Classic Prisoner Research Articles

The impact of conditional coupling based on environment comparison between interdependent networks on the evolution of cooperation

The coupling between interdependent networks is a crucial factor affecting the evolution of cooperation. Actually, not all nodes in different sub-networks of the interdependent network can establish a one-to-one corresponding coupling relationship, and whether the connection between corresponding nodes can be built is often related to the local environment and global environment where the individual is located. Therefore, we explore how the conditional coupling between interdependent networks based on the comparisons of local and global environments affects the spread of cooperative behavior. We consider two types of conditional coupling modes: static coupling and dynamic coupling. The classic prisoner’s dilemma is chosen as the fundamental game model. The numerical simulation results on the interdependent network constructed by square lattices show that conditional coupling based on environmental comparison favors the propagation of cooperation, regardless of the type of conditional coupling. And the promotion level of cooperation is proportional to the coupling strength. Moreover, we further perform the simulation experiments on the interdependent networks composed of ER (Erdös–Rényi) random networks. Our explorations may be helpful for understanding the survival and maintenance of cooperation in the interconnected and interrelated systems.

The evolution of social behaviors and risk preferences in settings with uncertainty

Humans update their social behavior in response to past experiences and changing environments. Behavioral decisions are further complicated by uncertainty in the outcome of social interactions. Faced with uncertainty, some individuals exhibit risk aversion while others seek risk. Attitudes toward risk may depend on socioeconomic status; and individuals may update their risk preferences over time, which will feedback on their social behavior. Here, we study how uncertainty and risk preferences shape the evolution of social behaviors. We extend the game-theoretic framework for behavioral evolution to incorporate uncertainty about payoffs and variation in how individuals respond to this uncertainty. We find that different attitudes toward risk can substantially alter behavior and long-term outcomes, as individuals seek to optimize their rewards from social interactions. In a standard setting without risk, for example, defection always overtakes a well-mixed population engaged in the classic Prisoner's Dilemma, whereas risk aversion can reverse the direction of evolution, promoting cooperation over defection. When individuals update their risk preferences along with their strategic behaviors, a population can oscillate between periods dominated by risk-averse cooperators and periods of risk-seeking defectors. Our analysis provides a systematic account of how risk preferences modulate, and even coevolve with, behavior in an uncertain social world.

Who Should Provide the Demand-Enhancing Service? Retailer Strategies on Service Provision in Competitive Channels

As observed in real-world practices, retailers commonly provide the demand-enhancing service to increase product value, but this service can also be outsourced to the upstream manufacturer. The party offering the service faces a tradeoff between the incurred cost of service and the additional revenue generated. Through a service provision strategy matrix based on the question of who is better off by undertaking the service provision, we develop a model of two heterogeneous competitive retailers selling an identical product produced by one manufacturer, and obtain several managerial insights. For instance, we find that the service provision always generates two potential effects: a positive “demand expansion effect” and a negative “service cost effect.” The favored retailer always benefits from the demand expansion effect. However, the disfavored retailer does not always benefit from service provision even if the negative service cost effect is transferred through service outsourcing. If the interretailer competition is not very fierce and the two retailers have similar initial market sizes, service outsourcing yields a win–win situation. Interestingly, we identify that two retailers adopting the retailer-provided service is a classic Prisoner's dilemma. Furthermore, we also examine the manufacturer's response and find that the manufacturer obtains a profit when the retailers outsource services. Counter-intuitively, the manufacturer has an incentive to reject service outsourcing since the retailer-provided service can bring more profits. Surprisingly, this initiative rejection strategy always forces the retailers into different Prisoner's dilemmas and decrease the channel efficiency. Furthermore, we discuss some extensions to prove the robustness of our main qualitative insights.

Tencents Success in Video Streaming: An Economic Theory-based Analysis

With the rise of internet technology and the popularity of mobile devices, the video industry has become an increasingly important part of the global entertainment landscape. This paper discusses the pricing strategy of Tencent in the video streaming industry. The paper states that Tencent has used the Bertrand Model to set prices equal to marginal costs to attract customers and expand its market share. However, in the case of Tencent Videos subscription price hike, the Cournot Model may be more applicable as the firm assumes that customers will continue to subscribe during the pandemic period. Despite the subscription price increase, the change in the price would be larger than the change in demand, leading to higher profits. The article also discusses the increase in demand for Tencent Video memberships and the factors contributing to it. From a game theory perspective, Tencent and its members can be modeled as playing a classic prisoners dilemma game. Finally, the article discusses the opportunity cost for consumers and the concerns regarding the fairness of the increase in membership fees. This paper also utilizes the SWOT analysis.

Impact of social reward on the evolution of cooperation in voluntary prisoner’s dilemma

The existence and sustainability of cooperation is a critical issue in nature and social systems. Reward is an essential mechanism to enhance cooperation. Meanwhile, some individuals loathe competition and then choose to escape and become a loner in competition. In this scenario, we propose a four-strategy networked evolutionary game model involving rewarders, loners, cooperators, and defectors. The classical square lattice and the Erdös–Rényi random network are adopted to describe the interaction between individuals. The four-strategy model is an extension of the classic prisoner’s dilemma game model. The simulation results show that the introduction of new strategic choices can significantly improve cooperation in the population. The promotion level of cooperation is directly correlated with reward intensity and negatively correlated with reward cost. With regard to the evolution of altruistic behaviors, the fixed income from interactions with loners has an impact that is connected to the temptation to defect. Furthermore, by analyzing characteristic snapshots of four strategies, we further dissect the essence of the evolution of cooperation. As the temptation value increases, cooperators and rewarders first form compact clusters, then more and more loners join to resist the intrusion of defectors. Eventually, the three strategies coexist stably in a spatially structured population. Our research may shed some light on exploring the nature of cooperation and solving social dilemmas in the future.

Infinitely repeated quantum games and strategic efficiency

Repeated quantum game theory addresses long term relations among players who choose quantum strategies. In the conventional quantum game theory, single round quantum games or at most finitely repeated games have been widely studied, however less is known for infinitely repeated quantum games. Investigating infinitely repeated games is crucial since finitely repeated games do not much differ from single round games. In this work we establish the concept of general repeated quantum games and show the Quantum Folk Theorem, which claims that by iterating a game one can find an equilibrium strategy of the game and receive reward that is not obtained by a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding single round quantum game. A significant difference between repeated quantum prisoner's dilemma and repeated classical prisoner's dilemma is that the classical Pareto optimal solution is not always an equilibrium of the repeated quantum game when entanglement is sufficiently strong. When entanglement is sufficiently strong and reward is small, mutual cooperation cannot be an equilibrium of the repeated quantum game. In addition we present several concrete equilibrium strategies of the repeated quantum prisoner's dilemma.

The Residency Match: Escaping the Prisoner's Dilemma.

The Residency Match: Escaping the Prisoner's Dilemma.

Blockchain technology for port logistics capability: Exclusive or sharing

Although the application of blockchain technology in maritime industry can improve the customs clearance efficiency and logistics transparency in the container cargo supply chains, it generates the unit operations cost and setup cost. In this study, a spatial model is proposed to conduct an investigation into the two heterogeneous ports when blockchain technology is applied under inter-port competition. Different utility-driven operations models are built to highlight the values of blockchain technology for port logistics capability, and to reveal the equilibria under the optimal strategies and equilibrium strategies. It is noticed that the relationship between the unit net benefit and unit operations cost brought out by blockchain technology is a key factor determining whether the blockchain technology is applicable. When the unit operations cost is lower than unit net benefit, and the setup cost is high, there is a win-win situation for two ports to apply traditional technology. It is further verified to be Pareto-optimal. In addition, three lose-lose situations are also identified, which are classic Prisoner's Dilemmas. Consequently, a horizontal collaboration mechanism “blockchain technology sharing + compensation” (BTSC) is designed to not only break these three Prisoner's Dilemmas, but also achieve the Pareto-optimum. Furthermore, we discuss some extensions to prove the robustness of our main qualitative insights.

Introducing a graph topology for robust cooperation.

Identifying the conditions that support cooperation in spatial evolutionary game theory has been the focus of a large body of work. In this paper, the classical Prisoner's Dilemma is adopted as an interaction model; agents are placed on graphs and their interactions are constrained by a graph topology. A simple strategy update mechanism is used where agents copy the best performing strategy of their neighbourhood (including themselves). In this paper, we begin with a fully cooperative population and explore the robustness of the population to the introduction of defectors. We introduce a graph structure that has the property that the initial fully cooperative population is robust to any one perturbation (a change of any cooperator to a defector). We present a proof of this property and specify the necessary constraints on the graph. Furthermore, given the standard game payoffs, we calculate the smallest graph which possesses this property. We present an approach for increasing the size of the graph and we show empirically that this extended graph is robust to an increasing percentage of perturbations. We define a new class of graphs for the purpose of future work.

Prisoners, Rooms, and Light Switches

We examine a new variant of the classic prisoners and light switches puzzle: A warden leads his $n$ prisoners in and out of $r$ rooms, one at a time, in some order, with each prisoner eventually visiting every room an arbitrarily large number of times. The rooms are indistinguishable, except that each one has $s$ light switches; the prisoners win their freedom if at some point a prisoner can correctly declare that each prisoner has been in every room at least once. What is the minimum number of switches per room, $s$, such that the prisoners can manage this? We show that if the prisoners do not know the switches' starting configuration, then they have no chance of escape—but if the prisoners do know the starting configuration, then the minimum sufficient $s$ is surprisingly small. The analysis gives rise to a number of puzzling open questions, as well.

Organizational Learning Through Debriefing: The Process of Sharing and Hiding Knowledge

Our objective with this article is to reach a better understanding of debriefing as a learning tool by exploring the process of sharing and hiding knowledge and mistakes, respectively. There is disparity between the ideal of sharing every mistake truthfully on the one hand, thus allowing mutual learning, and the human tendency to hide knowledge on the other hand, thus preventing mutual learning. We have identified the following research question: How do pilots experience the process of sharing and hiding mistakes during debriefing? The context is debriefing as it unfolded during regular training in a fighter squadron in the Royal Norwegian Air Force. Nine military pilots were interviewed, and the data were analyzed through coding and categorization. From the data analysis, four categories with subsequent narratives were revealed: (1) Mastery Culture – Embracing to Share Mistakes, (2) Safety Culture – Embarrassing to Hide Mistakes, (3) Performance Culture – Embarrassing to Share Mistakes, and (4) Cloaking Culture – Negotiating Whether to Share or Hide Mistakes. We discuss our findings in the light of the classic prisoner’s dilemma, delve deeper into the organizational, relational, and personal elements of this process and ask whether the military can learn from other professions. Our research deepens the knowledge of the disparity between the ideal of sharing mistakes and the human tendency to hide knowledge. Our research has practical implications for other military units and operative units, such as the police, fire fighters, and medical personnel as well as for organizational learning in general.

Thermodynamic susceptibility as a measure of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas.

The emergence of cooperation in the thermodynamic limit of social dilemmas is an emerging field of research. While numerical approaches (using replicator dynamics) are dime a dozen, analytical approaches are rare. A particularly useful analytical approach is to utilize a mapping between the spin-1/2 Ising model in 1D and the social dilemma game and calculate the magnetization, which is the net difference between the fraction of cooperators and defectors in a social dilemma. In this paper, we look at the susceptibility, which probes the net change in the fraction of players adopting a certain strategy, for both classical and quantum social dilemmas. The reason being, in statistical mechanics problems, the thermodynamic susceptibility as compared to magnetization is a more sensitive probe for microscopic behavior, e.g., observing small changes in a population adopting a certain strategy. In this paper, we find the thermodynamic susceptibility for reward, sucker's payoff, and temptation in classical Prisoner's Dilemma to be positive, implying that the turnover from defect to cooperate is greater than vice versa, although the Nash equilibrium for the two-player game is to defect. In the classical hawk-dove game, the thermodynamic susceptibility for resource suggests that the number of players switching to hawk from dove strategy is dominant. Entanglement in Quantum Prisoner's Dilemma has a non-trivial role in determining the behavior of thermodynamic susceptibility. At maximal entanglement, we find that sucker's payoff and temptation increase the number of players switching to defect. In the zero-temperature limit, we find that there are two second-order phase transitions in the game, marked by a divergence in the susceptibility. This behavior is similar to that seen in type-II superconductors wherein also two second-order phase transitions are seen.

Decisions and disease: a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation

In numerous contexts, individuals may decide whether they take actions to mitigate the spread of disease, or not. Mitigating the spread of disease requires an individual to change their routine behaviours to benefit others, resulting in a ‘disease dilemma’ similar to the seminal prisoner’s dilemma. In the classical prisoner’s dilemma, evolutionary game dynamics predict that all individuals evolve to ‘defect.’ We have discovered that when the rate of cooperation within a population is directly linked to the rate of spread of the disease, cooperation evolves under certain conditions. For diseases which do not confer immunity to recovered individuals, if the time scale at which individuals receive accurate information regarding the disease is sufficiently rapid compared to the time scale at which the disease spreads, then cooperation emerges. Moreover, in the limit as mitigation measures become increasingly effective, the disease can be controlled; the number of infections tends to zero. It has been suggested that disease spreading models may also describe social and group dynamics, indicating that this mechanism for the evolution of cooperation may also apply in those contexts.

Repeated Quantum Games and Strategic Efficiency

Repeated quantum game theory addresses long term relations among players who choose quantum strategies. In the conventional quantum game theory, only single round quantum games or at most finitely repeated games have been studied, therefore nothing is known for infinitely repeated quantum game. Investigating infinitely repeated games is crucial since finitely repeated games do not much differ from single round games. In this work we establish the concept of general repeated quantum games and show the Quantum Folk Theorem, which claims that by iterating a game one can find an equilibrium strategy of the game and receive reward that is not obtained by a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding single round quantum game. A significant difference between repeated quantum prisoner's dilemma and repeated classical prisoner's dilemma is that the classical Pareto optimal solution is not always an equilibrium of the repeated quantum game when entanglement is sufficiently strong. In addition we present several concrete equilibrium strategies of the repeated quantum prisoner's dilemma.

Malleable Lies: Communication and Cooperation in a High Stakes TV Game Show

We investigate the credibility of nonbinding preplay statements about cooperative behavior, using data from a high-stakes TV game show in which contestants play a variant on the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma. We depart from the conventional binary approach of classifying statements as promises or not, and propose a more fine-grained two-by-two typology inspired by the idea that lying aversion leads defectors to prefer statements that are malleable to ex-post interpretation as truths. Our empirical analysis shows that statements that carry an element of conditionality or implicitness are associated with a lower likelihood of cooperation, and confirms that malleability is a good criterion for judging the credibility of cheap talk. This paper was accepted by Elke Weber, judgment and decision making.

Prisons and picnics: tough talk and accent in Australian TV drama

Reflecting on the current TV landscape dominated by global streaming, Fremantle’s Jo Porter suggests that Australian TV is currently riding a high, with ‘quality’ dramas ‘cutting through’ and ‘getting noticed’ internationally. For Porter, this level of global visibility is occurring despite the barrier of its regional or ‘accented’ voice. However, in this article, I suggest that the global cache of certain Australian dramas may in fact be the product of accented storytelling rather than something to be conquered or overcome. In shaping this argument, I consider language politics and accent shifts in Australian TV history particularly in relation to exporting, format trade and remaking, exploring links between Grundy Television and Fremantle. By comparing language and accent in the cult classic Prisoner with Fremantle’s Wentworth and Picnic at Hanging Rock, I consider how the inclusion and exclusion of vernacular voice sheds light on industrial change and TV history.

Vertical contract selection under chain-to-chain service competition in shipping supply chain

In shipping industry, horizontal competition between carriers is no longer confined to price competition, but more performed as service competition between chain-to-chain. Confronting the fierce market competition, the contractual vertical alliance has gradually become the trend of shipping integration. Our paper studies the effects and vertical selection of contract in two parallel competitive shipping supply chains. We derive the equilibrium and optimal strategies through the contract selection matrix and find the chain's revenue-sharing contract brings service quality and demand volume advantage to itself but disadvantage to its competitor. However, when two competing chains choose different contracts, there will be a win-win situation where Pareto-optimization occurs in the chain which adopts the revenue-sharing contract and whose overall profit is maximized as well. Interestingly, we identify a lose-lose situation, that is, a classic Prisoner's Dilemma occurs when both chains adopt revenue-sharing contract. In the end, we provide insights for the carrier companies, port authority and government planning to adopt integrated strategies.

Rebate Decisions and Leadership Strategy in Competing Supply Chain with Heterogeneous Consumers

Rebate is a traditional type of promotion, and it can benefit manufacturers and retailers with expanded demands. However, the impact of leadership strategy in rebate competition on supply chain members and rebate decision is still somewhat unclear. Our paper focuses on a horizontal competition with respect to both rebate and leadership between two manufacturers selling substitutable products through a common retailer to consumers who are heterogeneous in their price sensitivity. Furthermore, we investigate the impacts of leadership strategy on profits and study rebate decision under different strategies. Our research indicates that Bertrand-Nash game benefits the retailer, but hurts manufacturers, while Stackelberg game benefits manufacturers but hurts the retailer, which shows no difference from previous studies. In addition, the sequential-move Stackelberg game could eliminate the classic prisoners’ dilemma in rebate decision, which is also influenced by fixed cost control.

Evolutionary investors’ power-based game on networks

The classical prisoner dilemma game on networks ignores the heterogeneity of players that may lead to the remarkable differences of their payoffs in reality. With the consideration of the heterogeneity, we propose an investors’ power-based game, where the payoffs of defectors depend on the efficiency of market and the related-power against cooperators. Economically, the efficiency of the market of investment is introduced in the game through a parameter α that becomes a key factor in the evolutionary process. Our simulation results show that, an improvement of efficiency benefits for the cooperation fundamentally. Furthermore, comparing with the result on BA scale-free networks, the evolution of cooperation performs great stability on WS small-world networks against the change of market efficiency. As the network of investment in real world may possess both of the properties of WS small-world networks and BA scale-free networks, the findings may be helpful in understanding and controlling the behaviors on the network of investment.

Lead Us (Not) into Temptation: Testing the Motivational Mechanisms Linking Honesty–Humility to Cooperation

Over the past decades, there has been considerable interest in individual differences in cooperative behaviour and how these can be explained. Whereas the Honesty–Humility dimension from the HEXACO model of personality has been identified as a consistent predictor of cooperation, the underlying motivational mechanisms of this association have remained unclear—especially given the confound between the temptation to exploit others and the fear of being exploited as motivational drivers of defection in social dilemmas. In a reanalysis and a new experiment, we tease apart these mechanisms by manipulating the rank order of pay–offs in a symmetric two–person game paradigm, essentially implementing the classic prisoner's dilemma, stag hunt, and chicken games. Results revealed that Honesty–Humility predicted cooperation specifically in the games in which temptation was a potential motivator of defection, whereas it did not account for cooperation in those games in which only fear implied defection. Our findings thereby shed light on the underlying motivational mechanisms of the Honesty–Humility–cooperation link and, more generally, demonstrate how economic games can be used to disentangle such mechanisms. Copyright © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology