1. The enemy within Comparative primatology is a subversive enterprise. Not of humanist prejudices; these were subverted a long time ago. It is rather Cognitive Science that is being transformed by ape language studies. For Cognitive Science was originally conceived on the post-computational mechanist paradigm (see Shanker, 1992). But primatology is usurping the pivotal role hitherto played by AI. It offers as an alternative to the study of artificial ‘toy domains’ an actual species whose cognitive capacities seem roughly comparable to that of the preverbal infant (with debates over whether chimpanzees can think taking the place of the 1960s debates over whether machines can think). But whereas AI was almost exclusively concerned with problem-solving, comparative primatology has placed the focus on languagelearning. Far more is involved here than a simple shift in subject-matter. Comparative primatologists have so far sought to present their work within the framework of what we might call classical Cognitive Science in order to establish how chimpanzees can be said to possess more sophisticated cognitive abilities than either linguists or ethologists have hitherto been prepared to concede. On this picture, the cognitive mechanisms which guide non-human primate behaviour are seen as an even greater mystery than those of humans; for our ability to penetrate the chimpanzee’s mind is said to be severely limited by the fact that we cannot communicate with our subjects. But through the combined use of controlled experiments (both laboratory and field), and the theoretical constructs afforded by information-processing models, we can justifiably infer that non-human primates are capable of such things as analogical reasoning (however limited this might be). It little matters that comparative primatology is endeavouring to establish itself within the orbit of classical Cognitive Science, however; for often the most subversive movements are those that are unaware of the fact. On the variant reading which will be explored in this paper, primatology is actually undermining the framework it has embraced. This entails a sharp conflict between theory and practice. It means that what comparative primatologists are doing calls into question the very theories they seek to instantiate. This is a result of the fact that the field is engaged in both a conceptual and an empirical investigation. For example, in How Monkeys See the World, Cheney and Seyfarth speculate that