Colombian Exports Research Articles

Which comes first—exporting or production efficiencies? A study of Mexican, Colombian, and Moroccan exporters

This article summarizes a study that examined data from production plants in Mexico, Colombia and Morocco to find out whether firms learn to become more efficient through their exporting activities and whether exporting firms transfer their learning to other nonexporting firms. Analysts have observed that firms participating in export markets are typically more efficient than firms focused solely on domestic markets. Production efficiencies may develop when export markets facilitate the transfer of knowledge between exporting plants and their customers. Several process improvements discovered in the course of the study that allow exporting plants to provide lower cost or higher quality products are discussed.

The Andean cocaine industry

The Andean Cocaine Industry Patrick L. Clawson and Rensselar W. Lee III New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996 Criminal activities are not normally considered as a contributor to national income, yet the cocaine industry in the Andean countries (Peru, Bolivia, and Columbia) are important enough to be a major part of their national economies, as this fascinating book documents. Cocaine exports (cocaine is primarily an export industry) are estimated to be 53% of Peru's exports in 1992. For Bolivia, U.S.AID estimates had put cocaine exports as 90% of the exports in 1988, but only 23% by 1992. For an illegal activity, these are high figures. The structure of the industry consists of large numbers of peasants growing the crop in low-lying and jungle areas, and with processing in laboratories located in the rural areas. The per capita incomes derived at this stage are low. The big profits are made by smuggling the drug into the U.S. and Europe. Estimates are that cocaine hydrochloride costs $1000 per kilogram, with the cost of transportation to the United States market being $3,000, and miscellaneous other costs (handling, bribes in major markets) $500. With a wholesale price estimated at $13,000 per kilogram in the U.S. market, the profit potential is very high. Getting the proceeds back home in legal form is estimated as costing 15% of the total, leaving the gross profit margins from shipping to the U.S. at $6,500 per kilogram, about half of the wholesale proceeds. Interestingly, European prices appear to be much higher at $35,000 per kilogram. With the retail price of cocaine being $120-$151 per gram, the retail price is $121,000-$151,000 per kilogram, about 10 fold higher than the port-of-entry prices. Thus most of the cocaine profits are made in the United States, creating a strong incentive for the Colombian exporters to move operations downstream. In many U.S. cities Colombians have established distribution cells that sell the cocaine in lots of 30 to 100 kilograms at prices of $35,000 to $45,000. These highly profitable operations are run by inmigrants from Columbia with strong ties back home (having relatives whose location is known to the exporter is one way of assuring loyalty). Since it is not known how many of these will eventually return home, it is unclear in national income accounting terms how much of this income should be credited to Columbia. Estimates by Colombian economists of their country's cocaine income differ widely from as low as $170 million to $3.1 billion. One table (p. 24) puts exports by core Colombian organizations (i.e. excluding the small organizations not affiliated with the major Cali or Medellincentered groups) at 250 tons to the U.S., and 80 tons to Europe, with total earnings of $3.71 billion. Due to higher prices in Europe, most of the earnings were actually from Europe. Estimating the major exporters as accounting for 75% of the exports, the total value of exports would be $8 billion. This substantial sum is 90% of the country's merchandise exports (recorded) in 1994, and 380% of the coffee exports (the leading agricultural export). The value-added proportion of this can be estimated at four to five billion dollars, which is equivalent to 8 to 9% percent of Colombia's 1994 GDP. While not discussed in this section, it is likely that much of this income is held abroad (Swiss bank accounts etc.) due to problems in money laundering and in spending the vast per capita incomes earned by the estimated 500 individuals who stand at the apex of the industry. The industry emerged in the 1970's with early traffickers smuggling small amounts in personal luggage. This system was organizationally simple. This small-scale system was replaced by fleets of small airplanes operating from rural airstrips that could carry 400 to 1000 kilograms, and later by large-scale smuggling in cargo containers, ships, etc. These systems required large organizations and sophisticated management One organizational innovation was insurance. …

The decline of the U.S. footwear industry and the expected impact of a Free Trade Agreement between Colombia and the United States

This article traces the internationalization of the U.S. footwear industry in terms of the many changes affecting market structure, raw materials, technology, shoe styling, wages, transportation, and the unresponsiveness of U.S. manufacturers to the foreign challenge. The econometric findings of an import demand function fit to U.S. data from 1963–1991 reveal unitary and significant elasticities with respect to both activity and price variables, well within the range of other studies of the footwear industry reviewed here. Possible scenarios of the impact of NAFTA on the U.S., Mexican, and Colombian footwear industries are presented in the context of a detailed analysis of Colombia's footwear industry, its exports to the world in general and to the United States. By examining the average unit prices of all Colombian exports and the U.S. tariffs specific to these products, we speculate on the potential for Colombian exports once tariffs are lowered.

Dutch disease economics and the Colombian export boom

Dutch disease models predict a primary export boom may result in deindustrialization due to an appreciating real exchange rate. This paper examines the effects on the Colombian economy of large increases in foreign exchange earnings from coffee and illegal drug exports. As predicted by Dutch disease models, the relative price of nontraded goods rose and the real exchange rate appreciated. Once the boom was over, both were slow to return to previous levels. Nontraded sectors are shown to have increased their growth rates during the boom years, while traded goods experienced slower growth. Non-coffee exports also grew more slowly. Econometric estimation shows that the real exchange rate was sensitive to the price of coffee and fiscal expansion, that sectoral production adjusts to the exchange rate and level of absorption as predicted, and that non-coffee exports respond to changes in the real exchange rate and foreign demand. The paper concludes with a discussion of economic policy in response to the export boom.

Coffee in Colombia 1850-1970: An Economic, Social and Political History.

List of tables List of figures List of maps Preface Acknowledgements 1. The Colombian export economy in the second half of the nineteenth century 2. The making of an oligarchy 3. Land and society in central Colombia in the second half of the nineteenth century 4. The internal structure of the coffee haciendas, 1870-1930 5. Living conditions and internal contradictions in the hacienda structure 6. Inflation, devaluation, and export taxes, 1870-1904 7. Crisis and transition towards the second cycle of expansion, 1903-10 8. Private appropriation of public lands in the west 9. Sociopolitical elements of antiogueno colonization 10. Coffee expansion and the strengthening of the Liberal model of development, 1910-50 11. The international cycle and coffee policies confronting the peasant, 1930-70 Appendices Weights and measures Glossary Notes Bibliography Index.