Classical Virtue Research Articles

The Importance of Developing Excellent Humans: Education, Virtue, and ChatGPT

The release of ChatGPT has stirred considerable concern and discussion in the field of education. Educators have expressed both frustration and optimism regarding the technology. In this article I argue that when educators consider potential uses of ChatGPT in the classroom, they should use ChatGPT in ways that do not undermine the formation of intellectual virtues. I begin by briefly reviewing a classical virtue theory, particularly as expressed by Aristotle and Aquinas. Then I define and discuss two intellectual virtues, open-mindedness and intellectual humility, explaining why these virtues are important for human flourishing. In short, these virtues contribute to the contemplation of God. Next, I explore the nature and purpose of ChatGPT. Once I have outlined what ChatGPT is, I consider potential uses of ChatGPT in light of the goals of developing open-mindedness and intellectual humility. In short, I defend the view that appropriate uses of ChatGPT must not replace students exercising the mental processes necessary for developing intellectual virtues. I conclude by noting how this discussion of ChatGPT implies that content mastery alone is not a sufficient condition for determining whether adequate education has taken place.

The sacred in the civil law: the Homo Sacer and Sacratae Leges of the legal humanists

ABSTRACT This paper argues that an exchange between Paolo Prodi and Giorgio Agamben on the role of the sacred in European constitutional history can inform the study of early modern history of political thought. Prodi, in his history of the sworn oath (sacramentum), and Agamben, in his history of the curse (sacer esto) and the accursed, or outlaw (homo sacer), explored how these sacred threats and promises, though not purely legal expressions themselves, underpinned the legal order. Through a study of three sixteenth-century legal humanists’ views of the Roman laws concerning these sacred oaths and curses (the sacratae leges), this paper describes a similar interest in exploring the connection between the sacred and the legal order. It concludes that the idea of the commonwealth in the sixteenth century was a complex of legal and para-legal techniques, symbols, and structures in addition to the more frequently studied restoration of classical virtue theory. This paper also provides an edition and translation of Guillaume Budé's discussion of the Roman law of banishment [D. 48.19.2], which was the first legal commentary to assemble the materials relating to the homo sacer.

Experiencing pedagogical reflection as the virtue phronesis

ABSTRACT After decades of work, a unified conceptualization of pedagogical reflection remains elusive. Seeking clarity on the identity of pedagogical reflection, this phenomenological study begins not with an a priori definition of reflection, but with the lived experiences of five veteran teachers. Its goal was to discern from the respondents’ narratives the essence of pedagogical reflection, what makes the experience of pedagogical reflection what it is. Analysis of respondents’ narratives show that their experiences of pedagogical reflection align with qualities of the classical virtue phronesis: an essentially moral, habitual way of being, concerned with practical situations, that weaves together thinking, feeling, wanting, deciding, and acting into a unified whole. This inclusive understanding of reflection organizes and harmonizes the varied work on reflection from Dewey to the present and provides direction for teacher educators in their work to help teacher candidates become reflective practitioners.

Lukan Parables of Reckless Liberality by Amanda Brobst-Renaud

Reviewed by: Lukan Parables of Reckless Liberality by Amanda Brobst-Renaud C. Anthony Ziccardi amanda brobst-renaud, Lukan Parables of Reckless Liberality (New Testament Monographs 42; Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2021). Pp. ix + 172. £65/$85/€70. This monograph is a revision of Amanda Brobst-Renaud's doctoral dissertation of 2018. Written under the direction of Mikael Parsons, it is marked by great consonance with his work, especially his volume published in the same year and co-authored with Michael Wade Martin, Ancient Rhetoric and the New Testament: The Influence of Elementary Greek Composition (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2018). Foundational to B.-R.'s methodology, as also to Parsons's approach, are at least two principles. First, because the Gospels were written in the Greco-Roman world, their authors and auditors/readers were attentive to their rhetorical constitution, the elements of which they either imbibed unconsciously or learned intentionally through the curricula of the paideia that prepared students for eventual oratorical declamation by preliminary exercises. Second, the fables (mythoi), which consisted of "fictional stories imaging truth" and figured prominently among these progymnasmata, were sufficiently akin to Jesus's parables, so that the evangelists handled them compositionally and rhetorically in similar ways. Brobst-Renaud begins by comparing Greco-Roman fables with Luke's parabolic material, and she evinces similarities of form, content, subject, and utilization; often embedded in larger narratives, fables served rhetoric's subsidiary goal of moral formation by providing exempla or behavioral models to be avoided and/or emulated. Then, by attention to classical fables and rhetorical devices, B.-R. considers how Luke attempts to form his readers/auditors morally through his characterization of the personages in three lexically and semantically related parables unique to him in Luke 15–16. Treating 15:11–32, B.-R. marshals the parable's rhetorical traits to show that the younger son exhibits, according to cultural canons rooted in Aristotle, the vices of shamelessness and prodigality, but then also change; the elder son, who is both dutiful and reasonable, simultaneously shows miserliness and meanness; and the father displays prodigality toward both sons. Yet, in the wider context of Luke's own ethic of unjustifiable and unrequitable generosity (6:30–35; 10:25–37; 14:12–24) and the immediate context of Jesus's seeking the lost (15:1–2), the father's modeling becomes a summons to transcend the classical virtue of liberality and adopt evangelical, reckless liberality. By concluding the parable with the father's speech, Luke leaves open the invitation to the elder son and the auditors/readers to join him in the party by liberality. Next, B.-R. explains 16:1–13 against the backdrop of fables favorably presenting tricksters and other characters acting shrewdly to secure their interests. Accused justly of [End Page 355] profligacy, the steward bests his master. While still in the master's employ, the steward consumes more of the master's property by liberality to debtors with a view to securing his future. In contrast to the younger son's example of change, the consistently unrighteous steward corners his master into magnanimous debt reduction, so that the master commends his shrewd behavior, and Jesus holds up for emulation his reckless liberality with unrighteous mammon as faithfulness in little that merits much: eternal habitations. The shrewdness and liberality of the steward meet their negative counterpart in the rich man of 16:19–31, who fails to display such to Lazarus. Linking this parable to the prior two by highlighting their similarities, B.-R. also rehearses the variety of classical views on the rich and poor. Then, through attention to narrative details, such as Lazarus's place in Abraham's bosom and the rich man's permanent separation therefrom, B.-R. maintains that Luke characterizes Lazarus as righteous and the rich man as unrighteous for his failure to heed the Law and Prophets' summons to reckless liberality such as Jesus himself enacts. The rich man's irreversible fate contrasts with the elder brother's situation: the father's invitation to him to enter the party signals the open-ended nature of his destiny. In addition, Abraham's refusal to send Lazarus to the rich man's brothers...

Liberalism and republicanism, or wealth and virtue revisited

ABSTRACT The unquestionable achievement of J. G. A. Pocock's The Machiavellian Moment was to describe the retention of pre-modern values in a modern society. Pocock was notoriously accused of decentring Locke and side-lining the Liberal Tradition. A more pertinent critique had it that he failed to articulate how civic humanism in the context of increasingly commercial societies produced more than Jeremiahs or Cassandras. This article explains how Pocock responded to his various critics by inventing the term “commercial humanism” in an effort to clarify the way in which classical virtue was modified in modern commercial contexts, especially by natural jurists and republicans. Commercial humanism proved controversial but stimulated one of the most original scholars working in the history of political thought, István Hont, to undertake a prolonged engagement with Pocock's revisionist ideas, which ultimately allowed him to answer Pocock's critics better than Pocock, whose voice remained too in tune with those whose view of modern political thought he had rejected. For Hont, Pocock's labours in the history of political thought remained less relevant to present politics than they might become, once the depth of eighteenth-century analyses of the relationship between wealth and virtue was recovered.

Judgement, Common Sense and Discernment: Contributions from Humanistic Thinking to the Social Professions

This paper reviews definitions and usage of judgement and common sense as time-tested criteria in decision-making. It looks at how scholars in different disciplines and professions have approached judgement and professional wisdom, (to include tacit knowledge and common sense). It advocates teaching, reflecting and dialoguing on ethical principles and the incorporation of the classical virtues in discussions to increase social workers and other professionals’ full understanding of the complex meaning of these terms. The paper does not advocate any single approach to decision-making and acknowledges the quandaries of professionals. However, the paper builds the case that practitioners and academics can use good judgement to enhance, not abandon, their commitment to fairness and justice. Professionals, in the sense of those who belong to a discourse tradition (MacIntyre, 1984), can successfully overcome prejudicial assumptions relying on discernment developed through study, reflection and lived experiences. Finally, it is acknowledged that social work policies and practice parameters are reliant on ethical and legal frameworks. Philosophic and legal reasoning discourses are discussed as offering worthwhile perspectives. The paper strives to draw on the humanistic and multidisciplinary approaches to «knowing» to enhance the wisdom upon which the all human professions build.

The Challenge of Self-Mastery in the Future of Work

The acceleration of technological change due to Industry 4.0 causes a need for new features of old virtues. Recent discoveries in neuroscience and in cognitive behavioral therapy complement classical virtue theory, especially that of Aristotle and Aquinas, to offer new scientific appreciation for classical virtues and more effective strategies for their acquisition. Self-mastery requires the ability to maintain focus on the task at hand in accord with one’s commitments by avoiding rumination, intrusive thoughts, and distractions. Mindfulness, positive psychology, and neuroscience complement the recent philosophical study of the virtues of acknowledged dependence (MacIntyre) and offer strategies for embracing stress for personal and community growth through work within teams shaped by shared goals. The freedom to focus in accord with personal commitments can both contribute to and benefit from the shared goals of a team that is shaped by a common hope.

Winning with Integrity: The Impact of Virtues Training

Can virtuous behavior be linked to concrete organizational elements? Over two years, with the theme of “winning with integrity,” the Vice President of Ethics & Integrity at a global Fortune 500 company delivered a two-day training program on the role of classical virtues in building an ethical workplace culture. Results from paired-sample t-tests and linear regressions show that organizational training positively affects the development of a growth mindset and the perceptions of the importance of classical virtues, regardless of employee nationality. This understanding creates an opportunity for organizations to take proactive approaches to strengthen the character of their employees.

Can Aristotelian virtue theory survive Fourth Order Technology? An ethics perspective

The Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) and accompanying Fourth Order technologies (FOTs) sit at the confluence of epistemé and techné knowledge identified in classical Greek philosophy. The former is interpreted as scientific knowledge and discoveries, and the latter is its practical application in the form of “new” technologies and manufacturing processes. This helps explain both 4IR and FOT where 4IR is characterised by the science of digitisation and computerisation, and FOT by machines combining artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced machine learning (AML), both key components in FOT functionality. Through the use of codification and algorithms, scientists and engineers are trying to imitate human thought and behaviour in ways devoid of human virtue and relationality, vital ingredients in the “lived” experience. Classical Aristotelian virtue theory is agent-based, but recognises the importance of the “lived experience”, both individual (self) and in terms of their relationality in the wider community (other). Phronesis, or practical wisdom, is a critical tool in Aristotelian virtue theory as it is theorised to assist the individual in their “lived” human experiences in the acquisition of both intellectual virtues (rational) and moral virtues (emotional), leading to a state of eudaimonia, or ultimate well-being for the individual (self) and eventually wider society (other). Aristotelian virtue theory understands that human life is not always calculable, measurable, or rational, but it has a corresponding and arguably deeper and more profound meaning and influence through the relative and moral brought about through the “lived” human experience and its iteration.

Improvising the international: Theorizing the everyday of intervention from the field

In this article, I argue that the introduction of ethnography to International Relations has not taken full advantage of the potential of bringing these two fields together. Using international intervention as an example, I suggest that to bring out this potential we need to be more attentive to the classical virtues of ethnography. This means taking the subjects of our studies much more seriously, as people capable of making sense of and reacting to the structures of power they are embedded in. Here implementers tasked to put international policies into action in relation to a concrete context provide an overlooked source of knowledge. Using their experiences, reflections and ways of dealing with the concrete dilemmas that arise in their daily work enables us to analyse intervention as concrete relations of power that play out, affect and are mitigated by people in the field. Seeing knowledge as in this manner arising from the field provides a deeper knowledge that is necessary if we want to read intervention not only as an exertion of power from the international to the local, but as dynamically reshaped, resisted and made sense of in the field.

Undoing Shakespearean Temperance

Undoing Shakespearean Temperance Maurice Hunt (bio) There are about two dozen articles or book chapters on Shakespeare's plays that either entirely or in part—and in some cases only for several pages—focus on the classical virtue of temperance.1 And only ten have "temperance" or forms of this word in their title. The authors of virtually every one of these publications assume in the play(s) they analyze that temperance is a stable reality that has dramatic consequences for the characters who do or don't practice the virtue. No one has argued, as I do in the following pages, that in a number of Shakespeare plays (and a sonnet) in which temperance figures the virtue exhibits instability, evaporates, has no consequences, or is irrelevant to the action. The subtlety by which this happens, notably within the dynamics of Aristotelian methodology and its tensions, has mainly determined the selection of the works I explore. I should caution that my thesis requires my criticism of criticism itself when a commentator argues in mistaken ways for the relevance of temperance in a Shakespeare play. John Wilkinson in 1547 translated into English Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, giving the result the title The Ethiques of Aristotle. Wilkinson's effort became part of a "renewed emphasis on the 'Ethics' in the post-Reformation educational programmes of both the Jesuits and German Lutheran pedagogues such as Melancthon."2 This emphasis reached Shakespeare, possibly in the curriculum of the King Edward school Shakespeare attended, or possibly in his general reading as preparation for writing one or more of his plays. W. R. Elton has demonstrated Shakespeare's familiarity with the Nicomachean Ethics in his analysis of the playwright's Troilus and Cressida.3 Since the dynamics of Aristotelian temperance frequently bears upon Shakespeare's staging of temperate and intemperate behavior in various characters, identifying some of its deficiencies and limitations helps explain why they either cannot attain it or find it nonexistent. Plato helped Aristotle understand that temperance could be a rare virtue. In The Republic Plato asserted that the best men in his city-state will be "wise, courageous, self-disciplined, and just."4 By "self-disciplined," Plato means temperate, for he goes on to say that "self-discipline . . . is [End Page 73] a kind of order. . . . It is a mastery of pleasures and desires; [however], "moderate desires, which are guided by rational calculation, using intelligence and correct belief, are things you come across only among a few people."5 Only a few people had the mindset to achieve a difficult balance between two extreme emotional states both of which seem radically rooted in human nature. In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle describes excellence of character as an "intermediacy between two bad states, one involving excess, the other involving deficiency." Almost immediately Aristotle admits to the problem of assigning terms to the three states of a given affect, especially with regard to its deficiency. "With regard to anger . . . there are excessive, deficient, and intermediate states, but since they are practically nameless, let us—since we say the intermediate person is mild-tempered—call the intermediate state 'mildness'; and those at the extremes, let the one who goes to excess be 'irascible,' and the corresponding state 'irascibility,' with the deficient one being in a way 'spiritless,' and the deficiency 'spiritlessness.'"6 But what could it mean to be spiritless? Would it be without feeling of any kind? So difficult is finding the right word here that one translator of the Ethics resorts to the cloudy coinage "unirascibility."7 Pleasure proves even more difficult, for what would the defect of pleasure be called: pleasurelessness, or would it be something akin to the Stoic state of apatheia?8 Montaigne in fact implicitly asserts that achieving anything more than momentary moderation in pleasure proves futile. "Isn't man a miserable animal? Hardly is it in his natural condition, to taste a single pleasure pure and entire, and still he is at pains to curtail that pleasure by his reason: his is not wretched enough unless by art and study he augments his misery."9 Howard Erskine-Hill writes that "in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle described intemperance as an excess...

Diseño de puentes: el enfoque español por Javier Manterola y su similitud en Alemania

Para Javier Manterola la ingeniería es racionalidad y emoción, función y forma, ciencia y arte. Sus puentes combinan las virtudes clásicas de eficiencia y verdad estructural, en una búsqueda permanente de la innovación y el progreso. Su trabajo sigue una tradición, que antes de él fue definida por la obra ahora clásica de Carlos Fernández Casado y Eduardo Torroja. Él ha forjado y desarrollado esta tradición española durante décadas y que ha sido ahora asumida por la próxima generación. Del mismo modo, en Alemania, el clásico Fritz Leonhardt fue seguido por Jörg Schlaich, que tiene la misma edad que Javier Manterola, y que es ahora seguido por la generación actual de ingenieros. Los dos ingenieros se conocen y respetan entre sí y también existe una similitud en su enfoque del diseño de los puentes. Para ilustrar esto y rendir homenaje a Manterola, algunos proyectos o de schlaich bergermann und partners se presentan aquí.

The Virtues of Military Politics

Sociologists and political scientists have long fretted over the dangers that a politicized military poses to democracy. In recent times, however, civil–military relations experts in the United States accepted retired or indeed still serving generals and admirals in high-ranking political posts. Despite customary revulsion from scholars, the sudden waivers are an indicator that military participation in momentous national security decisions is inherently political without necessarily being partisan, including when civilian authority defers to a largely autonomous sphere for objective military expertise. Military politics is actually critical for healthy civil–military collaboration, when done prudently and moderately. Janowitz and Huntington, founders of the modern study of civil–military relations, understood the U.S. military’s inevitable invitation to political influence. Here, we elaborate on two neglected dimensions, implicit in their projects, of military politics under objective civilian control based on classical virtues of civic republicanism: Aristotle’s practical wisdom and Machiavelli’s virtú.

The Westminster Standards and the possibility of a Reformed virtue ethic

AbstractThe renaissance of virtue ethics in Christian moral discourse has led a handful of Reformed theologians to consider whether or not the Reformed tradition is compatible with classical and medieval concepts of virtue. Barthians, in particular, express doubt regarding the prospect of such a retrieval, arguing that classical notions of virtue compromise the Reformed hallmark of divine sovereignty and Luther's dictumsimul justus et peccator.This essay counters that the Reformed tradition is broad enough to find more productive ways to engage virtue ethics. In particular, the Westminster Standards provideboththe formal space for a significant theological exploration of human agencyandthe material content for the development of something like a classical virtue ethic. Barthian concerns regarding divine sovereignty and moral progress are satisfied by a demonstration that Westminster's attention to human agency is always within the context of a greater emphasis on divine agency.

El valor de la autonomía en la intervención familiar

A partir de la evolución y las características más señaladas del valor de la autonomía, se examina su viabilidad y aplicación en el campo de la intervención social familiar. Las peculiaridades que presenta la intervención familiar suponen un desafío para uno de valores más asentados en la profesión. El motivo principal residiría en que la familia constituye un grupo organizado por la mediación de las normas morales, muchas veces en conflicto con los derechos éticos del individuo, ámbito bajo el que se conforman las realidades aludidas por el llamado principio de autonomía. Teniendo en cuenta la realidad moral que constituye la unidad familiar, se exponen diversos argumentos para una revisión crítica del principio de autonomía. Aun así, se enuncia un criterio general que nos permitiría justificar la prioridad de los derechos éticos del individuo.Se finaliza el artículo con la defensa de que el principio denominado de autonomía, más que un principio se ha de considerar una regla de actuación profesional, según los casos y circunstancias, en el contexto de una ética profesional presidida por la virtud clásica de la prudencia.

Law and Virtue: An Economic Analysis

Classical virtue theory has received limited attention in economics. The paper demonstrates its fruitfulness for economic and legal analysis by linking the traditional ethical literature with modern law and economics. Virtues are interpreted as a theory of moral psychology, and applied to economic theory, with comparisons against other behavioral models in economics. It is found that the virtue factor has major significance in economic life. The paper also outlines a general framework for the analysis of law from a virtue-based perspective, showing how optimal legal design depends on the level of virtue of the citizens. Six general principles are identified: (1) virtue goes together with more freedom, while lack of virtue calls for more legal and regulatory constraints; (2) virtue goes together with more demanding law, while lack of virtue calls for less demanding law; (3) virtue goes together with more precise laws, while lack of virtue calls for less legal precision; (4) virtue goes together with broad standards, while lack of virtue calls for narrow rules; (5) virtue goes together with lighter enforcement and sanctions, while lack of virtue calls for harsher punishments; and (6) virtue goes together with more participation in law-making and law-enforcement, while lack of virtue implies less participation. It is shown that there are several ways of gathering information about the level of virtue in society, and that laws and regulations may be designed in ways that account for the moral heterogeneity of the citizens. Finally, it is found the law plays a significant role in promoting and safeguarding virtues, but legal perfectionism may be counterproductive.

Husserl y la ética de la virtud

The article aims to determine the role that has the concept of virtue in Husserl s ethics and how would its relationship with other dimensions of his ethics be. With this purpose, firstly, we sketch a presentation of the central aspects of classical virtue ethics and of the objections raised against it. Secondly, we deal with this topic in Husserl s philosophy through an analysis of texts from the 1920s, including texts published in the volumes XXXVII and XLII of the Husserliana series. Concluding, we reflect on the relationship virtue - self-determination and on the way Husserl s conception could solve some problems of the classical theory.

Book Review: Renewing Moral Theology: Christian Ethics as Action, Character and Grace

Renewing Moral Theology: Christian Ethics as Action, Character and Grace. By Daniel A. Westberg. Downers Grove, 111.: IVP Academic, 2015. 281 pp. $25.00 (paper).Daniel Westbergs most recent offering is intended for the general reader interested in the discipline of Christian moral theology. It stands apart from other works in the field, however, not least because it combines two distinctive elements: it is at once Thomistic and Anglican. This may strike some readers as an odd pairing, but in fact it reflects a prominent stream of twentieth-century Anglican theology. The author deftly situates his project within this stream while also taking it in a slightly new direction. While he relies on Thomas Aquinas's moral theology as a starting point, he gracefully draws upon Anglican divines and numerous contemporary authors to weave an updated tapestry for Christian moral reflection. One of the many merits of this book is that it rises above the level of a popular introduction without becoming overly technical. It displays deep familiarity with centurieslong debates in moral theology without assuming that the reader shares this familiarity.The text is neatly divided into two parts. Part 1 is comprised of chapters that touch on some of the more theoretical and foundational aspects of Christian ethical reasoning (action, character, sin, grace, conversion, and law). Chapters 2 through 5 draw upon Westberg's earlier, more technical work and provide a clear and accessible analysis of practical reason and how we ought to understand human actions. Part 2 is devoted to analyses of the virtues, with each of the seven classical virtues receiving its own chapter. Each of these succinct treatments contains helpful everyday examples and concludes with suggestions for further reading. Reading the text from beginning to end, it becomes clear how the author's Anglican and Thomistic commitments work together to provide cohesion to the book's sixteen chapters.While this distinct set of commitments provides coherence to the overall project, there are some areas in which it leads to an inevitable tension. One example pertains to Westbergs treatment of sin. The inclusion of an entire chapter on the subject is admirable and fills a significant lacuna in much contemporary moral theology. An immediate difficulty arises, however, when one attempts to rehabilitate the Thomistic distinction between mortal and venial sins outside of a context in which sacramental confession is regularly practiced, let alone mandated. Westberg is well aware of this reality, and he does not go so far as to suggest that the mortal/venial distinction should become a normative principle of pastoral practice, as it has been in the Roman Catholic Church. …

Corruption and Partisanship: Rousseau, Ferguson and Two Competing Models of Republican Revival

AbstractPartisanship inspires a degree of ambivalence. There is a widespread tendency—which has a long history in republican political thought—to decry division and partisanship as corrupting, undermining individual judgment, and promoting clientelism, dependencies and loyalties antithetical to the common good. Yet there is an equally widespread intuition that excessive unity is corrupting, undermining the vigour of civic life. Contemporary political theory remains divided on the normative implications of division and unity—witness the battles between agonistic and consensus-oriented schools of democratic theory. In this article I examine the thought of two eighteenth-century writers who, while often treated as contributing to a common intellectual project of reinvigorating classical civic virtue, took opposite positions on the desirability of division. Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Ferguson offered competing accounts of what corrupts civic virtue, one decrying party divisions and the other lauding them. The article examines the underlying philosophical presuppositions of Rousseau and Ferguson's competing claims and suggests, ultimately, that both positions suffer from neglecting to attend to an important distinction between salutary and harmful divisions.

Before virtue: assessing contemporary virtue ethics

Classical virtue ethics, exemplified by Aristotle (d. 322 BC), asked: what can we know of human nature and the virtues by which it is perfected in order to live well? Dominant ethical theories today generally avoid the question of human nature, taking deontological (non-metaphysical) or utilitarian (maximizing perceived social benefit) approaches. Elizabeth Anscombe's 1958 article Modern Moral Philosophy, sparked a revival of virtue ethics. She critiqued contemporary ethical theories and exhorted her readers to recover central features of an Aristotelian approach. Jonathan Sanford finds that despite the common origins of contemporary virtue ethics in Anscombe, the literature varies widely not just in its scope but in its basic commitments. What exactly is contemporary virtue ethics? In Before Virtue , Sanford develops strategies for describing contemporary virtue ethics accurately. He then assesses contemporary virtue approaches by the Anscombean dual standard which inspired them: the degree to which they avoid the pitfalls of modern moral philosophy and the extent to which they exemplify a successful recovery of an Aristotelian approach to ethics. Sanford finds the results to be mixed. But an underlying and unifying theme emerges: an adequate virtue theory must incorporate at least preliminary answers to the questions of the nature of human beings, our ends, and the principles by means of which our ends are best pursued. It is only in light of recognizing the significance of those questions to moral philosophy that one can begin to appreciate the contribution of Aristotelian ethics. Ultimately, Anscombe's judgment about the need to eschew what she designates as modern moral philosophy is vindicated through a recovery of Aristotelian ethics that goes further in addressing those more basic questions than has most contemporary virtue ethics. The concluding chapters of this book contribute to that recovery.