Although argumentation can take many different forms and will vary with the unique stylistic and propositional preferences of the individual speaker, pedagogical materials and practices have tended to privilege certain types of evidence and models of reasoning while devaluing others. Our position is that traditional approaches to pedagogy favor particular advocacy preferences while risking marginalization of other legitimate approaches. Specifically, we believe that field dependent (FD) students experience a mismatch between their preferred ways of thinking and argumentation pedagogy. As a result, we urge instructors to include FD thinking and to create a sensitive mismatch between traditional approaches, which favor field independent (FI) thinking, and FD learning preferences. Our advocacy of pedagogical reform is grounded in Witkin's (1978) work on cognitive styles, which is the most widely accepted approach to learning styles in education. Both Polcar (2006) and Sellnow (2006) have raised certain issues regarding our call for reform. Although we have great respect for them both and appreciate their willingness to engage in a discussion about argumentation pedagogy, we believe that they do not refute our position directly or provide sufficient grounds to reject it. In the language of intercollegiate debate, Polcar's response is not competitive: Her conception of argumentation instruction is compatible with our own. Although Sellnow takes issue with the cognitive style approach, her position also is largely compatible with ours. We will discuss each paper in turn. Polcar's (2006) central proposition is that there is simply no need to pay attention to particular cognitive style preferences because argumentation theory addresses both FD and FI thinkers. We think that this ignores the realities of instructional and curricular practices. Polcar's vision of argumentation pedagogy is idealistic, possibly naive, and could be considered an attempt to sweep problematic pedagogical practices under the carpet. Ignoring a problem, however, will not make it go away. Although argumentation theory may include elements that appeal to FD learners, the reality is that traditional instructional practices privilege FI, and devalue FD, thinkers. This conclusion appears to be borne out by some initial research into an argumentation and debate course (see Hunt & Meyer, 2004, for a full description of this course). Students enrolled in this course were novices to debate. The course was designed to familiarize them with competitive debating and incorporated several in-class debates. The instructor utilized a standard, four-person, eight-speech format (without cross-examination). Our data suggested that this specific format--an extremely common format that differs substantially from the POLLS model--restricted opportunities for interpersonal communication, which is FD thinkers' preferred mode of communication. In addition, FD thinkers' preferred means of persuasion were largely devalued. It seems reasonable to suggest that traditional instructional strategies may be problematic for FD students. We are not arguing that such mismatches must be avoided at all costs in order to minimize student failure. Instead, we advocate a flexible approach (e.g., providing demonstration debates, expanding notions of what constitutes credible evidence, and informing students about the nature and implications of different types of reasoning) that ultimately works to the benefit of all students. Such pedagogy should allow both FD and FI thinkers to stretch their preferred reasoning styles and develop cognitive flexibility. Polcar's contention that argumentation pedagogy always has included interpersonal and dialogic elements seems inaccurate. Perhaps argumentation theory has addressed these issues, but theory does not always translate into practice in the classroom. We know many fine argumentation instructors who devote equal attention to a range of cognitive styles; however, our investigation, and the research that Sellnow cites, indicates that such classrooms are the exception. …