Club Goods Research Articles

Inviting all humanity to an elite club? Understanding tensions in UNESCO’s global heritage regimes through the lens of a typology of goods

ABSTRACT This paper aims to reflect on heritage diplomacy by analysing the nature of tensions in Global Heritage Regimes (GHRs) built around the World Heritage Convention and the Intangible Heritage Convention. Combining regime theory with Ostroms’ typology of goods, we claim that the process of transforming the abstract idea of ‘Heritage of Humanity’ (HoH) into an outcome in the form of a heritage list needs to mobilise heritage as diplomacy and also is the result of heritage as diplomacy. At the same time, the transformation generates tension based on the experienced delusion of (1) the expectations built upon the inclusive idea of the ‘Heritage of Humanity’ (public good) and (2) the exclusive character of heritage lists (club goods). We claim that this ‘Inclusion-Exclusion Tension’ (IET) is an inherent element of global heritage regime design and as such needs to be managed through diplomatic efforts.

Commoning and publicizing

Public goods have been neglected, if not outright rejected, by the anti-capitalist literature, which favors “commons.” This article argues that equal attention should be given to commons and to public goods—both are essential to social reproduction. Their difference is not one of nature, but of status; it results from the way they are managed and distributed. I offer some conceptual clarifications in the literature on commons, public goods, club goods and private goods, and argue for an approach that looks at the status of goods. This opens up room for examining two ways struggles for social goods are and may be waged: commoning and publicizing. While commoning practices require organization at the community level, publicizing practices make claims on the state as a provider of public goods.

The political economy of endogenous dual-sector model: public goods, labor markets and tax rates

PurposeThis paper studies the political economy of the endogenous urban–rural divide in two dimensions: labor market and provision of public goods.Design/methodology/approachThis paper gives a dual-sector model endogenously depending on the consumption of public goods (club goods), the number of rural–urban migrants and the tax rate (transfer payments).FindingsAccording to the research findings in this paper, the constraints on the participation of rural residents portray the rural residents' bargaining power, and in the game between the urban elites and the rural residents, tax rates depend on the preferences of the urban elites and the constraints urban elites and the rural residents jointly face. Therefore, the urban elites have to set tax rates deviating from the most preferred ones. The model in this paper can explain a series of empirical findings and yield new theoretical findings for empirical testing.Originality/valueSignificantly, the paper finds that the increase in agricultural productivity will lead to industrialization, accompanied by the disintegration of the dual-sector model. However, though the increase in industrial productivity can accelerate industrialization, it will further expand the urban–rural divide.

The influence of policy design on club good provisions: A study of for-profit shopping mall roof gardens in Shanghai

Greenspace provision in high-density metropolises is often constrained by land shortage; market-based tools show the potential to solve the problem. Privately-owned public greenspace is a type of club goods provided by private developers to club members with non-rival but excludable benefits. Club goods are for-profit, and their sustainability, or the long-term ability to deliver high-quality services, entails appropriate policy design. This paper explores how policy design influences club good’s sustainable provision, exemplified by the new developments of for-profit shopping-mall roof gardens in Shanghai, China. Such gardens established by developers to serve mall customers are club goods, providing ecosystem services and becoming significant compensation for urban greenspace shortage. Through field investigations and in-depth interviews, authors find that the current green-roof policy design increased roof gardens’ quantity but not quality and brought about gaps in legitimacy, profitability, and non-compliance. This research concludes that (1) general policy design can boost club good production; (2) more tailored policy design, including cross-department collaboration and tailored policymaking, are indispensable to improve clubs’ sustainability. This study suggests that policy designers take club good’s intrinsic characteristics into consideration and address the legitimacy, profitability, and compliance problems, which will enable market-based tools to be better utilized in public-goods provision.

A simulation study of how religious fundamentalism takes root

Religious fundamentalism is observed across the world. We investigate its roots using agent-based simulations of religiosity dynamics in a spatially dispersed population. Agents’ religiosity responds to neighbors via direct interactions as well as via club goods effects. A simulation run is deemed fundamentalist if the final distribution contains a cohesive subset of agents with very high religiosity. We investigate whether such distributions are more prevalent when model parameters are shifted to reflect the transition from traditional societies to the modern world. The simulations suggest that the rise of fundamentalism in the modern world is aided by weaker attachment to the peer group, greater real income, and less compatibility between religious and secular goods, and arguably also by higher relative prices for secular goods and lower tolerance. Surprisingly, the current model suggests little role for the rise of long-distance communication and transportation.

A game theory model of terrorist mobilization: the effects of repressive and accommodative counterterrorism and club goods on terrorist decision making

ABSTRACT This study proposes a new theoretical model of the decision-making process that mobilizes individuals to engage in terrorism. The model accounts for the effects of a state’s ability to retain power, a state’s various counterterrorism strategies, and the club goods provided by terrorist organizations. The comparative statics demonstrate that a state’s ability to retain power and a policy of counterterrorism that employs exclusive accommodation prevents terrorist mobilization, while the club goods provided by terrorist organizations have the reverse effect. In addition, repressive counterterrorism backfires if its direct effect is less than its provocative effect. The model contributes to the current knowledge base of theoretical understanding of terrorism by considering bipartite effect of repressive policies, and exclusiveness of accommodative counterterrorism policies.

Winners and Losers in Energy Transition: Study Case of Wood Biomass Power-Plants Implementation in France

International policies promote renewable forms of energy to mitigate climate change. In Europe, the production of electricity using wood biomass represents one of the most popular energy alternatives. In 2012, France initiated a large-scale strategy to develop wood biomass energy. The biggest wood biomass power-plant project has been developed in the French Mediterranean area and its huge size raises several issues for the short- and long-term sustainability of local forests and associated economic sectors. The French Mediterranean forests provide four types of economic goods (private, club, common, and public goods) and multiple ecosystem services, which makes them complex to manage under an energy transition policy. In this paper, we applied three qualitative methods, namely interviews, participative workshops, and observant participation, and three conceptual models, namely (i) Ostrom’s (2010) self-organization key conditions, (ii) the types of economic goods classified according to their excludability and rivalry properties, and (iii) the ecosystem service categorization system of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005). With our methods, we show that the renewable strategy chosen in France replicates the current centralized production model based on fossil and nuclear fuels. Thus, we demonstrate that European, national, and local authorities fail to consider the multiple ecosystem services that forest management strategies should include to face the energy transition, climate change, and the other ecological challenges of the 21st century.

Autonomy or Domination? Two Faces of Differentiated Integration

AbstractWhen is differentiated integration (DI) of the European Union a source of autonomy and when is it a source of domination? Much depends on what collective goods member state democracies seek through integration. Club goods often require member state democracies to form DIs of their choice. Public goods and common resource goods may, in contrast, require limits on DI if member state democracies are to meet their own obligations to their own publics to secure rights, justice, non‐domination and democracy itself. Those differences are important to understanding how European democracies should be ‘internationally ordered’ if they are to sustain internal forms of political autonomy. They also demonstrate the importance of DI to the autonomy of member state democracies in associating together beyond the state; in defining obligations within the state; and in securing the greatest autonomy of each European democracy compatible with the greatest possible autonomy of all European democracies.

Patent auctions and bidding coalitions: structuring the sale of club goods

AbstractAuctioneers of patents are observed to allow joint bidding by coalitions of buyers. These auctions are distinguished by the good for sale being nonrivalrous, but still excludable, in consumption—that is, they auctions of club goods. This affects how coalitional bidding impacts auction performance. We study the implications of coalitions of bidders on second‐price (or equivalently, ascending‐price) auctions. Although the formation of coalitions can benefit the seller, we show that stable coalition profiles tend to consist of excessively large coalitions, to the detriment of both auction revenue and social welfare. Limiting the permitted coalition size increases efficiency and confers benefits on the seller. Lastly, we compare the revenues generated by patent auctions and multilicense auctions, and we find that the latter are superior in a large class of environments.

The economics of religious communities

The religious club model is central to the economics of religion. To expand its scope for application, we develop the first model to combine (i) increasing returns to membership, (ii) discrimination, and (iii) religious competition. Any degree of non-rivalry in religious club goods introduces scale effects which require new analytical techniques. Due to increasing returns, a religious leader faces a trade-off between forming a large inclusive club and screening out less committed types to form a small strict club. Endogenous screening makes religious strictness a non-monotonic function of economic development, which is consistent with the emergence of strict sects following periods of liberalization and economic growth. Blanket discrimination against all community members makes the religious community stricter and more cohesive, explaining the survival of religious sects and minorities under persecution. Stigmatizing actively religious members promotes social integration on the whole, but can create an extreme isolationist sect. Contrary to prior work on religious markets, we uncover a mechanism by which religious competition reduces religious participation and boosts social integration. Thus, attempts to moderate religion by stigmatizing participation and restricting competition could backfire. Finally, our model provides guidance for empirical work on religious discrimination and further extensions of the religious club model.

Politician’s Strategy After The Pandemic: Strengthening of Patronage Goods in The Form of Social Assistance

This research describes and analyzes the strategies of politicians to attract voter support in electoral politics by providing patronage goods or club goods. The study of this strategy is increasingly relevant considering the Covid-19 pandemic that has emphasized to political actors the importance of social assistance (in Indonesian: bansos,etc.). In some areas, especially those with a flow-political landscape in the form of strong links between parties and social and religious organizations, it shows that local politicians are cooperating with organizations that share a platform with parties to distribute social assistance. However, this research confirms the academics' opinion, such as Edward Aspinall, who believe that giving from politicians with the motive of gaining mass support for party interests, and of course electoral politics, can be said to be an affirmation of patronage democracy. Through comparative analysis with several cases of social assistance distribution that have existed, this study strengthens the main thesis about patronage items as a binding of loyalty between the mass of voters whose numbers are very beneficial for parties and party politicians.

The Dark Side of Transnational Mobility: Croatian Travel Writers in Hitler’s New Europe

This article analyses the use of Europeanizing discourses in the travel writing of Croat visitors to the Third Reich. Situating these visits in the context of transnational exchanges in Hitler’s new Europe and the war against the Soviet Union, it considers a number of specific case studies of travel between Croatia and Nazi Germany. It argues that the European discourse of writers, journalists, and youth activists in the Ustasha-led Independent State of Croatia served a number of specific purposes. First, they created a space of normality in an extremely violent state, providing an illusion of stability. By bringing the sights, sounds, and pleasures of travel to the near abroad back to Croatia in the form of books, magazine articles, and mobile film reels, they also gave citizens a glimpse of the good life, consumption, and materiality. As such, these travelogues and accounts of journeys overseas also aimed to persuade intellectuals and members of the cultural elite who did not support the Ustasha regime of the various material and professional “club goods” that might accrue to them by becoming active supporters of the regime. Furthermore, they served to create an impression of mobility in a surveillance state in which even internal travel was extremely restricted. Finally, in depicting Nazi-led war in the East and the struggle against the “East within”—in the form of the campaign of genocide against Serbs, Jews, Roma and so-called “asocials”—to building European brotherhood, modernization, and becoming an essential member of the new Europe, they became a source of regime legitimation, thereby telling us important things about the subjectivity of both the state and ideological tourists in a time of terror, war, and occupation.

Study on the Classification of Forestry Infrastructure from the Perspective of Supply Based on the Classical Quartering Method

Abstract Complete forestry infrastructure is the material basis for the realization of forestry production, ecology, and social functions. In order to clarify the scope of duties of forest infrastructure suppliers, this paper analyzes the characteristics of forestry infrastructure from the perspective of main suppliers, and summarizes forestry infrastructure as a material engineering facility that provides public services for forestry production, forestry economics, and social and ecological functions. The classical quartering method of goods was used to classify forestry infrastructure, which is divided into four categories: private goods, crowded public goods, club goods, and pure public goods.

The Economics of Religious Communities

The religious club model is central to the economics of religion. To expand its scope for application, we develop the first model to combine (i) increasing returns to membership, (ii) discrimination, and (iii) religious competition. Any degree of non-rivalry in religious club goods introduces scale effects which require new analytical techniques. Due to increasing returns, a religious leader faces a trade-off between forming a large inclusive club and screening out less committed types to form a small strict club. Endogenous screening makes religious strictness a non-monotonic function of economic development, which is consistent with the emergence of strict sects following periods of liberalization and economic growth. Blanket discrimination against all community members makes the religious community stricter and more cohesive, explaining the survival of religious sects and minorities under persecution. Stigmatizing actively religious members promotes social integration on the whole, but can create an extreme isolationist sect. Contrary to prior work on religious markets, we uncover a mechanism by which religious competition reduces religious participation and boosts social integration. Thus, attempts to moderate religion by stigmatizing participation and restricting competition could backfire. Finally, our model provides guidance for empirical work on religious discrimination and further extensions of the religious club model.

From public goods theory to municipal capitalism: Evaluating investments in sport venues from an urban entrepreneurial perspective

ABSTRACT Using public goods theory as a guidepost, scholars have correctly observed that subsidies for sport venues are a product of the monopolistic structure of major sport leagues. Without challenging the observation that economic rent is being extracted from cities, we utilize the municipal capitalism framework to explore the ongoing appeal of teams to cities. We note that rising levels of economic segregation required local officials to aggressively pursue partnerships to offer competitive club goods that deflect regional economic activity into their taxing jurisdictions. After reviewing 116 published academic papers to establish the two frameworks (public goods and municipal capitalism), we use three previously studied case studies to assess outcomes in light of a municipal capitalism perspective. This permits us to provide insights into the use of various sources of public capital to deflect economic activity with the potential to enhance economic development and tax revenues. The work also identifies the need for additional research to compare and contrast classical public goods theory, municipal capitalism, and local government initiatives in an era of “fend for yourself federalism.”

Tax competition and club goods

We augment the traditional model of tax competition with spillovers in public good provision. In our model, identical countries compete for mobile capital. A subset of these countries can coordinate their taxes and provide a public good that generates international spillovers. This subset forms a club of high taxes. Adopting a utility function that is linear for the public good and a quadratic production function, we calculate the equilibrium tax rates and capital allocation. The partial tax equilibrium is analogous to size differences. We show that the utility of both club and non-club countries increases with the number of participating members. We also demonstrate that an increase in the degree of spillovers benefits all, including countries outside the club, even though outsiders do not directly benefit from the spillovers. We show that in a world with many tax competitors, spillovers can restore the stability of cooperation and compensate for incentives to exit the club to win the tax competition.

Patent Auctions and Bidding Coalitions: Structuring the Sale of Club Goods

Auctioneers of patents are observed to allow joint bidding by coalitions of buyers. These auctions are distinguished by the good for sale being non-rivalrous, but still excludable, in consumption{that is, they auctions of club goods. This affects how coalitional bidding impacts auction performance. We study the implications of coalitions of bidders on second-price (or equivalently, ascending-price) auctions. Although the formation of coalitions can benefit the seller, we show that stable coalition profiles tend to consist of excessively large coalitions, to the detriment of both auction revenue and social welfare. Limiting the permitted coalition size increases efficiency and confers benefits on the seller. Lastly, we compare the revenues generated by patent auctions and multi-license auctions, and we find that the latter are superior in a large class of environments. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Free riding in the monastery: Club goods, the cistercian order and agricultural investment in Ancien Regime France

How can transaction costs prevent effective monitoring of members in an organization? In this paper I test for a relationship between the cost of monitoring and free riding behavior within a religious organization by using a historical case study: the Cistercian Order in Ancien Regime France. Individuals were required to follow strict behavioral guidelines in order to maintain membership in the monastic order. Two monitoring devices emerged to identify free-riders: (1) an annual visit by the head of a ’supervising’ monastery and (2) attendance at an annual General Chapter meeting. Using digitized maps of transportation networks in eighteenth century France, I estimate travel costs as a proxy for monitoring costs. As a proxy for free-riding behavior in a monastic order, I use the value of agricultural investment since monks were discouraged from engaging in market-orientated behavior such as investment. After matching each property with its owner’s costs, I find that where monitoring costs are higher, monasteries engage in more free riding behavior. The results hold after controlling for characteristics of the monasteries, potential issues of sample selection and bias from major houses.

Factors Supporting or Hindering the Place-based Structure of Commons in Local Productive Systems

Recent results on the relationship between external economies and local public goods may be summarised as follows. Marshallian external economies are at the core of paths of development in vital local productive systems, such as Marshallian industrial districts or similar forms. They are partly external to the resources organized by single specialised firms and largely dependent on the embeddedness of the firm in the system and its various forms of division of labour. Exchanges need to integrate the contributions of the specialised producers, but all sorts of difficulties hinder them if a joint access to ‘local’ public goods does not help producers. Markets do not provide for them easily, nor top-down State planning does. Mechanisms and processes of local governance and place leadership, possibly combined with social customs and conventions, are an important support to local integration. The paper comes back to this kernel in the theories of local development, proposing an extended framework of relevant local public goods, qualified as specific public goods, club goods, and place-based common-pool resources, all sharing “commons”-like features. Factors hindering virtuous circles between external economies and specific commons are considered as well, in particular those related to different structures of interests

Value creation and appropriation in economic, social, and environmental domains: Recognizing and resolving the institutionalized asymmetries

Value creation and appropriation are much-studied processes in business and management fields. However, both academia and business practice have traditionally focused on how value is created and appropriated in the economic context and by economic actors. This overemphasis on economic logic has created institutionalized asymmetries in managing the relationship between business, society and ecological environment. In this paper, we broaden the value creation and appropriation analysis along two dimensions: (1) the type of economic goods used to create value (private and club goods, public goods and common goods) and (2) value creation and appropriation domains (economic, social, and environmental). Building on this framework, we argue that there are several institutionalized asymmetries in the relationship between the goods used to create value and the domains in which the value is eventually appropriated. We point out the system-level tendency of value over-appropriation in the economic domain over the two other domains as well as value over-appropriation in the social domain over the environmental domain. We also discuss how existing organizational practices, such as corporate social responsibility, shared value creation, and sustainable business models, have attempted to overcome them, and reflect on the main critiques to these approaches. Finally, we identify potential business-based solutions to the institutionalized asymmetries and provide implications to research and practice. • We broaden the study of value creation and appropriation along two dimensions: • The type of economic goods (private, public and common goods). • Value creation and appropriation domains (economic, social, and environmental). • We highlight institutionalized asymmetries across the different domains. • We discuss recent solutions, e.g., CSR, shared value, sustainable business models.