Cognitive Science Of Religion Research Articles

New Developments in the Cognitive Science of Religion: The Rationality of Religious Belief, by Hans van Eyghen, Rik Peels, and Gijsbert van den Brink

New Developments in the Cognitive Science of Religion: The Rationality of Religious Belief, by Hans van Eyghen, Rik Peels, and Gijsbert van den Brink. Springer. 2018. New Approaches to the Scientific Study of Religion 4. i–vii + 220pp. $139.99. ISBN: 978-3-319-90238-8.

Data Over Dogma: A Brief Introduction to Experimental Philosophy of Religion

AbstractExperimental philosophy of religion is the project of taking the tools and resources of the human sciences—especially psychology and cognitive science—and bringing them to bear on issues within philosophy of religion toward explicit philosophical ends. This paper introduces readers to experimental philosophy of religion. §2 explores the contours of experimental philosophy of religion by contrasting it with a few related fields: the psychology of religion and cognitive science of religion, on the one hand, and natural theology, on the other. §3 offers a brief history of experimental philosophy of religion. The goal in this section is to highlight the ancient pedigree of this emerging area of research; as the contemporary experimental philosophy of religion literature expands and proliferates, it's important to remember that this field has deep historical roots. Then, §4 focuses on the following questions: Why should we care about experimental philosophy of religion? And why is it needed?

Studying the Religious Mind: Methodology in the Cognitive Science of Religion

Studying the Religious Mind: Methodology in the Cognitive Science of Religion

Recent empirical work on religious experience: New directions

AbstractNovel developments in neuroscience, psychology, and anthropology have spawned a thriving empirical literature on religious experience. Previous literature in the cognitive science of religion has largely ignored empirical results from these fields, focusing narrowly on results from evolutionary psychology. Additionally, it has ignored the epistemological relevance of non‐paradigmatic cases of religious experience discussed in the literature from these subspecialties. In this article I submit that philosophical research on religious experience should take empirical work outside of evolutionary psychology as its primary foci towards uncovering fresh perspectives. I focus on three different literatures from neuroscience, psychology, and anthropology as case studies for generating novel philosophical research. I show that empirically‐discovered factors related to non‐paradigmatic religious experiences raise crucial and unique epistemological questions.

Non-belief as self-deception?

Abstract The suppression thesis is the theological claim that theistic non-belief results from culpable mistreatment of one's knowledge of God or one's evidence for God. The thesis is a traditional one but unpopular today. This article examines whether it can gain new credibility from the philosophy of self-deception and from the cognitive science of religion. The thesis is analysed in terms of the intentionalist and the non-intentionalist model of self-deception. The first proposed model views non-belief as intentional suppression of one's implicit knowledge of God. It is less feasible psychologically but has a good theological fit with Paul's and Calvin's versions of the thesis. This model also helps the argument for the culpability of non-belief. The second model views suppression as a process of subconscious motivated reasoning driven by a desire to avoid an uncomfortable truth. It fits Pascal's view that one's desire for or against God determines whether one sees general revelation as providing sufficient evidence for God. There is some empirical and anecdotal evidence for both models, but obvious cases of non-resistant non-belief present a major problem for the suppression thesis. Also, it is hard to see what might motivate anyone to deceive oneself about God's existence.

Arguing from cognitive science of religion: is religious belief debunked?

Arguing from cognitive science of religion: is religious belief debunked?

Spiritual oneness and the cognitive science of religion

Spiritual oneness and the cognitive science of religion

A Timid and Tepid Appropriation

Plantinga develops an ambitious theistic religious epistemology on which theists can have non-inferential knowledge of God. Central to his epistemology is the idea that human beings have a “sensus divinitatis” that produces such knowledge. Recently, several authors have urged an appropriation of the sensus divinitatis that is more friendly to internalist views, such as Phenomenal Conservativism. I argue that this appropriation is too timid and tepid in a variety of ways. It applies only to a small fraction of theistic beliefs; it fails to play the theological role Plantinga intended the sensus divinitatis to play; it fails to imply that most theistic beliefs, most of the time, are justified; when combined with a standard form of Evidentialism, it actually implies that most theistic beliefs are, if justified, inferentially justified; and it is consistent with substantive criticisms of theistic belief originating in work from the Cognitive Science of Religion.

The Neurocognitive Foundations of Prayer: A Critical Analysis

In recent decades, there has been a significant increase in the interest taken by experimental researchers in issues that have traditionally belonged to the sphere of interest of the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of cognition, and even the theology of spirituality. The availability of new research methods, as well as the increase in the knowledge of the world, has opened another door to the reality in which we live. By studying the functioning of the human brain in specific laboratory conditions, scientists are looking for the answers to questions that have been troubling us for centuries: what consciousness is, how do we recognize intentions, and what are spiritual experiences? This article deals with the topic of prayer as a specific religious experience in the context of neurocognitive research. In the 20th and 21st centuries, the frequency of such studies has increased significantly; for example, through the experiments of Nina Azari, Mario Beauregard, and Andrew B. Newberg. Selected experiments in the field of the neuroscience of spirituality and their results are discussed. Important philosophical questions about how we define prayer and other spiritual experiences in the context of the above research, the interdisciplinary nature of the research, as well as emerging problems and implications, e.g., the risk of reducing these phenomena to their biological base, the explanations of religious practices and experiences in cognitive science of religion have also been raised.

Puffing, Vexation, and Emanations in the Cognitive Science of Religion

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‘Implanted in us by Nature’: The Cognitive Science of Religion and its Importance for Theology

AbstractAbstract: The Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) holds that religion emerges from human cognition and its intuitions. Hence, it describes religion as a ‘natural’ belief in ‘supernatural agents’. Traditional theology also maintained that there is an ‘innate’ or ‘implanted’ knowledge of God or gods. It will be argued that CSR and theology can be related, yet not in a straightforward manner. After sketching out in what sense CSR calls religion ‘natural’ and how it describes ‘supernatural agents’, this article explores some examples of the traditional theological doctrine of an ‘implanted’ knowledge of God. It shows that the reliability of such an ‘implanted’ knowledge of God was disputed among theologians and, even if it was affirmed, had an ambiguous position in theology. This also applies to CSR if it is to be related to the traditional theological doctrine. There are illuminating convergences between CSR and theology but also considerable divergences. Both, however, prove significant for theology.

Dilemmas with Disciplinary Hierarchies and Ideals of Scientific Research in the Study of Religion

While strictly conceptual matters have dominated much of the discussion concerning religion as an object of scientific research, different understandings of the scientific character of the study of religion have also always had a significant role in the scholarly self-understanding. Here two significant conceptualizations of this scientific character—that of the so-called new scientificity (as advocated mostly by scholars from the cognitive science of religion) as well as that of the comparative history of religion—are described in detail and then thoroughly analyzed and criticized. It will be shown how both conceptualizations face problems, but those of the new scientificity are significantly more serious. Lastly, some more general reflections will be offered concerning the significance of these matters for the study of religion overall.

Methodological Naturalism and Methodological Secularism Scale

Scholars within and across fields such as the psychology of religion, sociology of religion, cognitive science of religion, religious studies, and theology often argue about the values and norms that ought to guide “academic” research in religion. Is it appropriate in the academy to explain religious phenomena by referring to supernatural forces (such as spirits or gods) as causal agents or to defend one’s scholarly arguments by appealing to the holy texts accepted as authoritative within one’s religious coalition? Debates surrounding such questions have remained intractable for decades in part because they have been based on anecdotal personal experiences rather than clear empirical data. This article presents the Methodological Naturalism-Methodological Secularism scale, a new survey instrument capable of moving forward debates about scholarly values in the academic study of religion. This initial deployment of the MNMS scale in a population of religion scholars (N=284) clarifies extant commitments, challenges common caricatures, and reveals unfamiliar configurations of academic values.

Why the debunking threat won’t go away

A central claim often made to debunk religious beliefs is that they would be formed regardless of whether they are true or false. One way to support this claim is to apply findings from the cognitive science of religion. However, this use of science in an argument against religious beliefs has been strongly criticized. This article is about weaknesses in that criticism. I consider two arguments. Firstly, the critic of debunking can argue that the debunker makes empirically dubious claims about the origin of religious beliefs. I argue that the debunker can avoid this problem because the controversial empirical claims are not necessary. General naturalistic assumptions about the origin of religion also create worries that support the central debunking claim. The second criticism focuses on the highly general nature of the claims or assumptions debunkers make about the origin of religious beliefs. Critics maintain that such claims or assumptions, even if true, fail to affect the specific religious beliefs you or I form. I respond, arguing that this criticism fails to engage with the most prominent version of debunking, which aims at classes of beliefs. Furthermore, by making a detour through a related discussion in metaethics, I show how this version of the debunking argument can be extended in such a fashion that it applies to a given individual who forms a religious belief.

What (if Anything) Should Christian Theology Learn from the Cognitive Science of Religion?

ABSTRACT This article asks what, if anything, Christian theology should learn from the cognitive science of religion (CSR). Two possible answers are explored. The first is that Christian theology has nothing to learn from CSR. This is rejected in favour of the second: theology can learn from CSR by appropriating CSR insights carefully and critically to a theological understanding formed first and foremost by Scripture. Karl Barth’s theological critique of religion and his engagement with Ludwig Feuerbach are used as a model for this approach. The article concludes with specific proposals about how, and how not, to engage theologically with CSR.

Inspirational Insights: ‘Ecosystems’ and ‘Mind Viruses’ in Folklore Research: Does Folkloristics Need Memetics?

Abstract The paper deals with applicability of the ‘memetic approach’ and ‘epidemiology of culture’ in present day folklore research. These theoretical models could be supplemented by certain ideas and hypotheses borrowed from actor-network theory and the cognitive science of religion. The development of contemporary folkloristic theorising could proceed from a new experimental ethnography that would combine memory and narrative studies, cognitive research and the theory of memes with more common or habitual methods of folklore research and cultural anthropology.

Upon the Roof of the Temple: Reconstructing Cognitive Aspects of Ancient Levantine Small-Scale Altar Usage

Abstract Among the ritual practices denigrated through explicit or implicit criticism levied by the biblical writers is the worship of a deity or deities on the rooftops – sometimes of royal architecture, and at other times on private houses. In the present study I interpret this practice using concepts derived from the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and cognitive linguistics. I summarize previous typologies of objects employed in the sacrificial cult of the ancient Southern Levant, confirming prior arguments for understanding shaft-type limestone altars as stylized models of architectural precursors. From a cognitive perspective, these stylized architectural models prompted offrants to run a conceptual blend that replaced the modest small-scale vegetable or incense offering of the offrant’s small-scale input space with the more sumptuous small-scale offering – or even large-scale animal sacrifice – of the monumental-scale input. This cognitive explanation provides explanation for Deuteronomistic and Priestly attempts to limit the practice, and occasions insight into the temporal aspects of “sacred space.”

Cognitive Science of Religion and Faith in the West

Abstract The interview given by Lluis Oviedo, a full Professor for Theological Anthropology at the Pontifical University Antonianum of Rome, and Fundamental Theology at the Theological Institute of Murcia (Spain). He is team member of research group on Creditions, based in Graz University (Austria). He edits a book series on “New approaches to the scientific study of religion” (Springer) and the bibliographic bulletin Reviews in Science, Religion and Theology. Research interests focus on the dialogue between theology and sciences, including the new scientific study of religion, and more recently to the interaction between religious belief and AI, and to how religious beliefs and behaviors are related to personal and social wellbeing.

Religious Hate Propaganda: Dangerous Accusations and the Meaning of Religious Persecution in Light of the Cognitive Science of Religion

Religious hate propaganda, which is sustained communication by an authority that attempts to guide an audience towards persecuting others based on religion, is a speech crime. Yet, it is one of the least understood and most difficult speech crimes to prosecute. This is due to misunderstandings and epistemic gaps regarding how persecutory language, which would otherwise have little significance for prosocial religious adherents, becomes meaningful for a religious community. Drawing from the cognitive science of religion (CSR), this article develops and explores the hypothesis that for some religious communities, discursive attacks on others become meaningful when they center on dangerous accusations. Dangerous accusations portray the other as capable of mystical harm and, when made by cultural authorities, become socially accepted truths if repeated during rituals of veridiction. This article shows that dangerous accusations are at the heart of religious hate propaganda and exploit cognitive biases for threat perception, coalitional psychology, and costly signaling. Moreover, dangerous accusations can reinforce the social order and maintain social cohesion. Together, an analysis of speech crimes and dangerous accusations shed light on how religious hate propaganda works, how it can offer meaning to religious communities, and how it can justify persecution in certain environments.

Neo-Perennialism: A Trap to Avoid or a Valid Research Program?

In a previous essay in this journal, I suggested that the kind of perennialism associated with the names of René Guénon and Fritzjof Schuon may—despite its obvious defects—remain relevant to our thinking about religious pluralism. Anything that seems to echo the perspectives of their classic perennialism is, however, often dismissed by scholars in the field of religious studies as invalid. Here, I suggest that this dismissal is often based on what sociologists call “recipe knowledge” and that a number of factors point toward the possibility of developing a more nuanced kind of perennialism. These factors include developments within the cognitive science of religion and of anthropology, which are reinforced by considerations related to psychology and sociology that allow a new appreciation of the notion of archetypes to be found in the writings of C. G. Jung and Mircea Eliade. All these factors, when viewed in light of empirical research into religious experience of the kind initiated by Alister Hardy, point toward the way in which religious experience is to be understood as a significant factor in exploring religious pluralism. In the “neo-perennialism” that I shall advocate, the valid aspects of current thinking within religious studies are affirmed, while, at the same time, the recipe knowledge that tends to distort judgments within that field is discarded.