Some evolutionary cognitive and developmental psychologists propose that the human mind consists of domain-specific modules. These are characterized as self-contained “mini-computers” that process information of a certain kind. Although, according to my reading, much of the extant human brain research does not necessarily support the module view (Greenwald, 1997), still module theories continue to occupy center stage in cognitive developmental and comparative psychology. One would think that neuroscience, as a study of the behavior beneath the skin, would simply replace cognitive psychology. But, perhaps I missed the value of the psychological construct. In their book, the Premacks set out to provide a synthesis of evidence from various fields in order to identify what they characterize as “original intelligence.” Their synthesis is derived from their reading of findings in comparative psychology, developmental psychology, neuroscience, anthropology and other “life sciences.” All of the evidence and theory from psychology from which they draw their evidence comes from the cognitive perspective including their own contributions to that research. For them, original intelligence includes certain phylogenetic and ontogenetic contributions that they identify as expectancies, capabilities that are present or not present in certain species including humans. These capabilities include inherited expectancies, derived from natural selection; and expectancies derived from experience and its interaction with inherited expectancies. Infants have inherited expectancies not only about how physical bodies “act,” but also about psychological and biological objects, about language, number, spatial navigation, and music. Indeed, infants have inherited expectancies in all the domains into which human problem solving can be divided. These expectancies are an integral part of the infant's modules. (p. 17)