Classical First-order Logic Research Articles

On Conditional Axioms and Associated Inference Rules

In the present paper, we address the following general question in the framework of classical first-order logic. Assume that a certain mathematical principle can be formalized in a first-order language by a set E of conditional formulas of the form α(v)→β(v). Given a base theory T, we can use the set of conditional formulas E to extend the base theory in two natural ways. Either we add to T each formula in E as a new axiom (thus obtaining a theory denoted by T+E) or we extend T by using the formulas in E as instances of an inference rule (thus obtaining a theory denoted by T+E–Rule). The theory T+E will be stronger than T+E–Rule, but how much stronger can T+E be? More specifically, is T+E conservative over T+E–Rule for theorems of some fixed syntactical complexity Γ? Under very general assumptions on the set of conditional formulas E, we obtain two main conservation results in this regard. Firstly, if the formulas in E have low syntactical complexity with respect to some prescribed class of formulas Π and in the applications of E–Rule side formulas from the class Π and can be eliminated (in a certain precise sense), then T+E is ∀B(Π)-conservative over T+E–Rule. Secondly, if, in addition, E is a finite set with m conditional sentences, then nested applications of E–Rule of a depth at most of m suffice to obtain ∀B(Π) conservativity. These conservation results between axioms and inference rules extend well-known conservation theorems for fragments of first-order arithmetics to a general, purely logical framework.

ONE-VARIABLE FRAGMENTS OF FIRST-ORDER LOGICS

AbstractThe one-variable fragment of a first-order logic may be viewed as an “S5-like” modal logic, where the universal and existential quantifiers are replaced by box and diamond modalities, respectively. Axiomatizations of these modal logics have been obtained for special cases—notably, the modal counterparts $\mathrm {S5}$ and $\mathrm {MIPC}$ of the one-variable fragments of first-order classical logic and first-order intuitionistic logic, respectively—but a general approach, extending beyond first-order intermediate logics, has been lacking. To this end, a sufficient criterion is given in this paper for the one-variable fragment of a semantically defined first-order logic—spanning families of intermediate, substructural, many-valued, and modal logics—to admit a certain natural axiomatization. More precisely, an axiomatization is obtained for the one-variable fragment of any first-order logic based on a variety of algebraic structures with a lattice reduct that has the superamalgamation property, using a generalized version of a functional representation theorem for monadic Heyting algebras due to Bezhanishvili and Harding. An alternative proof-theoretic strategy for obtaining such axiomatization results is also developed for first-order substructural logics that have a cut-free sequent calculus and admit a certain interpolation property.

A Syntactic Proof of the Decidability of First-Order Monadic Logic

Decidability of monadic first-order classical logic was established by Löwenheim in 1915. The proof made use of a semantic argument and a purely syntactic proof has never been provided. In the present paper we introduce a syntactic proof of decidability of monadic first-order logic in innex normal form which exploits G3-style sequent calculi. In particular, we introduce a cut- and contraction-free calculus having a (complexity-optimal) terminating proof-search procedure. We also show that this logic can be faithfully embedded in the modal logic T.

Material dialogues for first-order logic in constructive type theory: extended version

Abstract Dialogues are turn-taking games which model debates about the satisfaction of logical formulas. A novel variant played over first-order structures gives rise to a notion of first-order satisfaction. We study the induced notion of validity for classical and intuitionistic first-order logic in the constructive setting of the calculus of inductive constructions. We prove that such material dialogue semantics for classical first-order logic admits constructive soundness and completeness proofs, setting it apart from standard model-theoretic semantics of first-order logic. Furthermore, we prove that completeness with regard to intuitionistic material dialogues fails in both constructive and classical settings. As an alternative, we propose material dialogues played over Kripke structures. These Kripke material dialogues exhibit constructive completeness when restricting to the negative fragment. The results concerning classical material dialogues have been mechanized using the Coq interactive theorem prover.

On Presburger arithmetic extended with non-unary counting quantifiers

We consider a first-order logic for the integers with addition. This logic extends classical first-order logic by modulo-counting, threshold-counting and exact-counting quantifiers, all applied to tuples of variables (here, residues are given as terms while moduli and thresholds are given explicitly). Our main result shows that satisfaction for this logic is decidable in two-fold exponential space. If only threshold- and exact-counting quantifiers are allowed, we prove an upper bound of alternating two-fold exponential time with linearly many alternations. This latter result almost matches Berman's exact complexity of first-order logic without counting quantifiers. To obtain these results, we first translate threshold- and exact-counting quantifiers into classical first-order logic in polynomial time (which already proves the second result). To handle the remaining modulo-counting quantifiers for tuples, we first reduce them in doubly exponential time to modulo-counting quantifiers for single elements. For these quantifiers, we provide a quantifier elimination procedure similar to Reddy and Loveland's procedure for first-order logic and analyse the growth of coefficients, constants, and moduli appearing in this process. The bounds obtained this way allow to restrict quantification in the original formula to integers of bounded size which then implies the first result mentioned above. Our logic is incomparable with the logic considered by Chistikov et al. in 2022. They allow more general counting operations in quantifiers, but only unary quantifiers. The move from unary to non-unary quantifiers is non-trivial, since, e.g., the non-unary version of the H\"artig quantifier results in an undecidable theory.

Fibered universal algebra for first-order logics

We extend Lawvere-Pitts prop-categories (aka. hyperdoctrines) to develop a general framework for providing fibered algebraic semantics for general first-order logics. This framework includes a natural notion of substitution, which allows first-order logics to be considered as structural closure operators just as propositional logics are in abstract algebraic logic. We then establish an extension of the homomorphism theorem from universal algebra for generalized prop-categories and characterize two natural closure operators on the prop-categorical semantics. The first closes a class of structures (which are interpreted as morphisms of prop-categories) under the satisfaction of their common first-order theory and the second closes a class of prop-categories under their associated first-order consequence. It turns out that these closure operators have characterizations that closely mirror Birkhoff's characterization of the closure of a class of algebras under the satisfaction of their common equational theory and Blok and Jónsson's characterization of closure under equational consequence, respectively. These algebraic characterizations of the first-order closure operators are unique to the prop-categorical semantics. They do not have analogues, for example, in the Tarskian semantics for classical first-order logic. The prop-categories we consider are much more general than traditional intuitionistic prop-categories or triposes (i.e., topos representing indexed partially ordered sets). Nonetheless, to the best of our knowledge, our results are new, even when restricted to these special classes of prop-categories.

A Review of Automated Reasoning and Its Applications in the 21st Century.

This article takes a look at the progress and advancement of automated reasoning and its applications in the 21st century. Reasoning refers to the method of reaching logical conclusions. The construction of computing systems that automate this process over some knowledge bases is the focus of automatic reasoning. Automated Reasoning is frequently regarded as a subfield of machine learning. It is also studied in theoretical computer science and philosophy. Some of the applications of automated reasoning include but not limited to Tableau-style systems, Automatic Theorem Proving, Superposition and Saturation, benchmarks and Classical First-Order Logic. The development of formal led to the development of artificial intelligence, which was essential in the development of artificial intelligence for reasoning.

Natural deduction calculi for classical and intuitionistic S5

We propose an indexed natural deduction system for the modal logic , ideally following Wansing's previous work in the context of tableaux sequents. The system, given both in the classical and intuitionistic versions (called and respectively), is designed to match as much as possible the structure and properties of the standard system of natural deduction for first-order logic, exploiting the formal analogy between modalities and quantifiers. We study a (syntactical) normalization theorem for both and and its main consequences, the sub-formula principle and the consistency theorem. In particular, we propose an intuitionistic encoding of classical (via a suitable extension of the Gödel translation for first-order classical logic). Moreover, via the BHK interpretation of intuitionistic proofs, we propose a suitable Curry–Howard isomorphism for . By translation into the natural deduction system given by Galmiche and Salhi in [(2010b). Label-free proof systems for intuitionistic modal logic is5. In E. M. Clarke & A. Voronkov (Eds.), Logic for programming, artificial intelligence, and reasoning (pp. 255–271). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.], we prove the equivalence of w.r.t. an Hilbert-style axiomatization of . However, when considering the sheer provability of labelled formulas, our system is comparable to the one presented by Simpson in [(1993). The proof theory and semantics of intuitionistic modal logic [PhD thesis], University of Edinburgh, UK.]. Nevertheless, it remains uncertain whether it is feasible to establish a translation between the corresponding derivations.

Names and Quantifiers: Bringing Them Together in Classical Logic

Putting individual constants and quantifiers into the same syntactic category within first-order language promises to have far-reaching consequences: a syntax of this kind can reveal the potential of any such language, allowing us to realize that a vast class of noun phrases, including non-denoting terms, can be accommodated in the new syntax as expressions suited to being subjects of sentences. In the light of this, a formal system that is an extension of classical first-order logic is developed here, and is equipped with an appropriate semantics. An ontological interpretation of the new logic is then also provided, with several categories of object and notions of existence being distinguished. Last but not least, a modal version of the logic, with some interesting formal features, is proposed.

Predicate counterparts of modal logics of provability: High undecidability and Kripke incompleteness

Abstract In this paper, the predicate counterparts, defined both axiomatically and semantically by means of Kripke frames, of the modal propositional logics $\textbf {GL}$, $\textbf {Grz}$, $\textbf {wGrz}$ and their extensions are considered. It is proved that the set of semantical consequences on Kripke frames of every logic between $\textbf {QwGrz}$ and $\textbf {QGL.3}$ or between $\textbf {QwGrz}$ and $\textbf {QGrz.3}$ is $\Pi ^1_1$-hard even in languages with three (sometimes, two) individual variables, two (sometimes, one) unary predicate letters, and a single proposition letter. As a corollary, it is proved that infinite families of modal predicate axiomatic systems, based on the classical first-order logic and the modal propositional logics $\textbf {GL}$, $\textbf {Grz}$, $\textbf {wGrz}$ are not Kripke complete. Both $\Pi ^1_1$-hardness and Kripke incompleteness results of the paper do not depend on whether the logics contain the Barcan formula.

Semantical Analysis of the Logic of Bunched Implications

We give a novel approach to proving soundness and completeness for a logic (henceforth: the object-logic) that bypasses truth-in-a-model to work directly with validity. Instead of working with specific worlds in specific models, we reason with eigenworlds (i.e., generic representatives of worlds) in an arbitrary model. This reasoning is captured by a sequent calculus for a meta-logic (in this case, first-order classical logic) expressive enough to capture the semantics of the object-logic. Essentially, one has a calculus of validity for the object-logic. The method proceeds through the perspective of reductive logic (as opposed to the more traditional paradigm of deductive logic), using the space of reductions as a medium for showing the behavioural equivalence of reduction in the sequent calculus for the object-logic and in the validity calculus. Rather than study the technique in general, we illustrate it for the logic of Bunched Implications (BI), thus IPL and MILL (without negation) are also treated. Intuitively, BI is the free combination of intuitionistic propositional logic and multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic, which renders its meta-theory is quite complex. The literature on BI contains many similar, but ultimately different, algebraic structures and satisfaction relations that either capture only fragments of the logic (albeit large ones) or have complex clauses for certain connectives (e.g., Beth’s clause for disjunction instead of Kripke’s). It is this complexity that motivates us to use BI as a case-study for this approach to semantics.

A finitary outer measure logic

Abstract We extend classical first-order logic with a family of weak probability quantifiers, which we call submeasure quantifiers. Formulas are finitary, but infinitary deduction rules are needed. We consider first-order structures that are equipped with a countable family of submeasures (hence the name of the new quantifiers). We prove that every consistent set of sentences in the resulting logic is satisfiable in some structure as above. Then we restrict the set of formulas by requiring that no submeasure quantifier occurs within the scope of some classical quantifier. By suitably extending the deduction rules, we prove that every consistent set of sentences from the restricted class of formulas is satisfiable in some structure whose submeasures are actually outer measures. To perform the last step, we apply nonstandard techniques à la A. Robinson.

A Model Theory for the Potential Infinite

We present the model theoretic concepts that allow mathematics to be developed with the notion of the potential infinite instead of the actual infinite. The potential infinite is understood as a dynamic notion, being an indefinitely extensible finite. The main adoption is the interpretation of the universal quantifier, which has an implicit reection principle. Each universal quantification refers to an indefinitely large, but finite set. The quantified sets may increase, so after a reference by quantification, a further reference typically uses a larger, still finite set. We present the concepts for classical first-order logic and show that these dynamic models are sound and complete with respect to the usual inference rules. Moreover, a finite set of formulas requires a finite part of the increasing model for a correct interpretation.

Coherence in inquisitive first-order logic

Inquisitive first-order logic, InqBQ, is a conservative extension of classical first-order logic with questions. Formulas of InqBQ are interpreted with respect to information states—essentially, sets of relational structures over a common domain. It is unknown whether entailment in InqBQ is compact, and whether validities are recursively enumerable.In this paper, we study the semantic property of finite coherence: a formula of InqBQ is finitely coherent if in order to determine whether it is satisfied by a state, it suffices to check substates of a fixed finite size.We show that finite coherence has interesting implications. Most strikingly, entailment towards finitely coherent conclusions is compact.We identify a broad syntactic fragment of the language, the rex fragment, where all formulas are finitely coherent. We give a natural deduction system which is complete for InqBQ entailments with rex conclusions, showing in particular that rex validities are recursively enumerable.On the way to this result, we study approximations of InqBQ obtained by restricting to information states of a fixed cardinality. We axiomatize the finite approximations and show that, in contrast to the situation in the propositional setting, InqBQ does not coincide with the limit of its finite approximations, settling a question posed by Sano [19].

Paraconsistent Logic Programming in Three and Four-Valued Logics

AbstractFrom the interaction among areas such as Computer Science, Formal Logic, and Automated Deduction arises an important new subject called Logic Programming. This has been used continuously in the theoretical study and practical applications in various fields of Artificial Intelligence. After the emergence of a wide variety of non-classical logics and the understanding of the limitations presented by first-order classical logic, it became necessary to consider logic programming based on other types of reasoning in addition to classical reasoning. A type of reasoning that has been well studied is the paraconsistent, that is, the reasoning that tolerates contradictions. However, although there are many paraconsistent logics with different types of semantics, their application to logic programming is more delicate than it first appears, requiring an in-depth study of what can or cannot be transferred directly from classical first-order logic to other types of logic.Based on studies of Tarcisio Rodrigues on the foundations of Paraconsistent Logic Programming (2010) for some Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs), this thesis intends to resume the research of Rodrigues and place it in the specific context of LFIs with three- and four-valued semantics. This kind of logics are interesting from the computational point of view, as presented by Luiz Silvestrini in his Ph.D. thesis entitled “A new approach to the concept of quase-truth” (2011), and by Marcelo Coniglio and Martín Figallo in the article “Hilbert-style presentations of two logics associated to tetravalent modal algebras” [Studia Logica (2012)]. Based on original techniques, this study aims to define well-founded systems of paraconsistent logic programming based on well-known logics, in contrast to the ad hoc approaches to this question found in the literature.Abstract prepared by Kleidson Êglicio Carvalho da Silva Oliveira.E-mail: kecso10@yahoo.com.brURL: http://repositorio.unicamp.br/jspui/handle/REPOSIP/322632

In Defence of Discrete Plural Logic (or How to Avoid Logical Overmedication When Dealing with Internally Singularized Pluralities)

Abstract In recent decades, plural logic has established itself as a well-respected member of the extensions of first-order classical logic. In the present paper, I draw attention to the fact that among the examples that are commonly given in order to motivate the need for this new logical system, there are some in which the elements of the plurality in question are internally singularized (e.g. ‘Whitehead and Russell wrote Principia Mathematica’), while in others they are not (e.g. ‘Some philosophers wrote Principia Mathematica’). Then, building on previous work, I point to a subsystem of plural logic in which inferences concerning examples of the first type can be adequately dealt with. I notice that such a subsystem (here called ‘discrete plural logic’) is in reality a mere variant of first-order logic as standardly formulated, and highlight the fact that it is axiomatizable while full plural logic is not. Finally, I urge that greater attention be paid to discrete plural logic and that discrete plurals are not used in order to motivate the introduction of full-fledged plural logic—or, at least, not without remarking that they can also be adequately dealt with in a considerably simpler system.

Combining First-Order Classical and Intuitionistic Logic

This paper studies a first-order expansion of a combination C+J of intuitionistic and classical propositional logic, which was studied by Humberstone (1979) and del Cerro and Herzig (1996), from a proof-theoretic viewpoint. While C+J has both classical and intuitionistic implications, our first-order expansion adds classical and intuitionistic universal quantifiers and one existential quantifier to C+J. This paper provides a multi-succedent sequent calculus G(FOC+J) for our combination of the first-order intuitionistic and classical logic. Our sequent calculus G(FOC+J) restricts contexts of the right rules for intuitionistic implication and intuitionistic universal quantifier to particular forms of formulas. The cut-elimination theorem is established to ensure the subformula property. As a corollary, G(FOC+J) is conservative over both first-order intuitionistic and classical logic. Strong completeness of G(FOC+J) is proved via a canonical model argument.

Completeness also Solves Carnap’s Problem

In what sense, and to what extent, do rules of inference determine the meaning of logical constants? Motivated by the principle of charity, a natural constraint on the interpretation of logical constants is to make the rules of inference come out sound. But, as Carnap observed, although this constraint does rule out some non-standard interpretations, it does not rule them all out. This is known as Carnap’s problem. I suggest that a charitable interpretation of the logical constants should, as far as possible, make the rules of inference both sound and complete, and I show how this idea can be brought to bear on a successful solution to Carnap’s problem in the case of classical propositional logic, as well as classical first-order logic. In fact, the solution generalizes to any logic whose rules of inference are sound and complete with respect to a bivalent semantics that is classical with respect to negation.

A note on cut-elimination for classical propositional logic

In Schwichtenberg (Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics, vol 90, Elsevier, pp 867–895, 1977), Schwichtenberg fine-tuned Tait’s technique (Tait in The syntax and semantics of infinitary languages, Springer, pp 204–236, 1968) so as to provide a simplified version of Gentzen’s original cut-elimination procedure for first-order classical logic (Gallier in Logic for computer science: foundations of automatic theorem proving, Courier Dover Publications, London, 2015). In this note we show that, limited to the case of classical propositional logic, the Tait–Schwichtenberg algorithm allows for a further simplification. The procedure offered here is implemented on Kleene’s sequent system G4 (Kleene in Mathematical logic, Wiley, New York, 1967; Smullyan in First-order logic, Courier corporation, London, 1995). The specific formulation of the logical rules for G4 allows us to provide bounds on the height of cut-free proofs just in terms of the logical complexity of their end-sequent.

A Survey of the Proof-Theoretic Foundations of Logic Programming

AbstractSeveral formal systems, such as resolution and minimal model semantics, provide a framework for logic programming. In this article, we will survey the use of structural proof theory as an alternative foundation. Researchers have been using this foundation for the past 35 years to elevate logic programming from its roots in first-order classical logic into higher-order versions of intuitionistic and linear logic. These more expressive logic programming languages allow for capturing stateful computations and rich forms of abstractions, including higher-order programming, modularity, and abstract data types. Term-level bindings are another kind of abstraction, and these are given an elegant and direct treatment within both proof theory and these extended logic programming languages. Logic programming has also inspired new results in proof theory, such as those involving polarity and focused proofs. These recent results provide a high-level means for presenting the differences between forward-chaining and backward-chaining style inferences. Anchoring logic programming in proof theory has also helped identify its connections and differences with functional programming, deductive databases, and model checking.