Collaborative decision-making based on effort level: power battery recycling alliance

Abstract

As new energy vehicles continue to advance, the sphere pertaining to power battery recycling is experiencing steady growth. This has sparked widespread discussion and attention regarding the formation of an alliance dedicated to power battery recycling. In order to establish a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), and faster the amalgamation within the realm of battery recycling, this research examines the influence of the extent of recycling efforts on power battery demand in new energy vehicles. By utilizing a Stackelberg game, the consideration is given to the inclusion of a power battery manufacturer, a new energy vehicle enterprise, and a third-party recycler. The examination revolves around the consequences of various recycling alliance modes about decision-making and profits within the CLSC. The findings indicate that it is more advantageous for the power battery manufacturer to establish a recycling alliance with a new energy enterprise and recycler rather than establishing a separate alliance with a third-party, as this approach enhances the benefits to the battery manufacturer. In other words, the presence of multiple alliance members in the recycling realm positively correlates with the overall profitability of the CLSC. The power battery manufacturer should establish appropriate recycling sensitivity coefficients to incentivize enterprises to intensify recycling efforts and augment the recycled volume of used power batteries. Furthermore, the benefits of CLSC can be amplified by government subsidies, and the distribution ratio of these subsidies can affect the choice of a recycling alliance model for CLSC members.