Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997 On May 10, 1940, Germany’s panzers launched their westward assault on France. Attacking through the thick forests of the Ardennes, German forces rapidly breached French defenses near Sedan, then swept west to envelop the main French and British armies that had advanced to meet what French Commander in Chief Maurice Gamelin had expected to be the main German attack in Belgium. Adolf Hitler’s legions marched into Paris on June 12, 1940. A shattered French government, overwhelmed by the magnitude of its defeat, sued for peace and signed an armistice at Compiegne on June 22, 1940. The British Expeditionary Force oed across the English Channel, abandoning its equipment on the beaches of Dunkirk. Few defeats in military history have been as rapid, decisive, and unexpected. Sixty years later, the sudden collapse of France in May–June 1940, and the French foreign and military policy of the 1930s that contributed to that debâcle, remain a focus of security studies. The era appears to present a cautionary tale of a nation, and an army, that made just about every unfortunate choice possible. The ink was barely dry on the armistice of June 1940 when contemporaries advanced competing versions of the argument that France’s fate had been a sort of divine judgment invited by the inconsistencies and contradictions of its political culture. The most powerful indictment that the Third Republic exhibited all the symptoms of terminal decadence prior to its debâcle was made by Marc Bloch, whose posthumously published Strange Defeat offered a vision of a fearful, selash, and unpatriotic nation psychologically primed for calamity.1 The view that France’s collapse was the product of an
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