Collaborative Federalism Research Articles

Intergovernmental Innovation and the Administrative State in Canada

Canadian federalism has experienced considerable pressure for change and innovation in recent years. There have been calls for more collaborative federalism and demands for public sector reforms consistent with the precepts of New Public Management. This article examines the hypothesis that these pressures might be expected to have resulted in some intergovernmental institutional innovation in the arena of federal–provincial–territorial relations. Using a conceptual distinction between federalism, intergovernmental relations, and intergovernmental management (IGM) as the basis of analyzing institutional innovation at six levels in the Canadian intergovernmental administrative state, the authors find a differentiated impact with more institutional innovation evident at the micro levels of IGM and innovation more constrained at the macro levels of the administrative state by the traditional institutional infrastructure of executive federalism.

The economic impact of national competition policy on Australian regions

Over the past 7 years Australia has been undergoing substantial economic reform under a collaborative Federal and State government programme known as national competition policy. These reforms have increased the nation's productivity and international competitiveness, and are generally held responsible for Australia's increased growth rate in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita over the past decade. However, the reforms have been carried out against a background of increased interregional disparities, to which the reform programme may have partly contributed. In this study we examine a number of Australian studies that have used computable general equilibrium modelling to uncover the regional economic consequences of national competition policy.

Collaborative Federalism

Famously, federalism combines self‐rule with shared rule or unity with diversity. Typically, the mix is achieved by creating or preserving two levels of government, each with a direct relationship with the people, and by dividing power between them. Traditionally, unity is achieved through the exercise of power by the central government, in relation to the polity as a whole. Diversity is the consequence of the exercise of power by sub‐national governments over a portion of the population, generally territorially identified. The boundaries of power between the two spheres are secured by entrenching them in a written Constitution established as fundamental law, which is interpreted and applied by a court or courts.

Intergovernmental Relations in Canada: The Emergence of Collaborative Federalism

“Executive federalism” or “federal-provincial diplomacy” has long been considered the defining characteristic of Canadian federalism, which combines federalism and Westminster-style cabinet government. However, these processes have come under increasing stress in recent years from a number of forces that have affected the nature and conduct of federalism and intergovernmental relations in Canada. Executive federalism has not been displaced, but has been increasingly informed by a set of practices that we call “collaborative federalism,” characterized more by the principle of co-determination of broad national policies rather than by the more traditional pattern of federal-leadership. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

Book Reviews

Books reviewed:R. Minami, K. S. Kim and M. Falkus, eds Growth, distribution and political change – Asia and the wider worldDennis O’Flynn, Lionel Frost and A. J. H. Latham, eds, Pacific centuries: Pacific and Pacific Rim history since the sixteenth centuryGraeme Donald Snooks, Global transition: a general theory of economic developmentMartin Painter, Collaborative federalism. Economic reform in Australia in the 1990sPeter Sheldon and Louise Thornthwaite, eds, Employer associations and industrial relations changeA. W. Martin, Robert Menzies: a life, volume 2, 1944–1978

Book Reviews

Books reviewed:David Meredith and Barrie Dyster, Australia in the global economy: continuity and changeMartin Painter, Collaborative federalism: economic reform in Australia in the 1990sPaul L. Robertson, ed., Authority and control in modern industry: theoretical and empirical perspectivesJ. Thomas Lingblad, Foreign Investment in Southeast Asia in the twentieth century

Early Identification and Intervention: Head Start's Response to Mental Health Challenges

Serving low-income children from birth to age five and their families, Head Start is a primary venue for identification and intervention in the area of child mental health. However, recent research has demonstrated that the knowledge base regarding prevalence, developmental course, and predictive power of child mental health problems is lacking for young children in general and low-income, diverse populations in particular. Head Start's agency-level data is often discrepant from both national estimates and small, intensive studies of similar populations, perhaps for reasons related to availability of community services and professional staff, as well as concerns about stigmatization. Following on recent expert recommendations, new collaborative Federal initiatives are underway to increase our understanding of the types, trajectories, and treatments of mental health problems affecting the vulnerable children served by Head Start. The paper concludes with a call to action for the field in the area of young children's mental health.

Collaborative Federalism: Economic Reforms in Australia in the 1990s

Collaborative Federalism: Economic Reforms in Australia in the 1990s

Collaborative Federalism: Economic Reform in Australia in the 1990s

1. National problems, federal solutions 2. The theory and practice of cooperative federalism 3. SPC, COAG and the politics of collaboration 4. Achieving cooperation: players and processes 5. The machinery of intergovernmental relations: an institutional analysis 6. The institutions of collaborative federalism 7. Duplication and overlap: new roles, old battles 8. The future of collaborative federalism List of references Index.

Book Reviews

Books reviewed:Geoff Gallop, A State of Reform: Essays for a Better FutureMartin Painter, Collaborative Federalism: Economic Reform in Australia in the 1990s

Responsiveness versus accountability in collaborative federalism: the Canadian experience

Abstract: Accountability is very much on people's minds these days, and the area of intergovernmental relations is no exception. The concern here is that the processes of collaborative federalism developed in the name of “responsiveness” have resulted in the federal and provincial governments no longer being accountable to the public they are meant to serve. This perceived problem has elicited eloquent statements of alarm and various proposals for reform, most of which are grounded in the parliamentary version of the classic hierarchical accountability relationships.This paper presents a critique of proposals for a parliamentary solution to the problem of accountability in Canadian collaborative federalism. It shows that such proposals will not do because they are premised on faulty theoretical grounds. That is, they try to apply the parliamentary version of the classic accountability relationship to collaborative processes, when this resort is precluded by the nature of the locus of authority in the federal paradigm. The result is not a problem but a dilemma: we can have the assurance of classic accountability, or responsiveness seen as collaboration, but not both. The paper concludes that there is no satisfactory way around this dilemma, and that we must recognize that the loss of accountability is the price to be paid for the benefits of collaboration.Sommaire: Le concept d'imputabilité est, de nos jours, un important sujet de préoccupation, et le domaine des relations intergouvernementales ne fait pas exception à cette règle. Le but de ce article est de montrer que le développement du fédéralisme coopératif, issu dun désir des gouvernements fédéral et provinciaux de se montrer plus accueillants envers les besoins des administrés, a abouti à la non‐imputabilité de ceux‐ci vis‐à‐vis du public qu'ils ont pour mission de servir. Ce problème évident a donné lieu à d'éloquentes mises en garde et à plusieurs projets de réforme, qui s'appuient le plus souvent sur la version parlementaire des relations hiérarchiques classiques en matière d'imputabilité.Cet article présente une critique des projets qui préconisent une solution parlementaire au problème de l'imputabilité au sein du fédérahsme canadien de type cooperatif. Il met en lumière l'inadéquation de tels projets, qui partent tous de prémisses essentiellement théoriques. En clair, ces projets essaient d'appliquer aux processus de collaboration la version parlementaire des rapports d'imputabilité de type classique, alors que cette possibilité est exclue du fait de la nature même de la localisation du pouvoir à l'intérieur du modèle fédéral. Ce qui en resulté, ce n'est pas un problème, mais un dilemme: nous pouvons préserver l'imputabilité au sens classique ou la réceptivité entenctrie au sens d'une collaboration, mais pas les deux en même temps. L'auteur en conclut que ce dilemme n'admet pas de solution satisfaisante et que nous devons done reconnaître que les avantages de la collaboration ne peuvent être obtenirs qu'au prix d'une perte d'imputabilité.

Deferential Federalism: The Politics and Policy Implications of ‘Collaborative’ Federalism Since 1994

The topic of this essay is Canada’s evolving federalism. It will examine the development of "collaborative federalism"1 in Canada since the mid-1990s, analysing the politics operating behind it in order to i) detail the stances taken by recent federal governments in their dealings with the provinces and ii) show the consequences of these stances on national policy objectives and social programs. It is this author’s contention that federal governments over the last two decades have intermittently engaged in convenient deference toward their provincial counterparts and that, when this has been done, it has been detrimental to pan-Canadian policy objectives generally and social programs in particular. First of all, the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) of 1994 showcases the weaknesses of framework-oriented policy initiatives that characterize collaborative arrangements. Next, the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) created in the 1995 federal budget highlights how easily the federal government can defer greater authority onto the provinces and what this means for social programs [...]