AP A. Cowley, The Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C. (see n. 11). BAP B. Meissner, Beitrage zum altbabylonischen Privatrecht (Leipzig, 1893). BE Babylonian Expedition of the University of Pennsylvania, series A: Cuneiform Texts. BIN Babylonian Inscriptions the Collection of J. B. Nies. CH Codex Hammurabi. CT Cuneiform Textsfrom Babylonian Tablets the British Museum. TCL Textes cuneiformes du Louvre. UCP H.L.F. Lutz, Legal and Economic Documents from Ashjaly, University of California Publications Semitic Philology, vol. X (1931-1946). VAB Vorderasiatische Bibliothek. VAS Vorderasiatische Schriftdenkmaler der Koniglichen Museen zu Berlin. YOS Yale Oriental Series. On the other, it seems, at first sight, utterly superfluous. It is unnecessary both as a receipt (since it frequently follows an express statement that the receiver has been paid) and as a quitclaim (since it frequently precedes an express statement that no claims may be made). Nor, as Muffs has shown his classic study of the phrase, can it have anything to do with volition (as might be suggested by the similar-sounding expression in the joy of his heart).2 Small wonder, then, that Muffs analyzes it as a many-faceted term of considerable subtlety,3 containing some aspects of practically all the other contractual clauses and forming a kind of bridge between them. The result is, unfortunately, altogether too complex and fails to satisfy legal logic. Muffs identifies three principal types of transaction which the phrase has its typical function: sale, settlement of litigation, and receipt of the bride-price.4 In all three, one party relinquishes rights return for a quid pro quo: The seller relinquishes his rights over his property return for payment of the price, the litigant foregoes his claims return for payment or the rendering of an oath, and the father of the bride gives his daughter away marriage return for the bride-price. To take the case of sale, the relevant clauses are, for example: