Closed-loop Supply Chain Members Research Articles

Recycling Mode Choice in a Textile and Apparel Closed-Loop Supply Chain considering Blockchain

The development of the textile and apparel (T&A) industry has led to an increasing focus on recycling used products. Remanufactured product quality raises consumer concerns, and blockchain can effectively solve this problem. We establish a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) in which a manufacturer, a retailer, or a third-party recycler collects used T&A products to examine the most efficient recycling mode with and without blockchain and the impact of blockchain on CLSC decisions. The results show that (1) if the manufacturer’s recycling cost coefficient is relatively low, used T&A products are collected directly by the manufacturer. Otherwise, the responsibility for recycling used T&A products falls to the retailer or the third-party recycler. It is noteworthy that the manufacturer’s choice of recycling mode remains unchanged whether a blockchain is implemented or not. (2) The implementation of blockchain by the manufacturer and the retailer can increase profits and consumers also benefit when the cost of validating blockchain units remains below a certain threshold. (3) When the recycling cost coefficient exceeds a certain threshold, the implementation of blockchain increases prices and recycling rates. These findings offer CLSC members’ management insights into how to select the optimal recycling mode and the consequences of implementing blockchain.

Optimal Government Subsidy Decision and Its Impact on Sustainable Development of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain

Government subsidies generally play an important role in the sustainable operations management of a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). This paper investigates the optimal government subsidy decision and its influence on the sustainable development of the CLSC, consisting of one manufacturer, one retailer, and one third-party collector, from the economic, environmental, and social perspectives. Based on game analysis technology, different Stackelberg game models among the government and the CLSC members are formulated to analyze the optimal decisions under different power structures. By conducting theoretic comparative and sensitivity analyses and a case study, the effects of the government subsidy and the power structure are explored from the total profit, environmental benefit, and social welfare. Results show that the subsidy is good for sustainable development of the CLSC, which improves the total profit of the CLSC members, environmental benefit, and social welfare and the improvement effect is more prominent when the CLSC members have unequal bargaining power. Moreover, according to the growth proportion of profit, the retailer and collector benefit more from the subsidy among the CLSC members when they have different bargaining power, otherwise, the CLSC members benefit equally from the subsidy, and the subsidy is more beneficial to the environment compared with the total supply chain profit and social welfare.

Authorization or Outsourcing: Considering the Contrast/Assimilation Effect and Network Externality of Remanufactured Products under Government Subsidy

This paper examines the impact of the contrast/assimilation effect and network externality of remanufactured products on remanufacturing mode selection for original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) under government subsidy. We develop a two-period Stackelberg game model in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) composed of an OEM and a third-party remanufacturer (TPR) considering two remanufacturing modes: authorization remanufacturing mode and outsourcing remanufacturing mode. The results show the following: (1) The OEM prefers to select authorization when the contrast/assimilation effect and government subsidy level are both relatively low; otherwise, the OEM prefers outsourcing. The TPR always prefers the outsourcing mode. Therefore, a win–win situation between the OEM and the TPR could be achieved through OEM outsourcing remanufacturing when the government raises subsidy levels or the contrast/assimilation effect is relatively obvious. (2) The outsourcing mode is more beneficial in promoting the sales of remanufactured products and is more environmentally friendly, while the authorization mode is better in regards to consumer surplus and social welfare. (3) OEM, TPR and CLSC could benefit from network externality increasing. The stronger contrast effect (assimilation effect) is profitable to the OEM and CLSC (TPR), but hurts the TPR (OEM and CLSC). (4) Government subsidy can significantly reduce consumer spending on remanufactured products. CLSC members encroach government subsidies which are offered to consumers through pricing adjustments. The findings provide managerial implications for OEMs’ remanufacturing mode strategy in the context of the contrast/assimilation effect and network externality of remanufactured products under government subsidy.

Automotive parts remanufacturing models: Consequences for ELV take-back under government regulations

Increasing concerns pertaining to environmental conservation and the promotion of circular economy have exerted pressure on the implementation of automotive parts remanufacturing (APR). In order to examine the influence of government regulations on the choice of end-of-life vehicle (ELV) recycling, this study develops APR models for ELV take-back within a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). These models consist of two direct APR models and one hybrid APR model, all operating under the purview of government regulation. The Stackelberg game is employed to attain an equilibrium strategy concerning the profits of CLSC members. Furthermore, this study conducts an analysis of the impact of recycling license fees and remanufacturing recycling rates on each CLSC member, based on the “Management Measures for Scrap Vehicle Recycling” issued in 2019. In every recycling model, automotive parts manufacturers consistently achieved greater profits compared to the nonrecycling model, while retailers also benefited from their involvement in recycling activities. Additionally, third-party profits experienced an exponential increase with the escalation of recovery rates. Numerical analysis results indicate that as the remanufacturing level of ELV matures, the government is inclined to relax the restrictions on the “remanufacturing recycling rate,” thus promoting the proliferation of third-party recycling centers.

Pricing and Sales Effort Decisions in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering the Network Externality of Remanufactured Product

Considering the network externality of remanufactured product, this paper develops the Stackelberg game models in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a retailer with dual sales channel under three scenarios, i.e., no sales effort (Model N), the retailer exerting sales effort (Model R) and the OEM exerting sales effort (Model M). The study investigates the pricing and sales effort decisions for CLSC members. The results show that: (1) Compared with no sales effort, the sales effort behavior can always improve the profits of the OEM and entire CLSC. The retailer’s profit can be improved in Model R, so OEM exerting sales effort could cause a loss for the retailer and the sales effort behavior can promote the sales of remanufactured products and further cannibalize the new product market. (2) Model M is more favorable to improve the profits of the OEM and entire CLSC, while the retailer prefers Model R. Model M is more beneficial for boosting the sales of remanufactured products. (3) As the network externality/consumer’s sensitivity of sales effort becomes more obvious, CLSC members exert more sales effort, and the OEM exerts more sales effort compared to the retailer. (4) Only when the retailer’s sales effort cost is much lower than the OEM sales effort cost is it that OEM could obtain more profit when the retailer exerts sales effort; then, the win-win situation between OEM and the retailer is achieved.

Achieving Triple Benefits in a Platform-Based Closed-Loop Supply Chain: The Optimal Combination between Recycling Channel and Blockchain

In order to solve the problem of false recycling, where the real recycling volume does not match the theoretical one, blockchain is widely used in practice due to its characteristics of transparency, traceability, and tamper resistance. To study its value in academics, this paper focuses on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer and an online platform. This paper discusses the implementation conditions of blockchain, the impact on enterprise decision making, and manufacturer recycling channel selection, and the triple benefits of economy, environment, and society in the CLSC with blockchain empowerment are achieved. Because of the nontransparency of the supply chain, the problem of false recycling is always present. To further solve the problem of false recycling, the recycler decides whether to implement blockchain or not. Through analysis and numerical examples, it is concluded that the greater the difference between real and theoretical recycling volumes, the greater the need for blockchain implementation. At the same time, three major effects of blockchain implementation are defined as decision incentive effect, marketing leverage effect, and incentive alignment effect, which reveal the impact of blockchain on increasing the motivation of CLSC members to make efforts, expanding the market size by improving brand goodwill, and avoiding the inconsistency between the manufacturer and the platform in the preference of the recycling channel. In addition, under blockchain empowerment, a cost range of blockchain implementation is defined, where both the manufacturer and the platform are better off, as well as the optimal recycling channel, which achieves the triple benefits of the CLSC.

Dynamic corporate social responsibility adjustment strategies of a closed-loop supply chain with fairness concerns and supply chain financing

Taking corporate social responsibility (CSR) behavior into account, this paper investigated the equilibrium strategies for a dyadic closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of one manufacturer, one fairness-concerned retailer and one capital-constrained recycler in the static and dynamic frameworks, respectively. Based on the operational practice, both supply chain financing and fairness concerns issues are incorporated into the CLSC. The static decision-making model is firstly built to study the optimal single-period strategies. Then, according to the bounded rationality rule the dynamic decision-making model for the CLSC members is established and described as a discrete dynamic system. We examine the complex dynamics it admits, such as period-doubling bifurcation, chaotic phenomena and the parameter basins by means of applying the nonlinear theory and numerical simulations, and observe the dynamical model experiences more complex behavior than the static scenario. Furthermore, the periodic, bifurcation or chaotic changes and largest lyapunov exponent (LLE) in the wholesale price, retail price, CSR level and return rate are presented, respectively. Besides, the profit (utility) of the manufacturer, the retailer and the recycler are discussed. It is found that both the fairness-concerned parameter and the interest rate in trade credit financing have impacts on the dynamic decision-makings, such as the local stable, bifurcations and the route to the chaotic state etc. In addition, it is obvious that the adjustment speeds of the members have influences on system stability and profit (utility). Finally, some suggestions to CLSC management are also provided.

Collaborative decision-making based on effort level: power battery recycling alliance

As new energy vehicles continue to advance, the sphere pertaining to power battery recycling is experiencing steady growth. This has sparked widespread discussion and attention regarding the formation of an alliance dedicated to power battery recycling. In order to establish a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), and faster the amalgamation within the realm of battery recycling, this research examines the influence of the extent of recycling efforts on power battery demand in new energy vehicles. By utilizing a Stackelberg game, the consideration is given to the inclusion of a power battery manufacturer, a new energy vehicle enterprise, and a third-party recycler. The examination revolves around the consequences of various recycling alliance modes about decision-making and profits within the CLSC. The findings indicate that it is more advantageous for the power battery manufacturer to establish a recycling alliance with a new energy enterprise and recycler rather than establishing a separate alliance with a third-party, as this approach enhances the benefits to the battery manufacturer. In other words, the presence of multiple alliance members in the recycling realm positively correlates with the overall profitability of the CLSC. The power battery manufacturer should establish appropriate recycling sensitivity coefficients to incentivize enterprises to intensify recycling efforts and augment the recycled volume of used power batteries. Furthermore, the benefits of CLSC can be amplified by government subsidies, and the distribution ratio of these subsidies can affect the choice of a recycling alliance model for CLSC members.

Decision-Making and Coordination of Remanufacturing Closed-Loop Supply Chain with PIR under the Different Government Subsidy Strategies

Government subsidies and process innovation for remanufacturing (PIR) have become effective measures to improve the recycling and remanufacturing efficiency of waste products and promote sustainable economic development. Under different government subsidy strategies, the PIR decision and coordination of the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) of authorized competition remanufacturing are studied. This paper constructs five centralized and decentralized decision models of CLSC and analyzes the influence of government subsidy strategy and PIR input entity differences on the competition and cooperation relationship between manufacturers and remanufacturers and the performance of CLSC. A fixed license fee contract is designed to realize CLSC coordination and to improve the performance and operational efficiency of the CLSC. It is found that patent licensing fees can always play a role in sharing government subsidies between the manufacturer and remanufacturer, and making changes in government subsidy strategies only affects formulation of patent licensing fees. Manufacturer PIR input mode is more conducive to improving the market demand for new products, while remanufacturer PIR input mode is more conducive to improving the PIR input level, remanufactured product market demand, CLSC members and overall performance. Moreover, government subsidies can produce better efficiency and effects under remanufacturer PIR input mode. A fixed license fee contract can coordinate a CLSC effectively. The increase in government subsidies and PIR input effect can effectively expand the negotiation space between the manufacturer and remanufacturer, which is conducive to achievement of coordination contracts. Finally, the main conclusions are verified by numerical analysis.

Research on pricing and recycling decision of closed-loop supply chain under the mergers and acquisitions between competing manufacturers

Based on the increasingly popular practice background of corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A), the feasibility of M&A strategy is studied in the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) in combination with the different financial strength of competing manufacturers. By constructing a game model in CLSC under three modes of the decentralized decision-making with well-capitalized manufacturers, the decentralized decision-making with a capital-constrained manufacturers and the M&A between competing manufacturers, the paper analyzes the influence of bank loan interest rate and M&A coefficient on the optimal decision and revenue to calculate the conditions that competing manufacturers need to meet to implement the M&A strategy. It finds that: firstly, with the increase of bank loan interest rate, the capital-constrained manufacturers will increase the wholesale price to obtain higher returns, and meanwhile reduce the recycling rate of old products to reduce the capital investment, but the well-capitalized manufacturers will also lower wholesale prices, but they will increase the recycling rate of old products to reduce production costs. Secondly, with the increase in bank interest rates, the revenue of capital-constrained manufacturers decreases, while the well-capitalized manufacturers increase. Thirdly, when competing manufacturers can increase market power or improve core production technology to reduce costs after mergers and acquisitions, they will increase the recycling of old products and reduce the wholesale price of products to gain more market share. Moreover, the better performance of the M&A strategy, the higher the benefits of closed-loop supply chain members will be. Finally, whether manufacturers are capital constrained or not, the M&A strategy are not always beneficial to the manufacturers. And whether the M&A strategy is beneficial or not is related to market demand parameters, recovery cost parameters and merger coefficient. But when these parameters meet certain conditions, the competitive manufacturer’s M&A strategy can benefit all members of the closed-loop supply chain.

Dynamic Equilibrium Strategy of Power Battery Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Stochastic Differential Game

The industrialization of new energy vehicles has accelerated, and the recycling industry driven by a large number of retired power batteries has exploded rapidly. How to control and deal with decommissioned batteries and balance economic and environmental benefits has become an urgent problem to be solved. Considering the influence of uncertain interference factors, the dynamic equilibrium strategy of power battery closed-loop supply chain members composed of leading manufacturer, recycler, and cascade utilization enterprise was studied. (1) This paper describes the stochastic evolution process of cascade utilization effort level by using Ito process and constructs a stochastic differential game model of closed-loop supply chain dynamic system combined with cost-sharing coordination mechanism. (2) Based on the stochastic differential game theory, the optimal profit function of the participants is given, and the dynamic equilibrium strategy of each participant is obtained. (3) In order to grasp the statistical characteristics of cascade utilization effort level, the random evolution characteristics of cascade utilization effort level are revealed. (4) Combined with numerical example, the influence of relevant parameters on the dynamic system of power battery closed-loop supply chain is analyzed. The results found that with the increase of the proportion of manufacturer sharing the innovation cost of cascade utilization enterprise, the cascade utilization effort level will improve, the profits of cascade utilization enterprise and recycler will increase significantly, the profits of manufacturer will decrease slightly, and the overall profits of the supply chain will increase. The cost-sharing coordination mechanism is conducive to ensuring the steady development of the industry and effectively improving the utilization efficiency of industrial resources.

Power Battery Echelon Utilization and Recycling Strategy for New Energy Vehicles Based on Blockchain Technology

With the increasing popularity of new energy vehicles (NEVs), a large number of automotive batteries are intensively reaching their end-of-life, which brings enormous challenges to environmental protection and sustainable development. This paper establishes a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model composed of a power battery manufacturer and a NEV retailer. The benchmark scenario of CLSC members without blockchain technology is analyzed, and the optimal recycling strategy of the manufacturer and retailer using traceability information based on blockchain technology is discussed. We generate our findings from three aspects, as follows: the manufacturer or retailer is more willing to take the responsibility of recycling when the proportion of retired batteries that can be used in echelons is relatively high. Meanwhile, when the recycling cost is large, both manufacturers and retailers should adopt blockchain technology to obtain greater profits. Furthermore, with the improvement of traceability information transmission efficiency, a higher profit growth rate will be achieved.

Impacts of demand disruption and government subsidy on closed-loop supply chain management: A model based approach

Since manufacturing enterprises consume a lot of resources in the production process, in order to alleviate environmental pollution and resource shortages, manufacturers are mandated by the government to conduct closed-loop management and be responsible for the entire life cycle of their products. At the same time, manufacturers have to face the impacts of various emergencies on the supply chain. Without government assistance, closed-loop supply chain management will be difficult to carry out. Therefore, based on government subsidies and demand disruption, this paper constructs six mathematical models for three government subsidy modes, namely, the government subsidizes the manufacturer, retailer and consumer respectively, to analyze a closed-loop supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The optimal decisions and profits of the closed-loop supply chain members in each model are compared by adopting a game-theoretical approach. The results show that the closed-loop supply chain members will make corresponding decision-making adjustments according to changes in demand, and there is a positive correlation between government subsidies, demand disruption and the members’ decisions and profits. Besides, different objects of government subsidies have different impacts on the operation of closed-loop supply chain. From a comprehensive perspective, when the government subsidizes the retailer, the price is lower, the recovery level and the profits are the highest, which can bring the greatest economic and environmental benefits to the entire closed-loop supply chain. • Three subsidy modes are compared in a closed-loop supply chain with and without demand disruption. • The supply chain members’ strategic adjustments under demand disruption are investigated. • The economic and environmental benefits are optimal when subsidizing the retailer. • The impacts of demand disruption and government subsidies are analyzed.

Optimal Decisions in a Multi-Party Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Green Marketing and Carbon Tax Policy

Global warming and e-waste pollution are two major environmental pollution issues that have attracted widespread attention. The government has adopted various measures to reduce carbon emissions from businesses and to make manufacturers responsible for recycling e-waste. In the face of external pressures, more and more companies are implementing sustainable closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) management to reduce environmental pollution and achieve sustainable development. Therefore, it is essential to study the operational decisions of CLSC enterprises. This paper considers a sustainable CLSC consisting of two competing manufacturers and a dominant retailer. The government imposes a carbon tax on the retailer, and two manufacturers collect used products directly from their customers. We separately examine whether implementing green marketing by the retailer and the collaboration between the two manufacturers can improve their profits. By building decentralized CLSC mathematical models and applying game theory methods, we obtain that green marketing can increase profits for all CLSC members and improve return rates. The collaboration may yield higher total profits for two manufacturers than a decentralized solution, while the retailer’s profits may be lost under certain conditions. Finally, we perform several numerical analyses to find the relationship between unit carbon emission tax and social welfare and gain some managerial insights. The study gives key factors that CLSC companies should consider when making decisions to help them achieve sustainability and provides recommendations for the government to set a reasonable unit carbon tax.

The Differential Game of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Manufacturer Competition Considering Goodwill

The dynamic optimization of the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) is a hot research topic. Members’ competitive behavior and product goodwill play an important role in the decision making of CLSC members. In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with competitive manufacturers and single retailers is studied, in which the manufacturer produces and recycles the products, and the retailer is responsible for the sales of the products. On this basis, a dynamic linear differential equation of product goodwill is constructed, the optimal dynamic path of each decision variable is found, and the influence of price competition among manufacturers on the decision making of members in a dynamic closed-loop supply chain is studied. The conclusion is verified by an example. The results show that goodwill directly affects the wholesale price, the retail price, the recovery price, and the profit of supply chain members. The wholesale price and the retail price of products are not only positively affected by their own goodwill, but also by the goodwill of competing products. The manufacturer competition intensity will affect the product price and the supply chain member profit. To a certain extent, the more intense the manufacturer’s competition is, the higher the wholesale price and the retail price, and the greater the profit of the supply chain members.

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Information Sharing Among Closed-loop Supply Chain Members in Cloud Environment

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Information Sharing Among Closed-loop Supply Chain Members in Cloud Environment

Collection decisions and coordination in a closed-loop supply chain under recovery price and service competition

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>With the increasing growth of consumers' request for recovery channels, in addition to collecting price, the collecting service has gradually become a competitive point for collectors to collect used products. Focusing on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with recovery competition (on collecting price and collecting service) and distinguishing collecting quality, we propose two models (decentralized and centralized models) to study the collection strategies and profits of the CLSC. Moreover, we analyze the impact of the collecting competition and quality on the CLSC. Finally, a revenue-cost sharing contract (RCSC) is introduced to coordinate the supply chain. And a numerical example is illustrated to verify the contract's efficiency. It is found that the collected quantities and profits of the CLSC members are positively correlated with the remanufacturable ratio. The collecting competition dampens consumers' enthusiasm for recycling, which is not conducive to collectors to carry out collecting activity, resulting in the reduction of the CLSC's profit. The collectors appropriately improving collecting prices and service levels can increase the collected quantities, but to cope with the increasing competition, increasing collecting price is the main means for collectors to attract consumers to recycle. In addition, the designed RCSC can effectively improve the CLSC's efficiency and increase the profits of each party.</p>

Joint Capacity Investment, Collecting and Pricing Decisions in a Capacity Constraint Closed-Loop Supply Chain Considering Cooperation

In this paper, a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of one manufacturer and one supplier is considered. The capacity of the manufacturer is limited, the manufacturer can increase capacity by investing in capacity, and there are different cooperation contracts among the supply chain members. This paper pushes collecting activities upstream, assumes that the collecting activity can be completed by the supplier, and accepts that there is cooperation between the members, which increases supplier involvement. Dynamic game models among CLSC members are formulated. The optimal decisions of pricing, capacity investment, and collecting channels of the CLSC members are obtained, and the impacts of some important factors, for example, the capacity investment cost coefficient and the cost-sharing factors, on optimal decisions are investigated. The results reveal that the supplier collecting mode performs better in some scenarios; therefore, the management enlightenment desired by the supplier can be obtained. Additionally, the coordination between the manufacturer and the supplier sometimes fails to increase the closed-loop supply chain’s sustainability, which is a finding quite different from some current research results.

A disease transmission inspired closed-loop supply chain dynamic model for product collection

This paper studies the reverse channel in dynamic closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system which consists of manufacturers and retailers. Based on the dynamic CLSC model, we research the decisions and profits of CLSC members in different reverse channels that consider the quantitative characteristic of products. The results show that the optimal collection decisions for the given quantitative characteristic of products are diverse in different development levels of CLSC. Furthermore, we propose a transfer payment coordination mechanism based on Nash bargaining model to address the objective inconsistency between CLSC and its members. Moreover, we carry out the case study using the statistical data of Chinese new energy vehicles (NEVs). We show the robustness of results through the sensitivity analysis and offer some suggestions for the government and NEV managers in China.

Optimal Alliance Strategy and Its Impact in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain by considering Greenness and Service Effort

This paper handles Stackelberg game models in light of different alliance strategies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a third-party recycler. In this CLSC, four scenarios are examined: the decentralized case, the manufacturer and the retailer forming an alliance, the manufacturer and the third-party recycler forming an alliance, and the centralized case. And in these Stackelberg game models, a comparison between four alliance strategies is analyzed by considering greenness and service effort. The effect of alliance strategy on the decisions of the CLSC system, consumer, environment, and society is also investigated. The main objective is to find out the optimal price, greenness level, and service effort to maximize the CLSC members’ profits and give the optimal alliance strategy by using theoretical analysis. It is found that the alliance strategy improves the operation efficiency of the CLSC, and it also benefits consumers, the environment, and society. The MR alliance strategy is more effective than the MT alliance strategy, but it cannot achieve the efficiency of a centralized scenario. Finally, numerical examples are illustrated to justify the feasibility and practicability of the proposed models in reality.