Cognitive Science Literature Research Articles

Teaching for transfer of core/key skills in higher education: Cognitive skills

This article is a result of a completed survey of the mainly cognitive science literature on the transferability of those skills which have been described variously as ‘core’, ‘key’, and ‘generic’. The literature reveals that those predominantly cognitive skills which have been studied thoroughly (mainly problem solving) are transferable under certain conditions. These conditions relate particularly to the methods and environment of the learning of these skills. Therefore, there are many implications for the teaching of key skills in higher education, which the article draws out, following a summary of the main findings of the research literature. Learning of principles and concepts facilitates transfer to dissimilar problems, as it creates more flexible mental representations, whereas rote learning of facts discourages transfer. Transfer is fostered when general principles of reasoning are taught together with self-monitoring practices and potential applications in varied contexts. Training in reasoning and critical thinking is only effective for transfer, when abstract principles and rules are coupled with examples. Transfer is promoted when learning takes place in a social context, which fosters generation of principles and explanations. Transfer improves when learning is through co-operative methods, and where there is feedback on performance with training examples. The specificity of the context in which principles are learned reduces their transfer. Transfer is promoted if learners are shown how problems resemble each other, if they are expected to learn to do this themselves, if they are aware of how to apply skills in different contexts, if attention is directed to the underlying goal structure of comparable problems, if examples are varied and are accompanied by rules or principles (especially if discovered by the learners), and if learners’ self-explanations are stimulated. Learning to use meta-cognitive strategies is especially important for transfer.

Cognitive Modularity, Biological Modularity, and Evolvability

I examine an argument that has recently appeared in the cognitive science literature in favor of thinking that the mind is mostly (or even exclusively) composed of Fodorian-type cognitive modules; an argument that concludes that a mind that is massively composed of classical cognitive mechanisms that are cognitively modular is more evolvable than a mind that is not cognitively modular (or that is scarcely cognitively modular), since a cognitive mechanism that is cognitively modular is likely to be biologically modular, and biologically modular characters are more evolvable. I argue that the notion of cognitive modularity needed to make this argument plausible will have to be understood (at least partly) in terms of the biological notion of variational independence, as follows: a cognitive feature is cognitively modular only if few or no other morphological changes (cognitive and not) are significantly correlated with variations of that feature arising in members of the relevant population as a result of ontogeny. I also argue that most of the connotations contained in a cluster of notions of classical cognitive modularity (e.g., domain specificity, encapsulation, functional specialization, etc.) are, as far as we know, irrelevant to the argument, and that only the presence of selective impairments—also known as cognitive dissociations—can be considered as strong indicators of the type of modularity that genuinely enhances evolvability.

The concept of knowledge in KM: a dimensional model

PurposeThis paper seeks to sharpen the concepts of tacit, implicit and explicit knowledge by linking them to findings from cognitive psychology and memory science and thus finding a possibility for measuring non‐explicit knowledge.Design/methodology/approachA review of KM and cognitive science literature leads to a dimensional model of knowledge types that links the concepts from KM to more specific concepts from psychology. One central assumption of the model was empirically tested and put into practice in one small‐scale KM project.FindingsThe concepts in KM can be linked to concepts from psychology and thus receive theoretical support. The developed model enables psychometric access to a part of non‐explicit knowledge through structural assessment techniques. Furthermore, the model has proven to be of value in a practical application in KM.Research limitations/implicationsThe experiment and the practical application are too small in scope to provide full support for the model. Further research is required.Practical implicationsA fraction of non‐explicit knowledge can be measured with structural assessment techniques. This can be used in the quantitative evaluation of KM projects as these techniques allow the quantification of individual knowledge increase. Furthermore, a detailed analysis of individual project‐relevant knowledge is useful for post‐project analysis.Originality/valueThe paper integrates findings from several scientific fields for use in KM and presents a novel view of classic KM concepts. The developed model is of importance to both researchers and practitioners.

Cognitive Science and the Origin of Lexical Metaphor: A Neurofunctional Shift (NFS) Hypothesis

A long-standing and cardinal issue in the cognitive science and humanities research literatures on lexical metaphor is whether figurative language is derived from literal language. In examining this issue, research from a broad spectrum of studies in both cognitive science and the humanities is addressed with particular attention to findings from classicist research on ancient Greek texts, on the cognitive significance of the invention of the Crreek vocalic alphabet. These findings are related to current research on brain hemispheric laterality. It will be suggested that lexical metaphor was originally not a linguistic figure-of speech derived from literal language but only later came to be so conceptualized as the consequence of a neurofunctional shift (NFS) in hemispheric laterality, a shift that was precipitated in part by the invention and adoption of the Crreek vocalic alphabet. It will be further suggested that the prevailing view of metaphor as a linguistic figure of speech is the consequence of an inappropriate cognitive turn that resulted in a superimposition or back scanning of a modern alphabetic-based epistemology on to phenomena originating in a preliterate culture

The psychology of ongoing threat: relative risk appraisal, the September 11 attacks, and terrorism-related fears.

There are now replicated findings that posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms related to the September 11, 2001, attacks occurred in large numbers of persons who did not fit the traditional definition of exposure to a traumatic event. These data are not explained by traditional epidemiologic "bull's eye" disaster models, which assume the psychological effects are narrowly, geographically circumscribed, or by existing models of PTSD onset. In this article, the authors develop a researchable model to explain these and other terrorism-related phenomena by synthesizing research and concepts from the cognitive science, risk appraisal, traumatic stress, and anxiety disorders literatures. They propose the new term relative risk appraisal to capture the psychological function that is the missing link between the event and subjective response in these and other terrorism-related studies to date. Relative risk appraisal highlights the core notion from cognitive science that human perception is an active, multidimensional process, such that for unpredictable societal threats, proximity to the event is only one of several factors that influence behavioral responses. Addressing distortions in relative risk appraisal effectively could reduce individual and societal vulnerability to a wide range of adverse economic and ethnopolitical consequences to terrorist attacks. The authors present ways in which these concepts and related techniques can be helpful in treating persons with September 11- or terrorism-related distress or psychopathology.

Autism: Common, heritable, but not harmful.

We assert that one of the examples used by Keller & Miller (K&M), namely, autism, is indeed common, and heritable, but we question whether it is harmful. We provide a brief review of cognitive science literature in which autistics perform superiorly to non-autistics in perceptual, reasoning, and comprehension tasks; however, these superiorities are often occluded and are instead described as dysfunctions.

The Mind and Its Stories: Narrative Universals and Human Emotion (review)

Reviewed by: The Mind and Its Stories: Narrative Universals and Human Emotion Frederick Luis Aldama Hogan, Patrick Colm . 2003. The Mind and Its Stories: Narrative Universals and Human Emotion. New York: Cambridge University Press. $65.00 hc. 302 pp. In spite of the hustle-bustle of our everyday lives, we still take pause to read novels, short stories, and poems; watch films, television shows, and soap operas; and/or to hear someone recount a story. Storytelling in all its shapes and sizes is probably as old as the human species and continues to perform a vital function in the quotidian experiences of people worldwide. One of the main reasons for this is that narration acts on our emotions in very particular ways, some of them so important that they have contributed to humankind's survival, evolution, and development. Indeed, emotions play such a vital role because they reinforce our capabilities to feel empathy and to learn from other persons' experiences. In The Mind and Its Stories, Patrick Colm Hogan explores the universal storytelling capacities of the human mind while focusing on emotion and showing how the biological and social components of literary narrative and of emotion are equally universal. Here, he displays once more the innovative theorizing and research that has been his mark particularly in the articles and books he has been publishing since the mid 1990s, including On Interpretation (1995); Philosophical Approaches to the Study of Literature (2000); Colonialism and Cultural Identity (2000); The Culture of Conformism (2001); Cognitive Science, Literature, and the Arts (2003); and the forthcoming Empire and Poetic Voice. This list of titles points to a mind possessing an encyclopedic knowledge and a boundless curiosity for the scientific and philosophical endeavors that may shed a new light on literature, Hogan's true passion and ultimate focus. However, in The Mind and Its Stories this focus has broadened to literature as a whole, that is, literature in all its variety and richness as world literature, past and present. As a result, this book serves as a trailblazer in two domains: cognitive science and global comparative literature. Thanks to Hogan's efforts, cognitive science is now in a much better position to further explore and empirically verify the universal nature of emotions, for The Mind and Its Stories is a treasure-trove of data on emotions dug out from the literary texts and the literary forms and themes developed in historical periods from around the world. At the same time, the innovative methodology Hogan has [End Page 247] created and applied here to analyze narrative literature on many levels—thematic, structural, stylistic—shows a new way of "doing" comparative world literature and of bringing it to bear on scientific issues. As Hogan points out in the introduction, by now quite a few authors have linked literary study with cognitive science. But none of them has embarked on a cross-cultural study of "the relation between two crucial elements of literature and the human mind—narrative and emotion" (4). Drawing on research in psychology, linguistics, neurology, Indic literary theory, and philosophy, as well as on his own seemingly all-encompassing knowledge of literature, Hogan tackles the problem of explaining how storytelling works cross-culturally, affects and is affected by the emotions, and exhibits universal structures:: both from the point of view of the author/storyteller and the reader/audience. Hogan inscribes his study of literary universals—which may be viewed as an "anthropology of world literature"—within "an encompassing research program in cognitive science" (7). The Mind and Its Stories comprises seven chapters plus an introduction and an afterword. In chapters 1 and 2, Hogan presents the basic principles about literary universals and literary emotion. In chapter 3, he identifies two universal narrative structures: heroic tragi-comedy and romantic tragi-comedy. He argues that these structures are central because they are prominent across unrelated cultural traditions and because they are generated from "two contextually dependent universal prototypes for happiness" (11), namely the personal prototype (romantic union) and the social prototype (social domination). In chapter 4, he discusses the presence in many heroic narratives of an "epilogue of suffering" in which the story continues beyond its expected conclusion (that...

Gold's Theorem and Cognitive Science

A variety of inaccurate claims about Gold's Theorem have appeared in the cognitive science literature. I begin by characterizing the logic of this theorem and its proof. I then examine several claims about Gold's Theorem, and I show why they are false. Finally, I assess the significance of Gold's Theorem for cognitive science.

Pain catastrophizing mediates the relationship between worry and pain suffering in patients with irritable bowel syndrome

Although separate lines of behaviorally oriented pain research have drawn attention to the importance of pain catastrophizing and trait worry, little is known about how they work together to influence aspects of chronic pain. Integrating pain research with the broader anxiety, cognitive science, and learning literature, we hypothesized that the process (vs. content) of worry influences pain through catastrophizing. One hundred and eighty-six consecutive patients diagnosed (Rome II) with irritable bowel syndrome completed measures of three dimensions of pain (sensory pain, affective pain, long-term suffering), pain intensity, trait anxiety, worry, catastrophizing, and somatization during baseline assessment of an NIH-funded clinical trial of two psychological treatments. Worry was most strongly associated with the emotionally unpleasant aspects of pain, particularly suffering. Multivariate mediational analyses showed that catastrophizing mediated the link between worry and suffering. Worry, catastrophizing and control variables accounted for 46% of the variance in suffering. Chronic pain patients who worry excessively engage in more catastrophic thinking and through this cognitive process experience more intensely the suffering component of pain. Data are consistent with the notion that worry functions as an “experiential avoidance” strategy for aversive features of pain. Findings are discussed with respect to their relevance to behavioral models for understanding and treating anxiety-related chronic pain disorders.

The rationality debate as a progressive research program

We did not, as Brakel & Shevrin imply, intend to classify either System 1 or System 2 as rational or irrational. Instrumental rationality is assessed at the organismic level, not at the subpersonal level. Thus, neither System 1 nor System 2 are themselves inherently rational or irrational. Also, that genetic fitness and instrumental rationality are not to be equated was a major theme in our target article. We disagree with Bringsjord & Yang's point that the tasks used in the heuristics and biases literature are easy. Bringsjord & Yang too readily conflate the ability to utilize a principle of rational choice with the disposition to do so. Thus, they undervalue tasks in the cognitive science literature that compellingly reveal difficulties with the latter. We agree with Newton & Roberts that models at the algorithmic level of analysis are crucial, but we disagree with their implication that attention to issues of rationality at the intentional level of analysis impedes work at the algorithmic level of analysis.

Social cognition, artefacts, and stigmergy: A comparative analysis of theoretical frameworks for the understanding of artefact-mediated collaborative activity

Collective behaviour is often characterised by the so-called ‘coordination paradox’: looking at individual ants, for example, they do not seem to cooperate or communicate explicitly, but nevertheless at the social level cooperative behaviour, such as nest building, emerges, apparently without any central coordination. In the case of social insects such emergent coordination has been explained by the theory of stigmergy, which describes how individuals can effect the behaviour of others (and their own) through artefacts, i.e., the product of their own activity (e.g., building material in the ants’ case). Artefacts clearly also play a strong role in human collective behaviour, which has been emphasised, for example, by proponents of activity theory and distributed cognition. However, the relation between theories of situated/social cognition and theories of social insect behaviour has so far received relatively little attention in the cognitive science literature. This paper aims to take a step in this direction by comparing three theoretical frameworks for the study of cognition in the context of agent–environment interaction (activity theory, situated action, and distributed cognition) to each other and to the theory of stigmergy as a possible minimal common ground. The comparison focuses on what each of the four theories has to say about the role/nature of (a) the agents involved in collective behaviour, (b) their environment, (c) the collective activities addressed, and (d) the role that artefacts play in the interaction between agents and their environments, and in particular in the coordination of cooperation.

Dream use in film making.

The correlation between film and dream has an extensive theoretical basis in both cognitive science and cinematic literature. Biographical and autobiographical reports from film makers document antidotal descriptions of the use of dream in creative aspects of screen writing, acting and directing film. However, no systematic or analytic approach has been used in the attempt to document dream utilization in film making. Film makers attending the Sundance Film Institute Screenwriter and Director Labs from 1995-7 were asked to complete a previously validated questionnaire regarding dream recall and incorporation into a spectrum of awake behaviors. Compared to a previous general population study, all responses to questions assessing reported dream effects on awake behaviors and recall were significantly higher for the film makers. An in-group study of film makers found that reported dream recall and effects on waking behavior for the Creative group (Directors, Screen writers, Actors) were significantly higher than for the Working group (Crew). Responses from the Professional Group (Producers, Editors and Cinematographers) were intermediate. Within the Creative Group, reported specific dream effects on behavior varied significantly with creative role.

THE IMPACT OF HUMAN ERROR ON DELIVERING SERVICE QUALITY

This paper opens a new avenue for investigation of quality issues in services. We take the viewpoint that a substantial portion of service failures is the result of human error in the delivery process. Drawing upon the Generic Error Modeling System (gems) from the cognitive science literature, we develop a framework for understanding the role of human error in service failures. An empirical investigation assesses the applicability of this framework to services, identifies which error mechanisms are important sources of service failure, and clarifies how the different roles of customers and providers affect the errors made by each.

Conceptual fuzzy sets and their connectives

The evaluation of element pertinence to sets and connecting the sets themselves when these are not crisp may cause serious epistemological and practical problems. Fuzzy Set Theory (FST) solved some of these problems, with noticeable success since its inception by Zadeh [40] in the 1960s. But that theory now is meeting with difficulties for penetrating AI or, more generally, Cognitive Science. This is mainly due to the characteristics of the membership (characteristic) function and, by reflection, of the connectives MIN-MAX. According to these operators, set connections are performed by diffusing numerical data, i.e. values of membership degree, rather than qualitative data, such as meaning of the data themselves [42], so that the meaning itself can be taken into consideration. In this paper we present an interpretation of element pertinence to sets which yields a more adequate type of set connectives [3]. The general principles assumed to develop the subject and to show its consistency as an algebraic structure form a theory of conceptual sets (c-sets) [9]. A c-set consists of elements collected as function of a specific concept; to each element there is associated a number — element typicality — which expresses the goodness by which the element itself represents the whole set. The way in which the said typicality is computed permits conceiving how to connect c-sets so that the symbolic aspects of the connected sets are accounted for. This is realized by formally relating the properties characterizing every single element to those of all other elements that form the whole set, rather than the subjectively assessed membership function of the element itself, as performed in FST. We develop c-set theory by formalizing the regularities that can be found in concepts, as described in Cognitive Science literature, beginning with the work of E. Rosch (for example, see [15, 24, 28, 36]). The matter reported herein essentially regards the theoretical basis for the formalization of c-sets; besides it outlines a first approach to codify adequate connectives among the c-sets themselves. In addition to typicality, other important numerical and symbolic c-sets parameters are considered in the paper: variable relevance, c-set specificity, indication clarity, c-set prototype and type of c-set linearity. Among these, relevance quantifies the importance of each variable in describing elements, with respect to a specific c-set; c-set specificity expresses the semantical concordance within the elements of a c-set. The importance of the latter parameter was pointed out by Yager [39] and analysed also by other scholars. All the parameters mentioned enable us to cope with the c-set multiformity, as, for example, the complexity and non-linearity that may be faced in possible applications. By the development we perform a tool for machining knowledge learning and concept computation is achieved. Also, an outlook on a possible abductive c-set logic is introduced.

A study of the performance of patients with frontal lobe lesions in a financial planning task.

It has long been argued that patients with lesions in the prefrontal cortex have difficulties in decision making and problem solving in real-world, ill-structured situations, particularly problem types involving planning and look-ahead components. Recently, several researchers have questioned our ability to capture and characterize these deficits adequately using just the standard neuropsychological test batteries, and have called for tests that reflect real-world task requirements more accurately. We present data from 10 patients with focal lesions to the prefrontal cortex and 10 normal control subjects engaged in a real-world financial planning task. We also introduce a theoretical framework and methodology developed in the cognitive science literature for quantifying and analysing the complex data generated by problem-solving tasks. Our findings indicate that patient performance is impoverished at a global level but not at the local level. Patients have difficulty in organizing and structuring their problem space. Once they begin problem solving, they have difficulty in allocating adequate effort to each problem-solving phase. Patients also have difficulty dealing with the fact that there are no right or wrong answers nor official termination points in real-world planning problems. They also find it problematic to generate their own feedback. They invariably terminate the session before the details are fleshed out and all the goals satisfied. Finally, patients do not take full advantage of the fact that constraints on real-world problems are negotiable. However, it is not necessary to postulate a 'planning' deficit. It is possible to understand the patients' difficulties in real world planning tasks in terms of the following four accepted deficits: inadequate access to 'structured event complexes', difficulty in generalizing from particulars, failure to shift between 'mental sets', and poor judgment regarding adequacy and completeness of a plan.

Inductive Model Analysis Systems: Enhancing Model Analysis in Decision Support Systems

After building and validating a decision support model, the decision maker frequently solves (often many times) different instances of the model. That is, by changing various input parameters and rerunning different model instances, the decision maker develops insight(s) into the workings and tradeoffs of the complex system represented by the model. The purpose of this paper is to explore inductive model analysis as a means of enhancing the decision maker's capabilities to develop insight(s) into the business environment represented by the model. The justification and foundation for inductive model analysis is based on three distinct literatures: 1) the cognitive science (theory of learning) literature, 2) the decision support system literature, and 3) the model management system literature. We also propose the integration of several technologies that might help the modeler gain insight(s) from the analysis of multiple model instances. Then we report on preliminary tests of a prototype built using the architecture proposed in this paper. The paper concludes with a discussion of several research questions. Much of the previous MIS/DSS and management science research has focused on model formulation and solution. This paper posits that it is time to give more attention to enhancing model analysis.

Opening the black box of connectionist nets: Some lessons from cognitive science

Connectionist networks are not simply opaque black boxes with useful and efficient computational properties. Rather they have important internal structure that must be harnessed if their full potential as a novel computing technology is to be realised. First, the importance and usefulness of opening the black box is discussed and research is reviewed on how internal representations have been studied and used in the Cognitive Science literature. In the second section, a simple method for the geometrical analysis of decision space is presented. This shows connectionist networks as transparent boxes in which their computational properties are clear. The paper finishes with an example of how decision space diagrams can be useful for investigating under what circumstances it is best to adapt old weights for use in novel tasks.

Empathy, Mind, and Morals

Early Greek philosophers doubled as natural scientists; that is a commonplace. It is equally true, though less often remarked, that numerous historical philosophers doubled as cognitive scientists. They constructed models of mental faculties in much the spirit of modern cognitive science, for which they are widely cited as precursors in the cognitive science literature. Today, of course, there is more emphasis on experiment, and greater division of labor. Philosophers focus on theory, foundations, and methodology, while cognitive scientists are absorbed by experimental techniques and findings. Nonetheless, there are sound reasons for massive communication between philosophy and cognitive science, which happily proceeds apace. On this occasion I shall not try to enumerate or delineate these lines of communication in any comprehensive fashion. I just wish to illustrate the benefits to philosophy in two domains: the theory of mind and moral theory. Though this may sound like an ambitious agenda, I shall in fact examine just a single phenomenon: empathy. Using that term first broadly and later narrowly, I shall argue that empathy may be the key to one sector of the philosophy of mind and to several sectors of moral theory. But whether empathy can in fact unlock any doors depends heavily on the outcome of empirical research in cognitive science.

Shirt and long-term effects of different exposure to picrotoxin and pentylenetetrazolon the forced swim test in rats

U-shaped learning behaviour in cognitive development involves learning, unlearning and relearning. It occurs, for example, in learning irregular verbs. The prior cognitive science literature is occupied with how humans do it, for example, general rules versus tables of exceptions. This paper is mostly concerned with whether U-shaped learning behaviour may be necessary in the abstract mathematical setting of inductive inference, that is, in the computational learning theory following the framework of Gold. All notions considered are learning from text, that is, from positive data. Previous work showed that U-shaped learning behaviour is necessary for behaviourally correct learning but not for syntactically convergent, learning in the limit (= explanatory learning). The present paper establishes the necessity for the hierarchy of classes of vacillatory learning where a behaviourally correct learner has to satisfy the additional constraint that it vacillates in the limit between at most b grammars, where b∈{2,3,…,∗}. Non-U-shaped vacillatory learning is shown to be restrictive: every non-U-shaped vacillatorily learnable class is already learnable in the limit. Furthermore, if vacillatory learning with the parameter b=2 is possible then non-U-shaped behaviourally correct learning is also possible. But for b=3, surprisingly, there is a class witnessing that this implication fails.

Metaphor Comprehension: A Connectionist Approach to Implications for the Mental Lexicon

The growing body of research on metaphor interpretation demonstrates a need for a psycholinguistic model of word meaning that is both more detailed and more flexible than those heretofore described in the psycholinguistic or cognitive science literature. Recent work in connectionist models for representing information suggests such a lexical model, a biologically more plausible one, which accommodates within the same framework both literal and figurative language and yields the appropriate contextual and rhetorical effects. Within the model, massive arrays of low-level representations interact to interpret a given expression within a given context.