Classical Contract Theory Research Articles

Publishing Agreements Through a Sharper Lens: How Relational Contract Theory Informs Author–Publisher Negotiations

Classical contract theory—of will and morality, of promise or consent—translates awkwardly to contemporary publishing agreements where cultural products are not definitively valued, and publishing agreements’ industrial and aspirational ideals require an ongoing conversation, and relationship, between an author and publisher. Relational contract theory presents a framework in which parties to a contract can continue negotiations, particularly when industry developments create change or conflict. This paper applies relational contract theory to publishing contract negotiations to show how they operate incrementally, and illustrates via select qualitative interviews how contract terms are used in a post negotiation space to strengthen author–publisher relationships and support authors’ livelihoods.

Constitucionalismo autoritario. El incumplimiento de las obligaciones estatales y ciudadanas como hipótesis de la fractura del contrato social

Se realiza una revisión de la teoría contractualista clásica que explica el origen del Estado y su desarrollo a la luz de diferentes hechos que generan su estudio. El Estado posee, al igual que el pueblo y su consideración moderna desde la ciudadanía, obligaciones mínimas que, por una parte, garantizan la viabilidad del contrato social y, por la otra, en caso de contravención, obligan a los ciudadanos a llevar a cabo conductas dirigidas a la exigibilidad de esta estructura en condiciones de garantizar su existencia. En razón de ello se revisan nuevos postulados en la teoría constitucional, como el constitucionalismo autoritario, teniendo como marco de referencia principal la situación de no democracia que atraviesa Venezuela, sin dejar de lado otros antecedentes que se ubican en la misma línea de investigación.

Good Faith in English Contract Law: A 'Contagious Disease of Alien Origin'

This paper seeks to address the current position of good faith within English contract law. It contradicts the proposition that good faith is a “contagious disease of alien origin” by instead suggesting that the principles introduced by good faith and relational contract theory are simply a mutative development on classical contract theory. In so doing, the paper suggests that these principles simply seek to uphold the objectives of classical contract theory of facilitating economic exchange, albeit by different means. It rationalizes this development according to the theory of creative destruction, that in dynamic processes, objectives may only be achieved by the destruction of the old processes. The paper further considers the suppositions introduced by this paper in both a theoretical and practical context in relation to English contract law jurisprudence.

Self Selection and market power in risk sharing contracts

Although the theory of optimal contracts and the principal agent model are now well established in the literature, empirical support for this theory has been mixed at best. We use economic experiments to test contract theory and assess the empirical relevance of two possible confounding factors that may explain why the theory has not received stronger empirical support. First, parameters of interest may be biased if agents self-select into projects with differing risk profiles based on risk preferences. Second, differing levels of market power on either side of the market could shift contract terms in ways contrary to theoretical predictions. In general, we find support for classical contract theory augmented to accommodate market power and self-selection based on risk preferences. We also find evidence for a third confound in the form of the characteristics of agents not party to the transaction affecting the terms of the contract.

A Study on Karl N. Llewellyn's Legal Realism as a Modification to Classical Contract Theory

A Study on Karl N. Llewellyn's Legal Realism as a Modification to Classical Contract Theory

Cohabitation Contracts and the Democratization of Personal Relations

Feminist opposition to the use of cohabitationcontracts for the private regulation of personalrelations has been predicated on the classical readingof contract as commerce. On this reading,cohabitation contracts construct cohabitants'obligations as commercial and typically detrimental towomen because of their weaker bargaining power. Butthe premisses of classical contract theory are beingundermined by radical critiques which emphasize theimportance of relationality in the reading ofcontract. On such critiques, the obligationsconstructed by cohabitation contracts need no longerexclude considerations of the parties' differentfinancial status and social circumstances. Theconstruction of cohabitants' obligations canaccordingly foreground fairness and equality, both indrafting and in enforcing cohabitation contracts. Inthis way, the conceptualization of contract asrelationality encourages the use of cohabitationcontracts as progressive mechanisms for thedemocratization of personal relations.

‘Does Sex Matter to Democracy?’– A Comment

Two aspects of the relation between sexual difference and democracy are discussed: (i) the construction in classic contract theory of the ‘natural’ difference between the sexes as a relation of superiority and subordination; (ii) the peculiarities and paradoxes of women's standing as citizens as the ‘different’ sex. This is illustrated by the examples of motherhood ‐ women have been seen as having a distinctive political duty as mothers, but motherhood is also seen as the antithesis of citizenship ‐ by the difficulties surrounding women and consent, and by the questions raised by contemporary feminists about the meaning of (‘normal’) ‘sex’.

A Contractual Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics

Within the discipline of welfare economics, one tradition-the BergsonSamuelson tradition-has been dominant for over a quarter of a century. The most basic concept in this tradition is the social welfare ordering or social welfare function. This represents the judgments of some private individual, public official or ethical observer concerning what is better or worse for society. Certain restrictions are placed on the form such an ordering may take; these represent ethical judgments which, it is presumed, anyone who orders social alternatives would or should accept. These ethical judgments are the Paretian ones. Sometimes a writer argues that his own moral intuitions about the rightness or reasonableness of the Paretian value judgments are so strong that he feels everyone should accept them. (This seems to be Samuelson's (1977) own position.) Other writers argue, although usually without supporting evidence, that, as a matter of fact, almost everyone does have such moral intuitions (e.g. Graaff, 1957, p.9; Mishan, 1960, p.199). In either case the Paretian value judgments are treated as axiomatic for welfare economics. They are not to be derived from anything more fundamental. So long as there is no dispute about the status and force of Paretian principles this procedure is unexceptionable. However it is inadequate if a justification is sought for the principles in question. Usually economists have not given this question much thought. Some (e.g. Graaff, 1957, p.9) have suggested in passing that Paretian principles embody an individualist or liberal ethic, but they have not shown why this is the case. Moreover, recent work has cast doubt on the idea that Paretian social choice theory is compatible with liberalism (e.g. Sen, 1970b; Sugden, 1978). We propose to provide a justification for Paretian principles, and to do this we turn to another tradition in political philosophy and welfare economics, namely social contract theory. In its modern version this theory begins with the idea of an original position, corresponding to the state of nature in classical contract theory, in which all persons are equally free, rational and self-interested, and in which each is located behind a of about his or her place in society (cf. Rawls, 1972, pp.11-17). Ideas of social choice are accordingly understood as those principles that would be agreed by all persons behind the veil of ignorance as rules to govern the terms of their association. To us at least this theory is an appealing device for systematizing those ethical convictions that would otherwise have to be treated as underived axioms within welfare economics. We shall show that the theory provides a justification for Paretian principles. More importantly, we shall argue, it provides a justification for other principles, which some writers have wished to add to the Paretian corpus, but for which no rationale could be found within the framework of the Bergson-Samuelson approach. So, our intention in this paper is to show how social contract theory can form the basis for wel-