Cognitive Offloading Research Articles

Excessive use of reminders: Metacognition and effort-minimisation in cognitive offloading.

People often use external reminders to help remember delayed intentions. This is a form of "cognitive offloading". Individuals sometimes offload more often than would be optimal (Gilbert et al., 2020). This bias has been linked to participants' erroneous metacognitive underconfidence in their memory abilities. However, underconfidence is unlikely to fully explain the bias. An additional, previously-untested factor that may contribute to the offloading bias is a preference to avoid cognitive effort associated with remembering internally. The present Registered Report examined evidence for this hypothesis. One group of participants received payment contingent on their performance of the task (hypothesised to increase cognitive effort, and therefore reduce the bias towards offloading); another group received a flat payment for taking part, as in the earlier experiment. The offloading bias was significantly reduced (but not eliminated) in the rewarded group, suggesting that a preference to avoid cognitive effort influences cognitive offloading.

Know Your Cognitive Environment! Mental Models as Crucial Determinant of Offloading Preferences.

Human problem solvers possess the ability to outsource parts of their mental processing onto cognitive "helpers" (cognitive offloading). However, suboptimal decisions regarding which helper to recruit for which task occur frequently. Here, we investigate if understanding and adjusting a specific subcomponent of mental models-beliefs about task-specific expertise-regarding these helpers could provide a comparatively easy way to improve offloading decisions. Mental models afford the storage of beliefs about a helper that can be retrieved when needed. Arithmetic and social problems were solved by 192 participants. Participants could, in addition to solving a task on their own, offload cognitive processing onto a human, a robot, or one of two smartphone apps. These helpers were introduced with either task-specific (e.g., stating that an app would use machine learning to "recognize faces" and "read emotions") or task-unspecific (e.g., stating that an app was built for solving "complex cognitive tasks") descriptions of their expertise. Providing task-specific expertise information heavily altered offloading behavior for apps but much less so for humans or robots. This suggests (1) strong preexisting mental models of human and robot helpers and (2) a strong impact of mental model adjustment for novel helpers like unfamiliar smartphone apps. Creating and refining mental models is an easy approach to adjust offloading preferences and thus improve interactions with cognitive environments. To efficiently work in environments in which problem-solving includes consulting other people or cognitive tools ("helpers"), accurate mental models-especially regarding task-relevant expertise-are a crucial prerequisite.

Effect of simulation training on nurse leadership in a shared leadership model for cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the emergency department.

Empowering a senior nurse in a shared leadership role has been proposed as a more efficient set up for the cardiac arrest team in ED. In this model, a senior nurse leads the cardiac arrest algorithm which allows cognitive off-loading of the lead emergency physician. The emergency physician is then more available to perform tasks such as echocardiography and exclude reversible causes. Simulation provides an opportunity for training and practice of this shared leadership model. We hypothesised that a structured simulation training programme that focused on implementing a nurse and doctor shared leadership model for cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), would improve leadership and teamwork quality in the setting of cardiac arrest as measured by a Trauma Non-technical Skills (T-NOTECHS) teamwork scale. Fifteen senior ED nurses participated in this pre-interventional post-observational study. Training consisted of a didactic course on team leadership and crisis resource management (CRM) followed by 4 × 10-min resuscitation scenarios with a structured debrief focusing on team leadership skills and CRM. The primary outcome was measured on scenarios 1 and 4 using a modified T-NOTECHS teamwork scale. A statistically significant increase in the T-NOTECHS scale was detected for the measures of leadership (P = 0.0028), CRM (P = 0.0001), adherence to New Zealand Resuscitation Council ALS algorithm (P = 0.0088) and situational awareness (P = 0.0002). The present study shows that a short simulation training programme improved nurse leadership and teamwork performance in the setting of a shared leadership model for CPR in the ED which could easily be replicated in other departments.

Children Devise and Selectively Use Tools to Offload Cognition

From maps sketched in sand to supercomputing software, humans ubiquitously enhance cognitive performance by creating and using artifacts that bear mental load [1-5]. This extension of information processing into the environment has taken center stage in debates about the nature of cognition in humans and other animals [6-9]. How does the human mind acquire such strategies? In two experiments, we investigated the developmental origins of cognitive offloading in 150 children aged between 4 and 11 years. We created a memory task in which children were required to recall the location of hidden targets. In one experiment, participants were provided with a pre-specified cognitive offloading opportunity: an option to mark the target locations with tokens during the hiding period. Even 4-year-old children quickly adopted this external strategy and, in line with a metacognitive account, children across ages offloaded more often when the task was more difficult. In a second experiment, we provided children with the means to devise their own cognitive offloading strategy. Very few younger children spontaneously devised a solution, but by ages 10 and 11, nearly all did so. In a follow-up test phase, a simple prompt greatly increased the rate at which the younger children devised an offloading strategy. These findings suggest that sensitivity to the difficulties of thinking arises early in development and improves throughout the early school years, with children learning to modify the world around them to compensate for their cognitive limits.

Developmental origins of cognitive offloading: The development of cognitive offloading

Many animals manipulate their environments in ways that appear to augment cognitive processing. Adult humans show remarkable flexibility in this domain, typically relying on internal cognitive processing when adequate but turning to external support in situations of high internal demand. We use calendars, calculators, navigational aids and other external means to compensate for our natural cognitive shortcomings and achieve otherwise unattainable feats of intelligence. As yet, however, the developmental origins of this fundamental capacity for cognitive offloading remain largely unknown. In two studies, children aged 4-11 years (n = 258) were given an opportunity to manually rotate a turntable to eliminate the internal demands of mental rotation - to solve the problem in the world rather than in their heads. In study 1, even the youngest children showed a linear relationship between mental rotation demand and likelihood of using the external strategy, paralleling the classic relationship between angle of mental rotation and reaction time. In study 2, children were introduced to a version of the task where manually rotating inverted stimuli was sometimes beneficial to performance and other times redundant. With increasing age, children were significantly more likely to manually rotate the turntable only when it would benefit them. These results show how humans gradually calibrate their cognitive offloading strategies throughout childhood and thereby uncover the developmental origins of this central facet of intelligence.

Developmental origins of cognitive offloading.

Many animals manipulate their environments in ways that appear to augment cognitive processing. Adult humans show remarkable flexibility in this domain, typically relying on internal cognitive processing when adequate but turning to external support in situations of high internal demand. We use calendars, calculators, navigational aids and other external means to compensate for our natural cognitive shortcomings and achieve otherwise unattainable feats of intelligence. As yet, however, the developmental origins of this fundamental capacity for cognitive offloading remain largely unknown. In two studies, children aged 4-11 years (n = 258) were given an opportunity to manually rotate a turntable to eliminate the internal demands of mental rotation--to solve the problem in the world rather than in their heads. In study 1, even the youngest children showed a linear relationship between mental rotation demand and likelihood of using the external strategy, paralleling the classic relationship between angle of mental rotation and reaction time. In study 2, children were introduced to a version of the task where manually rotating inverted stimuli was sometimes beneficial to performance and other times redundant. With increasing age, children were significantly more likely to manually rotate the turntable only when it would benefit them. These results show how humans gradually calibrate their cognitive offloading strategies throughout childhood and thereby uncover the developmental origins of this central facet of intelligence.

The effect of recent reminder setting on subsequent strategy and performance in a prospective memory task

ABSTRACTThe technological advancement that is rapidly taking place in today’s society allows increased opportunity for “cognitive offloading” by storing information in external devices rather than relying on internal memory. This opens the way to fundamental questions regarding the interplay between internal and external memory and the potential benefits and costs of placing information in the external environment. This article reports the results of three pre-registered online experiments investigating the consequences of prior cognitive offloading on A) subsequent unaided ability, and B) strategic decisions whether to engage in future cognitive offloading. We administered a web-based task requiring participants to remember delayed intentions for a brief period and manipulated the possibility of setting reminders to create an external cue. Earlier cognitive offloading had little effect upon individuals’ subsequent unaided ability, leading to a small and nonsignificant drop in subsequent performance. However, there was a strong effect on participants’ subsequent likelihood of setting reminders. These findings suggest that the short-term impact of cognitive offloading is more likely to be seen on individuals’ strategy choices rather than basic memory processes.

Optimal use of reminders: Metacognition, effort, and cognitive offloading.

Individuals frequently choose between accomplishing goals using unaided cognitive abilities or offloading cognitive demands onto external tools and resources. For example, in order to remember an upcoming appointment one might rely on unaided memory or create a reminder by setting a smartphone alert. Setting a reminder incurs both a cost (the time/effort to set it up) and a benefit (increased likelihood of remembering). Here we investigate whether individuals weigh such costs/benefits optimally or show systematic biases. In 3 experiments, participants performed a memory task where they could choose between (a) earning a maximum reward for each remembered item, using unaided memory; or (b) earning a lesser amount per item, using external reminders to increase the number remembered. Participants were significantly biased toward using external reminders, even when they had a financial incentive to choose optimally. Individual differences in this bias were stable over time, and predicted by participants' erroneous metacognitive underconfidence in their memory abilities. Bias was eliminated, however, when participants received metacognitive advice about which strategy was likely to maximize performance. Furthermore, we found that metacognitive interventions (manipulation of feedback valence and practice-trial difficulty) yielded shifts in participants' reminder bias that were mediated by shifts in confidence. However, the bias could not be fully attributed to metacognitive error. We conclude that individuals have stable biases toward using external versus internal cognitive resources, which result at least in part from inaccurate metacognitive evaluations. Finding interventions to mitigate these biases can improve individuals' adaptive use of cognitive tools. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Interface and interaction design: How mobile touch devices foster cognitive offloading

A central feature of modern technologies such as smartphones or tablets is that they allow for the externalization of working memory processes (i.e. cognitive offloading). Such externalizations enable their users to perform beyond the limitations of internal cognitive processing. In this experimental study (N = 172), we investigated two determinants of participants' decision to offload working memory processes when using mobile devices. These determinants, interface design (i.e. responsivity in terms of temporal delay) and interaction design (touch-based vs. mouse-based control) of the involved mobile devices altered offloading behavior in a Pattern Copy Task. We observed that participants performing the task with a highly responsive device (i.e. no delay when accessing relevant information) offloaded more working memory processes than participants handling the same device at a lower responsivity (i.e. temporal delay). Further, participants using the device's touch function also offloaded more working memory processes than participants using a computer mouse. These findings were further supported by subjective measures about the easiness, naturalness, and intuitivity when using the device. Thus, our study showed that both interface and interaction design influence metacognitive evaluations of the use of mobile devices and offloading behavior.

Control over spatial representation format enhances information extraction but prevents long-term learning.

Previous research has demonstrated that cognitive offloading (i.e., externalizing mental processes) is useful for immediate problem solving. However, long-term effects of cognitive offloading on subsequent problem solving without offloading are remarkably understudied. Our main goal was to investigate the effects of representation control (i.e., adjusting the format of the representation to task requirements) on incidental procedural learning in an information extraction task with interactive visualizations. More specifically, we tested how the availability of representation control for solving tasks in a practice phase affects procedural learning measured in a testing phase in which representation control is no longer available. In both phases, we explored time on task as well as proportion correct as proxies of task performance and analyzed how often participants used representation control. We conducted three experiments in which participants could modify and reorganize information displays in the practice phase, whereas in the testing phase, they had to solve equivalent and near transfer problems without this offloading opportunity. We show that representation control is beneficial for immediate task solution, particularly for problems that require a spatial transformation. This benefit was more pronounced for automated (i.e., system-controlled) types of control (Experiment 3). In contrast, in subsequent problem solving without representation control (up to 24 hr later), participants who had been using representation control previously fell back to the level of an untrained baseline condition (Experiments 1 and 2). However, the detrimental effect of representation control was confined to equivalent tasks and did not generalize to a near transfer task. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved)

Exploring the Potential Impact of Body Worn Cameras on Memory in Officer-Involved Critical Incidents: a Literature Review

The current paper reviews existing literature that relates to how body worn cameras might influence an officer’s memory of their interactions with the public, namely those that involve the use of force. Notably, most of this research does not come from the policing field but focuses on the impact of camera technology in other settings. Much of the available research supports the commonly held view that body worn cameras could be used to enhance memory for these interactions, particularly interactions that are complex or stressful. However, contrary to what people might expect, research also exists that suggests body worn cameras may actually have a detrimental effect on officer memory. Three major potential detriments: cognitive offloading, retrieval-induced forgetting and misinformation-type effects are highlighted. Future studies examining the impact of body worn cameras on officers’ memory are necessary. Ways forward are discussed.

Problem Solvers Adjust Cognitive Offloading Based on Performance Goals.

When incorporating the environment into mental processing (cf., cognitive offloading), one creates novel cognitive strategies that have the potential to improve task performance. Improved performance can, for example, mean faster problem solving, more accurate solutions, or even higher grades at university.1 Although cognitive offloading has frequently been associated with improved performance, it is yet unclear how flexible problem solvers are at matching their offloading habits with their current performance goals (can people improve goal-related instead of generic performance, e.g., when being in a hurry and aiming for a "quick and dirty" solution?). Here, we asked participants to solve a cognitive task, provided them with different goals-maximizing speed (SPD) or accuracy (ACC), respectively-and measured how frequently (Experiment 1) and how proficiently (Experiment 2) they made use of a novel external resource to support their cognitive processing. Experiment 1 showed that offloading behavior varied with goals: Participants offloaded less in the SPD than in the ACC condition. Experiment 2 showed that this differential offloading behavior was associated with high goal-related performance: fast answers in the SPD, accurate answers in the ACC condition. Simultaneously, goal-unrelated performance was sacrificed: inaccurate answers in the SPD, slow answers in the ACC condition. The findings support the notion of humans as canny offloaders who are able to successfully incorporate their environment in pursuit of their current cognitive goals. Future efforts should be focused on the finding's generalizability, for example, to settings without feedback or with high mental workload.

Confidence guides spontaneous cognitive offloading

BackgroundCognitive offloading is the use of physical action to reduce the cognitive demands of a task. Everyday memory relies heavily on this practice; for example, when we write down to-be-remembered information or use diaries, alerts, and reminders to trigger delayed intentions. A key goal of recent research has been to investigate the processes that trigger cognitive offloading. This research has demonstrated that individuals decide whether or not to offload based on a potentially erroneous metacognitive evaluation of their mental abilities. Therefore, improving the accuracy of metacognitive evaluations may help to optimise offloading behaviour. However, previous studies typically measure participants’ use of an explicitly instructed offloading strategy, in contrast to everyday life where offloading strategies must often be generated spontaneously.ResultsWe administered a computer-based task requiring participants to remember delayed intentions. One group of participants was explicitly instructed on a method for setting external reminders; another was not. The latter group spontaneously set reminders but did so less often than the instructed group. Offloading improved performance in both groups. Crucially, metacognition (confidence in unaided memory ability) guided both instructed and spontaneous offloading: Participants in both groups set more reminders when they were less confident (regardless of actual memory ability).ConclusionsThese results show that the link between metacognition and cognitive offloading holds even when offloading strategies need to be spontaneously generated. Thus, metacognitive interventions are potentially able to alter offloading behaviour, without requiring offloading strategies to be explicitly instructed.

Text and you might miss it? Snap and you might remember? Exploring “Google effects on memory” and cognitive self-esteem in the context of Snapchat and text messaging

This study examines “Google effects on memory” and “cognitive self-esteem” in the interpersonal contexts of Snapchat and text messaging, and looks at the relationship between the two concepts, given that both are derived from earlier research on transactive memory systems (originally an interpersonal domain). It was hypothesized that the permanence of text messages would impair memory relative to the ephemerality of Snaps, and these effects would be mediated by cognitive self-esteem such that information permanence would increase cognitive self-esteem, which in turn would impair memory. Using a laboratory experiment (n = 189) manipulating the channel (text messaging/Snapchat/control condition) from which people received images and facts about animals, there were no Google effects on memory, and cognitive self-esteem was positively related to memory. However, results indicated that when cognitive self-esteem and possible moderating effects of mobile application use were controlled for, both text messaging and Snapchat impaired some forms of memory relative to a control condition. Implications of the null and positive (counter-hypothesized) results are discussed in the context of other recent research, suggesting that Google effects may not be as robust as earlier studies may have proposed and/or memory impairment being due to increased cognitive load rather than cognitive offloading.

Cognitive Offloading: Structuring the Environment to Improve Children's Working Memory Task Performance.

Research has shown that adults can engage in cognitive offloading, whereby internal processes are offloaded onto the environment to help task performance. Here, we investigate an application of this approach with children, in particular children with poor working memory. Participants were required to remember and recall sequences of colors by placing colored blocks in the correct serial order. In one condition the blocks were arranged to facilitate cognitive offloading (i.e., grouped by color), whereas in the other condition they were arranged randomly. Across two experiments (total N=166) the ordered condition improved task performance for children with low working memory ability. In addition, participants in Experiment 2 rated the difficulty of the two arrangements and performed a further condition in which they were given an opportunity to freely arrange the blocks before completing the task. Despite performing better in the ordered condition, children with low working memory ability did not rate the ordered arrangement as easier, nor did they choose an ordered arrangement when given the opportunity to do so. This research shows that cognitive offloading can also be a useful process in populations other than typical adults, and the implications of this work for supporting children with poor working memory are discussed.

A role for metamemory in cognitive offloading

Cognitive offloading refers to our reliance on the external environment in order to reduce cognitive demand. For instance, people write notes on paper or smartphones in order not to forget shopping lists or upcoming appointments. A plausible hypothesis is that such offloading relies on metamemory – our confidence in our future memory performance. However, this hypothesis has not been directly tested, and it remains unclear when and how people use external sources to aid their encoding and retrieval of information. In four experiments, here we asked participants to learn word pairs and decide whether to offload some of the pairs by “saving” them on a computer. In the memory test, they had the opportunity to use this saved information on half of trials. Participants adaptively saved the most difficult items and used this offloaded information to boost their memory performance. Crucially, participants' confidence judgments about their memory predicted their decisions to use the saved information, indicating that cognitive offloading is associated with metacognitive evaluation about memory performance. These findings were accommodated by a Bayesian computational model in which beliefs about the performance boost gained from using offloaded information are negatively coupled to an evaluation of memory ability. Together our findings highlight a close link between metamemory and cognitive offloading.

Offloading memory: Serial position effects.

Despite the long history and pervasiveness of cognitive offloading as a memory strategy, the memorial fate of offloaded information is not well understood. Recent work has suggested that offloading information may engage similar mechanisms as instructions to forget (e.g., directed forgetting). In the present investigation, we test this prediction by examining the serial position effect for offloaded information. Previous research has demonstrated that "forget" instructions can eliminate the primacy effect while leaving an intact recency effect. Across two experiments, participants completed a number of free recall trials using an external aid and then a final recall trial without the external aid. We compared a group that was expecting to use the aid for the final trial (offloading) with a group that was not (no-offloading). We found a memory impairment for offloaded items that was characterized by a reduced primacy effect but a typical recency effect, similar to what has been reported in research on intentional/directed forgetting.

Recorded Lectures as a Source of Cognitive Off-loading

Objective. To assess and elucidate the impact of student pharmacists' knowledge of future access to recorded lectures on their ability to remember information presented during lecture. Methods. Pharmacy students viewed 50 minutes of videotaped lecture in a simulated class period. For the early lecture material, participants were instructed as to whether or not they would have future access to the recorded lectures for restudy prior to their test one week later. For the late lecture material, participants were instructed they would not have future access to lecture material. Participants were tested immediately following the lectures and again one week later. The primary outcome was the participants' performance on the examination administered immediately following presentation of the late lecture material. If participants had preserved cognitive resources (eg, memory, attention) because of knowledge they would have future access to recorded lectures, performance was expected to be higher on the late lecture material. Results. Overall performance on the examinations did not differ between participants who knew they would have access to the lecture material for later restudy and those who did not. There was, however, loss of knowledge over time. Participants with knowledge of future access to recorded lectures wrote more notes, which correlated with better performance on the examination. Conclusion. These findings suggest knowledge of future access to recorded lectures did not enhance the ability of participants to remember other information and therefore, may not free-up cognitive resources that could be used for other tasks within the classroom.

Autonomy, Cognitive Offloading, and Education

AbstractIf we want our intellectual lives to go as well as possible, should we be “delegating” as many information‐gobbling tasks to our gadgets as we can? If not, then how much cognitive outsourcing is too much and, relatedly, what kinds of considerations are relevant to determining this? In this article, J. Adam Carter submits that one particular dimension of intellectual flourishing that will be helpful for the purpose of exploring such questions is that of intellectual autonomy, in particular what he describes as the value of one's freedom to achieve. Several related conclusions are drawn and then applied to recent discussions in the philosophy of education concerning education's epistemic aims.

On serendipity: The happy discovery of unsought knowledge

On serendipity: The happy discovery of unsought knowledge