(Re)composition at the Edges of Radical Relativism l__7fci 1- % Scott Gleason With example 1, Arnold Schoenberg's Funfzehn Gedichte aus "Das Buch der hangenden Gdrtenx'begins. And, in a sense, thus ends the work even before Stefan George's poetry has begun. Benjamin Boretz's analytical reconstruction of these measures implies this paradox.1 He somewhat obsessively discusses, analytically (re)constructs and (re)com poses this small portion, troubling over the possibility of a substantive reconstruction beyond these opening phrases, leaving the status of the remainder inquestion, doubt. We might even claim that inBoretz's hear ing there is a very real sense inwhich the piece ceases to exist after its sev enth measure. However, ifthework does exist along with and following the entrance of the vocalist, itdoes so in a rarefied form. Boretz's analyt ical reconstruction leaps over the remainder of the song (cycle), reaching far beyond itsboundaries, beyond anything we would normally regard as Schoenberg's work, creating broader systematic relations, implying other (Re)composition at the Edges of Radical Relativism 193 MaBig J=54 6 6 \ r.H. PP*\ f T~ EXAMPLE 1: SCHOENBERG, OP. 15, NO. 1, MEASURES 1-7 possible pieces that could have continued after Schoenberg's opening. But these are possible, not actual, pieces, pieces which one senses can not?do not?exist in or as Schoenberg's work. Meta-Variations?the setting inwhich Boretz's analytical reconstruc tion takes place?argues a radical relativism: the fundamental ontological claim ofMeta-Variations, [is] that the very being ofmusic is created by cognitive attributions made by indi vidual perceiving or conceiving imaginers, in individual acts of per ceiving or conceiving?that, in fact, the only realmusic "theory" is the creative-intellectual transaction which ontologizes music itself.2 In a strict reading it follows thatmusic not heard by someone does not exist: music's very being ispredicated upon the existence of the subject who hears (or imagines, conceives) music. In principle, this position does not exclude any attributions one could impart tomusic, forwhat Boretz calls "'musical structure' is just the coherent juxtaposition of everything relevant to the identity of a musical work."3 Lest we move too quickly, 194 PerspectivesofNew Music however, the identity of amusical work ismost definitely not constituted by everything. The "everything" that identifiesmusical structure carries the double burden of being coherently juxtaposed and relevant. Thus what one might imagine as a liberating declaration concerned with abun dance or maximization of individual acts of choice, arrives at a price: our attributions tomusic, in order (to be said) to createmusic, must in some sense cohere, must be cognitive, and in some sense relevant?the coher ent and cognitive ensuring the relevant.4Musical structure creates musi cal identity, the very being of music?when our individual acts of perceiving and conceiving are coherent and relevant,we imagine (create) some cognitive construct. Only then have we identifiedmusic. Considering the notion of structure in somewhat more detail, we real ize that "there isno question as to the 'structure of a piece; the piece is its structure, and its structure is just the interpretive-synthetic intellectual-perceptual construct in themind's ear of some beholder(s)."5 This string of identifications emphasizes the synthesizing motion of structure, creating a richness of overdetermination on behalf of music, absorbing ornament into itself,figuring as a resuscitation of subjectivity at the center of second nature's cognition. Boretz's hearing of the piano's ornately isolated beginning displays precisely this situation, and it is the removal of such overabundance, surplus, with the vocalist's entrance which motivates the underdetermination of the remainder of the song?perhaps out of existence. Listening is do-it-yourself composing. Composing is speculative listening.7 Musical composition ismusical creation,8 an identification that entails speculation: progressing beyond thatwhich is given and venturing risks thatmay ormay not become profitable. Since, forBoretz, listening (con ceiving) is the fundamental mode inwhich music exists, so too is listen ing a form of composition, for it is only during moments of musical audition thatmusic can secure an actuality?subjective in actuality, but intersubjective inprinciple.9 Given that listening creates music, identifies itselfwith conception, it follows that theory-construction also...