Cognitive Sophistication Research Articles

Conditionally supporting freedom of speech: how cognitive sophistication and social identity affect adolescents’ support for freedom of speech and its restrictions

ABSTRACT Democracy requires the socialization of young people into democratic values. Yet, support for these democratic values cannot be unconditional, because they conflict in concrete situations. This paper aims to explain to what extent and why young adolescents support freedom of speech in uncontested and contested situations. We combine insights from moral development, political socialization, and social identity theory as mechanisms behind support for specific types of speech across different groups. We use large-scale, nationally representative data collected among 2355 young adolescents in 42 schools in the Netherlands, at the very start after they tracked into secondary education. We find that young adolescents differentiate between various types of speech. They combine high support for the abstract principle of free speech with lower support for types of speech in conflicted situations. Cognitive sophistication explains why abstract support for free speech is higher among students in pre-academic education than in pre-vocational education, whereas we find the inverse in contested situations. Social identity theory explains why adolescents are more reluctant to support free speech when it challenges their in-group. These findings underpin that adolescents have a fine-grained understanding of democratic values, and the need to focus on democratic trade-offs in scholarly research.

구석기시대 석기의 자루 장착과 기능 연구 - 밀개를 중심으로

Hafting of Paleolithic stone tools has been a widely recognized practice essential for understanding lithic technology. However, research in Korea has predominantly focused on the typology and edge morphology of stone tools, with limited investigation into hafting. This study aims to enhance the understanding of hafting, particularly in Upper Paleolithic end scrapers from Korea. Hafting, which emerged at least 300,000 years ago, demonstrates the cognitive sophistication of early humans, enabling them to control tool shape and size through specific techniques. While the haft was often reused, the tool component was retouched to fit, leaving distinctive traces of use, production, and hafting. From a lithic technological perspective, this study examines the concept and significance of hafting, haft types, and attachment methods. Through use-wear analysis supported by experiments and ethnographic data, four primary hafting techniques for end scrapers were identified. Future research will focus on material properties, morphometrics, and use-wear analysis to further advance the study of hafting and Paleolithic tool-use traditions.

Cleaner gobies can solve a biological market task when the correct cue is larger

Animal cognition is deeply influenced by interactions with the environment. A notable example of sophisticated cognition in the animal kingdom is described by the mutualistic relationship between cleaner fish and clients, where decision-making processes play a pivotal role in partner choice and fish survival. In this context, while extensive research has explored the cognition of the cleaner wrasse Labroides dimidiatus, it is important to note that studies on the cognition of other wrasse species and on its Caribbean counterparts, Elacatinus spp., are limited. Therefore, to extend our comprehension of cognition in cleaner fish with different evolutionary backgrounds, it is important to focus our attention on the genus Elacatinus spp. In this study, we used plexiglass plates as surrogates for clients and assessed the ability of cleaner gobies, Elacatinus oceanops, to solve a biological market task where prioritizing an ephemeral food plate over a permanent one would double the food reward. We varied cue-based decision-making using both ecologically relevant cues (plate, size, and color) and non-relevant ones (presentation side). Additionally, we tested their capacity for reversal learning, an indicator of complex cognitive abilities. Notably, cleaner gobies were able to solve the biological markets task when the distinguishing cue was a larger plate size. Given that these gobies tend to prioritize larger predatory clients in nature, our results align with their natural inclination. Consequently, further research, including studies involving wild individuals, is essential to elucidate the cognitive abilities of the studied species and their implications in the ecological context and evolutionary history.

How (not) to Talk to a Plant: An Application of Automata Theory to Plant Communication

Plants are capable of a range of complex interactions with the environment. Over the last decade, some authors have used this as evidence to argue that plants are cognitive agents. While there is no consensus on this view, it is certainly interesting to approach the debate from a comparative perspective, trying to understand whether different lineages of plants show different degrees of responsiveness to environmental cues, and how their responses compare with those of animals or humans. In this paper, I suggest that a potentially fruitful approach to these comparative studies is provided by automata theory. Accordingly, I shall present a possible application of this theory to plant communication. Two tentative results will emerge. First, that different lineages may exhibit different levels of complexity in response to similar stimuli. Second, that current evidence does not allow to infer great cognitive sophistication in plants.

Susceptibility to poor arguments: The interplay of cognitive sophistication and attitudes

Despite everyday argumentation being crucial to human communication and decision-making, the cognitive determinants of argument evaluation are poorly known. This study examined how attitudes and aspects of cognitive sophistication, i.e., thinking styles and scientific literacy, relate to people’s acceptance of poorly justified arguments (e.g., unwarranted appeals to naturalness) on controversial topics (e.g., genetically modified organisms (GMOs)). The participants were more accepting of poorly justified arguments that aligned with their attitudes compared to those that opposed their attitudes, and this was true regardless of one’s thinking styles or level of scientific literacy. Still, most of the examined aspects of cognitive sophistication were also positively related to fallacy detection. The strongest cognitive predictors of correctly recognizing the fallacies were one’s scientific reasoning ability and active open-mindedness. The results thus imply that decreasing misleading attitude effects, and increasing certain aspects of analytic and scientific thinking, could improve argumentation.

Better to be a Pig Dissatisfied than a Plant Satisfied

In the last two decades, there has been a blossoming literature aiming to counter the neglect of plant capacities. In their recent paper, Miguel Segundo-Ortin and Paco Calvo begin by providing an overview of the literature to then question the mistaken assumptions that led to plants being immediately rejected as candidates for sentience. However, it appears that many responses to their arguments are based on the implicit conviction that because animals have far more sophisticated cognition and agency than plants, and that plants should not have the same moral status as animals, plants should not have any moral status. Put in simpler terms: it is not as bad to eat plants than to eat, say, pigs. While there are still uncertainties around comparative moral and policy implications between animals and plants, given a gradualist account of quasi-sentience and partial moral status, both of which we claim are a matter of degree, we may not have to abolish our convictions by declaring that plants have no sentience or moral status at all. Indeed, we can hold two things at the same time: that animals and plants have moral status, but animals have prima facie more moral status than plants.

A chromosome-level reference genome for the common octopus, Octopus vulgaris (Cuvier, 1797).

Cephalopods are emerging animal models and include iconic species for studying the link between genomic innovations and physiological and behavioral complexities. Coleoid cephalopods possess the largest nervous system among invertebrates, both for cell counts and brain-to-body ratio. Octopus vulgaris has been at the center of a long-standing tradition of research into diverse aspects of cephalopod biology, including behavioral and neural plasticity, learning and memory recall, regeneration, and sophisticated cognition. However, no chromosome-scale genome assembly was available for O. vulgaris to aid in functional studies. To fill this gap, we sequenced and assembled a chromosome-scale genome of the common octopus, O. vulgaris. The final assembly spans 2.8 billion basepairs, 99.34% of which are in 30 chromosome-scale scaffolds. Hi-C heatmaps support a karyotype of 1n = 30 chromosomes. Comparisons with other octopus species' genomes show a conserved octopus karyotype and a pattern of local genome rearrangements between species. This new chromosome-scale genome of O. vulgaris will further facilitate research in all aspects of cephalopod biology, including various forms of plasticity and the neural machinery underlying sophisticated cognition, as well as an understanding of cephalopod evolution.

Valuing epistemic rationality bolsters the effect of analytic thinking on skepticism toward pseudo-profound bullshit

We examine in three studies whether skepticism toward pseudo-profound bullshit (BS) requires sufficient analytic sophistication as well as motivation to form beliefs based on logic and evidence. Across studies, the positive relationship between individual differences in cognitive sophistication and skepticism toward BS was stronger among people who ascribe high (vs. low) value to being epistemically rational. Moreover, experimentally reducing people's ability to engage in analytic thinking (by inducing cognitive load) reduced skepticism toward BS among individuals who ascribe high value to being epistemically rational. By contrast, skepticism toward BS was equally low in the no-load condition as under cognitive load among people who ascribe low value to epistemic rationality (Study 2). We also demonstrate that cognitive sophistication, coupled with ascribing high value to being epistemically rational, predicts skepticism toward BS, regardless of the source's credibility (Study 3).

On the Deeply Moving and the Merely Touching

Abstract Critics often link yet distinguish between ‘moving’ and ‘touching’ characters, scenes and artworks. It has been argued that being moved is a specific emotion, that its formal object is the thin goodness of exemplified final, important and impersonal thick values, and that being touched is an attenuated form of that phenomenon. First, I dispute that the values that move us must be impersonal, since we can be moved by the personal goodness of being loved, free or healthy. Second, I argue that being touched should be considered a distinct emotion type. To support this claim, I refer to apparent differences between the formal objects that the two affective phenomena relate to as well as to dissimilarities in cognitive sophistication and phenomenology. I suggest that we are touched by that which invites love. Vulnerable, innocently suffering and affectionate beings are touching insofar as they need and will be responsive to love.

Editorial—The truth is out there: The psychology of conspiracy theories and how to counter them

Editorial—The truth is out there: The psychology of conspiracy theories and how to counter them

What would qualify an artificial intelligence for moral standing?

AbstractWhat criteria must an artificial intelligence (AI) satisfy to qualify for moral standing? My starting point is that sentient AIs should qualify for moral standing. But future AIs may have unusual combinations of cognitive capacities, such as a high level of cognitive sophistication without sentience. This raises the question of whether sentience is a necessary criterion for moral standing, or merely sufficient. After reviewing nine criteria that have been proposed in the literature, I suggest that there is a strong case for thinking that some non-sentient AIs, such as those that are conscious and have non-valenced preferences and goals, and those that are non-conscious and have sufficiently cognitively complex preferences and goals, should qualify for moral standing. After responding to some challenges, I tentatively argue that taking into account uncertainty about which criteria an entity must satisfy to qualify for moral standing, and strategic considerations such as how such decisions will affect humans and other sentient entities, further supports granting moral standing to some non-sentient AIs. I highlight three implications: that the issue of AI moral standing may be more important, in terms of scale and urgency, than if either sentience or consciousness is necessary; that researchers working on policies designed to be inclusive of sentient AIs should broaden their scope to include all AIs with morally relevant interests; and even those who think AIs cannot be sentient or conscious should take the issue seriously. However, much uncertainty about these considerations remains, making this an important topic for future research.

The Concept of Political Sophistication: Labeling the Unlabeled

The concept of political sophistication, first introduced almost 60 years ago, is still widely discussed in political studies. However, due to the discrepancies in definitions, indicators, and findings, it is often difficult to discern how various approaches have contributed to the broader literature. Thus, to propose an intellectual order, this article uses a simple classification to understand these studies: the distinction between sophistication as the complexity of political reasoning ( cognitive sophistication) and sophistication as the amount of political information ( pragmatic sophistication). In addition, this article discusses the most recent developments in research and examines why previous literature have generally overlooked them. Finally, it provides a schematic summary that can serve as a guide to understanding the variety of research on political sophistication.

Science beliefs, political ideology, and cognitive sophistication.

Some theoretical models assume that a primary source of contention surrounding science belief is political and that partisan disagreement drives beliefs; other models focus on basic science knowledge and cognitive sophistication, arguing that they facilitate proscientific beliefs. To test these competing models, we identified a range of controversial issues subject to potential ideological disagreement and examined the roles of political ideology, science knowledge, and cognitive sophistication on science beliefs. Our results indicate that there was surprisingly little partisan disagreement on a wide range of contentious scientific issues. We also found weak evidence for identity-protective cognition (where cognitive sophistication exacerbates partisan disagreement); instead, cognitive sophistication (i.e., reasoning ability) was generally associated with proscience beliefs. In two studies focusing on anthropogenic climate change, we found that increased political motivations did not increase polarization among individuals who are higher in cognitive sophistication, which indicates that increased political motivations might not have as straightforward an impact on science beliefs as has been assumed in the literature. Finally, our findings indicate that basic science knowledge is the most consistent predictor of people's beliefs about science across a wide range of issues. These results suggest that educators and policymakers should focus on increasing basic science literacy and critical thinking rather than on the ideologies that purportedly divide people. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Perceived expert and laypeople consensus predict belief in local conspiracy theories in a non-WEIRD culture: Evidence from Turkey

AbstractPast research has shown that perceived scientific consensus (or lack thereof) on an issue predicts belief in misinformation. In the current study (N= 729), we investigated how perceived consensus among both experts and laypeople predicts beliefs in localized and specific conspiracy theories in Turkey, a non-WEIRD country. Participants in our study were found to overestimate consensus among both experts and laypeople regarding baseless conspiracy theories surrounding the alleged secret articles of the Lausanne Treaty and unused mining reserves in Turkey. Notably, conspiracy believers exhibited a higher tendency to overestimate consensus compared to non-believers. Furthermore, perceived expert consensus had a stronger association with conspiracy beliefs than perceived laypeople consensus. We also explored the correlates of conspiracy beliefs and perceived consensus, including socioeconomic factors, worldview, cognitive sophistication, and personality. The results further indicate that the correlations between belief and perceived consensus manifest with comparable magnitudes, irrespective of the specific conspiracy theories under consideration. These findings support the potential of perceived consensus as an important factor for understanding conspiracy beliefs.

Reliability of three pain assessment tools in children requiring dental treatment: A comparative clinical study.

The appropriate intervention of pain is based on its accurate evaluation, which is a challenge in the pediatric population as they often do not have the language development or cognitive sophistication to describe it correctly. Untreated pain has a negative impact on the psychosocial well-being of children. The study aimed to evaluate and compare the reliability of different pain assessment scales, namely, the Wong Baker Facial Pain Rating scale (WBFPS), Modified Emoji Pain Scale (MEPS), and indigenously developed indigenously made GIF Pain Scale (SPGPS) in children undergoing dental treatment under local anesthesia (LA). The study included 152 children aged 4-6 years with a Frankl behavior rating of score 3 and 4 (positive and definitely positive) requiring dental treatment under LA. After local infiltration, each child with two independent observers was asked to record the response of the current pain on the WBFPS, MEPS, and SPGPS. The reliability of the pain scales was assessed on the basis of similar responses given by all three individuals. The Pearson correlation test was performed to determine the correlation among the scales. A very strong correlation was found between the WBFPS and SPGPS (r = 0.848), while a moderate correlation was found among the WBFPS and MEPS (r = 0.691). A strong correlation was found between the SPGPS and MEPS (r = 0.723). The SPGPS proved to be a more reliable pain assessment tool compared to the WBFPS and MEPS in clinical pediatric dentistry.

On the Independent Roles of Cognitive & Political Sophistication: Variation Across Attitudinal Objects

AbstractPeople are motivated to maintain consistency between importantly held identities, preferences, and judgments. In political contexts, motivated reasoning can help explain a wide range of political phenomena, including extremism, polarization, and misperceptions. However, recent findings in psychology have challenged this account. These perspectives emphasize the role of cognitive sophistication (e.g., analytical reasoning, numerical literacy) in political attitudes, but differ in terms of whether it is expected to attenuate or exacerbate politically motivated reasoning and belief in conspiracy theories. Yet prior investigations have not examined the relative and independent effects of both political and cognitive sophistication. Using data from two samples, including one sampled to approximate representativeness in the U.S., we demonstrate that both types of sophistication have independent and (at times) countervailing effects on belief in COVID‐19 conspiracy theories and other political attitudes. Our results are critical for theories of cognitive sophistication, political cognition, and attitudes, and the psychology of conspiracy theories.

Hypothesized drivers of the bias blind spot—cognitive sophistication, introspection bias, and conversational processes

Abstract Individuals often assess themselves as being less susceptible to common biases compared to others. This bias blind spot (BBS) is thought to represent a metacognitive error. In this research, we tested three explanations for the effect: The cognitive sophistication hypothesis posits that individuals who display the BBS more strongly are actually less biased than others. The introspection bias hypothesis posits that the BBS occurs because people rely on introspection more when assessing themselves compared to others. The conversational processes hypothesis posits that the effect is largely a consequence of the pragmatic aspects of the experimental situation rather than true metacognitive error. In two experiments (N = 1057) examining 18 social/motivational and cognitive biases, there was strong evidence of the BBS. Among the three hypotheses examined, the conversational processes hypothesis attracted the greatest support, thus raising questions about the extent to which the BBS is a metacognitive effect.

COVID-19 and Politically Motivated Reasoning.

BackgroundDuring the COVID-19 pandemic, the world witnessed a partisan segregation of beliefs toward the global health crisis and its management. Politically motivated reasoning, the tendency to interpret information in accordance with individual motives to protect valued beliefs rather than objectively considering the facts, could represent a key process involved in the polarization of attitudes. The objective of this study was to explore politically motivated reasoning when participants assess information regarding COVID-19.DesignWe carried out a preregistered online experiment using a diverse sample (N = 1,500) from the United States. Both Republicans and Democrats assessed the same COVID-19–related information about the health effects of lockdowns, social distancing, vaccination, hydroxychloroquine, and wearing face masks.ResultsAt odds with our prestated hypothesis, we found no evidence in line with politically motivated reasoning when interpreting numerical information about COVID-19. Moreover, we found no evidence supporting the idea that numeric ability or cognitive sophistication bolster politically motivated reasoning in the case of COVID-19. Instead, our findings suggest that participants base their assessment on prior beliefs of the matter.ConclusionsOur findings suggest that politically polarized attitudes toward COVID-19 are more likely to be driven by lack of reasoning than politically motivated reasoning—a finding that opens potential avenues for combating political polarization about important health care topics.HighlightsParticipants assessed numerical information regarding the effect of different COVID-19 policies.We found no evidence in line with politically motivated reasoning when interpreting numerical information about COVID-19.Participants tend to base their assessment of COVID-19–related facts on prior beliefs of the matter.Politically polarized attitudes toward COVID-19 are more a result of lack of thinking than partisanship.

Supplemental Material for Science Beliefs, Political Ideology, and Cognitive Sophistication

Supplemental Material for Science Beliefs, Political Ideology, and Cognitive Sophistication

Paper wasps form abstract concept of 'same and different'.

Concept formation requires animals to learn and use abstract rules that transcend the characteristics of specific stimuli. Abstract concepts are often associated with high levels of cognitive sophistication, so there has been much interest in which species can form and use concepts. A key abstract concept is that of sameness and difference, where stimuli are classified as either the same as or different than an original stimulus. Here, we used a simultaneous two-item same-different task to test whether paper wasps (Polistes fuscatus) can learn and apply a same-different concept. We trained wasps by simultaneously presenting pairs of same or different stimuli (e.g. colours). Then, we tested whether wasps could apply the concept to new stimuli of the same type (e.g. new colours) and to new stimulus types (e.g. odours). We show that wasps learned a general concept of sameness or difference and applied it to new samples and types of stimuli. Notably, wasps were able to transfer the learned rules to new stimuli in a different sensory modality. Therefore, P. fuscatus can classify stimuli based on their relationships and apply abstract concepts to novel stimulus types. These results indicate that abstract concept learning may be more widespread than previously thought.