Collective Defense Research Articles

Страны Балтии и стратегическая автономия Европейского союза

Nowadays, three Baltic countries – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – form the most solid core in the camp of European Atlanticists with a strong emphasis on the U.S. as the main security guarantee. Due to their geographical location, they have always been particularly acutely aware of the tension between East and West. With the beginning of Russia’s special military operation on the territory of Ukraine, the topic of a potential Russian threat has become predominant in their foreign policy discourse. The article is devoted to the analysis of the evolution of the Baltic countries’ approaches to national and regional security and the main factors influencing the formation of these approaches, in particular, the relationship between Atlanticism and Europeanism. Particular attention is paid to the existing dichotomy of the Baltic countries in the field of European security, the catalyst of which was the European Union’s course on strategic autonomy. From the very beginning, the idea of strategic autonomy of the European Union did not arouse much enthusiasm in these countries because of the fear of breaking the strategic link between Europe and the United States. The course of the EU leadership towards strategic autonomy has violated the established picture of the world in the Baltic States: NATO, under the strong leadership of the United States, should provide collective defense against a potential Russian threat, and the EU – economic well-being and prosperity. The European Union was assigned a subsidiary and far from the main role in the field of security. However, being part of the EU, the Baltic States could no longer completely ignore the integration projects of Brussels in the field of European defense. If until February 24, 2022, the security policy of the Baltic countries was distinguished by balancing between the United States/NATO and the European Union, then the Ukrainian conflict has once again tipped the scales in favor of the Atlantic choice as the main guarantor of security.

ПЕРЕОСМИСЛЕННЯ ЧИННИКА ЧОРНОМОРСЬКОЇ БЕЗПЕКИ НА ТЛІ РОСІЙСЬКОЇ АГРЕСІЇ

This paper examines the rethinking of the Black Sea security factor based on the analysis of primary sources, including the texts of speeches by officials and experts, quantitative analysis of scientific publications on Black Sea issues in the Web of Science Core Collection, as well as the results of an international research project on Black Sea security, in which the author of this publication participated, and which included semi-structured interviews with diplomats and experts, as well as a questionnaire expert survey. The study gives grounds to conclude that since the end of the Cold War, the Black Sea region has not been considered one of the most important strategic spaces for a long time, and its security issues have been out of focus for decades, both in Europe and in the Euro-Atlantic community. The reassessment of the importance of the Black Sea security factor for Europe, the United States and the world as a whole occurred only after and under the influence of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which changed the balance of power in the region and threatened the global security architecture. Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine has moved the Black Sea region from the periphery to the centre of Euro-Atlantic security processes, and has shown that this region should be considered an integral part of the overall European security system. The return of largescale war to Europe has forced the countries of the continent to more soberly assess their vulnerabilities and the value of collective defence within NATO. Awareness of the rapidly growing security threats has prompted officials, experts and scholars in Europe and the United States to recognise the strategic importance of the Black Sea region, the need for a clear strategy for the region by Western countries and their regional allies and partners, and the need to take urgent steps to return peace, security and stability to the region.

Free Riding, Network Effects, and Burden Sharing in Defense Cooperation Networks

AbstractHow do states distribute the burdens of collective defense? This paper develops a network theory of burden sharing. We focus on bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCAs), which promote cooperation in a variety of defense, military, and security issue areas. Using a computational model, we show that DCA partners’ defense spending depends on the network structure of their agreements. In bilateral terms, DCAs increase defense spending by committing states to defense activities and allowing partners to reciprocally punish free riding. However, as a state's local network of defense partnerships grows more densely connected, with many transitive “friend of a friend” relations, DCAs have the countervailing effect of reducing defense spending. The more deeply integrated states are in bilateral defense networks, the less they spend on defense. We distinguish two potential mechanisms behind this effect—one based on efficiency improvements, the other on free riding. An empirical analysis using multilevel inferential network models points more to efficiency than to free riding. Defense networks reduce defense spending, and they do so by allowing countries to produce security more efficiently.

The evolution of NATO policy in the conditions of the russian-Ukrainian war

Abstract. The article provides a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of NATO policy within the context of the russian-Ukrainian war. The North Atlantic Alliance consistently demonstrates its commitment as a reliable guarantor of peace, security, and stability for its member countries. The foundation of NATO’s accomplishments lies in its dependable and effective institutional structure, well-regulated political consultation mechanisms geared towards consensus-building, and the aspiration to constantly maintain and improve the balance of transatlantic interests. The russian invasion of Ukraine has prompted a critical reassessment of NATO’s role and its development prospects, primarily regarding the imperative of strengthening the Alliance’s defensive potential, the expansion of its operational scope, and the refinement of its security missions. The new Strategic Concept outlined NATO’s priorities, core objectives, and approaches. It also identified the main threats to Euro-Atlantic security and proposed countermeasures for the next decade. The Alliance reacted to the kremlin’s aggressive intentions by activating its defence plans and deploying additional military formations on NATO’s eastern flank, backed by significant air and naval potential. Moreover, the Alliance enhances the reliability of nuclear forces, strengthens the operational capabilities of conventional armed forces and anti-missile defence assets, and reinforces the resilience of member countries for collective defence. An analysis of Ukraine’s relations with NATO amidst the large-scale russian aggression underscores that the heroic resistance of the Ukrainian people could facilitate a quick accession of Ukraine to the Alliance following the end of the war. An invitation to Ukraine at the 2023 Vilnius Summit opens prospects for establishing long-term sustainable peace in Europe. Keywords: NATO, russian aggression, Strategic Concept, NATO expansion, Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine.

FLEXI - A Conceptual Model for Enterprise Cyber Resilience

The growing increase in cyberattacks overwhelms the ability of organizations to reliably contain and maintain their operations. In this sense, current good practices and standards create a false sense of security that is usually exploited by attackers to create areas of instability that end up compromising not only their operations but also their promise of value. Therefore, the FLEXI model and its basic practices are proposed as an unconventional alternative that prepares the organization to assume the uncertainty and instability as the new normal of its operation, which is to learn, cushion and rebound in the face of a successful cyber event, where the challenge is to overcome the vision of silos in the organization to build a collective defense that generates greater uncertainty to the adversary's risk model and a better organizational posture in the face of the inevitability of failure.

ОБ’ЄДНАНА РОЗВІДКА, СПОСТЕРЕЖЕННЯ ТА РЕКОГНОСЦИРОВКА ЯК ПРІОРИТЕТНА СФЕРА ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЇ НАТО

Russia's horrific war against Ukraine has radically changed international security. NATO will need to continue bolstering its Deterrence and Defence Posture, which is essential to ensuring the collective defense of Allies and to continue investing in crisis management and cooperative security while adapting these tasks to meet its changing security needs and globally integrated hybrid environment. The Alliance should pay a strong emphasis on retaining and strengthening technological edge, in particular, improving strategic forecasting and situational awareness, the ability to understanding, monitoring and prediction the actions of potential adversaries using means of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance based on comprehensive agreements in this sphere. The purpose of the study is to analyze the development, improvement and application experience of NATO's Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) as a priority area of the Alliance's transformation in terms of improving capabilities, as well as the significance for future operations and the decision-making process There were determined definitions, content, main components and means of the system of NATO's Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Conceptual and doctrinal documents for the implementation of NATO's obligations in this area have been studied. The security conditions, the process of formation based on experience and best practices, vulnerabilities and key areas of the system, which combines the potential of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance based on phased approach were analysed. There were considered the projects that provide gather of data and information, which JISR brings together, such as NATO’s Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system, NATO Airborne Warning & Control System (AWACS) surveillance aircraft and national JISR assets from the space, air, land and maritime domains/ Highlighted are the key aspects of the process of interpretation and analysis of information, requirements for the professional level of experts and the importance of the final product for the decision-making process. There were indicated further development and improvement of JISR capabilities in training and education, doctrine and procedures and networking environment spheres. Considered are methods to practice and evaluate technical and operational concepts for conducting NATO`s Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. An overview of the possibilities of applying Ukrainian innovative developments tested in combat conditions in terms of situational awareness as well as Ukraine's cooperation with NATO in this field was made. The result of the research is conclusions on the development and improvement of JISR capability to facilitate rapid decision-making in several main areas, including the Readiness Action Plan, enhanced Forward Presence, the hybrid warfare strategy, and the overall Deterrence and Defence Posture. Keywords: NATO, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, situational awareness, NATO Ground Surveillance System, Airborne Early Warning and Control System, Deterrence and Defence Posture, enhanced Forward Presence, decision-making process, operation and mission.

Current trends in the military-industrial integration of the EU countries and implications for Ukraine

In the face of common security challenges, the issue of protecting civilised countries from external military aggression is of utmost importance for the entire European continent. The research aims to analyse the existing integration processes in Europe and extrapolate them to the military-industrial complex of Ukraine since the Ukrainian state is an outpost of the European Union, where the entire range of modern military technologies is used. The objectives of the study are to identify trends in the military industries of the leading European countries and to assess the prospects for their further integration in the context of the current external military aggression. The key indicators were collected and analysed using statistical and regression analysis, as well as the longitudinal method. The study provided results on the development of defence spending in individual countries, data on the participation of EU countries in joint projects, the scope of sanctions imposed on the aggressor country, indicators of Ukraine's participation in the common customs area, and the volume of military assistance from partner countries. The analysis of the data led to the conclusion that the defence capability of both Ukraine and the entire European Union has significantly improved. It was also found that the replacement of outdated Soviet standards with modern Western ones has led to a significant increase in defence capabilities. In addition, the study found that the unjustified armed aggression against Ukraine strengthened relations between the countries of the European Defence Agency and gave them an impetus to develop collective defence capabilities and conclude joint agreements involving military-industrial complexes. From a practical point of view, the obtained indicators of changes on the continent made it possible to draw conclusions about the directions of further integration and to correct the identified shortcomings

Selling Rural Palestine: Land Devaluation, Ethical Investment, and the Limits of Human Rights

AbstractThis article is a study of the causes and consequences of making Palestinian land into an ethical investment. It builds on fieldwork in villages north of Ramallah where a Palestinian real estate company purchased devalued agricultural lands and offered them to Palestinian buyers as an ethical investment. It argues that through private titling, planning, and infrastructure, this company secured land for potential investors and produced an imaginary of rural areas as empty and unowned. It created enclaves that protect the rights of new owners but undermine the possibilities for collective land defence, and it pioneered a model of development that will transform the use and control of village land across the West Bank. Rather than an example of a company that uses human rights to cover up illegality, this case illuminates the limits of human rights for critiquing capital and settler colonialism and for understanding the forces that are reshaping rural Palestine.

Perception of resilience in the security policy of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Republic of Poland

ObjectivesThe purpose of the article is to present the place of resilience in the security strategy of the North Atlantic Alliance and the Republic of Poland. This is particularly important in the context of the Russian Federation's military aggression against Ukraine and Moscow's attempts to destabilize other regions. In light of such a stated goal, the following research problem was established: will the concept of resilience to threats become a key concept for NATO and Polish security policy in the third decade of the 21st century?MethodsThe research methods used in the research process primarily included analysis of source materials (legal acts), scientific studies and publications of government institutions.ResultsThe results of the study confirmed the thesis that the concept of resilience now occupies a very important place in the security policy of the North Atlantic Alliance and Poland. This is their response primarily to the aggressive policies of the Russian Federation: the attack against Ukraine, threats against NATO (including Poland), the attempt to destabilize the situation in other regions of the world. NATO, including Poland, has realized the need to build efficient collective defense mechanisms and resilience to military and non-military threats.ConclusionsConclusions of the research indicate that the North Atlantic Alliance is increasing its emphasis on creating resilience to threats. Unfortunately, in Poland, the apt provisions of the National Security Strategy regarding resilience and universal defense have so far remained only in the realm of declarations.

PERSPECTIVES ON THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATIONAL MILITARY STRUCTURES SO AS TO ADAPT TO THE ALLIED CONTEXT

The complexity of the security situation at international and especially regional level, generated by Russia's aggression against Ukraine, accentuates the need to develop and strengthen the North Atlantic Alliance's collective deterrence and defence posture. The collective defence system is and will remain an effective element in geopolitical equations, especially in the current context, when the threat spectrum is unprecedentedly diverse, and the system is NATO's main objective. Against the backdrop of these challenges, following the financial crisis and in particular since 2014, with the NATO Summit in the UK (4-5 September 2014), there has been a demand at Allied level for a robust set of defence capabilities capable of responding effectively to the full spectrum of threats and supporting NATO's political and strategic objectives in the coming phases. Initiatives such as the 'Defence Capability Building', the 'Interoperability Platform' or the 'Connected Forces Initiative', together with the gradual increase of defence budgets to reach the 2% of GDP target, have been aspirations adopted by Member States and largely imposed at national level. Subsequent Summits since 2014 have made significant progress in strengthening NATO capabilities and adapting the Alliance to the current geopolitical reality. Therefore, as the types of threats confronted seem to evolve and acquire increasingly diverse features, states and their instruments, in turn, must undergo a process of transformation and adaptation, both individually, at state level, and in the allied context. Transformation is a constant challenge and requirement for the Alliance and its members, which will have to be faced continuously.

WHY NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL HAS FAILED AFTER 20 YEARS OF EXISTENCE

At the end of 2021, Russia mobilised over a hundred thousand soldiers along its border with Ukraine constituting a permanent threat to Ukraine and a concern for the West and the whole world. On February 24, 2022, Russia initiated a military intervention in Ukraine. The Kremlin has decided to reconstitute its border lines of the former USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and its spheres of influence in Central and Eastern Europe.
 After the end of the Cold War, Russia, a nuclear power, has constantly expressed its desire to have a special status in relation to the North Atlantic Alliance different from that of former communist countries, members of the Warsaw Pact. The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) is the structure in which Russia had that special and unique relationship with NATO. NRC was established in 2002 to resolve any inconsistencies in the NATO-Russia relations, to facilitate a more flexible dialogue, and understanding between the parties and to open new areas of collaboration. However, it could not change the perceptions created during the Cold War, and most importantly, it could not resolve Russia's place and role in Europe's security issues.
 From February 24, 2022, the NRC lost its credibility, the policy of dialogue was no longer relevant and NATO switched to the policy of deterrence and collective defense of the entire Eastern flank of NATO.
 The study presents the evolution of relations between NATO and Russia, the phases they went through in the last twenty years since the creation of the NRC and explained the failure of NATO-Russia cooperation in NRC.

Towards a New Arab Moment

Towards a New Arab Moment

New Questions for an Old Alliance: NATO in Cyberspace and American Public Opinion

Abstract Cybersecurity poses new questions for old alliances. These questions emerge with special force in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Russian Federation wields substantial cyber capabilities, but NATO members have been ambivalent about stating what sorts of attacks would trigger the North Atlantic Treaty's Article 5 collective self-defense provisions. Nevertheless, NATO officials state that there are some attacks that would trigger Article 5. This leads to a puzzle: why would an explicit alliance guarantee designed to ensure collective defense against certain forms of attack be informally extended to include others? Because the policy of the United States toward such questions will likely be of great significance in determining NATO policy, we use a series of survey experiments to test American public opinion regarding support for defending allies and friendly countries against cyber operations. Respondents are likelier to support a response to an attack that causes fatalities and when the victim has a treaty alliance with the United States. In contrast, support falls if US participation is likely to provoke further retaliation or the target attacked is civilian rather than military.

Lessons from EU Space Programmes for Collective Defence

The European Defence Fund (EDF) has been interpreted by a number of scholars as a step beyond intergovernmental cooperation and towards the introduction of supranationalism in defence policy. We suggest that past developments in space policy can be a guide for developments in the defence area given the functional dependencies between the two fields and their institutional similarities. Based on this, we believe that the Commission will be unable to convert its new authority over the EDF into actual influence over use of force. On the contrary, the EDF may signal that European defence industrial policy is increasingly motivated by civilian and predominantly commercial considerations, dissociated from the operational objectives of national defence policies. Like the EDF, the European Union’s (EU’s) space programmes involve the supranational financing of militarily relevant capabilities. We argue that Member States have accepted supranationalism in space policy insofar as the Commission was able to civilianize matters of industrial governance and keep them separate from the conduct of military operations. We show that the EU implemented civilian programmes in areas that were otherwise driven by national militaries. In instances where civilianization was impossible, Member States’ security interests are preserved through intergovernmental modes of decision-making, even within purportedly ‘community’-driven processes. Member States have also retained significant control over future developments by exploiting a web of overlapping institutions and hazy task allocation. spillover, neofunctionalism, space policy, European Defence Fund, defence industry, industrial policy

Defensive shimmering responses in Apis dorsata are triggered by dark stimuli moving against a bright background.

Giant honeybees, including the open-nesting Asian giant honeybee Apis dorsata, display a spectacular collective defence behaviour - known as 'shimmering' - against predators, which is characterised by travelling waves generated by individual bees flipping their abdomens in a coordinated and sequential manner across the bee curtain. We examined whether shimmering is visually mediated by presenting moving stimuli of varying sizes and contrasts to the background (dark or light) in bright and dim ambient light conditions. Shimmering was strongest under bright ambient light, and its strength declined under dim light in this facultatively nocturnal bee. Apis dorsata shimmered only when presented with the darkest stimulus against a light background, but not when this condition was reversed (light stimulus against dark background). This response did not attenuate with repeated exposure to the stimuli, suggesting that shimmering behaviour does not undergo habituation. We suggest that this is an effective anti-predator strategy in open-nesting A. dorsata colonies which are exposed to high ambient light, as flying predators are more easily detected when they appear as dark moving objects against a bright sky. Moreover, the stimulus detection threshold (smallest visual angular size) is much smaller in this anti-predatory context (1.6-3.4deg) than in the context of foraging (5.7deg), indicating that ecological context affects the visual detection threshold.

Afghanistan’s Significance for NATO Strategy

NATO has reaffirmed crisis management as one of its ‘core tasks’, even as it strengthens collective defence amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and specifically refers to the need to learn from Afghanistan. Henrik Larsen argues that NATO needs to face the uncomfortable realities that can explain the failure of its most ambitious and deadliest operation in its history. Given that the Afghanistan experience makes a strong case against crisis management, he argues that NATO should refine its definition: ‘crisis’ synonymous with the prevention of inter-state conflict rather than diffuse threats such as global terrorism; and ‘management’ synonymous with over-the-horizon rather than open-ended operations or the supply of weapons like the case of Ukraine. ◼

Long-distance vocalizations of spotted hyenas contain individual, but not group, signatures.

In animal societies, identity signals are common, mediate interactions within groups, and allow individuals to discriminate group-mates from out-group competitors. However, individual recognition becomes increasingly challenging as group size increases and as signals must be transmitted over greater distances. Group vocal signatures may evolve when successful in-group/out-group distinctions are at the crux of fitness-relevant decisions, but group signatures alone are insufficient when differentiated within-group relationships are important for decision-making. Spotted hyenas are social carnivores that live in stable clans of less than 125 individuals composed of multiple unrelated matrilines. Clan members cooperate to defend resources and communal territories from neighbouring clans and other mega carnivores; this collective defence is mediated by long-range (up to 5 km range) recruitment vocalizations, called whoops. Here, we use machine learning to determine that spotted hyena whoops contain individual but not group signatures, and that fundamental frequency features which propagate well are critical for individual discrimination. For effective clan-level cooperation, hyenas face the cognitive challenge of remembering and recognizing individual voices at long range. We show that serial redundancy in whoop bouts increases individual classification accuracy and thus extended call bouts used by hyenas probably evolved to overcome the challenges of communicating individual identity at long distance.

Volcano: Between Structural Vulnerabilities and Collective Defence of Honor in Communities Surrounding an Open Dumpsite.

This study analyzes the dynamics in which structural vulnerabilities are shaped and expressed in the day-to-day lives of people making a living from a garbage dump in Argentina. It is a mixed methods case study, qualitative driven with a collaborative cycle (2016-2021). The study is embedded in medical anthropology, social epidemiology and Latin America Social Medicine, with the focus on the ways people respond to inequalities locally. The findings contribute to the field of health disparities in three directions: 1) the description of patterns of segregation in South America peripheries, shedding light on cumulative disadvantages and multiple exposures; 2) the experience of living enmeshed in places with strong stigmas, revising the ways this source of discrimination become social suffering; and 3) the detection of the impact of collective action and social capital in providing material and symbolic resources for restoring dignity and honour that challenge depreciated status.

Still fit for purpose? Reassessing and revising NATO’s core tasks

ABSTRACT NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept established three core tasks for the Alliance: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. While those tasks remain sound, the 2010 Concept reflected a different geopolitical, geostrategic, and security environment from today’s, characterized by renewed conflict with Russia, concerns about China’s strategic and economic ambitions, and new security challenges like hybrid threats and disinformation. Considering the changed strategic landscape and emerging challenges, we argue that NATO should make several refinements to its core tasks. European Allies must improve defense capabilities, ensuring their ability to help NATO meet its core tasks. In conjunction with the other Allied nuclear powers (the United Kingdom and France), the U.S. must renew its commitment to maintaining NATO as a nuclear alliance. NATO should adopt a more rigorous operational definition of crisis management, and a more systematic emphasis on the early warning and pre-crisis phases. Finally, while national “resilience” is already implied in Article 3ʹs requirement for member states to “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack,” adding it as a fourth core task would powerfully emphasize the need for allies to address new elements of resilience, to include both technological threats and democratic backsliding.

Japan's Security Policy Evolution: The Interaction between Think Tank Proposals and Government Implementation

executive summary: This essay spotlights interactions between private think tanks' security policy proposals and the development of the Japanese government's security policies since 1995, identifies items on the current security policy agenda, and suggests the future direction of Japan's security policy. main argument Japan's defense and security policy is steadily moving in a pragmatic and proactive direction toward becoming a "normal country" through "passive realism," although the direction and speed of change is not dramatic or linear. Interactions between think tanks' policy recommendations and the government's realization of them since 1995 illustrate in part this development process. For example, following a committee's suggestions to revitalize the Japan-U.S. alliance to deal with contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, the Japanese government adopted a related law after it agreed upon the 1997 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation with its U.S. counterpart. The Abe cabinets implemented many ambitious policies suggested in think tank proposals, including permitting the exercise of the right of collective defense, creating the National Security Council, and establishing the National Security Strategy. Currently, the Japanese government is conducting a series of conversations with security experts to revise the National Security Strategy and the ruling LDP has announced a general policy proposal. The proposal recommends that the Kishida cabinet initiate the development of an indigenous counterstrike capability and increase the defense budget toward 2% of GDP. Past interactions between policy think tanks and the Japanese government suggest that the government will continue to take steps toward becoming a so-called normal country, although such steps could be gradual and incremental. policy implications • Japan should continue to implement a realistic security policy agenda, which will contribute not only to its survival but to regional stability in the new era following the post–Cold War. • The U.S. should encourage and cooperate with Japan's proactive development of its realistic and pragmatic security policy since it will be important both to regional stability and to a sustainable U.S. security strategy in the face of threats from an assertive Russia and China. • Japan and the U.S. should collaborate on research and development in defense and dual-use technology, which are critical for Japan's sustainable development of its defense capability and industrial base.