During late 1960s and early 1970s, scholars fiercely contested questions of how cold began and who was to blame for it. The traditional view that aggressive Soviet expansion had incited postwar tensions sustained relentless challenge from revisionists who argued that American actions and attitudes were primarily responsible. An acrimonious battle raged in books, journals, papers, and popular publications over interpretations, facts, and footnotes. The controversy was bitter and intense, but relatively short in duration. By latter half of 1970s, disputes between traditionalists and revisionists had been largely superseded by widespread agreement that both United States and Soviet Union shared accountability for outbreak of cold in roughly equal proportions. A growing body of scholarship combined elements of both traditional and revisionist interpretations to produce an eclectic postrevisionist view. That was how it appeared, at least, to authors of two historiographical reviews of literature on origins of cold war. I maintained in 1981 essay that new consensus that presented a more balanced explanation of beginning of cold war had materialized. In 1983 article, John Lewis Gaddis detected the emergence of