation of the lesson materials at the beginning of each recitation. The advantages of such a procedure are that the students imitate a good model, the teacher instantly corrects pronunciation, and the subject matter is covered just prior to discussion. In contrast with this procedure, the usual one of individual reading and correction is time-consuming and does not affect, completely, the students who are not reading. In addition, the oralaural approach means that nearly all of the work in the classroom

Reviews of Books

Abstract Abstract Hindenburg: The Wooden Titan. By John W. Wheeler Bennett. (Macmillan). 21s. The Conquest of Morocco. By Vice-Admiral C. V. Usborne, C.B., C.M.G. (Stanley Paul). 18s. The First of the League Wars. By Major-General J. F. C. Fuller. (Eyre and Spottiswoode). 10s. 6d. Japan's Feet of Clay. By Freda Utley. (Faber and Faber). 15s. General Grant's Last Stand. A Biography. By Horace Green. (Scribner's). 12s. 6d. Mesopotamia: The Last Phase. By Lieut.-Colonel A. H. Burne, D.S.O. (Gale and Polden). 5s. Combat Intelligence—Its Acquisition and Transmission. By Major Edwin E. Schwien, U.S. Army. (The Infantry Journal, Inc.). $2 Titles and Forms of Address: A Guide to their Correct Use. (A. & C. Black, Ltd.). 3s. 6d. Jane's Fighting Ships. Edited by F. E. McMurtrie, A.I.N.A. (Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd.). £2 2s. The Infantry Commander's Pocket Book. By Infantry Officer. (Gale and Polden). 1s. The Welsh Regiment of Foot Guards. By Major C. Dudley Ward, D.S.O., M.C. (John Murray). The Rifle Brigade, 1914–1918. Vol. II: 1917–1918. By Brigadier-General William W. Seymour. (Butler and Tanner, Ltd.). The Royal Canadian Regiment, 1883–1933. By R. C. Fetherstonhaugh. (Gazette Printing Company, Montreal, 1936). $6. History of the 5th Battalion (Pathans) 14th Punjab Regiment. By Major R. S. Waters, O.B.E. (James Bain, Ltd.). Jane's All the World's Aircraft. Compiled and edited by C. G. Grey and Leonard Bridgeman. (Sampson Low and Martin). 42s.