Coherent Sets Of Desirable Gambles Research Articles

Desirable gambles based on pairwise comparisons

This paper proposes a model for imprecise probability information based on bounds on probability ratios, instead of bounds on events. This model is studied in the language of coherent sets of desirable gambles, which provides an elegant mathematical formulation and a more expressive power. The paper provides methods to check avoiding sure loss and coherence, and to compute the natural extension. The relationships with other formalisms such as imprecise multiplicative preferences, the constant odd ratio model, or comparative probability are analyzed.

Joint desirability foundations of social choice and opinion pooling

We develop joint foundations for the fields of social choice and opinion pooling using coherent sets of desirable gambles, a general uncertainty model that allows to encompass both complete and incomplete preferences. This leads on the one hand to a new perspective of traditional results of social choice (in particular Arrow’s theorem as well as sufficient conditions for the existence of an oligarchy and democracy) and on the other hand to using the same framework to analyse opinion pooling. In particular, we argue that weak Pareto (unanimity) should be given the status of a rationality requirement and use this to discuss the aggregation of experts’ opinions based on probability and (state-independent) utility, showing some inherent limitation of this framework, with implications for statistics. The connection between our results and earlier work in the literature is also discussed.

Axiomatising Incomplete Preferences through Sets of Desirable Gambles

We establish the equivalence of two very general theories: the first is the decision-theoretic formalisation of incomplete preferences based on the mixture independence axiom; the second is the theory of coherent sets of desirable gambles (bounded variables) developed in the context of imprecise probability and extended here to vector-valued gambles. Such an equivalence allows us to analyse the theory of incomplete preferences from the point of view of desirability. Among other things, this leads us to uncover an unexpected and clarifying relation: that the notion of `state independence'---the traditional assumption that we can have separate models for beliefs (probabilities) and values (utilities)---coincides with that of `strong independence' in imprecise probability; this connection leads us also to propose much weaker, and arguably more realistic, notions of state independence. Then we simplify the treatment of complete beliefs and values by putting them on a more equal footing. We study the role of the Archimedean condition---which allows us to actually talk of expected utility---, identify some weaknesses and propose alternatives that solve these. More generally speaking, we show that desirability is a valuable alternative foundation to preferences for decision theory that streamlines and unifies a number of concepts while preserving great generality. In addition, the mentioned equivalence shows for the first time how to extend the theory of desirability to imprecise non-linear utility, thus enabling us to formulate one of the most powerful self-consistent theories of reasoning and decision-making available today.

Robust Bayesian analysis in partially ordered plausibility calculi

In Robust Bayesian analysis one attempts to avoid the ‘Dogma of Precision’ in Bayesian analysis by entertaining a set of probability distributions instead of exactly one. The algebraic approach to plausibility calculi is inspired by Cox's and Jaynes' analyses of plausibility assessment as a logic of uncertainty. In the algebraic approach one is not so much interested in different ways to prove that precise Bayesian probability is inevitable but rather in how different sets of assumptions are reflected in the resulting plausibility calculus. It has repeatedly been pointed out that a partially ordered plausibility domain is more appropriate than a totally ordered one, but it has not yet been completely resolved exactly what such domains can look like. One such domain is the natural robust Bayesian representation, an indexed family of probabilities.We show that every plausibility calculus embeddable in a partially ordered ring is equivalent to a subring of a product of ordered fields, i.e., the robust Bayesian representation is universal under our assumptions, if extended rather than standard probability is used.We also show that this representation has at least the same expressiveness as coherent sets of desirable gambles with real valued payoffs, for a finite universe.

Coherent Predictive Inference under Exchangeability with Imprecise Probabilities

Coherent reasoning under uncertainty can be represented in a very general manner by coherent sets of desirable gambles. In a context that does not allow for indecision, this leads to an approach that is mathematically equivalent to working with coherent conditional probabilities. If we do allow for indecision, this leads to a more general foundation for coherent (imprecise-)probabilistic inference. In this framework, and for a given finite category set, coherent predictive inference under exchangeability can be represented using Bernstein coherent cones of multivariate polynomials on the simplex generated by this category set. This is a powerful generalisation of de Finetti's Representation Theorem allowing for both imprecision and indecision. We define an inference system as a map that associates a Bernstein coherent cone of polynomials with every finite category set. Many inference principles encountered in the literature can then be interpreted, and represented mathematically, as restrictions on such maps. We discuss, as particular examples, two important inference principles: representation insensitivity—a strengthened version of Walley's representation invariance—and specificity. We show that there is an infinity of inference systems that satisfy these two principles, amongst which we discuss in particular the skeptically cautious inference system, the inference systems corresponding to (a modified version of) Walley and Bernard's Imprecise Dirichlet Multinomial Models (IDMM), the skeptical IDMM inference systems, and the Haldane inference system. We also prove that the latter produces the same posterior inferences as would be obtained using Haldane's improper prior, implying that there is an infinity of proper priors that produce the same coherent posterior inferences as Haldane's improper one. Finally, we impose an additional inference principle that allows us to characterise uniquely the immediate predictions for the IDMM inference systems.

Probability and time

Probabilistic reasoning is often attributed a temporal meaning, in which conditioning is regarded as a normative rule to compute future beliefs out of current beliefs and observations. However, the well-established ‘updating interpretation’ of conditioning is not concerned with beliefs that evolve in time, and in particular with future beliefs. On the other hand, a temporal justification of conditioning was proposed already by De Moivre and Bayes, by requiring that current and future beliefs be consistent. We reconsider the latter approach while dealing with a generalised version of the problem, using a behavioural theory of imprecise probability in the form of coherent lower previsions as well as of coherent sets of desirable gambles, and letting the possibility space be finite or infinite. We obtain that using conditioning is normative, in the imprecise case, only if one establishes future behavioural commitments at the same time of current beliefs. In this case it is also normative that present beliefs be conglomerable, which is a result that touches on a long-term controversy at the foundations of probability. In the remaining case, where one commits to some future behaviour after establishing present beliefs, we characterise the several possibilities to define consistent future assessments; this shows in particular that temporal consistency does not preclude changes of mind. And yet, our analysis does not support that rationality requires consistency in general, even though pursuing consistency makes sense and is useful, at least as a way to guide and evaluate the assessment process. These considerations narrow down in the special case of precise probability, because this formalism cannot distinguish the two different situations illustrated above: it turns out that the only consistent rule is conditioning and moreover that it is not rational to be willing to stick to precise probability while using a rule different from conditioning to compute future beliefs; rationality requires in addition the disintegrability of the present-time probability.

Irrelevant and independent natural extension for sets of desirable gambles

The results in this paper add useful tools to the theory of sets of desirable gambles, a growing toolbox for reasoning with partial probability assessments. We investigate how to combine a number of marginal coherent sets of desirable gambles into a joint set using the properties of epistemic irrelevance and independence. We provide formulas for the smallest such joint, called their independent natural extension, and study its main properties. The independent natural extension of maximal coherent sets of desirable gambles allows us to define the strong product of sets of desirable gambles. Finally, we explore an easy way to generalise these results to also apply for the conditional versions of epistemic irrelevance and independence. Having such a set of tools that are easily implemented in computer programs is clearly beneficial to fields, like AI, with a clear interest in coherent reasoning under uncertainty using general and robust uncertainty models that require no full specification.

Irrelevant and independent natural extension for sets of desirable gambles

The results in this paper add useful tools to the theory of sets of desirable gambles, a growing toolbox for reasoning with partial probability assessments. We investigate how to combine a number of marginal coherent sets of desirable gambles into a joint set using the properties of epistemic irrelevance and independence. We provide formulas for the smallest such joint, called their independent natural extension, and study its main properties. The independent natural extension of maximal coherent sets of desirable gambles allows us to define the strong product of sets of desirable gambles. Finally, we explore an easy way to generalise these results to also apply for the conditional versions of epistemic irrelevance and independence. Having such a set of tools that are easily implemented in computer programs is clearly beneficial to fields, like AI, with a clear interest in coherent reasoning under uncertainty using general and robust uncertainty models that require no full specification.

Conglomerable natural extension

At the foundations of probability theory lies a question that has been open since de Finetti framed it in 1930: whether or not an uncertainty model should be required to be conglomerable. Conglomerability is related to accepting infinitely many conditional bets. Walley is one of the authors who have argued in favor of conglomerability, while de Finetti rejected the idea. In this paper we study the extension of the conglomerability condition to two types of uncertainty models that are more general than the ones envisaged by de Finetti: sets of desirable gambles and coherent lower previsions. We focus in particular on the weakest (i.e., the least-committal) of those extensions, which we call the conglomerable natural extension. The weakest extension that does not take conglomerability into account is simply called the natural extension. We show that taking the natural extension of assessments after imposing conglomerability—the procedure adopted in Walley’s theory—does not yield, in general, the conglomerable natural extension (but it does so in the case of the marginal extension). Iterating this process of imposing conglomerability and taking the natural extension produces a sequence of models that approach the conglomerable natural extension, although it is not known, at this point, whether this sequence converges to it. We give sufficient conditions for this to happen in some special cases, and study the differences between working with coherent sets of desirable gambles and coherent lower previsions. Our results indicate that it is necessary to rethink the foundations of Walley’s theory of coherent lower previsions for infinite partitions of conditioning events.

Sets of desirable gambles: Conditioning, representation, and precise probabilities

The theory of sets of desirable gambles is a very general model which covers most of the existing theories for imprecise probability as special cases; it has a clear and simple axiomatic justification; and mathematical definitions are natural and intuitive. However, much work remains to be done until the theory of desirable gambles can be considered as generally applicable to reasoning tasks as other approaches to imprecise probability are. This paper gives an overview of some of the fundamental concepts for reasoning with uncertainty expressed in terms of desirable gambles in the finite case, provides a characterization of regular extension, and studies the nature of maximally coherent sets of desirable gambles, which correspond to finite sequences of probability distributions, each one of them defined on the set where the previous one assigns probability zero.