Valuing epistemic rationality bolsters the effect of analytic thinking on skepticism toward pseudo-profound bullshit

Abstract

We examine in three studies whether skepticism toward pseudo-profound bullshit (BS) requires sufficient analytic sophistication as well as motivation to form beliefs based on logic and evidence. Across studies, the positive relationship between individual differences in cognitive sophistication and skepticism toward BS was stronger among people who ascribe high (vs. low) value to being epistemically rational. Moreover, experimentally reducing people's ability to engage in analytic thinking (by inducing cognitive load) reduced skepticism toward BS among individuals who ascribe high value to being epistemically rational. By contrast, skepticism toward BS was equally low in the no-load condition as under cognitive load among people who ascribe low value to epistemic rationality (Study 2). We also demonstrate that cognitive sophistication, coupled with ascribing high value to being epistemically rational, predicts skepticism toward BS, regardless of the source's credibility (Study 3).