Policing Insurgencies: Cops as Counterinsurgents. By Christine S. Fair and Sumit Ganguly (eds.). New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2014. 362 pp. cloth. Policing is a concept that has only recently attracted attention in debate on counter-insurgency (COIN). For a long time, COIN was seen as a purely military affair, clearly with a political dimension, but conceived and discussed as a strategy that would concern military personnel and civil administration. This volume is one of few that addresses role of police forces in cases of counter-insurgencies, mostly in South and Southeast Asia but includes case studies on Kenya, Colombia, Iraq, and Northern Ireland. It addresses two predominant assertions on role of police forces in counter-insurgency campaigns. The first sees police as part of problem as its repressive practices fuel rebellion instead of offering security. The second see police forces as a core component of a successful COIN. As David P. Fidler in his succinct summarizing contribution points out, this volume really goes beyond this dichotomy and adds to our knowledge on actual dynamics of situations in which police forces are part of rebellions or outright civil wars.The balance sheet of 10 case studies in this book shows a very mixed result. Contributions of police forces for success of COIN operations were at times really important as Kumar Ramakrishna shows for case of what is perhaps a bit euphemistically called the Malayan emergency, a rebellion of leftist peasants between 1948 and 1960. The emergency was an outright guerilla war and cost around 10,000 lives, mostly of rebels who had fought against British colonial rule. Walter C. Ladwig III's article on a rebellion in Philippines (1946-1954) also only marginally addresses political agenda of Hukbalahap rebels who fought against foreign rule and feudal domination. Such a depoliticized account might look justified when analysis of police work is real topic of investigation. However, one might wonder whether police work is actually as apolitical as some contributions present it. According to authors, both cases show that committed leadership, a professionalization of force, and an institutionalized responsibility toward civilian population as well as an end of indiscriminate violence at least enhances acceptance of police and renders it seemingly more efficient in fighting a rebellion instead of just fuelling violent escalation. Other cases, like attempt of British to quell Mao-Mao rebellion in colonial Kenya (1952-1960) or (1952-1960) or violence in Northern Ireland are examples, however, that there is no magic formula that works under any circumstances.Jugdep S. Chima shows in his contribution on Sikh rebellion in India's Punjab that even if all conditions mentioned above like committed leadership, sufficient support, and institutionalized responsibility within police forces are met, success still depends on another variable that is beyond police forces' control: political constellation under which police reform is done. The rebellion in Punjab dried out in 1990s as participation of grass-root organizations and inclusion of local power holders eased situation.A similar mechanism, although with a different result, seems to be at work in Afghanistan after 2001, as Austin Long argues in his contribution. …