I56 SEER, 87, I, JANUARY 2009 reports were carried on the mass murder of Jews at named places such as Auschwitz, Belzec, Chelmno, Sobibor and Treblinka) prompted extensive comments on the 'bestiality' and cruelty of theGermans. A socialist publica tion,WRN, issued a call on 28 September 1942 that itwas 'the duty of every Pole to help the victims of German bestiality' (p. 93). However, a report in the 14October 1942 issue of Rzeczpospolita Polska (ThePolish Republic) of the Government-in-Exile Delegates summed up precisely the kinds of thinking to be found across the board of the underground press at all times and which are fully represented throughout this book. Admitting that that therewas not a party or person inPoland that did not consider theJews as the principal and most threatening enemy of thePoles, nevertheless, in the circumstances, Poles should react to theJews in the sense 'that they are humans' (p. 63). Interestingly, while there was much criticism of the 'passivity' of the Warsaw Jews in the summer of 1942when the ghetto was being cleared, to a degree that changed somewhat when theWarsaw Jews began to fight back against theGermans inJanuary and April 1943 (pp. 676?.). There is, of course, much, much more to be found in this extremely detailed studywhich ultimately leaves the reader with a distinct sense of unease. London John P. Fox Kenez, Peter. Hungary from the Nazis to theSoviets: The Establishment of the CommunistRegime inHungary, 1944-1948. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 2006. ix + 312 pp. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. ?45.00: $75.00. Gati, Charles. Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington,Budapest, and the1956Hungar ian Revolt. Cold War International History Project Series. Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, Washington, D.C. and Stanford, CA, 2006. xv + 264 pp. Notes. Selected bibliography. Index. $24.95. Failed hopes and shattered illusions have pride of place in Hungarian historical memory. But is this fascination with tragic turns of events merely a consequence of calamity? Or is the phenomenon of 'Magyar illusionism', apdy described by Andras Gero, a trademark of an antiquated Romantic historiography? Undoubtedly, theworship of fallen heroes isa key component of the historically constructed Magyar identitywhich, according to certain prominent scholars, still inhibits self-reflection inHungary. Be that as it may, not all sorry tales of delusional hopes and frustrated ambitions can be regarded as distortions of theMagyar collective memory. Against the background of Soviet occupation, themajority ofHungarians in 1945-46 believed in some kind of democratic transition. Despite a pro nounced left-wingbias in the parliamentary system, theCommunists suffered two crushing electoral defeats, which clearly reflected the political mood and inflated confidence of the public. In 1956, theHungarian masses showed even more defiance and optimism. As Peter Kenez rightlypoints out, theywere not REVIEWS 157 all 'knaves and fools' (p. 1). In the aftermath of the Second World War, 'it was not at all naive to believe that at the conclusion of the peace treaty Soviet troops would leave Hungary, and then a democratic regime might let roots down and firmly establish itself (p. 5). A decade later, inOctober 1956, the possibility of the Red Army's withdrawal from Hungary was an even less far-fetched proposition. After all, we now know that such a possibility was actually entertained by theKremlin, ifonly for a fleeting sixteen to eighteen hours. And yet, the period from 1948 to 1953 in Hungary, dubbed 'five years of totalitarian nightmare' (p. 47) by Charles Gati, changed the political atmosphere beyond recall. During the coalition years, Hungarian political lifewas characterized by compromise and cooperation. Whether those who searched for an accom modation with the Communists really 'deserve credit rather than blame' (p. 6), as Kenez urges, is open to question. All the same, the years of 'imper fect pluralism' (p. 4) were comparatively benign. By contrast, the revolution in 1956was an uncontrolled explosion or, inGati's words, 'a furious challenge to the Soviet empire' (p. 67). Gati ishighly critical not only of the violence on the streets,but also of the 'bungling' performance of all themain participants. However, his accentuation of the political flaws serves to reinforce the thesis that in 1956, just as in 1945-46, 'failurewas neither predestined...