Columbia Court Research Articles

Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment

LL.B. 1966, Yale Law School. Member of the California, District of Columbia, Missouri and United States Supreme Court Bars. Partner, Benenson, Kates and Hardy (San Francisco office). Of counsel, O'Brien & Hallisey, San Francisco, California. Mr. Kates authored one of the petitions for certiorari in Quilici v. City of Morton Grove. — Ed. The author wishes to thank the following for their assistance: Professors William Van Alstyne (Law, Duke University Law School), Roy Wortman (History, Kenyon College), and Stephen Halbrook (Philosophy, George Mason University); Dr. Joyce Malcolm (Law Fellow, Harvard Law School), Dr. David I. Caplan, Mr. Willis Hannawalt (Pillsbury, Madison and Sutro, San Francisco), and Mr. David Hardy (Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Interior Department, Washington, D.C.). Of course, the responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation is the author's alone. 1 Such legislation could, for example, take the form of a restrictive permit requirement designed and administered to exclude more than 99% of the civilian population from handgun ownership. On the constitutionality of restrictive permit systems, see notes 253-54 infra and accompanying text. 2 See J. ALVIANI & W. DRAKE, HANDGUN CONTROL: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES 48-54 (U.S. Conference of Mayors, 1975) (quoting resolutions to that effect from: The Board of Church and Society, United Methodist Church, Common Cause, National Alliance for Safer Cities, Union of America Hebrew Congregations and Unitarian Universalist Association). [Copyright © 1983 Michigan Law Review. Originally published as 82 MICH. L. REV. 204-273 (1983). For educational use only. The printed edition remains canonical. For citational use please obtain a back issue from William S. Hein & Co., 1285 Main Street, Buffalo, New York 14209; 716-882-2600 or 800-828-7571.]

The Forensic Psychologist as an Expert Witness in the District of Columbia

The author notes that the evolution from nonacceptance to the present day full acceptance of psychologists as expert witnesses in the District of Columbia court system is complete. This acceptance has been gained despite the opposition, among others, of the American Psychiatric Association. District of Columbia appellate court decisions are cited to show the resolution of the conflict about whether to accept psychologists as experts in the field of mental health.

United States: District of Columbia Court of Appeals Decision in Caravel Office Building and Hynning v. Peruvian Air Attache (Personal Diplomatic Immunity; Sovereign Immunity; Commercial Lease of Office Space)

United States: District of Columbia Court of Appeals Decision in Caravel Office Building and Hynning v. Peruvian Air Attache (Personal Diplomatic Immunity; Sovereign Immunity; Commercial Lease of Office Space)

Juvenile Justice: Even-handed or Many-handed?

The District of Columbia Court Reorganization of 1970 was designed as model legislation to be emulated in other jurisdictions seeking swift and certain justice as a solution to their crime problems. Among other things, it abolishes the independent juvenile court and creates a Juvenile Branch of the Family Di vision of the Superior Court. It also provides for the assignment of all Superior Court judges to any branch of the court, includ ing the Juvenile Branch, as needed.

Psychiatric Morbidity and Treatment of Prison Inmates

Abstract The failure to provide adequate treatment for persons committed to mental institutions has recently received considerable attention. The doctrine of “the right to treatment” has been judicially expressed in the now famous Rouse v. Cameron decision (373F 2d 451), (D.C. Cir., 1966). Rouse was sent to St. Elizabeth Hospital in the District of Columbia after he was found not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity. Three years later he sought release stating that he was not receiving adequate treatment to which he was entitled. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals stated that the possibility of ”indefinite commitment without treatment of one who has been found not criminally responsible may be so inhuman as to be cruel and unusual punishment.” A great deal of legal literature has been devoted to this issue.

The Small Claims Court in the District of Columbia

THE small claims court was made a national phenomenon when Congress in 1938 established a Small Claims Court and Conciliation Branch in the Municipal Court of the District of Columbia.' In THE ANNALS for September 1939 Judge Nathan Cayton 2 reviewed the background of the small claims movement and analyzed the provisions of the congressional enactment.3 I shall not repeat what was said there, but shall rather examine the operations of the District of Columbia court as a