Modulation Of Cognitive Control Research Articles

Context-dependent switching between proactive and reactive working memory control mechanisms in the right inferior frontal gyrus

A critical feature of higher cognitive functioning is the capacity to flexibly tailor information processing and behaviors to current situational demands. Recent neurocognitive models have been postulated to account for the dynamic nature of human executive processing by invoking two dissociable cognitive control modes, proactive and reactive control. These may involve partially overlapping, but temporally distinct neural implementation in the prefrontal cortex. Prior brain imaging studies exploring proactive control have mainly used tasks requiring only information about single-items to be retained over unfilled delays. Whether proactive control can also be utilized to facilitate performance in more complex working memory tasks, in which concurrent processing of intervening items and updating is mandatory during contextual cue maintenance remains an open question. To examine this issue and to elucidate the extent to which overlapping neural substrates underlie proactive and reactive control we used fMRI and a modified verbal 3-back paradigm with embedded cues predictive of high-interference trials. This task requires context information to be retained over multiple intervening trials. We found that performance improved with item-specific cues predicting forthcoming lures despite increased working memory load. Temporal dynamics of activation in the right inferior frontal gyrus suggest flexible switching between proactive and reactive control in a context-dependent fashion, with greater sustained responses elicited in the 3-back task involving context maintenance of cue information and greater transient responses elicited in the 3-back task absent of cues.

Modulation of Brain Activity during a Stroop Inhibitory Task by the Kind of Cognitive Control Required

This study used a proportion congruency manipulation in the Stroop task in order to investigate, at the behavioral and brain substrate levels, the predictions derived from the Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) account of two distinct modes of cognitive control depending on the task context. Three experimental conditions were created that varied the proportion congruency: mostly incongruent (MI), mostly congruent (MC), and mostly neutral (MN) contexts. A reactive control strategy, which corresponds to transient interference resolution processes after conflict detection, was expected for the rare conflicting stimuli in the MC context, and a proactive strategy, characterized by a sustained task-relevant focus prior to the occurrence of conflict, was expected in the MI context. Results at the behavioral level supported the proactive/reactive distinction, with the replication of the classic proportion congruent effect (i.e., less interference and facilitation effects in the MI context). fMRI data only partially supported our predictions. Whereas reactive control for incongruent trials in the MC context engaged the expected fronto-parietal network including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex, proactive control in the MI context was not associated with any sustained lateral prefrontal cortex activations, contrary to our hypothesis. Surprisingly, incongruent trials in the MI context elicited transient activation in common with incongruent trials in the MC context, especially in DLPFC, superior parietal lobe, and insula. This lack of sustained activity in MI is discussed in reference to the possible involvement of item-specific rather than list-wide mechanisms of control in the implementation of a high task-relevant focus.

Alcohol affects the emotional modulation of cognitive control: an event-related brain potential study

ObjectiveThe present study aimed to determine whether alcohol affects the emotional modulation of cognitive control and its underlying neural mechanisms, which is pivotal to an understanding of the socially maladaptive behaviors frequently seen in alcohol-intoxicated individuals.MethodEvent-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded in male participants receiving either a moderate dose of alcohol (0.65 g/kg alcohol; n = 32) or a non-alcoholic placebo beverage (n = 32) while performing an emotional Go/No-Go task that required response execution (Go trials) to pictures of a “target” emotional facial expression (angry, happy, neutral) and response inhibition (No-Go trials) to a different “non-target” expression.ResultsOverall, N200 and P300 amplitudes were more enhanced during No-Go than Go trials. Interestingly, alcohol-intoxicated individuals displayed larger No-Go N200 amplitudes across all emotional conditions than controls, accompanied by decreased task performance (i.e., more errors), particularly in response to angry faces. P300 amplitude in the alcohol group was significantly reduced for both Go and No-Go trials, but only following angry and happy emotional expressions.ConclusionsThese results suggest that alcohol-intoxicated individuals need to effortfully activate more cognitive resources during the early inhibition process in order to regulate a response than controls. Moreover, alcohol affected the emotional modulation of both response inhibition and execution in the later stages of cognitive control. Alcohol dampened emotional responsiveness, which may restrict the availability of attentional resources for cognitive control. Yet, these findings may underlie the lack of control in alcohol-intoxicated individuals when faced with emotionally or socially challenging situations.

Pro- and Antisaccades: Dissociating Stimulus and Response Influences the Online Control of Saccade Trajectories

ABSTRACT The authors examined whether the diminished online control of antisaccades is related to a trade-off between movement planning and control or the remapping of target properties to a mirror-symmetrical location (i.e., vector inversion). Pro- and antisaccades were examined in a standard no-delay schedule wherein target onset served as the movement imperative and a delay cuing schedule wherein responses were initiated 2,000 ms following target onset. Importantly, the delay cuing schedule was employed to equate pro- and antisaccade reaction times. Online control was evaluated by indexing the strength of trajectory amendments at normalized increments of movement time. Antisaccades exhibited fewer online corrections than prosaccades, and this result was consistent across cuing schedules. Thus, the diminished online control of antisaccades cannot be tied to a trade-off between movement planning and control. Rather, the authors propose that the intentional nature of dissociating stimulus and response (i.e., vector inversion) engenders a slow mode of cognitive control that is not optimized for fast oculomotor corrections.

Cardiorespiratory Fitness and the Flexible Modulation of Cognitive Control in Preadolescent Children

The influence of cardiorespiratory fitness on the modulation of cognitive control was assessed in preadolescent children separated into higher- and lower-fit groups. Participants completed compatible and incompatible stimulus-response conditions of a modified flanker task, consisting of congruent and incongruent arrays, while ERPs and task performance were concurrently measured. Findings revealed decreased response accuracy for lower- relative to higher-fit participants with a selectively larger deficit in response to the incompatible stimulus-response condition, requiring the greatest amount of cognitive control. In contrast, higher-fit participants maintained response accuracy across stimulus-response compatibility conditions. Neuroelectric measures indicated that higher-fit, relative to lower-fit, participants exhibited global increases in P3 amplitude and shorter P3 latency, as well as greater modulation of P3 amplitude between the compatible and incompatible stimulus-response conditions. Similarly, higher-fit participants exhibited smaller error-related negativity (ERN) amplitudes in the compatible condition, and greater modulation of the ERN between the compatible and incompatible conditions, relative to lower-fit participants who exhibited large ERN amplitudes across both conditions. These findings suggest that lower-fit children may have more difficulty than higher-fit children in the flexible modulation of cognitive control processes to meet task demands.

Incorporating multiple patterns of activity into the design of cognitive work support systems

The design of support systems for cognitive work needs to account for the different patterns of activity resulting from changes in context. The contextual control modes from Hollnagel’s model of control are presented as a suitable framework to describe these patterns and to identify the implications for design of support systems. The design and evaluation of a prototype support system for airline operations is used as a case study in supporting multiple cognitive control modes. The evaluation of the prototype with experts illustrated clear and distinguishable changes in the patterns of activity in different contextual control modes. Notably, different designs were demonstrated to support particular contextual control modes and to disrupt cognitive activity in contextual control modes which they were not intended to support.

Creativity as flexible cognitive control.

Creative individuals have been described in terms suggestive of greater automatic processing (e.g., defocused attention, looser associations) and greater controlled processing (e.g., greater abilities to focus while working on a creative task). Both views cannot be correct from a static ability-related perspective. On the other hand, both views could be correct if creative individuals are better able to modulate the functioning of their cognitive control system in a context-sensitive manner. The present study (N 50) assessed individual differences in creativity in terms of original responses on the Torrance Test of Creative Thinking (Torrance, 1974) and also in terms of creative behavior on the Creative Achievement Questionnaire (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005). The same participants performed a color–word Stroop task. Creative individuals were neither more nor less capable of overriding cognitive conflicts on incongruent (relative to congruent) Stroop trials. On the other hand, creative individuals displayed more flexible cognitive control, as defined by greater cognitive control modulation from trial to trial. Implications for theories of creativity and its underlying processing basis are discussed.

Dopaminergic Modulation of Cognitive Control: Distinct Roles for the Prefrontal Cortex and the Basal Ganglia

Evidence from psychopharmacological functional neuroimaging begins to elucidate the neurochemical mechanisms of cognitive control. The role of dopamine in two subcomponent processes of cognitive control is discussed: the active maintenance and the flexible updating of goal-relevant representations. A range of studies have highlighted a role for the prefrontal cortex (pFC) and its modulation by dopamine in the active maintenance of distractor-resistant goal-relevant representations. This work suggests that dopamine might modulate top-down signals from the pFC, thereby increasing the activity of posterior cortical regions that process goal-relevant representations and rendering them distractor-resistant. Conversely, other studies highlight a role for dopamine in the basal ganglia in cognitive switching, which might reflect a modulation of the selective gating of cortical cognitive and motor programs. We present a working hypothesis that integrates these two disparate literatures and states that the flexible adaptation of current goal-relevant representations is mediated by modulatory influences of activity in the dopamine-sensitive basal ganglia on connectivity between the prefrontal cortex and posterior cortex.

Monitoring antisaccades: inter-individual differences in cognitive control and the influence of COMT and DRD4 genotype variations

Conscious monitoring of behavior is an essential control function for adaptation and learning. Antisaccade performance was investigated in a large sample of young healthy men in two tasks, one that required conscious error monitoring and one that did not. Conscious error monitoring did not lead to changes in error rate between the two tasks, while other antisaccade parameters were significantly modulated. Application of signal detection theory showed a large inter-individual variability in error detection sensitivity: the majority of individuals were unable to monitor antisaccade errors (chance error detection group), while a minority that successfully monitored their errors (non-chance error detection group) were worse in antisaccade performance in both tasks. These results were explained by the hypothesis of two modes of antisaccade processing favored by each one of the two groups: a mode of conscious cortical cognitive control leading to error monitoring, worse performance and no post-error adaptation and a mode of non-conscious subcortical control leading to chance error monitoring, post-error slowing and better performance of the antisaccade task. This hypothesis was corroborated by the results of the genotype analysis. Error-monitoring sensitivity in the non-chance error detection group was modulated by COMT genotype variations that in turn did not have an effect on error rate. On the other hand, DRD4 genotype variations were related to differences in antisaccade error rate while not affecting error-monitoring sensitivity.

Adjustments of conflict monitoring in Parkinson's disease.

In Stroop-like tasks, the detection of conflict triggers adjustments of cognitive control to reduce conflict in subsequent trials. The present study tested the hypothesis of an impaired modulation of conflict monitoring in Parkinson's disease (PD). 18 PD patients and 18 healthy control (HC) participants performed a Stroop-like task in 2 conditions differing in terms of incongruent/congruent stimuli ratio. HC participants demonstrated a sustained modulation of interference effect, the interference effect being decreased when the proportion of incongruent stimuli was high. A trial-by-trial analysis also showed that in the HC group, processing an incongruent stimulus reduced interference in the subsequent trial. Unlike controls, PD patients did not demonstrate any transient or sustained reduction of the interference effect. Within the framework of recent models, these results can be interpreted as an impairment of a proactive mode of cognitive control in patients with PD.

Retrieval constraints on the front end create differences in recollection on a subsequent test

Four experiments were conducted to investigate how the cognitive control of memory retrieval selects particular qualitative characteristics as a consequence of instantiating a retrieval mode for recognition memory. Adapting the memory for foils paradigm from Jacoby, Shimizu, Daniels, and Rhodes (Jacoby, L. L., Shimizu, Y., Daniels, K. A., & Rhodes, M. G. (2005a). Modes of cognitive control in recognition and source memory: Depth of retrieval. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 12, 852–857), we demonstrate that inspecting distractors under different retrieval modes leaves more versus less recollective details in memory. Participants also reported using different rejection strategies under different retrieval modes. The result that retrieval modes are based on selecting qualitative characteristics of the study phase to aid recognition memory was demonstrated by showing that participants cannot establish unique retrieval modes based solely on trace strength or relative judgments of strength. Whether early selection versus late correction criteria will be applied during a memory test depends on the particular retrieval mode established by the characteristics of the recognition memory test.

Flexible neural mechanisms of cognitive control within human prefrontal cortex

A major challenge in research on executive control is to reveal its functional decomposition into underlying neural mechanisms. A typical assumption is that this decomposition occurs solely through anatomically based dissociations. Here we tested an alternative hypothesis that different cognitive control processes may be implemented within the same brain regions, with fractionation and dissociation occurring on the basis of temporal dynamics. Regions within lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) were examined that, in a prior study, exhibited contrasting temporal dynamics between older and younger adults during performance of the AX-CPT cognitive control task. The temporal dynamics in younger adults fit a proactive control pattern (primarily cue-based activation), whereas in older adults a reactive control pattern was found (primarily probe-based activation). In the current study, we found that following a period of task-strategy training, these older adults exhibited a proactive shift within a subset of the PFC regions, normalizing their activity dynamics toward young adult patterns. Conversely, under conditions of penalty-based monetary incentives, the younger adults exhibited a reactive shift some of the same regions, altering their temporal dynamics toward the older adult baseline pattern. These experimentally induced crossover patterns of temporal dynamics provide strong support for dual modes of cognitive control that can be flexibly shifted within PFC regions, via modulation of neural responses to changing task conditions or behavioral goals.

Cognitive abilities and superior decision making under risk: A protocol analysis and process model evaluation

AbstractIndividual differences in cognitive abilities and skills can predict normatively superior and logically consistent judgments and decisions. The current experiment investigates the processes that mediate individual differences in risky choices. We assessed working memory span, numeracy, and cognitive impulsivity and conducted a protocol analysis to trace variations in conscious deliberative processes. People higher in cognitive abilities made more choices consistent with expected values; however, expected-value choices rarely resulted from expected-value calculations. Instead, the cognitive ability and choice relationship was mediated by the number of simple considerations made during decision making — e.g., transforming probabilities and considering the relative size of gains. Results imply that, even in simple lotteries, superior risky decisions associated with cognitive abilities and controlled cognition can reflect metacognitive dynamics and elaborative heuristic search processes, rather than normative calculations. Modes of cognitive control (e.g., dual process dynamics) and implications for process models of risky decision-making (e.g., priority heuristic) are discussed.

Consciência situacional, tomada de decisão e modos de controle cognitivo em ambientes complexos

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a consciência situacional, os processos de tomada de decisão naturalística e os modos de controle cognitivo utilizados por pilotos de aeronaves em um experimento em simulador de voo. Dessa forma, diferentes situações foram propostas durante a simulação objetivando o estudo da consciência situacional e tomada de decisão dos tripulantes. As ações dos participantes foram investigadas e classificadas de acordo com o modelo de controle cognitivo proposto. Os resultados sugerem que os fatores de complexidade contextual afetam a gestão da dificuldade, influenciando a consciência situacional, a tomada de decisão e os modos de controle cognitivo dos pilotos.

Atypical modulation of cognitive control by arousal in autism

We examined the effects of viewing high-arousal pictures on regional brain activations elicited by a cognitive control task in participants with high-functioning autism and neurotypical controls. Specifically, using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging, we assessed the effects of brief presentations of highly arousing pictures (i.e., both very pleasant and very unpleasant) on the processing of stimuli requiring cognitive control. Similar to previous findings, when stimuli with high cognitive control demands were preceded by low-arousal pictures, individuals with autism demonstrated regional brain activations that were comparable to neurotypical control individuals. When the presentation of the cognitive control stimuli was preceded by high-arousal pictures, however, the control group was characterized by relatively greater activation in the right lateral midfrontal cortex in response to cognitive control stimuli. In contrast, preceding high-arousal stimuli did not modulate activity elicited in this region by cognitive control stimuli in the autism group. Differential modulation of right lateral midfrontal activation by high-arousal stimuli in autism is consistent with the “inefficiency model” of brain functioning in autism spectrum disorders, and contributes to a growing body of evidence that autism may be characterized by anomalous sensitivity of cognitive control brain regions to social-emotional context.

Cognitive control: Dynamic, sustained, and voluntary influences.

The cost of incongruent stimuli is reduced when conflict is expected. This series of experiments tested whether this improved performance is due to repetition priming or to enhanced cognitive control. Using a paradigm in which Word and Number Stroop alternated every trial, Experiment 1 assessed dynamic trial-to-trial changes. Incongruent trials led to task-specific reduction of conflict (trial n + 2) without cross-task modulation (trial n + 1), but this was fully explained by repetition priming. In contrast, an increased ratio of incongruent words did lead to sustained task-specific enhancement, above and beyond repetition priming (Experiment 2). Experiments 3 and 4 assessed the voluntary modulation of cognitive control: A cue predicted the congruency of the incoming trial, allowing participants to establish the correct mindset (Word Stroop in Experiment 3, Flanker task in Experiment 4). Preparing oneself to process an incongruent word (or flanker) enhanced conflict resolution in the subsequent Number Stroop, an example of cross-task modulation. Taken together, these experiments reveal the multifaceted aspects of conflict resolution: Trial-to-trial changes are often due to repetition priming; sustained modulations brought about by task demands are task specific; and voluntary modulations are task general.

Atypical modulation of cognitive control by arousal in autism

Atypical modulation of cognitive control by arousal in autism

Strategic Modulation of Cognitive Control

The neural substrate of cognitive control is thought to comprise an evaluative component located in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and an executive component in the prefrontal cortex (PFC). The control mechanism itself is mainly local, triggered by response conflict (monitored by the ACC) and involving the allocation of executive resources (recruited by the PFC) in a trial-to-trial fashion. However, another way to achieve control would be to use a strategic mechanism based on long-term prediction of upcoming events and on a chronic response strategy that ignores local features of the task. In the current study, we showed that such a strategic control mechanism was based on a functional dissociation or complementary relationship between the ACC and the PFC. When information in the environment was available to make predictions about upcoming stimuli, local task features (e.g., response conflict) were no longer used as a control signal. We suggest that having separate control mechanisms based on local or global task features allows humans to be persistent in pursuing their goals, yet flexible enough to adapt to changes in the environment.

Cognitive Control Dynamics for Reaching a Satisficing Performance in Complex Dynamic Situations

The study of dynamic situations, in which the human operator can exert only partial control (such as in industrial process control, aircraft piloting, or air traffic control), has offered rare opportunities to examine the dynamics of cognitive control. Unlike most of the laboratory approaches to the study of cognition, this kind of study has stressed that several cognitive modes can act in parallel and that the distribution of control among the modes can evolve over time in relation to task requirements and human operator states. This article is a review of the arguments, developed in the literature on dynamic situations and by the authors themselves, in favor of a dynamic adjustment of cognitive control to situational features (integrating both the environment and the human) as a major component of adaptation. The main criterion used by the human operator to adjust cognitive control is situation mastery, as a guarantee that a satisficing performance will be reached with an acceptable quantity of resources. Two main dimensions are proposed to characterize cognitive control modes: the level of abstraction (symbolic/subsymbolic) and the origin (internal-anticipative, external-reactive) of the data used for control. Metacognition is considered as a means to distribute the cognitive control within these dimensions in order to ensure situation mastery. Theoretical, methodological, and practical implications of this perspective on cognitive control dynamics are drawn. From a theoretical viewpoint, the approach stresses the need to consider the cognitive system degrees of freedom to adapt to situations, and that therefore several solutions are possible in order to perform the same task. On the methodological side, the access to the diverse cognitive control modes, to their parallelism, and to the cognitive control dynamics requires new methodological approaches. The practical implications consist in developing support systems that keep the degrees of freedom open for adaptation and in trying to manage consistency.

Incentive‐related modulation of cognitive control in healthy, anxious, and depressed adolescents: development and psychopathology related differences

Developmental changes in cognitive and affective processes contribute to adolescent risk-taking behavior, emotional intensification, and psychopathology. The current study examined adolescent development of cognitive control processes and their modulation by incentive, in health and psychopathology. Predictions include 1) better cognitive control in adults than adolescents, and in healthy adolescents than anxious and depressed adolescents, and 2) a stronger influence of incentives in adolescents than adults, and in healthy adolescents than their depressed and anxious counterparts. Antisaccadic eye movement parameters, which provide a measure of cognitive control, were collected during a reward antisaccade task that included parameterized incentive levels. Participants were 20 healthy adults, 30 healthy adolescents, 16 adolescents with an anxiety disorder, and 11 adolescents with major depression. Performance accuracy and saccade latency were analyzed to test both developmental and psychopathology hypotheses. Development and psychopathology group differences in cognitive control were found. Specifically, adults performed better than healthy adolescents, and healthy adolescents than anxious and depressed adolescents. Incentive improved accuracy for all groups; however, incremental increases were not sufficiently large to further modulate performance. Incentives also affected saccade latencies, pushing healthy adolescent latencies to adult levels, while being less effective in adolescents with depression or anxiety. This latter effect was partially mediated by anxiety symptom severity. Current findings evidence the modulation of cognitive control processes by incentives. While seen in both healthy adults and healthy adolescents, this modulatory effect was stronger in youth. While anxious and depressed adolescents exhibited improved cognitive control under incentives, this effect was smaller than that in healthy adolescents. These findings suggest differential incentive and/or cognitive control processing in anxiety and depression, and across development. Differences could result from disorder specific, or combined developmental and pathological mechanisms.