Clinton Administration's Policy Research Articles

The Clinton Administration and Africa: Perspective of the Congressional Black Caucus and TransAfrica

Surprising to some, African American leaders have expressed a relatively high level of dissatisfaction with the Clinton administration's policies toward Africa both before and after President Clinton's historic journey to the African continent in 1998.1 Well-publicized protests against the administration's Nigerian policy were supported by TransAfrica, many members of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), and other organizations with large numbers of African American supporters, such as the Washington Office on Africa (WOA). Likewise, both TransAfrica and many members of the CBC were sufficiently unhappy with Clinton's approach that they boycotted the 1994 White House Conference on Africa. More recently, the CBC refused to take an official stance on the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, and over 30 percent of its members voted against the act in the House of Representatives. Given the contrast between an African policy perceived popularly as innovative and supportive of Africa, and the fairly high level of dissension and disapproval among African American leaders toward that policy, it is particularly worth exploring African American perspectives about Clinton's African policies.

The Maple Peril: From Presidential Policy to Pharmaceutical Importation, 1992–Present

Abstract: In 2001, the safety of drugs purchased from other countries, especially Canada, became a major policy issue in the United States. A political and geographical line was drawn in the sand separating Canadian and American drugs. Canadian drugs were characterized as dangerous—“a maple peril.” This article explores the practice of cross-border drug reimportation and considers the Bush and Clinton administration's policies regarding the necessary balance between drug access, affordability, and safety. This paper suggests continuity rather than change typified these policies. It connects business, economic, and political history with public policy and it aims to furnish an interdisciplinary overview of the legislative and executive branches, as well pharmaceutical firms and consumers.

Yeltsin, Putin, and Clinton: Presidential Leadership and Russian Democratization in Comparative Perspective

Immediately after coming to power, the Clinton administration declared the consolidation of market and democratic institutions in Russia to be a vital American interest. The administration's central tactic for promoting this outcome was to help Boris Yeltsin remain in power. In a major assault on Clinton's historical legacy, much of the scholarly community maintains that U.S. policy was fundamentally flawed, both morally and strategically. In the view of these analysts, post-Soviet Russia's founding president was an autocratic leader who derailed the country's progress toward democracy. However, this body of research focuses exclusively on the Russian Federation and fails to utilize comparative referents. In contrast, we analyze the experiences of the full population of post-communist states of Eastern Europe and Eurasia from 1991 to the present. Whether examined in cross-national or longitudinal perspective, we find that Russian democracy under Yeltsin was, relatively speaking, a success. We conclude that the Clinton administration's policy of support for Yeltsin both served various American foreign policy interests and strengthened the prospects for democratic consolidation in Russia, thereby fulfilling the dictates of both real- and idealpolitik. In addition, the relative success of Russia's democratization in the 1990s, the reversal of that pattern in this decade, and the magnitude of the transformation of the polity under Putin all demonstrate the pivotal role played by presidential leadership in Russia's transition.

A Critique of the China Threat Theory: A Systematic Analysis

Proponents of the theory argue that it is inconceivable for China to have a rise; a superpower China will inevitably be a threat to the United States. This article analyzes the military and economic aspects of the theory from theoretical, methodological, and points of view. theory's flaws are in its assumptions, which this article tackles by providing counter examples as well as by highlighting external and internal problems facing China that can complicate its rise to great-power status. In addition, the theory is based on linear projection and imperfect historical analogies that are as misleading conceptually as they are strategically counterproductive to Sino-American relations. This, of course, is not to argue that China poses no threat; it is, however, to suggest that the nature of any threat is far more nuanced than the theorists claim it to be. Key words: East Asian Security, U.S.-China relations Introduction China's rise has been viewed with uncertainty and anxiousness in the West. Its rapid economic growth, military modernization, and in recent years a surge in energy demand have made many in the United States talk about a threat. Policy makers, thinkers, academics, and pundits have started exploring strategies of containing China, and rejecting the concept of peaceful rise.1 There are many reasons for such fears. Robert Kagan, for example, has used history to argue that China's rise will not be peaceful. He has asserted: The history of rising powers . . . and their attempted 'management' by established powers provides little reason for confidence or comfort. Rarely have rising powers risen without sparking a major war that reshaped the international system to reflect new realities of power.2 Others have expressed the threat from a rising China in starker terms. Bill Gertz, for example, has argued that The People's Republic of China is the most serious national security threat the United States faces at present and will remain so into the foreseeable future . . . reason Americans should take the threat from China so seriously is that it puts at risk the very national existence of the United States.3 U.S. government has been more nuanced and reserved about the perceived threat from China, but it has also sounded the alarms. 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, for example, asserted that has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages.4 Of course, different administrations have had different attitudes toward the threat. President George W. Bush's administration, however, made it clear that-unlike the Clinton administration- it saw China as a competitor. following quote from Condoleezza Rice-then a foreign policy adviser to then-Governor George W. Bush-is telling. Arguing against the Clinton administration's policy of engagement of China, Rice wrote: Even if there is an argument for economic interaction with Beijing, China is still a potential threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Its military power is currently no match for that of the United States. But that condition is not necessarily permanent. What we do know is that China is a great power with unresolved vital interests, particularly concerning Taiwan and the South China Sea. China resents the role of the United States in the Asia- Pacific region. This means that China is not a status quo power but one that would like to alter Asia's balance of power in its own favor. That alone makes it a competitor, not the strategic partner the Clinton administration once called it. Add to this China's record of cooperation with Iran and Pakistan in the proliferation of ballistic-missile technology, and the security problem is obvious. …

From the Six-Party Talks to a Northeast Asian Security Regime?: Cooperative Threat Reduction Strategies and Institutional Development

Are there relevant lessons from the Nunn Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction case that can inform counterproliferation policy versus the nuclear weapons threats presented by North Korea? During the 1990s, there were various attempts by the Clinton Administration to innovate in national security policymaking. Innovations were attempted in peace operations, the interagency process, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Were the 1990s Clinton policy leadership efforts in stopping the threats of WMD proliferation in North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq all policy failures that could have been prevented? Could more effective Clinton Administration policy leadership have made US counterproliferation efforts more successful? This paper focuses on the Clinton Administration’s Counterproliferation Policy Initiative in the development and implementation of the Nunn Lugar programs for Cooperative Threat Reduction with Russia and the Former Soviet Republics. This case study uses institutionalist theory to explore using a cooperative strategy approach for building a counterproliferation regime in Northeast Asia. The analytical framework includes an examination of the Nunn Lugar, or Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs, from policy relevance and instrumental relevance perspectives. Overall, this paper’s findings suggest the significance of institution and organization-building approaches for improving counterproliferation policymaking. The option suggested here is to nurture a small group of like-minded states and statesmen (the six parties), focused around one specific functional area (counterproliferation), to build effective rules, organizations and enforcement mechanisms for developing an effective Northeast Asian security regime.

The U.S. Policy and Strategy toward DPRK: Comparison and Evalution of the Clinton and Bush Administrations

This article focuses on studying and evaluating the Clinton and Bush administrations' policies and strategies toward North Korea.The Clinton administration's policy toward North Korea was a continuation of the abandonment of containment and confrontation strategies of the Cold War era. That policy was based on a strategic transfer of power for the purpose of preventing a war, through a combination of aid and deterrence in the Korean peninsula by its engagement policy. The Administration believed that additional food aid and easing of economic sanctions would make a contribution to North Korean survival, and hence, a reduction in its bellicose disposition. Providing that this policy continued, it would be possible not merely to lead North Korea's change, but also to help it enter into international society by breaking down its self‐imposed isolation. To the contrary, the Bush administration points out that the Clinton administration's engagement policy did not lead to North Korea's change, and even left the wrong precedent in nuclear and missile negotiations. Focusing on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction with an emphasis of transparency, monitoring, and verification, the Bush administration has claimed a broad agenda. This includes an improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea's nuclear activities, verifiable control over North Korea's missile programs and a ban on its missile exports, and a less threatening conventional military posture.With the different views of these two administrations as a background, this article explores the U.S. efforts for achieving such policy goals as freezing North Korea's nuclear weapons program and halting its missile development and sales, together with looking at North Korea's response. American efforts for supporting the necessities for life, easing of some economic sanctions toward DPRK are also described. At the same time, the U.S. policy toward DPRK is evaluated on the whole in considering U.S. policy limits for nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the lack of effort by North Korea for peacemaking and survival, and inconsistency on U.S. assistance. Lastly, this article suggests a way for an alternative solution by thinking about some dilemmas for the U.S. and the DPRK.

HUMAN TRIALS OF PESTICIDES

THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROtection Agency has announced a moratorium on considering human test results for purposes of assessing pesticide safety. Earlier this year, the Bush Administration decided to consider the results of trials in which human volunteers are fed pesticides to identify or quantify any adverse effects. This was a reversal of the Clinton Administration's policy. EPA was given the results from tests of the pesticides azinphos methyl, chlorpyrifos, and phosmet in which human volunteers were given pesticide doses hundreds of times higher than levels considered safe for the general population. If such data are available, EPA does not have to impose the 10-fold safety factor required under the Food Quality & Protection Act when extrapolating from animal data to human exposure. Now, EPA has asked the National Academy of Sciences to review the complex scientific and ethical issues surrounding the use of human studies conducted by outside parties, such as pesticide makers.The results of the ...

The Clinton administration's policy toward Angola: an assessment

This article assesses President Bill Clinton's foreign policy towards Angola within the context of United States’ post‐World War II foreign policy, Clinton's overall foreign policy, and his approach towards sub‐Saharan Africa. In September, 1992, multi‐party elections based on national reconciliation were held in Angola. After losing those elections to President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) Jonas Savimbi and his National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) returned to warfare, quickly gaining control of over 70 per cent of the country. The Bush administration responded to Savimbi's actions by proposing a new round of negotiations based on ‘power sharing’, designed to give Savimbi and UNITA another chance to gain state power. President Clinton extended diplomatic relations to the Government of Angola, but also promoted the power sharing solution. In 1984 an agreement was made between the Government and UNITA, which led to a government of national unity in 1997. Savimbi, however, continued to terrorise the Angolan society. Two central questions raised in this assessment are: 1) Why was Savimbi able to sustain his military option? and 2) Was the Clinton administration actually committed to ‘national reconciliation’ in Angola? The current analysis shows that: 1) Savimbi sustained his military option because UNITA earned over $3 billion smuggling diamonds, enabling him to purchase ample supplies of weapons; and 2) as long as Western business interests made profits there, the instability wrought by Savimbi was acceptable to the hegemonic interests of the United States.

The world and President Bush

The world was kind to America in the 1990s. It is unlikely, however, that the next decade will be so accommodating. Clinton administration policies on China and Iraq, inadequate defence spending and delays in building a national missile defence are intimately related failures that may well converge most unpleasantly for the Bush administration. Since the end of the Cold War, Americans have confused themselves by asking the wrong question: 'Where is the threat?' Yet the danger to be faced does not fit neatly under the heading of 'international terrorism', 'rogue states' or 'ethnic conflict'. The danger, rather, is that the United States, the world's dominant power, on which the maintenance of international peace and the support of liberal democratic principles depend, will neglect its responsibilities and allow the international order that it created and sustains to collapse.

Congress Considers New Allegations of Efforts by China to Influence Clinton Administration Policy

For one thing, first of all, I understand there's a new allegation about that—I have two things to say about it. First of all, all the foreign policy decisions we made were based on what we believed—I and the rest of my administration—were in the interests of the American people.

The Irony of U.S. policy towards North Korea

Many recent developments in North Korea have no doubt caused renewed consternation among critics of U.S. foreign policy. Periodic border episodes, occasional civil‐military rifts, and persistent demands for food aid as an apparent precondition for peace talks all provide opponents of the Clinton Administration's policy toward North Korea with fodder for the cries of “appeasement” or “Munich” that have peppered editorial pages since the October 1994 U.S.‐North‐Korean nuclear energy agreement. Unless North Korea immediately agrees to institute liberal economic reforms, democratic elections, unilateral disarmament and unification with South Korea, the hyperbole will likely continue. But have the harsh criticisms of the Clinton Administration's policy of North Korean “engagement” been justified? We believe the answer is no. While some of North Korea's apparent “opening” has resulted from the country's own partially self‐inflicted economic and humanitarian woes, U.S. policy also accounts for some of the notable moderation in North Korean behavior over the last several years. Despite the seminal failure of British policy in the 1930s, appeasement can sometimes produce positive results. The irony of U.S. policy towards North Korea is that appeasement is working! This shows in the substantial progress made since the Agreed Framework was signed in areas such as: North Korean diplomacy (particularly in relations with the U.S., Japan, China and Russia); North Korean economic liberalization; North‐South Korean relations; and in the Framework's implementation in the first place. Naturally, considerable debate surrounds the exact meaning of these developments and the U.S.’s role in bringing them about. Even so, these significant developments would have been far fewer without a credible and well‐timed U.S. appeasement policy.

An age of uncertainty: Building a post-cold war U.S. security strategy for east and Southeast Asia

The contours of the future U.S. security policy in the Asia-Pacific is a vexed question both in research literature and among American elites. There is no conformity either in threat perceptions or concrete methods of security policy. However, the region is recognized by all competitive groups as a critical area for U.S. national interests presently and in the foreseeable future. This article explores the major security challenges that America faces in the region; including China-Taiwan and other local conflicts, conventional arms race and nuclear proliferation, generational transition and nontraditional threats. The article reviews Clinton administration policy in the region and explains the nature of the U.S. domestic debate on the Asia-Pacific.

The Clinton administration's policy on reforming multilateral peace operations (presidential decision directive 25, May 1994)

The Clinton administration's policy on reforming multilateral peace operations (presidential decision directive 25, May 1994)

Opportunities for industrial and academic partnering with the Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division, Newport

With the continuing defense drawdown, the Clinton administration policy of defense technology conversion, and the emphasis on development of dual use technologies, the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) Division, Newport in Newport, RI is seeking partnerships with industry, academia, and other government activities. Division, Newport is the Navy’s principal laboratory for research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E), engineering, and Fleet support for submarine and surface ship sonars, submarine combat and communications systems, autonomous underwater vehicles, undersea offensive and defensive weapons systems, and countermeasures associates with undersea warfare. To support this mission, the Division maintains a staff of technical experts in many areas including acoustics, signal processing, oceanography, hydrodynamics, large scale numerical analysis, structural acoustics, advanced materials, guidance and control. The Division also operates many world class acoustic and engineering facilities including acoustic test, transient flow loop, integrated transducer design, acoustic display, and propulsion test facilities. The Divison also operates several underwater acoustic measurement and test facilities such as the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC). Mechanisms for industry, academia, and other Government activities to partner with the Division, make use of facilities/expert, or use Division patents are described.